
Engineer Memoirs

**Lieutenant General
Arthur G. Trudeau**



**US Army Corps
of Engineers**
Office of the Chief
of Engineers

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E N G I N E E R M E M O I R S

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU, USA, RETIRED


This manuscript is the product of tape-recorded interviews conducted by COL Calvin J. Landau while a student at the U.S. Army War College in 1971. The interview is printed by arrangement with the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Dr. Paul K. Walker of the Historical Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers, prepared the interview for publication. General Trudeau retains all rights.

FOREWORD

Few retired officers or civilians of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ever set down a summary of their careers with the intention of sharing their acquired knowledge with others. As a result, our organization and the engineering profession have lost valuable information and an important perspective for present and future decision-making. This volume in the Engineer Memoirs Series attempts to correct the situation by preserving material of historical significance that is not available elsewhere.

Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau had a distinguished career in the U.S. Army that included nearly 20 years in the Corps of Engineers; troop command in Europe, the Far East, and Korea; and a final assignment as Chief, Research and Development, U.S. Army. His career provides an outstanding example and many valuable insights for young Engineer officers. General Trudeau's accounts of his role in Engineer amphibian operations during World War II and of national defense issues in the 1950s make particularly good reading. I recommend this interview to thoughtful officers and civilian members of the Engineer family.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ARTHUR E. WILLIAMS
Colonel, Corps of Engineers
Chief of Staff

THE INTERVIEWER

COL Calvin J. Landau (USA Retired) served on active duty in the Infantry and Field Artillery. His last assignment was as Chief of Staff, First Army, at Fort Meade, MD (1974-78). After retiring in March 1978, Landau went to work for the General Development Corporation, a developer of communities in Florida. In 1983, he became assistant vice president, Environmental Plans and Programs.

While a student at the U.S. Army War College in 1971, Colonel Landau conducted this interview under the auspices of the Military Research Collection at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The interview spanned seven sessions between January and March 1971. The interview was conducted with two goals in mind: (1) To provide valuable insights and lessons learned to officers and commanders in the immediate future; and (2) To assemble an important collection of tapes and a transcript for the benefit of historians and scholars. Trudeau's philosophy of life is examined to provide the thread which holds the story together. Personality, motivation, and attitudes which set him apart from others are investigated. Emphasis is placed on key crises and decisions and the people who influenced his life, his style, and his philosophy.


INTERVIEWEE'S INTRODUCTION

Even being known as a rather frank and direct person, my associates still seem puzzled when I state: During the decade of the 1950s three senior members of the Army General Staff got fired; I was one of them and replaced the other two!

Such a declaration deserves a brief explanation. The Korean War was winding down in November 1953 when I was suddenly brought back to the Pentagon to replace General Dick Partridge as Chief of Army Intelligence. Partridge had failed to impress Senator Joe McCarthy that he sufficiently recognized the dangers of Communism. Two years later, in August 1955, I myself made a sudden departure from Washington. I went back to the Far East after the Central Intelligence Agency, with State Department support, objected to my concern about Soviet penetration of General Gehlen's West German intelligence agency. Something over two years later, in January 1958, I was brought back to the Pentagon again to replace General Jim Gavin as Army Chief of Research and Development at the beginning of the Space Age.

In the following interview, which was refined from an Army War College transcript of some 25-30 hours of tape, recorded during the winter and spring of 1971 by Colonel Calvin J. Landau, I tell these and other stories from my Army career, a highly diversified and satisfying one to me. While edited, the interview remains in simple conversational form. As I make no claim to fame either from deeds performed, seniority attained, or courtesy from the press and media, I have repeatedly declined to prepare it for publication. However, having now achieved true senior citizen status by virtue of passing my octogenarian milestone, I have succumbed to the wishes of others and have released this little story transcribed more than a decade ago.

Arthur G. Trudeau



ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU

As a young boy in Middlebury, Vermont, Arthur Trudeau avidly read Horatio Alger stories, played soldier with a friend whose grandfather had graduated from West Point, and developed a strong desire to be the best at whatever he did. He realized his dream of attending the Military Academy when he secured an appointment by way of the competitive exam in 1920.

Trudeau's 1924 graduating class at West Point was the largest to date. Impressed by the Corps of Engineers' contributions to the development of the West and its World War I record, he believed that the Corps offered him the greatest career opportunity and a chance for a high degree of decision-making responsibility. By finishing seventeenth in his class of more than 400, he chose a commission in the Corps of Engineers along with classmates of later note--Emerson Itschner, Herbert Vogel, and Howard Ker.

General Trudeau's first 15 years of active duty included graduate school at Berkeley; a senior administrative position with the New Deal Works Progress Administration in New York City; a civil works assignment in the Seattle District, which turned out to be the only one of his career; and a stint as an instructor with the 104th Engineers in the New Jersey National Guard. As an instructor at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in 1941, he was charged with the development of doctrine for the new motorized division. Working with Walter K. Wilson, later Chief of Engineers, in early 1942 Trudeau put together the college's first amphibious assault problem. As a case study they chose the site of our 1944 English channel crossing.

When a new Engineer Amphibian Command under the Army Service Forces was ordered in 1942, Trudeau's experience at Leavenworth served him well. He became chief of staff for the command and played an instrumental part in its organization and training. In 1942 Trudeau also headed a mission to the Pacific which resulted in an urgent appeal from General MacArthur for Engineer Amphibian troops. Trudeau selected Cairns, Australia, as the site for a plant to assemble pre-fabricated landing craft that would be shipped to the theater from the U.S. Within an amazingly short period of time the plant was turning out some 300 vehicles per month! The water was MacArthur's highway up the island chain, and his Amphibian Engineers gave him the means of transport and supply.

In addition to the Amphibian Command, during World War II Trudeau served as Deputy Director and then Director of Military Training, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, and in the Philippines as commander of Base X (the port of Manila and surrounding depots and facilities). Base X was charged with reequipping Sixth and Eighth armies for the final invasion of Japan. While in Manila, General Trudeau also served as a senior member on the War Crimes Tribunal. Its most noted case was that of General Masukara Homma, overall commander in the Philippines, whose numerous charges included responsibility for the atrocities against Americans during the Bataan Death March. Homma was condemned to death, but the trial left serious questions in Trudeau's mind. To what degree should commanders be held guilty of crimes committed by subordinates operating largely on their own in the confusion of battle over vast areas or on scattered islands?

As the Army scaled down to peacetime strength in March 1946, General Trudeau returned home to serve on the War Department General Staff in positions relating to military training and as Chief of Manpower Control. Two years later the Army sent him to Germany. General Clarence R. Huebner, an old admirer, had been holding a command position open for him with the First Constabulary Brigade. Trudeau arrived on the day the Russians moved into Czechoslovakia. This assignment proved to be one of the most rewarding of his career, one which opened the door to broader opportunities. Being an engineer, he recognized the Army's difficult position in case of attack and focused on extensive demolition and barrier plans.

Another "sponsor," General Matthew Ridgway, was responsible for bringing Trudeau back to the U.S. in 1950 as Deputy Commander of the reactivated Army War College. The school started up at Fort Leavenworth but largely through Trudeau's efforts moved to Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in 1952. While assigned to the War College, Trudeau transferred from the Corps of Engineers to Armor.

Volunteering for the Korean War, General Trudeau returned to the Far East in 1952 as commander of the 1st Cavalry Division in Japan and then of the 7th Infantry Division in Korea. Within days of his arrival in Korea, the Chinese drove his troops from Old Baldy. Until the armistice was signed in July 1953, they fought back successfully at the T-Bone, Alligator Jaws, and Pork Chop Hill after a concentrated effort at reorganizing their position.

Later that year Trudeau returned to Washington in the key position of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. For the better part of the next two years he worked to gain respect for Intelligence in the Army by bringing in officers of general-officer potential, emphasized the development of language training and technical Intelligence, and was responsible for improvement in combat Intelligence training. During these years, accompanied by others from the Intelligence community, he visited all but two countries that had an American embassy. His strong views on national security policy resulted in abrupt reassignment to the Far East in September 1955.

Trudeau returned to the States for his final assignment, as Director of Army Research and Development, in February 1958. It was the beginning of the Space Age. During the next four years, General Trudeau brought concepts of value analysis and engineering and the use of computers and the armed helicopter to the Army. He also pushed for development of ground nuclear weapons and stressed programs of fire power, communication, and mobility along with basic research. In numerous speeches General Trudeau established himself as a firm anticommunist and advocated a strong national defense.

General Trudeau retired from the Army on 30 June 1962. He spent the next ten years in positions as president of Gulf Research and Development Company, a division of Gulf Oil, and as assistant to the chairman of the board of North American Rockwell. In addition he has continued to work as a consultant and sponsor of new technologies.

CAREER SUMMARY

September 1924 - August 1926
Troop Duty, Fort Belvoir, VA

September 1926 - May 1927
Student, The Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, VA

July 1927 - May 1928
Student, University of California, Berkeley

June 1928 - April 1929
Company Commander and Battalion Adjutant, 6th
Engineers, Fort Lewis, WA

May 1929 - April 1931
Post Engineer Supply Officer, Hawaiian Engineer
Department

September 1931 - July 1935
Instructor, 104th Engineers, New Jersey National
Guard

August 1935 - August 1936
Special Assistant Administrator, Works Progress
Administration, New York, NY

September 1936 - June 1940
Assistant District Engineer, Seattle District

July 1940 - June 1941
Executive Officer, 13th Engineer Battalion, Fort
Ord, CA

July 1941 - April 1942
Instructor, Command and General Staff College

May 1942 - April, 1943
Chief of Staff, Engineer Amphibian Command, and
Commanding General, 4th Engineer Special Brigade

April 1943 - November 1944
Deputy Director Military Training, Headquarters,
Army Service Forces

November 1944 - June 1945
Director Military Training, Headquarters
Army Service Forces

July 1945 - August 1945
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFWESPAC

August 1945 - March 1946
Commanding General, Base X, Manila, Philippines

March 1946 - June 1946
Deputy Director Military Training, Headquarters,
Army Service Forces

June 1946 - March 1948
Chief, Manpower Control Group, Personnel and
Administrative Division, War Department General
Staff

March 1948 - April 1950
Commanding General, 1st Constabulary Brigade,
European Command

April 1950 - March 1952
Deputy Commandant, Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks, PA

March 1952 - July 1952
Assistant Division Commander, Headquarters,
1st Cavalry Division, Far East Command

July 1952 - March 1953
Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division,
Far East Command

March 1953 - October 1953
Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Korea

November 1953 - August 1955
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the
Army

September 1955 - October 1956
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations,
Far East and UN Command

October 1956 - February 1958
Commanding General, Headquarters, I Corps, Army
Forces, Far East, and U.S. Army Pacific, Korea

April 1958 - June 1962
Chief, Research and Development, U.S. Army

30 June 1962
Retirement from the United States Army

1 July 1962 - 31 July 1968
President, Gulf Research and Development Company

1 August 1968 - 30 June 1972

Assistant to the Chairman of the Board, North American Rockwell Corporation, and Management Consultant

July 1972 -

Management Consultant

PROMOTION HISTORY

Promotion	Temporary	Permanent
Second Lieutenant		12 June 1924
First Lieutenant		1 January 1929
Captain		1 August 1935
Major	31 January 1941	14 June 1941
Lieutenant Colonel	24 December 1941	12 June 1947
Colonel	24 June 1942	10 June 1948
Brigadier General	10 August 1944	--
Brigadier General	14 June 1947	15 April 1953
Major General	18 September 1947	5 July 1954
Lieutenant General	18 October 1956	18 October 1956

PERSONAL DATA

Date and Place of Birth

5 July 1902, Middlebury, VT

Parents

Jeremiah Charles Trudeau and Mary Una Dumas Trudeau

Marriages

Helen Ruddy Trudeau, 30 August 1924 (deceased)

Rosalie Camalier Walsh Trudeau, 1956

Children

Joan Trudeau Kane (b. 1925)

Arthur Gilbert Trudeau, Jr. (b. 1930)

Grandchildren

Francis, Helen Anne, Christopher, Thomas, Joseph, Mary, Jeanne, and Arthur Kane; Bradford and Catherine Trudeau

EDUCATION

United States Military Academy, West Point, NY (BS, 1924)
Engineer Officer Course, The Engineer School, Fort Belvoir,
VA (1927)
University of California, Berkeley, CA (MSCE, 1928)
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KA,
Third Special Course (1941)
National War College, Equivalent, Washington, DC (1948)
Army War College, Regular Course (1951)
Seattle University, University of Michigan, Middlebury
College, Norwich University, and the University of
Akron (Doctor of Laws, Honoris Causa)
Pennsylvania Military College (Doctor of Science)
Manhattan College (Doctor of Engineering)

CITATIONS AND DECORATIONS

Distinguished Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters
Silver Star with Oak Leaf Cluster
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star
Air Medal
Army Commendation Ribbon with Metal Pendant
Commander of the Order of Leopold II and Cross of Officer
of the Order of Leopold II (Belgium)
Commander of the Order of Honor Star of Ethiopia with
Cordon
Grand Officer of the Order of Boyaca (Colombia)
Order of the Rising Sun, Third Class (Japan)
Distinguished Military Service Medal with Silver Star
(Korea)
Knight Commander of the Order of the Sword (Sweden)
United Nations Medal

PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES

Society of Automotive Engineers
Society of American Military Engineers
Association of the United States Army
United States Armor Association
American Ordnance Association (past president)
Industrial Research Institute (Director Emeritus)

ABSTRACT

I. (1918-1933)

Childhood in Middlebury, Vermont; Pre-Academy days working as a bellboy, shoe shine boy, grocery clerk, and bank teller; Beginning of lifelong friendship with George Russell, next-door neighbor and later Navy Vice Admiral; Led to West Point by interest in past wars, Indian campaigns, and soldiering; Entered West Point on 1 July 1920 as one of 600 in the largest class to date; Excelled in track and by first class (senior) year rated number one in general military rating with high academic marks; Cadet captain of second battalion; Reflects on moral ascendancy MacArthur held as Commandant among junior members; Reduction in size of the Army, setback in grade, and choice of branch; Reference to MacArthur, Russell, Sladen, Barber, Eisenhower, Pershing, Hart, Mitchell, and Ker; Assignment at Fort Humphreys with 13th Engineers; Participation in "Golden Gate Orchestra" as outstanding left-handed banjo player while attending Engineer School; Sensitivity to and understanding of race relations in the Army; Duty as adjutant and D Company commander of 6th Engineer Battalion at Fort Lewis, Washington; Postgraduate work resulting in MS in Civil Engineering from University of California in 1928; Two-year tour in Hawaiian Engineer Department beginning on 1 May 1929; Reflections and impressions of the Army in the late 20s and early 30s; Growing problem with Japan; Return to mainland US in April 1931; Selection of duty with 104th Engineers, New Jersey National Guard, which introduced a new politico-military element into Trudeau's life; Volunteer work for the Professional Engineers Committee on Unemployment (PECU) in addition to nominal instructor and advisor schedule; Involvement by 1933 in the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) at Camp Dix and later in Vermont.

II. (1933-1943)

Discussion of the CCC emphasizing contribution made by younger experienced officers as compared to older and wiser but out-of-touch superiors; Lack of clear-cut lines of authority and discipline related to contemporary

problems; Proper role and degree of involvement of the military in domestic activity discussed; Role, accomplishments, and involvement in Works Progress Administration (WPA); Discussion of Hugh Johnson, Harry Hopkins, Fiorello LaGuardia, Victor Ridder, Robert Moses, Anna Rosenberg, George Meany, Jim Mitchell, and Brehon Somervell; Public Works Administration (PWA) compared to WPA; Attention to detail coupled with mindful focus on "what's important" as a foundation for the attainment of greatness; Penalties and consequences of involvement of the military in political affairs; Assignment with the District Engineer at Fort Lewis, Washington; Working with the WPA and involvement in politics; Clarks Fork Basin, Hungry Horse, and Mud River dams; Renaming of Mud River Dam to Isaac Ingalls Stevens Dam explained; Return to 13th Engineers in 1940 and service with General Joe Stilwell, Commanding General of 7th Infantry Division; Problems of rapid expansion, draftees, marginal personnel; Relative merits of command versus staff, relation between commander and staff and commander and executive officer questioned; Duty and assessment of courses at Command and General Staff College; Preparation of positions and doctrine for "motorized division" and amphibious plans for cross-channel operations; Discussion of stereotyped, inflexible, nonimaginative officer; Review of conflicts between armor, infantry, and motorized and dismounted forces; Problem of officer promotion and time in grade; Advantages of combat arms versus combat support arms; Conflicts and events leading to formation of the Engineer Amphibian Command on Cape Cod; Relationship between Dan Noce and Trudeau and comment on opinions of Generals Truesdell, Somervell, and Sturdevant, and service and allied cooperation and competition; Discussion of the Engineer Amphibian Command, the formation of Engineer Amphibian Special Brigades, and the idea for names, insignia, and mission.

III. (1942-1946)

Initial problems of concept, organization, and training of the Engineer Amphibian Command; Conflict with the Navy, feuds between ASF and AGF, and decision to abandon the Amphibian Command; First Engineer Special Brigades misuse and disbandment for Operation Torch; Trip to sell Engineer Special Brigades to MacArthur followed by MacArthur's request for the brigades which saved the organization; Search for Eddie Rickenbacker and for ports, facilities, and boat assembly plants in Australia;

Transport and assembly of prefabricated boats in Cairns and relation to MacArthur's successful island-hopping campaign; Command planning for six brigades and related problems with Engineer career command and advancement program; Development of the LCM6 landing craft for 34-ton tanks; Trudeau's delayed promotion to brigadier general; Problems and variety of activities as Director of Military Training; Impact of logistics on war; Training, acceptance, and use of the Negro soldier; Trips to Europe for reorganization of the 2d Cavalry Division for invasion of Southern France--the Anvil Operation; General Johnson's selection as "Mayor of Rome"; Plans for cross-channel operations; Evaluation of Officer Candidate School and Marshall's decision to "wipe out" the Army Specialized Training Program; Desire to place Office of Military History at Carlisle; Universal military training, the Volunteer Army, and mobilization; Trips to Europe to plan for redeployment and termination of the Pacific war; Trip to Pacific and discussions with MacArthur concerning his staff and reassignment orders to the Pacific; Duty as G-3, Western Pacific, and Commander, Base X, in Manila; End of the war and VJ Day followed by problems of occupation, reconstruction, rehabilitation, and rejuvenation; Responsibility for re-establishment of beer industry; Pilferage and vandalism, corruption from within the service, and the "send the boys home" syndrome; Role as member of the War Crimes Commission and case of LTG Homma, Japanese commander in the Philippines at time of Bataan "death march"; References to Stark, Kinkaid, King, McNair, Ridgway, Keating, MacArthur, Hoskins, Casey, Somervell, Huebner, Devers, Noce, Patton, Lee, Weible, Marshall, Gillem, Clay, Mark Clark, Seaman, McNarney, Styer, Wainwright, and Donovan.

IV. (1946-1953)

Discussion of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments while Chief, Manpower Control Group, under the Assistant Chief of Staff; Review of Army reduction, the draft, and specialized training; Later placement of individual training under Deputy for Personnel as target and accomplishment of Trudeau's efforts; MacArthur's determination to hold on to "his boys" and his theatre understrength; the Haislip Board and impact of unification on the Armed Forces; Army's loss of tactical air support as a serious mistake; Flag officer rank, the discrepancy between the services, service schooling, and dilemmas caused by unification; Professionalism; Problem

of permissiveness and impact on the services; Little chance of success seen for the Volunteer Army; Changes in military justice and erosion of military discipline; Assignment as Commanding General, 1st Constabulary Brigade, in Germany; Conversion from constabulary to combat forces, defense planning and practice, coordination and collaboration with the French, and the value of our ability to speak "their" language; Relative advantages an airlift provides to the user; Discussions with German General Halter and problems resulting from his lack of an airlift in the invasion of Russia; Task Force Trudeau, the first force designed to test US resolve to maintain Berlin access; Relations with the Air Force in Wiesbaden; Relationship with General I.D. White; Officer quality, retention, promotion, duration in grade, and problems of slow and fast elevation; Change of command and associated requirements; Role in establishing revitalized Army War College; Reasons why Trudeau selected to this assignment; School at Leavenworth, animosity existing between two schools, problems associated with establishing Carlisle; Relationship with MG Joseph M. Swing; Efforts to establish "Graduate School"; Interest in the Middle East and predictions concerning the region's role in world affairs; Explanation of transfer by general officers from one branch to another; Assumption of command of 1st Cavalry Division in Japan and promotion to major general; Discussion of the Japanese, the condition of forces, 1st Division activities in Japan and Korea, and selection to command the 7th Infantry Division in combat in Korea; References to MacArthur, Paul Lutes, Haislip, Eisenhower, Huebner, Milburn, Clay, Eckhardt, Sebree, Clarke, White, Keyes, LeMay, Cannon, Noce, Reid, Ridgway, Bull, Eddy, Almond, Swing, Gerow, Westmoreland, Palmer, Abrams, McCaffrey, Haines, Train, Collins, Bonesteel, Harrold, Jark, Cooper, and Harrison.

V. (1953-1955)

Move from command of 1st Cavalry Division to 7th Infantry Division; Ridgway's desire that Trudeau prove himself as a division commanding general in Japan; Reflections on previous experience in 1940 as commanding officer of the 13th Engineer Battalion, 7th Infantry; Attack on Old Baldy; Decision to abandon Old Baldy and possible use of atomic weapons; Analysis of presence of newsmen on the battlefield; Emphasis on field fortifications; Role of helicopters in command, control, and reconnaissance;

Impact of the helicopter on troop strength in Vietnam; Role of helicopter in limited general war; The April Battle of Pork Chop Hill--praise for artillery, application of fire power to both offensive and defensive operations, value of closing ranks and keeping rear and forward echelons together, importance of awards and decorations, and role of the commander as leader; Value of the abbreviated code; Tribute to then COL Harry Lemley; Proper role of commander and staff and importance of not trying to do everything; Role of Armor in Korean terrain; July Battle of Pork Chop Hill--role of the armored personnel carrier (APC); Decision to evacuate Pork Chop in daylight rather than at night as suggested by General Taylor; Events leading to a second silver star; Korean Service Corps and the Katusas and problems resulting from their integration; Post-battle let-down; Construction of R and R centers and schools; the motion picture "Cease Fire"; Relief of MacArthur; Politico-military aspects of battle and positive aspects of efforts in Southeast Asia; Reassignment to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; McCarthy Hearings; Secretary of the Army praised for stand in defense of the Army; World travels to visit attaches; Doolittle and Clark Board investigations; Problem of internal security as applied to industrial security, technical intelligence, and foreign attaches. Trip to Saigon and conversations with French General Eli on support of Diem; Visit to Haile Selassie in Ethiopia and his trip to US; Relations with heads of state in Pakistan, Iran, and Argentina; Pistol sent as gift to Peron and its part in his overthrow; Intelligence instruction moved from Fort Riley to Fort Holabird; Beginning of "Civic Action Programs" in South America; Concern over later effort to unify intelligence gathering and evaluation; Sudden departure from position of G-2; References to Huebner, McAuliffe, Brooks, Ridgway, Taylor, Wayne Smith, Kendall, Almond, Lemley, Clarke, Clark, McGraw, Partridge, Bolte, Weible, Bolling, Zwicker and O'Daniel.

VI. (1955-1962)

Role as Chief of Staff for Military Operations in the Far East Command; Allen Dulles and later welcome back to Washington; Steamship trip to Tokyo and reunion with Mrs. Trudeau; Japan's role in world and past and future relations with the US; Importance of oil and US support; Concern for small percent of GNP allocated to the military; Formosa as anchor, given US drift away from

Japan and Okinawa and indifferent attitude of Philippines; Taiwanese-Chinese problem; Promotion and assumption of command of I Corps in Korea; G-2 incident vindicated; Discussion of SEATO; Positive efforts in Southeast Asia overlooked during Vietnam War; Indonesians no longer under Communist domination; US action in Vietnam in 1965 called for greater application of power against Haiphong and Hanoi; Use of communications, battlefield illumination, and night action during I Corps command; Visits of Presidents Diem and Rhee; Rushed back to Washington to replace Gavin as Chief of Research and Development in 1958; Memorable farewell from Korea; Introduction of 280mm atomic cannon; Japanese love of Abraham Lincoln and distribution of Lincoln coins and Gettysburg Address printed on cards to the public; Role and duties as Chief of Research and Development; Approval of Nike Zeus development; Evolution of Safeguard; Hercules firing against a WAC Corporal missile; Project Horizon; Air Force-Army feud over missiles, aircraft, and roles and missions; Systems Engineering placed in proper perspective; Low Army visibility and attempt to show industries how they could profitably team up with the Army; Research and Development field untangled; Army Research Center established at Durham, North Carolina; New systems and concepts while Chief, Research and Development, including: helicopters, chemical and biological weapons, Project HARP, basic, value, and human engineering, use of Special Forces in counterinsurgency; Fight against Communism through speeches; Efforts lead to 1962 muzzling of the military and a congressional hearing; Serious consideration as CIA Director and Director of AID; R&D system destroyed by McNamara allowing underbids resulting in lost time, delay, and ultimate cost overrun; Project managers as important cog in R&D and role of ARPA; Role of nuclear weapons; Cannon-launched guided missiles and nuclear power plants; Departure from R&D; Retirement in Korea; Reflections on a 38-year career; Presidency of Gulf Research and Development Company; References to General Hayashi, President Rhee, Secretary Laird, Senators Jackson, Fulbright, and Thurmond, President Diem, BG Park Chung Hee; Officers mentioned include Caraway, Barnes, Rogers, Parks, Fowler, Hubbard, Strikler, Gard, White, McGarr, Montegue, Lemnitzer, Stump, Anderson, Gavin, MacArthur, Jark, Mason, Sands, Bush, Decker, Betts, Burke, Walker, Johnson, Vittrup, Somervell, and Barksdale.

VII. (1962-1971)

Decision for a second career; Computerization, pipeline efficiency, increased production, use of by-products, and changing research image while at Gulf Research; Gulf Oil changed from concept of oil to concept of energy; Continuing interest in American security; Widespread speechmaking; Small research facilities established in Europe and the Far East; Member of Army Scientific Advisory Panel and trustee of three universities; Extra (sixth) year spent at Gulf; Association with the Rockwells and third career as Assistant to the Chairman of North American Rockwell; Part-time consultant to exploit new technology in the aerospace industry; Assisted in new acquisitions, joint ventures, and expansion and diversification; Discussion of future of the world; Reality and benefit of Sino-Soviet rift; Middle East remains critical; Observations on Soviet intentions; Fears for growing inferiority with respect to offensive and defensive nuclear weapons; Outlook for Vietnam seems favorable to US interests.

CHAPTER I

The Early Years

A: I came from a modest but hard-working family. All of my grandparents were born in Canada, and they were about the eighth or ninth generation of the family that were. The early French families are easily traced back, and there are four volumes on them from the Institute Drouin in Canada traced from our earliest ancestor who came to Canada in 1659. These early settlers were French Catholics, who came over to build French Canada. They arrived from La Rochelle on the Saint Andre in 1659 about the time when religious difficulties were developing in France. They lived the hard life of pioneers in Canada of those generations. Consequently, none of them had any great claim to fame. They were simple people, lived close to the soil, had great belief in God, and were given to considerable longevity. They were hardy people. They were prolific people as far as their families were concerned.

In any event, going back to my grandfathers in particular, my grandfather on the Trudeau side enlisted as a young man in the Vermont infantry during our Civil War in 1861. After the war, he went back and got his bride, who was a Canadian girl, and they both returned to the United States. They lived in a village near Middlebury, Vermont, where I was born. I found the records of that family dating back to 1862 in the old village hall in New Haven, Vermont. My grandparents on my mother's side had similar backgrounds. They both came from Canada, although my maternal grandfather was not a U.S. veteran. On my father's side, he was the tenth of 13 children and his father died as the result of wounds some years after the war when my father was ten years of age.

My father's education was rather limited by that fact. As one of the older sons, he had to go to work. He was a man of great natural intelligence. He was a mathematical wizard almost. He was a man of great strength. He had started in the marble mills of Vermont, and I have seen him many times take members of the Middlebury College football team and just put them all over the mat although he was a small man of only 155 pounds. In any event, we had a good family life.

My mother was a very intelligent woman, a fine pianist, and also a fine organist. They loved fun and they loved people. I think I acquired some of my liking of people from both of them. We were good Christians. It was a Catholic family and I was the oldest of four children, two brothers and a sister.

One of my early playmates was a boy named Fletcher, Warner Fletcher. He was named for his grandfather, who was always called Colonel Warner. They were a leading family in the village, and Warner and I were very close friends all our lives. I will mention another one -- Vice Admiral George Russell, U. S. Navy, recently deceased. He and I were born next door to each other and were boyhood friends. The three of us played soldier and cowboys and Indians along with exploration of the west. Colonel Warner had been a West Pointer and Warner Fletcher, his grandson, my pal, still had his uniforms and sword. I remember we used to get them out and admire them. We read everything we could and apparently it had its impact, since we both went to West Point. I'm sure all of us read every Horatio Alger story that was ever written, so we all developed solid goals in life.

At that time I decided what I wanted. I was a good student and a good athlete. I decided that I wanted to go to West Point, be an officer, and be an Engineer officer. I accomplished all three. George Russell went to the Naval Academy; Warner Fletcher went to West Point and then into the Army Air Corps. He was killed, unfortunately, in an aircraft accident in 1925.

You will see then that Warner and George had considerable impact on me as a boy. They were about two years older than I was. We lived on the same street. We saw many of the same people, although in those days there was a shadow between the old Yankee families and the French Canadians, mostly farmers, and others who arrived -- the Irish, a few Poles, some Italians -- to work in the quarries of Vermont.

This difference or gap, whatever you want to call it, of course, has long since disappeared, by and large. It was accented by the fact that most immigrants from Europe plus those of French Canadian descent were Catholics whereas the others were of diverse Protestant religions. Even as a small boy this was a gap that could be felt. What is interesting to notice is the strength -- and I use this word broadly -- of

these immigrant peoples and their later success relative to the descendants of some of the earlier Yankee group over these past decades. Perhaps it was because they had to work harder for what they got. They have all come through well.

Getting back to other incidents leading up to West Point: I worked during summers, in particular, and I did odd jobs at other times for my family and for others. I remember the summer of 1916 when I was 14 years old and George Russell and I and two other boys worked as bellhops in the Addison House in Middlebury, Vermont, which is now called the Middlebury Inn. As bellboys we had to do all sorts of things, but we weren't too proud to do whatever we had to do.

Russell's father was a prominent attorney in town. He had more stature than my father did. My father was a village trustee for more than 20 years, however, which is one of the most respected elective offices in a small New England village. There are seven of them elected by the people of the village, and they run the local government -- no mayor. It is run by a Board of Trustees. This is the old New England system.

Speaking about my Addison House experience, there were times, particularly during the county fair -- which always occurred during the last week of August -- that the shoeshine business got to be real heavy in the hotel. You couldn't go through the week without heavy rain. All of us had to work to beat the devil to do that as well as our other jobs. George and I tried to outshine each other on other people's shoes. We both had the urge to always be the best. The other boys didn't give a damn and got away with as little as they could. Anyway, they both ended up spending unimportant and uninteresting lives doing rather menial jobs in Vermont. I think there is a lesson here.

One of the jobs I had when the war broke in 1917 was in a grocery store. This was owned by a man named Hanfield who happened to be a friend and next door neighbor of my family. He was a nice man and always very nice to me. He was very tightfisted, but that was typical of New England people to whom money came hard, and they took care of what they had. In any event, the point I am making here (because it certainly was a turning point) involves one Saturday night when the store closed. It was about 10:30PM because the farmers all came into town shopping on

Saturday afternoon or evening in those days. I guess they still do in the small villages in the West and New England. He had taken the cash from the cash register and gone up to his desk, which was at the rear of the store. I was sweeping up from behind the counters when I noticed a ten-dollar bill on the floor. I put down my broom, took the ten-dollar bill up to him, and said, "You must have dropped this, Mr. Hanfield." He said, "Yes, thank you very much." He was very pleasant and appreciative, but I later found out that he had been testing me because the president of the bank, which was only two doors away, was considering me for employment in the bank. Our young men had gone to war and they needed someone, part time at least. So this was the test. I don't think the president of the bank prescribed it, but in any event he had asked Mr. Hanfield for a recommendation on me, and this was the means that Mr. Hanfield used to test me. Quite obviously, here was a critical point.

I then went into the bank. I worked there during the summer of 1918. As a matter of fact, they wanted me to stay on full time. The pay was \$30 a month. They promised to give me \$60 if I worked full time during the school year. I was tempted, as a boy would be, to do that, but I wanted to go to West Point and I particularly wanted to go back to play football. So I went back to school, retained part-time employment and arranged my courses in school so that I was excused from study hall. I was successful in completing my courses and graduated, although I did so poorly in Latin IV that I had to get a tutor during Christmas week of 1918 in European history to offset my poor grade in fourth-year Latin.

When I decided I wanted to go on to further education I was invited to the University of Vermont and considered entering there in the fall of 1919. I also considered Dartmouth but when I expressed my interest to Mr. Pinney, who was president of the bank, about West Point, he said, "I'm going to help you."

The leading man in our town was a representative in the Vermont legislature and later the governor, John E. Weeks. Through Mr. Pinney and Mr. Weeks I had the opportunity (and they were scarce) to take the competitive examinations for West Point to enter in 1920. This I did. My high school record was good. I

worked full time at the bank instead of entering the University of Vermont, feeling sure that I could make it. I took the competitive exams, and I succeeded in passing those without too much difficulty.

I remember one humorous thing in taking the physical examination, however, at Fort Ethan Allen. I weighed 122 pounds and the minimum weight was 125. Of course, in those days waivers weren't as generously given as they are today. There wasn't that kind of flexibility. I prepared for my examinations on the morning when I was to take them by eating seven or eight bananas because I was told that they would add great poundage. The unfortunate thing was that, after registration and taking one of the mental exams first, the bananas (the extra weight) sort of disappeared by afternoon. In any event, I guess they allowed me a couple of pounds to pass the requirements.

I was notified a few months later by good Senator Page of those days that I was the number-two man of the 15 who had taken his competitive exam, and he had one appointment for Annapolis and one for West Point. The number-one man had chosen West Point, so he offered me his principal appointment to Annapolis or the first-alternate appointment to West Point. I thought about that carefully. I decided on West Point and I never regretted that, with all due respect to the Navy. It was what I wanted most.

While I was waiting to hear from Washington, two things happened. First, Senator Dillingham, the other senator in my state, also had an appointment, so I had applied to Senator Dillingham with recommendations from Mr. Weeks and Mr. Pinney. Senator Dillingham's principal failed for one reason or another, so I was soon notified that I had Dillingham's appointment. Secondly, the Army decided to double the number going into West Point, as there was practically nobody left because of early graduations during World War I. By the time I entered on July 1st, 1920, I had Dillingham's principal appointment and I had an appointment from Page that was as good as the principal. There was even some confusion at West Point as to which appointment governed. In any event, I was now qualified to enter West Point.

I know you want me to talk more about Middlebury and the French Canadian environment. It wasn't largely a French Canadian environment. We were near Canada and there were a considerable number of French Canadians

in the village, mostly farmers. There never was any open strife between people of varying European nationalities that I ever heard of. There might have been an occasional brawl between a Polish chap and an Italian or an Irishman or a Frenchman or a Yankee, but nothing severe in that respect. This may be surprising in itself. You have to realize this was in the days before labor exercised much power -- organized labor.

For instance, there would be a shipload of immigrants to arrive in New York, let's say from Poland. Perhaps the Vermont Marble Company, which operated throughout the state, could absorb 100 immigrant families. They would come to Vermont and be sent to various towns where they were needed. There were marble or granite mills and quarries all through that state. Perhaps two years later there would be an expansion or maybe some of the early employees would shift to farms or small industry; there wasn't much else. A new group of immigrants from another country would arrive. This certainly helped to prevent any large-scale labor organization, and, of course, the wage and working demands on men who were right on the bottom then were rather severe. I remember that in those days a newly employed man (and this might go on for several years) was working a ten-hour day in a marble mill for 20 an hour on a six-day week. These were pretty tough circumstances for those people. My father had certain skills and a foreman's abilities that brought him up fast, but he still was a very hard-working man.

You were also wondering, since the war was going on, if there was any effort on the part of the government -- local, state or national -- to help subdue dissent that might have been created by the war. There was no dissent. They hardly had to exercise the draft. Everybody tried to go. I tried to enlist myself in the Royal Canadian Air Force because they used to send bands and bagpipers down through Vermont recruiting. Some of my pals did while we were still in high school but they didn't end up flying planes. They ended up in machine-gun and infantry battalions, but at least they went. Most of them came back. There was no dissent.

There was tremendous patriotic approval. I'm afraid we have lost that kind of spirit. The movement to the cities and the changes in life, the lack of any discipline exercised by the country, the church, the schools, or most families, have resulted in a hodgepodge where these youngsters don't know where

they are going. They don't even know why they are here, which is sad indeed. I don't know the answer, except to hope that the pendulum will swing through and we'll come to better days before it is too late. In this connection I am reminded of a saying which I would like to inject here because it may be prophetic. In viewing the problems of our civilization today, I am taken back to a statement made 65 years ago by Hudson Maxim, a great inventor and a strong patriot. He said in 1915, and I quote, "Fate has decreed that our pride shall be humbled, and that we shall be bowed to the dust. We must first put on a sackcloth, ashed in the embers of our burning homes. Perhaps, when we build anew on the fire-blackened desolation, our mood may be receptive of the knowledge that we must shield our homes with blood and brawn and iron."

Vermont was a strong Republican state. A Democrat was almost an oddity of whatever ethnic nationality we might be speaking. Teddy Roosevelt was our hero, and even in 1912 when I was a boy of ten years I remember that when he came to the Rutland Fair, the people went absolutely wild. But they accepted Woodrow Wilson and they backed him. I never heard of dissent, or any group that tried to create dissent, with respect to the exercise of authority by our President or by anybody else in a responsible position. We never heard any organized resentment. This modern approach to anarchy through violence, it never appeared in those days. It would have been almost unthinkable.

Speaking of President Wilson, I remember that he announced his 14 points for peace in 1916. I was the one selected to give them on the stage of the town hall on Memorial Day, which was always a great day in all our villages. After the parade, the people ended up in the town hall and heard speeches. So I had this one to give, and I think that I had gotten only to the 12th point when I forgot the next. My prompter, instead of speaking just from the wings, marched boldly out on the stage and said, "Arthur, the 13th point, (the 12th or whatever it was) of Wilson's 14 points is as follows." She then read it to the audience.

As boys we used to go up to the Delta Kappa Epsilon fraternity house at Middlebury College. This was a small college of less than 200 students in those days. Some of the seniors would be teaching courses in our high school and others were our athletic

coaches. So George Russell and I would be there frequently. Those were the days when banjos, banjo-mandolins, and string instruments were very popular in frat houses and orchestras. Well, I am left-handed and you can't pick up someone else's banjo or mandolin that is strung right-handed and restring it, you know, each time. So I just took one and started playing it. I developed a technique that is different. It is different but it is reasonably effective, let's say. So that is the story on that.

George went to Annapolis in 1917 and became one of the great banjo players of the country; he's the Admiral Russell that I told you about. When George had the submarine forces in Hawaii during the war, his Special Services Officer was Lieutenant Commander Eddie Peabody, who everybody knows was absolutely the greatest banjo player in the country. They lived and played banjos together. Eddie died of a heart attack when he was playing down in Tennessee or Kentucky about 1970 -- unfortunately. He was a tremendous banjo player and taught George a lot. George played better than I do, but we still had some wonderful jam sessions while flag-rank officers in the Pentagon.

I forgot one point. In high school we had some remarkably dedicated teachers when I went to school. Most of them were women. But there were two of them -- one, Frances Warner, in science. and another, Evelyn Muldoon, in English -- who, to me, were beacons to my future and I would like to give them credit.

Q: I'm not so sure that we have many people who talk about their teachers today. There isn't that dedication. I don't want to belabor the banjo, but I must admit that you have impressed a lot of people with your banjo playing. Let us turn to your days at West Point.

A: My days at West Point were happy days from beginning to end. I didn't succeed in doing too much in athletics when I was a plebe. I developed physically and put on some weight. By the time I was a yearling I probably weighed about 135 or 137 pounds, so I couldn't get into the major sports. I was a good student. My class was 658 and the largest class ever entered to date. There were only two other classes, totalling about 400, at West Point then because of early graduations during the war. We graduated 405, which will show you the attrition was something over one-third during the four years. At the end of the

first year, I stood about 100th in my class. Each year I improved. By the time I reached my first-class (senior) year, I stood in the first three percent academically.

I was the number-one man in general military rating as a first-classman, which completely startled the commandant and other senior officers because they thought they had their man already selected. I topped him because of an excellent athletic record. I was the two-miler in track, captain of cross-country, and on the hockey team, so I had a lot of athletic credits. My academics were very high. Apparently both the tactical officers and my fellow cadets thought reasonably well of me so that I came up with number one in military rating as I entered first-class year. I held cadet ranks of corporal, sergeant, and second captain (battalion commander) in my final year.

Q: I'd like to ask you, Sir, do you feel that your ability to play the banjo had an effect upon your acceptance, an understanding by other people of you? Was it a form of relaxation for you as the years went by, although I would not like to concentrate on your playing it at this time because, obviously, you have continued to play it all your life. What would you say about that?

A: Well, there were four of us at West Point who managed to get into the same cadet company. There were Burrill, Sexton, Gibson, and myself. We all played different string instruments. For instance, Sexton was my roommate during the latter part of my cadet days and he played a banjo-guitar. I played a banjo-mandolin then, Gibson played a plectrum-banjo, and Burrill played a regular banjo. We got together frequently and there were a couple of other chaps who played instruments also. We'd get together (Sundays were sometimes dull, particularly if we didn't have any gals) on the roof of barracks and we would have 50 guys up there singing. The four of us would play anything they would ask us to play. They'd sing or just sit there and tell lies or do anything that they wanted to do. No liquor and no pot, not even beer. We had some great times.

Off and on all through my service, particularly with my officer friends and their wives, we've had a lot of entertainment of this kind. Sometimes in the field I'd take my banjo with me. I'd get it out at night when I had a battalion, or I'd get it out on occasions

in Germany or when things were quiet in Korea when my division was in combat. I played with Horace Heidt and his band when he stayed with us. We had a lot of music. It is good for the soul; it is good for relaxing. The troops love it. Everybody needs an outlet. Mine has never been heavy concentration on, let's say, bridge, for instance. I would rather have the complete relief from tension I enjoy when I can get with music. When I can hear good music, I enjoy that, too.

Q: Sir, we have jumped through the Academy very quickly and discussed some points. I think probably there is a take-off point here. I'd be interested in your feeling as to the benefits that you derived from school, personally and professionally.

A: Well, the one that you would say was the most apparent, maybe not the most important but the most apparent, would be a decided improvement in my physical structure. It certainly did wonders for me from a physical standpoint, and I thoroughly endorse the program. Mentally, the education that we received was most challenging. I don't believe, for the purpose for which it was intended, including the broad cultural aspects, that it could be better. I know when I went on in later years to take graduate work at the University of California that I found I was beautifully equipped to take on the advanced work. In those classes where we participated with senior classes in certain subjects (there were six of us who were graduates of West Point in this one class), our performance was outstanding. As a matter of fact, for us to receive our master's degree required honors or high honors in all subjects we took with the senior class, plus our research thesis, and none of us had any difficulty in qualifying. I am glad to see West Point further improved in these days. I am glad to see it broadened and the cultural aspects accented more than they were then, but I still feel that I received a wonderful education.

Now, let's get into the spiritual and moral aspects and character building -- "Duty, Honor, Country." I suppose that it varies with the character of the individual as he enters, but all of us are much better men when we come out because of it. It instilled integrity, the ability to make decisions to do what is right, pride in accomplishment and mission, ambition but not at the expense of others, confidence in your own ability, and loyalty. If there is anything that

we have lost today, it is pride and loyalty. It is one of the most defacing aspects on the American scene today. There is none left, or not much.

Q: Sir, General MacArthur was the superintendant at the Academy for two or three years that you were there. We discussed earlier influences on you. General MacArthur had a tremendous influence on many people, and you had the rare fortune of having him associated with you early. Would you care to comment on this?

A: Yes, he had a great impact. He was young, of course, for his position, the youngest brigadier in the Army at that time. He was a man of tremendous personality and leadership. He has been criticized by many because of a certain aura about him, a feeling of detachment. There has never been any doubt in my mind or anybody's that has been exposed to him, either at the Academy, during World War II, or later, about the moral ascendancy that he holds, almost unwittingly perhaps, over those around him, the tremendous moral ascendancy he held over people he dealt with. This is vital to great leadership at high levels.

Q: MacArthur, in one of his superintendent reports back in 1922, made the comment that he felt that you -- the whole student body, the graduates, especially, as they came out -- weren't getting sufficiently tuned to the world. He called it "worldly," but he felt that he needed to loosen up some of the restrictions. How strict were things at the Academy? He indicated that he wanted to establish a six-hour pass and let you get out and deal with the world so that when you did graduate you were aware that people did things differently. I am interested in your reaction because you lived through it.

A: I think this was highly desirable. You have to remember that our class was, in effect, a most unusual class for these reasons. When we went in there was no first class (seniors). The second class, which graduated the next year on a short graduation, had 102 people. The third class, the only other class there, was about 350. So you are talking about upperclassmen totaling less than 500 handling an incoming class of 638. This was something new in itself, you see. It created many problems. Our class has always been called the "thundering herd" because they thought we were a bunch of bushwhackers and everything else. We didn't do badly because we did produce something over a hundred generals during our careers in the Army.

But, in any event, the class was unusual within itself because any World War I veteran could come in up to age equalling 22 plus the length of his military service. I entered almost the day I became 18 years old, but we had a very large number of men in our class with military service. A few of them were 24 and 25 years of age, and a great number were 20 or 22 and had the experience and maturity that resulted from having been in France and lived the life of a free adult for years. This made a hell of a difference. We were kids to them in our own class. It was an amazing group of people. I'm sure both the young and the old have a great appreciation for each other now. I frankly don't know of any class that is as close as our class. First, because we were plebes together and, of course, all plebes are looked down on by their seniors. The upperclassmen also looked down on us because we outnumbered them and had greater diversity as far as age and background, I guess. It made us a very close-knit class.

Q: I also want to ask you what you consider the importance of being a cadet leader at the Academy. You have already indicated that you admired the leader, and I know that you obtained a rather significant rank. What did you consider the importance of being a leader at that time among your contemporaries?

A: I thought it was extremely important. It represented the opinions of the tactical officers who knew you. It represented the opinion of the first classmen, the senior class, as you know, who knew you. It represented your relative academic standing, your disciplinary rating, and your activities rating, which included a great number of things -- extracurricular activities -- in pretty good balance. I have forgotten the percentages used, but it was fair. I think it definitely picked out the men who were leaders. I have seen other men who have come to the top, some from near the bottom of the class. I don't disparage them in any way. These things will happen over a period of years. It may be that they suddenly discover themselves, or it may be that they are suddenly discovered by somebody.

Q: While you were at the Academy, I'm wondering about your aspirations. How did you see yourself? Did you see yourself as a combat commander, or did you see yourself as an engineer?

A: I had to struggle with myself on that angle. In fact, I looked carefully at three branches: the infantry, the artillery, and the engineers. I felt that the engineers offered the greatest opportunity. The engineers, particularly the combat engineers, had done some remarkable fighting on their own, such as bridging the gap between the Australian and British forces at a very critical point toward the end of World War I as one example that I can remember. I furthermore realized that in the engineers you could get not only additional knowledge and education but early experience beyond the reach of people in most other branches by the nature of your assignment. For instance, it was not unusual to have lieutenants in responsible charge of \$5- and \$10-million projects that were being built. I always felt that responsibility. I liked responsibility; I liked the idea of making decisions. I felt that I was going to get an opportunity there that I never would as a foot-slogging lieutenant for 10 or 15 years. Remember, in those days my class expected to retire as lieutenant colonels with a slight possibility that some would be colonels and that we would spend up to 22 years before we reached the rank of captain. Yet we weren't quitters, because we were dedicated to something better than the payroll and the rank, and also because the whole class -- everything is relative -- would all be in the same relative position with our contemporaries. It was an honorable life and a service to our country. It offered us what we wanted. Some did resign, I'll admit, but most of us didn't. We stuck for a purpose. You can't buy that.

Q: I don't think we have to say any more. You have said it very clearly. It is a beautiful thing that, unfortunately, we have lost. I don't want to leave the Academy yet. I was just wondering about when General MacArthur left and then General Fred Sladen came in. Any comment on the differences?

A: A tightening of discipline. Sladen was an understanding man and yet he was more of the martinet or the older type general, as we thought of him in those days. The Academy didn't suffer under Sladen. It may have been that a little tightening up was needed. This is why a change of tempo or type of people who are in positions of responsibility is good. The weaknesses of one may be offset by the actions of another, or the excesses of one may be balanced by a succeeding commander who does things differently. Sladen was a fine superintendent,

splendid. I had the pleasure of having his son serve as my Chief of Staff in Korea.

Q: Sir, in 1922 they instituted the summer camp which apparently had been cancelled as a result of World War I, and I recall that that had 100-year tradition previous to that time.

A: Two summers, the summer of 1920 when we were entering and the summer of 1921 when we went to Camp Dix, the training was at Camp Dix. When we were at Camp Dix in the summer of 1921, the First Infantry Division was there, at least substantial parts of it. We had the advantage of observing demonstrations by Regular Army troops and were exposed to things different than you see on the plains of West Point. I still think that the summer training program at West Point is excellent as long as they combine it (and, of course, this costs money) with trips to various establishments such as the Armor Center at Fort Knox and other training centers. I think much of the training can be conducted at West Point with some economy, but it is a tough piece of ground. We are using every inch of it.

I had my share of disciplinary problems during the early years, but not excessively; practically none as I got into my second-class year. The most interesting one to me is this (and it taught me a lesson): we were down at Camp Dix and while living in barracks we had cots with mosquito netting over them, so it was very easy to assume that when night inspections were made at taps, even if you weren't under covers, you wouldn't be missed. This didn't involve putting dummies into your bed. I suppose that has been done, but I'm not talking about that sort of thing; that definitely is out. That is not part of the game as far as a cadet is concerned. In any event, this one night a chap and I were interested in a couple of girls in one of the nearby towns. We were enjoying the evening so that we didn't get back until late. Come to find out, I had been tabbed as missing at the inspection that night, whereupon I was called in. The penalty for that could be very severe; it could have been dismissal in those days. I was called in by the officer who was then my summer tactical officer, Captain Hal Barber (later General Barber, class of 1917), and he said, "Mr. Trudeau, you were reported missing at taps last night. Is that correct." I said, "Yes, sir." And he said, "Where were you?" and I said, "I was down on the Rancocus." (That's a river where we used to go canoeing, spooning, or whatever

you wanted to do.) He said, "Why didn't you return in time for taps?" So I thought a minute and I said, "Well, to be perfectly honest, I was having such a good time that I took a chance that I wouldn't be missed." He said, "What time did you get in?" I said, "About two o'clock." He thought that over for a moment and then he awarded me a punishment that was really nothing, a little confinement. It could have been a turning point. I was a cadet non-commissioned officer at that time. I was only a cadet corporal, but I could have been busted for that. I could have been given a month's slug on the area. I could have been given punishment even more severe. It was a demonstration to me that you had to tell the unqualified truth. He and I have often talked and joked about it in later years.

Q: Guess it turns the other way, too, when you are in that position and listening, you listen better.

A: You bet your life. Just come clean. I can go twice as far for a man, at least, if he's not trying to equivocate and hide.

Q: Sir, let me change the subject. We have many officers that come in through other means and other schools, the Citadel, VMI, Cornell, others. What do you think of the comparison, based upon your own matriculation and the observation of others? How would you rate the product?

A: That is a pretty tough question. I have the highest regard for the military colleges. I am a trustee at Norwich and took my competitive entrance examinations at Norwich in 1919. I'm still a trustee. I know the Citadel quite well. I know Pennsylvania Military College quite well. I have an honorary degree from there, as well as from Norwich. Of course, I know Valley Forge also. I might say, since you have gotten on that question, that in World War II when I was Deputy Director of Military Training, Army Service Forces, and later the Director of Military Training, that the support of the military colleges was under the direction of my office. This included West Point at that time. I've served with officers and commanding officers during my 40 years in uniform from every source, including battlefield commissions, OCS, and the rest of them. There is no reason why a West Pointer shouldn't always be in the top echelon, but that is not necessarily true. There is a very good reason why the honor graduates and distinguished

students coming in from the other military colleges should be outstanding officers, because they have been carefully selected. Many have the same motivation the Regular Army officer should have. I think the graduates of these different colleges, including the ROTC, do a great deal for our country. I think there are a lot of examples that good men from West Point can give other officers and vice versa. The point I really want to make here is that the melding of viewpoints and ideas from the best men from all sources who hold commissions is really good for the Army.

Q: I'd like to open up our discussion on West Point. Just a few odd post-holes here and there. One thing that intrigues me is that you have already indicated that you produced from your class over 100 generals. I'm wondering if you, personally, developed early any personnel indicators that you thought might detect early leadership. In retrospect, do you recall any? I would like to think back just to your days at the Academy whether there were things that you saw there, whether you pointed to someone and said, "He's going to make it," or "He's not going to make it."

A: Well, of course, the academic aspect has to stand on its own. I think in the study of men that one of the things that I consider fascinating is real leadership. This doesn't necessarily mean getting promoted to four stars. This can happen for a number of reasons, some of which are not pleasant to contemplate, let's say. I think that when you are talking about real leadership, you are talking about character and integrity, and the ability to exercise, without being a stuffed shirt, a moral ascendancy over your subordinates. If you can do this, it may also be over your contemporaries, too. One of the unfortunate aspects is when superior men serve in subordinate positions under men of lesser capability. Their real talents are not appreciated, and they are "cut down to size," as some people like to say. This is a narrow view, but it is one that is taken by narrow men. Yet, very high-grade men suffer from this sort of an approach. I have felt, and I became convinced as I went through my career, that I could pick the coming leaders after some observation, close observation, even when they were young officers. I have yet to feel that I have been mistaken in this regard. I have seen a lot of people with rank on their shoulders, and sometimes you wonder just why it is there. I have also seen a tremendous number of really capable people

come through and get the kind of reward they deserved. So in a human system you are going to have these degrees and variations. I never knew but one way and that was to do my job as best I could without fear or favor, and with an objective goal in sight. I've never been deterred, and I never changed my route; perhaps it might have been better if I had.

Q: I would like to talk leadership all through our discussion at different times and different stages. The thing that intrigues me about your career is the diversity. I want to ask you a question now: whether you feel that leadership is cross-task reliable, if I can use that term. In other words, if you are a good leader here, do you feel that you can be certain that you are going to be a good leader there? I would like to try to limit this to your early development, but, if you care to, you can discuss this openly because I think it is a very important point. Is it cross-task reliable?

A: It is. It is cross-task reliable to a very high degree in the senior positions or senior rank. This is because the experienced leader has the capability to organize and to fill his staff with people who have the particular military, technical, sociological, or other qualifications to get the job he wants done under his general direction and with his broad judgment. In the younger, the lower, ranks, this becomes obviously more difficult because it revolves around the limitations on a man's technical competence (in many respects) or professional competence to meet the particular challenge of the time, in addition to being able to exercise those qualities of leadership that a leader must have, whatever his job is. We are obviously recognizing the difference in the qualities one must have, say, in the church or in medicine or particularly in the military. In the military, the ultimate in leadership is combat, where men's lives are in your hands. This is the ultimate responsibility in leadership, to my mind. My definitions of discipline and leadership haven't changed from what I learned at the Academy. They have been broadened much by experience, I hope.

Q: All right, Sir, let's go to Fort Humphreys, which I understand was your first tour of duty with the 13th Engineers. I was pleasantly surprised to find out that Fort Humphreys was what is now Fort Belvoir.

CHAPTER II

Troop Duty

A: Let me give you just a little bit of background which may be interesting to start with. The present National War College was old Fort A. A. Humphreys, named after a Civil War engineer of great repute. When, in the early 1900s, they did a revamping of the military and established the Army War College, Fort A. A. Humphreys became the Army War College and then the name of Humphreys was up for grabs for years. In any event, Fort Humphreys, as we then called it, was built in 1917 as a World War I cantonment and then, after the war, was designated as the Engineer School. At the time I reported in 1924 there was a rather poor two-lane macadam road that led there from Washington, but even that was of recent vintage because during the war the road leading south from Washington through that area -- Belvoir and down to Richmond -- was only a dirt road, and the traffic on it between Washington and now Fort Belvoir, then Fort Humphreys, became so heavy that the road was impassable in the winter and spring. There was a period during World War I when the only access to that post was by water down the Potomac, believe it or not, which, in the light of today, is interesting.

It certainly is a fascinating assignment to look back upon. I had been married at the end of that summer. I reported for duty three months after I graduated from West Point, which, in date, was September 12, 1924. My wife remained behind with her family in New York. I did what I assumed to be the correct thing then, because West Point had taught us to be very meticulous about our dress. So when I reported for duty that morning I remember that I was in dress uniform; in other words, blouse, Sam Browne belt, breeches, and boots. There was no assistance given to new arrivals as far as the post was concerned. You were supposed to get there on your own, which I did from the railroad station in Alexandria by taxi. I think it cost me \$4.50, which a second lieutenant could ill afford. As far as anybody meeting you or helping you, there was nothing like that. You just got out on your own and shoved off. Maybe we would be better off if it were more like that today. We get over-serviced at times. In any event, I got there, and was assigned quarters. They were temporary, prefabricated quarters built in 1919 or 1920. They weren't much, but they were the kind that both my

contemporaries and even my seniors were living in, so I found no problem accommodating myself to them. They were not the equivalent of the kind of an apartment my wife had lived in in New York, but we were happy. We lived on Army pay of a second lieutenant of \$143 per month with rations, which didn't take you too far.

As far as the life was concerned, it was extremely pleasant. There were 90 officers on the post. There were 19 from my class, as all new Engineers were sent there. We had a very happy and pleasant life. Actually, I stayed there three years: a little more than one on troop duty with the 13th Engineers; one as Personnel Adjutant with the regiment, which was really a regimental headquarters with one battalion; and the third as a student at the company officers' course of the Engineer School. Our only daughter and older child was born in Walter Reed, and we simply enjoyed three delightful years. The hunting was good -- ducks, turkeys and birds -- a lot of athletics, and good polo which I enjoyed. That really is the personal side of Fort Belvoir in those days.

My initial assignment, together with two of my classmates who later became general officers, Howard Ker and Herbert Vogel, was to C Company of the 13th Engineers. It was commanded by an officer, first lieutenant in grade, with seven years' service to whom a second lieutenant was more like a plebe to West Point. First Lieutenant Arrowsmith was a competent engineer officer. He did some things differently than we thought they should be done, perhaps, but I guess it was a different perspective between an officer of experience and young West Point graduates. I remember once he told me to go out and design a timber rack on which to place three garbage cans by the kitchen exit. Well, I didn't think this was too much of an engineering problem so I took one of the sergeants in my platoon who had about 23 years' service out there and said, "We want to put three garbage cans about ten inches off the ground on this spot. It will take a stand about so long and so wide, two-by-fours or other similar timber. Build it." He had it finished by noon, and I think we painted it the same afternoon. Two days later I was asked where my report was on the design of the garbage stand, whereupon I said that perhaps I had misunderstood, but I had already built the damn thing. Well, I must say, and I don't want to speak disparagingly of the officer in question, but he lined me out on the basis that I hadn't carried out his orders. Technically, he was correct. Actually, I

didn't think that a lieutenant needed orders on how to design a garbage stand for three cans, and so I had built it. This caused a little flurry at the time and pointed out areas in which we needed to be extremely careful in further dealings with our company commander.

But all in all, it was a great experience. We did command platoons. There weren't many men in each of them, probably 30. We did the usual close-order drill and other infantry training. One of the great advantages of the engineers, particularly the combat engineers, was that, while we had a great deal of infantry training, we also did a great deal of engineer work. This made it far more interesting than I think might have been true had I just commanded an infantry platoon. Maybe no, but I was learning two trades, and not only one, and I found it relatively rewarding. I admit I don't think our capacity was tested very often or very greatly. I can't imagine in these days spending as many months or years in junior assignment as we did then. To produce the best officers, we need more stimulation and more opportunity. Our young men today are getting it. As a matter of fact, they are getting it so fast that they don't really know the details of one job before they move to another. As they grow up, they know less and less about some of the details that are important in really mastering a profession.

By the time we left the platoon after a couple of years as platoon commanders, we certainly were, or should have been, masters of our job. As we went on to the next one, this was very helpful. In reverse, however, this teffific attention to detail and lack of incentive in those days was frustrating. For instance, I remember majors proudly going out to drill in the morning on their horses with their adjutants behind them watching three infantry companies in close-order drill and becoming very concerned if someone stepped off on the fifth count instead of the sixth or vice-versa. This continued up until World War II. You wonder how so many of those men were successful when they had large commands and had to delegate responsibility. To put it another way, it is surprising that more of them weren't failures.

Q: You talked about a relationship with your company commander, and I would like to ask you about your relationship with your NCOs.

A: They were great. They were very satisfying. For instance, as the senior of three very junior second lieutenants who reported, I was immediately made the first sergeant. I took no exception to this. My first sergeant in those days is still alive or was last year -- longtime retired, of course. World War I experience, great guy named Jake Dempsey. He let me sweat out all morning reports, rosters and details, the guard details, and all the rest, but he never really let me fall down. I mean, if he saw a place where I had missed a point, he told me. We always had a tremendous rapport. It was the arm's-length respect that always exists between a good officer and a good noncommissioned officer, but it was a healthy respect and a warm regard for each other, a good understanding. They understood it perfectly. As a matter of fact, they would have been amazed if there had been any other approach on the part of their officers.

There were no colored soldiers in this particular unit. I bring up that point because I had been a lieutenant in the 13th Engineers only about eight months when a bad situation occurred in the Engineer School Detachment. This consisted of perhaps 200 men, and there was within this school detachment a white detachment and a colored detachment. Let's say that the colored detachment was 75 men, the white was 125. Well, they ran into some severe problems because they were using a common mess hall and they would alternate cooks from white to colored. In those days the ration was around 17¢ to 18¢ a day. The running of the mess had to be done in a pretty efficient manner or else you didn't eat too well. In this particular case, the mess had been run by the negro mess sergeant for one month and things were in pretty bad shape for at least several weeks financially. So the white cooks were put in to get the mess solvent again. There were two wings to a common kitchen. The white cooks and the mess sergeant took over, but the situation was so bad that, in financially balancing the accounts, my predecessor directed that for the last six days of the month they would be fed frankfurters only, which were low priced. But if six days on these frankfurters was too much for the whites, it was absolutely impossible for the negro troops, who had been enjoying pork chops and kale. There was a hell of a bad situation there which probably had been agitated by other factors as well.

So I was put in command of the Engineer School Detachment (Colored). This was quite a job. Most of these were young negroes from Washington, D. C., topped off by maybe ten percent of good old noncoms from the 25th Infantry and the 2d and 10th Cavalry (all Black). These old soldiers were good. None of them had less than 20 years' service, but the rest of the youngsters left something to be desired. We found that out in a number of ways. One of the problems, however, was that they were only being used for strictly menial labor. They had a minimum of education and training. They had a maximum of grooming horses for the rides of the students in the school and for polo, also a maximum of firing furnaces and things of this sort. These chores were absolutely essential. I'm not saying that they shouldn't be done, but there was little in the nature of reward coming to these men. So I took an old building the Knights of Columbus had used during World War I and renovated it as the Royal Social Club for the Engineer School Detachment (Colored). This was very successful in its purpose. Maids were so cheap at that time that most of the officers were able to afford at least a part-time maid, and the senior officers had a full-time maid. So, it being in Virginia country, there were plenty of girls around for these negro soldiers but they hadn't had any place to go. Here at least, while today we would say it was segregated, it was their club. They enjoyed it, and for the most part they respected what had been made available. I had one little problem over there one night, but we resolved that all right.

Another thing I did was to institute training and equitation, because, while they groomed the horses and rode them up to polo or whenever they were delivering them to the students, that was the extent of their knowledge of equitation. I gave them courses on equitation and took them out on rides. That improved the esprit a lot. We organized a separate mess where they could have the type of food they preferred as far as it could be obtained within the ration and the company fund. That was really my earliest experience with negro troops. Shortly after that I was called over as the Personnel Adjutant, which was a newly established job in the regiment. The next year I took the company officers' course.

Q: That is very interesting. I know that we are going to probably get back to the colored soldier when you later on became the Director of Training. I think you

were involved in some aspects, but we will save that 'til later. I think a criticism today is the fact that the individual is stymied, he is not permitted much freedom of action. I'm wondering, back in those days as a young lieutenant (now you have already talked about this garbage can incident) would you say that you were allowed freedom of action in the things that you did so that you could develop?

A: Not in the troop training schedules. Those were on a five-and-a-half-day basis by an hourly or half-hourly count and they were pretty well fixed. There were other aspects, though, where I was. One in particular was sort of an extracurricular activity. My commanding officer then was Major John Conklin. A new post commander arrived, Colonel Edwin Markham, who later became Chief of Engineers. He was very unhappy about the fact that, while we had a band, the 13th Engineer regimental band, the orchestra was so poor that for post dances they used to import the orchestra from the 3d Cavalry, which was stationed at Fort Myer. Well, of course, many of us didn't like this. Our new commander, in particular, thought it was an insult to the Engineers to have to go up to the Cavalry and hire their orchestra to play for our dances. Major Conklin, my regimental commander, made the mistake, or otherwise, of telling the colonel, "I've got a young officer here who used to play in the cadet orchestra at West Point." Markham said, "Well, put him to work." So the next thing I knew I was told to get an orchestra built, pronto.

I was authorized to expend \$100 from the regimental fund, which was a lot of money in those days and the regimental fund didn't have too much. So I figured out what I could do.

I had been going to New York occasionally since my wife's family lived there, and I read about the resurgence of the North German Lloyd Line. I knew something about the interest of Europeans trying to get into the American Armed Forces. So I went to New York and went down to a liner of the North German Line that came into port. I wrangled my way in to get hold of a man I found in the orchestra. I asked him if there were any of the people in the orchestra who were interested in staying in the United States, and he admitted there were. I came back about two days later and he told me that there were three good musicians. He told me what they could do; each of them played at least two instruments. One of them, I remember, was

from Hungary and played a gypsy xylophone among other instruments. So to make a long story short (and I guess the statute of limitations has run out), I had them all jump ship and took them down and enlisted them in the Army at 39 Whitehall Street and had them shipped to Fort Belvoir. So I had the beginnings of an orchestra.

In addition, our assistant band leader was a man of accomplishment. He had played with Victor Herbert's orchestra. He was a Puerto Rican, Staff Sergeant Vega. He was a fine trumpeter, but his was about the only talent in the band, he and a chap named Huntington, who was a fine drummer. So we started with these three Germans and the drummer and the trumpeter, whom I made the head of the orchestra because he was a staff sergeant. We had the beginnings of an orchestra, but we were very weak on piano when a great break occurred.

I was an officer of the guard one day when the sergeant of the guard said, "There is a man who wants to see you." I said, "What about?" He said, "I don't know but he says he can play the piano." I said, "Send him to me when he comes in tonight." Our prisoners worked pretty hard in those days, harder than they do today. They slept on hard bunks, too. They took cold showers in the morning and at night. They all lived through it, and nobody was any the worse for it. As a matter of fact, we gave them parole when we thought we could trust them back to duty. Anyhow, this man showed up and this very interesting story developed. This chap was a Britisher and he had studied at the Royal Academy of Music in London. His name was Arthur Stone and he always wanted to be a band leader in the British Army, which he thought was great. So he decided he would enlist for a year and try it out. After he signed the papers, he found out that instead of signing the British short-term enlistment for one year he had signed the British long-term enlistment for 12 years. After one or two of those years, he had enough of it. So he worked his way to Canada on some ship. Then he decided Canada wasn't the place for him. He really wanted to go to the United States. So he came down across the border and enlisted in the 26th Infantry in Plattsburgh, New York. Well, that was fine except Plattsburgh was too cold. He didn't think Plattsburgh was the place for him, so he deserted. Eventually he was picked up in Washington, D. C. As they did with many people the MPs picked up, they put

him down in Fort Belvoir stockade, which was a break for me. So he told me what a fine pianist he was. I told him I'd give him a chance to prove it.

It was in the days of the old silent movies with two troop shows, one at 6:00, one at 8:00. We used to hire some gal to sit down and play. While she was watching that movie, she would pump the piano with no interest, but there was some tone coming out of it. Remember? So I excused her one night and marched my prisoner over and had the guard sit with his rifle between his knees back of the piano stool. Stone played the piano and just wowed them. As a matter of fact, when he would stop playing the audience would stop looking at the movies and applaud. So every night at a quarter of six we would see a sentry with a rifle over his soulder marching Private Arthur Stone over to play the piano at the movies. It didn't take long to realize that I had a find here as far as the orchestra was concerned. So Stone joined the orchestra, and we built a very good one.

What happened next was this: Major Conklin was a great friend of a Mississippi Congressman, Ross Collins. He had orders to build up esprit on the post from General Markham. We already had taken over from the Cavalry orchestra. We were playing at the post dances and other affairs; that is, the post orchestra was. I was the leader of the orchestra, but I didn't play with them except occasionally. I frequently took over the leader's job and once in a while I pulled out a soprano saxophone. I seldom played the banjo with them. In any event, we got an invitation through Congressman Collins to play before what is still the number-one radio-TV station in Washington, WRC, in the fall of 1925. (Congressman Ross Collins was trying then to get rid of horses in the Army. He didn't succeed until about 1940 or 1942, but that is another story.)

We apparently did well, because the next thing I knew I had a telephone call requesting a meeting with the president of the American Hotel Corporation. They were building the George Mason Hotel in Alexandria in 1925. He heard our orchestra and he thought it was a great orchestra. So, to make a long story short, we developed simple little uniforms, called it the Golden Castle Orchestra after the Engineer insignia, and took the contract. I was the leader of the orchestra and took them on a three-day pass to Alexandria, Virginia, ten miles from Fort Belvoir. We played for the

opening of this hotel. This seemed to meet with further approval. So, to carry on from there, the next year the orchestra played for the opening of the Shenandoah in Martinsburg, West Virginia, the Hendrick Hudson in Troy, and the Cavalier in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Then we had an offer to have the enlisted men bought out and for me to resign to play in the Roosevelt Hotel in New York, which was a part of this hotel chain. I turned that down as I didn't want to be a professional musician; I was just having a lot of fun. I took no compensation. The funds earned were distributed among my men, and they were always well taken care of at the hotels. In any event, the whole time that I am telling you about this orchestra was not over a year, because after that I went to the Engineer School.

It was a very interesting episode and was frequently used by General Markham in later years as an example of the fact that you could give a young officer, who could get something done, any kind of a job and he would get it done. You asked me about something like that earlier; in this case I happened to have some, but not much, musical talent. I can't read music. I never studied music; I refused, as most kids did in those days and more of them do today. I did have sufficient knowledge and ability to play a couple of instruments and it worked.

Q: Before we leave that, I discovered a 1943 letter that you wrote to the Special Services officer, which said that you wrote the Engineer song in those days.

A: Yes, I wrote it in 1925 and it was played for many years both here and in Hawaii where I was stationed later. I think I could still have a copy in my music file.

Q: I was very interested in looking through some of your papers. It was something one doesn't see very often for lieutenants, an invitation to the White House. President Coolidge invited you to the White House in 1925. What was the occasion, and was this normal for lieutenants in the area to be invited to the White House?

A: I think this was quite normal in those days. I don't suppose the total number of officers in the Washington

area then would have exceeded 500. We had 90 at the Engineer School. The total Corps of Engineers in 1924 was only 500 officers, U.S.-wide. They weren't worldwide but we had a few overseas stations.

Q: This must have been an impressionable moment for you. Did it have an influence on you? What I am really getting at is the relationship between the military, the government, the administration, and the people. We're talking about 1925 now. Accepted? Just what was the situation.

A: We didn't feel detached from the people. Of course, I was stationed in the heart of activities, including social activities, in Washington, being nearby. I don't know the feeling throughout the country, but I never felt antagonism such as seems to exist now. No, the uniform could be worn anywhere and the greatest respect would be shown for it. It is very hard to understand how far we have fallen, and how dangerously close we are to destroying the esprit of the military and the security of the country.

Q: Sir, to be specific, let's talk about a situation that occurred back then in line with this same feeling of the relationship. Billy Mitchell made an accusation against the high command. I quote: he said, "Incompetency, criminal negligence, and almost treasonable administration of national defense," and he was talking about the use of air power. He was court-martialed for a violation of Article of War 96, found guilty, and given a suspension of five years without pay and allowances. President Coolidge reviewed that and said that he would uphold the suspension but return half the pay. Obviously, you were very much aware of this. Was there a stigma against the military? What were your feelings about General Mitchell?

A: I don't think there was any stigma against the military. I think the problem was within the military: as between the Army and the Army Air Corps then on one side, and certainly the Navy on the other. There was a failure to recognize what Billy Mitchell did recognize, and they took stringent action to suppress it. The interesting thing is that this trouble with Mitchell was really intraservice friction (which is much worse). I would rather see the services stand together (against Fulbright and people who feel as he does) than to have an intraservice fight. I'm not sure but what one of the efforts today

is to cause more intraservice difficulties and contests. I hope that the Joint Chiefs of Staff never permit this to occur. A young lieutenant in uniform, I was a little isolated from the "civilian approach," if you want to put it that way. On the other hand, I don't think the civilians themselves understood enough about it unless they were strictly partisans on one side or the other, to show much interest. Of course, the problem today is to get the majority of our people to show any interest in anything. They are the most complacent people -- dozing in the face of all that is facing us -- that the world could possibly imagine. Not because they are ignorant, but because they are indifferent.

Q: Might we say that we need more Mitchells today? People who will stand up?

A: Well, we certainly need more people who will stand up. I don't know whether this is possible any more. I mean, the McNamaras and Yarmolinskis during past administrations cut people down who stood up. That, plus repercussions from the My Lai case and many others, are having a terrific impact on the willingness of the individual officer to accept great responsibility. This is not exactly new. We foresaw it when we had the trials of the Japanese in the Philippines, which we will probably come to later. We saw it then, and we used to walk away when we had a break in the trial and walk along that seawall behind the American Embassy in Manila where we were trying General Homma. Those of us on the tribunal used to say to each other time and again, "If we had been the losers, this would have been General MacArthur on the stand." We saw it when the Supreme Court said that Yamashita was responsible for any crime committed by anybody -- the least of his troops -- anywhere in the Philippines. You could see what was coming. Then Nuremburg proved it. Now we've got it down where we are court-martialing our own.

Q: Well, Sir, let's leave Fort Humphreys and the 13th Engineers. I understand that from there you went to graduate school. I'm intrigued with that. We have a graduate school program now. I suspect that you had a very limited one. Do you want to discuss it?

A: Well, in those days, in the early 1920s, from about 1920 on, all newly commissioned officers in the Corps of Engineers were sent to graduate school. Those schools, and I might miss one or two but generally

speaking, were RPI, MIT, Iowa State in hydraulics, Cornell, and the University of California at Berkeley. Certain graduates in other branches were also sent to schools, and here I speak principally of the technical branches: the Signal and the Ordnance. In my particular case I opted for the University of California at Berkeley to take an advanced course in civil engineering. I preferred civil to electrical or mechanical or hydraulics, which were the other major disciplines involved. So I went there together with five other Engineer officers and we had a perfectly fascinating and valuable year. It was very enlightening to live among our civilian counterparts. We were slightly older than many, but not older than some in the graduate school. However, we did take certain courses that were senior-coursed in the College of Engineering such as Foundations and Frame Structures.

In graduate work we all had original research to do. Mine was in quick-setting cement, which was new in those days (1927-28). Some of my other work revolved around the design of locks and dams, which was a perfectly natural problem for an Engineer officer. We had to get honors or high honors in all subjects in order to get our masters degree in one year. We all succeeded in doing so without too much difficulty.

I think what we noted most was lack of classroom discipline as far as students are concerned, or the exercise of it by instructors. Also the fact that, while we were trained to neatness in personal appearance, the college engineer senior disdained anything that appeared to be neat. As far as personal cleanliness was concerned, that was okay. They were not the hippies of today. They didn't wear their hair long, and they weren't a ratty-looking bunch. The mark of the senior in engineering was a light-colored pair of corduroy trousers where you had wiped your drawing pen and colored pencils and what-not on the front of them -- of course, unpressed. This became a little hard for us to adjust to, but we did. All of us made many friends who have been lifelong friends. As a matter of fact, when I take off for West Point this afternoon, one of the people who is going to be with me on the board is Dean O'Brien. He retired as the dean of the College of Engineering in California but was just starting as a young instructor when I was going into graduate school over 40 years ago.

When I graduated in May 1928, I was ordered to the 6th Engineers at Fort Lewis, Washington. There was one engineer regiment in the Northwest with headquarters and one battalion at Fort Lawton, which is near Seattle, and the second battalion at Fort Lewis. I was assigned to that battalion and became the adjutant. I also commanded D Company. It was a very interesting period of one year. It was a lovely post with great atmosphere out among those pines. There was good fishing and hunting, many friends, and very instructive. One of the jobs that I had to do there that was different than I had been concerned with before was in mapping the post. At that time we had just come to the use of searchlights for mapping, and it was greatly accelerating our instrumentation and control. I was able to play polo and built the polo field there. All in all, it was a very satisfying year of troop duty.

Q: I won't ask you about the techniques that you used in handling your men. I'm sure there wasn't much of a change. The point that comes to mind, though, is what was the role of the wife during those years? Did they get involved? You indicated that you were commander of D Troop. Did the wives participate?

A: Well, a post like Lewis was some distance from any city, and consequently the post life becomes important for the women. I think they gave our children a lot more attention than they do now. For instance, while many of these girls would play bridge in the afternoon, if they had time to, it was almost an unwritten rule in those days that you were home when your children came home so that you could be there to welcome them and give them an afternoon snack. They helped them out with their problems and encouraged them to do better and all that sort of motherly love which has completely gone by the board.

In 1929, I was ordered to Hawaii. I arrived there on May 1, 1929 -- May day, payday, and lai day. I had initial orders when I was at Fort Lewis to go to Panama, but those had been changed for one reason or another. We were not opposed to foreign service at all. We had one child, born in 1925. She was four years old, my daughter. We looked forward to it. My wife was well adjusted in this respect. She wasn't worrying about her mother's apron strings and that

sort of thing which caused a lot of fine officers a lot of trouble and got them out of the service when they would have done a lot better if they had stayed in.

I was initially in charge of the recruit detachment for the 3d Engineer Regiment and division staff units. In addition to the recruit detachment, I was the post engineer, had the war reserve stocks, handled maintenance of roads, and operated quarries.

In addition, my first year there I was coach of the Engineer Staff football team. This was one of those little sidelines you get, I guess, but a very interesting one and one I welcomed. I had no problem there. All relationships, officer-to-officer and officer-to-men relationships, were good. We had a terribly active athletic program right down my alley, all any man could want to get into. We kept our men busy, and as a result our problems were relatively small. There were always some disciplinary problems, but there weren't too many. It was a fine period of service. My son was born there in 1930. I will never forget the week I arrived there, however.

I was coming from Fort Lewis, and, as usual, only had a limited amount of clothing with me. I arrived there on "May day, lai day, and payday" in 1929, and the division maneuvers started about two days or three days later. So I had to go on division maneuvers in some of my best boots and uniform clothes. They weren't "best" for long, because I didn't have my field clothes and had to go on these maneuvers. We went over the toughest trails, some of which hadn't been gone over for years. I was made S-2, intelligence officer of the 3d Engineers, so we had to see whether these trails were passable and carry out certain other missions. In fact, you had to hack your way down some of those streams and through the jungle because nobody had been through there for a long time. So my first week or so was quite memorable, but Hawaii was delightful service. We worked pretty hard from 7:00 in the morning straight through to 1:00, but there was no afternoon duty then, as it was devoted to athletics. I was either coaching football or playing polo or golf. This was a very pleasant period of two years. Let me say this. I stayed there until 1931. As far as Hawaii is concerned, we didn't know what a depression was. We hardly heard about it. We were about a year and a half behind getting the latest dance tunes over there, but by the same token I guess

we were also about a year and a half late learning that they really were having a depression in the United States. It didn't take me very long to find out after I hit the mainland, though.

Q: While you were in Hawaii, were you conscious of the level of preparations in the Pacific as they might relate to Japan? Looking back in retrospect, were there any thoughts at that time that we were a decade away from a rather great conflict?

A: Not really. We knew that there were problems that might require U. S. troops over there. At that time we had the 15th Infantry and some forces in Tientsin, and we had the 34th and other forces in the Philippines. It is true that we recognized that, at some time or other, there probably would be some problems in the Pacific. The one before had been in 1924 or 1925 when they had the terrific Tokyo earthquake and the Japs were so scared that we were going to move in to take over that they even refused our aid. The next thing was this expeditionary force planning to go to China in 1930 which, I would say, was to counter some expected Japanese action. It wasn't until after I got back to the United States in 1931 and the Manchurian incident occurred in about September of that year that we became much more aware of what was ahead. From then on it seemed to be a question of time, particularly when Secretary Stimson tried to enunciate a Stimson doctrine and get something done to stop the Japanese in the early 1930s. Of course, nothing happened. Then, in 1936, they went into China on a big scale and the chips were down. It was just a question of when.

I was a fairly good rifle shot and I knew that I was being ordered back to Camp Perry for the Engineer rifle team; as a matter of fact, I left in April 1931. But what about my future assignment? I had been requested as an instructor by two departments at West Point. I wanted to get back to the East Coast. It may have been partly the influences of my wife because she lived in New York, but there was a job for an Engineer instructor in Englewood, New Jersey, with the 104th Engineers, New Jersey National Guard, that appealed to me. So it was a question as to whether I was going to West Point to teach in one of two departments or take this job which I was told by one of my friends in the Chief of Engineers' office could be made available to me. These National Guard people were all World War I and they really wanted an older,

World War I, officer with whom they could fight World War I over again. They weren't too keen on a young instructor coming. On the other hand, I knew that, come a war, you not only need to know the professional Army but you need to know something about the Guard and the Reserve, and I thought this was an opportunity. Also it would give me a flexibility that I wouldn't have at West Point, where I'd be teaching the same subject every day for four years. So preferring something new rather than something that was staid or fixed, as interesting as the former could be, I opted for the New Jersey Guard and I got it.

As I see it now, while as an instructor I was pretty well informed (I had had five years of troop duty by then) on my duties and could hold up my end, this can still be quite a job against the combined knowledge and questions of 35 officers who individually may not be as well informed but collectively can give you quite a challenge. However, I wasn't worried by that, and by the time I had been there two years the colonel of the regiment was right on my team. I was getting good armory instruction across and I was getting good summer training accomplished. He finally made them all enroll in extension courses which I was giving, so I felt that I was being successful in my assignment.

In the meantime, the Chief of Engineers had told me that I couldn't go to Leavenworth (the Staff College) because I hadn't had "River and Harbor" duty, so my career wasn't balanced. I decided to enroll in the Command and General Staff Extension Course in which there were then 700 officers in the 2d Corps Area enrolled and only some number like 15 or 20 had ever finished it. This course leveled out at 500 hours of work, so I had to push, as my Guard job required four nights a week, to complete this course in about ten months. At least I had that on my record if I had never gotten to Leavenworth (which I did do later for a short course).

As far as West Point is concerned, it could have been interesting, although I hate repetition. I like to feel that I'm moving on to something else. As the war came along, there were a great number of people who profited by association with many of our senior officers because they had been stationed at West Point and knew them, whereas I was in a somewhat isolated position as far as getting broad acquaintances in the Army. I never felt that it hurt me in the long run, however, and even if it had I was still happy with the

decision that I had made. I was only an hour and a half away from West Point. I got up there for all the games that I wanted to see. I had many friends and classmates there; we visited back and forth. Yet I didn't have the daily task of teaching another section of math or philosophy for four years.

At my National Guard office I was alone with one sergeant. It was an Engineer regiment without a college graduate or a graduate engineer in it except the colonel. There were some good people there. There were some hard-working people. There were some about whom I couldn't say as much. One of the great jobs I had was to break the barrier that they set against commissions for college graduates. Finally, in my last year there (1935), I succeeded in getting a graduate in marine engineering from Stevens Institute in as an officer of the regiment, so when war came, they did have one engineer. He made a good record, and he stayed in the Army for a while. I've lost track of him now. It is an interesting note on some of the old National Guard units before World War II.

Q: While you were there, in fact, I have a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Wilby of the Corps of Engineers who wrote you and it said that the Chief had received a letter from Colonel Wilgus, Director of the New York Public Welfare, in which he spoke very highly of you. What he wanted you to do was to find out if, in your spare time, you could continue your work on the Professional Engineers Committee on Unemployment. He wanted you to chair this committee. What I'm asking you is that it seems that Lieutenant Trudeau had other things in mind.

A: Well, let me say this. What was the date of that letter, do you know?

Q: The letter was November 3, 1934.

A: All right. Now from the beginning of 1931 to the middle of 1934 I was a volunteer worker for the Professional Engineers Committee on Unemployment, PECU, sponsored by the four founder engineering societies and operating out of the Engineer building at 29 West 39th Street in New York City then. I spent as much of my day as I could. I would go to the Armory in Englewood early each morning and mark extension course papers. I'd take a bus about 11:30, get to New York, and take a subway downtown so I'd be at the office by 12:30 and probably grab a sandwich on

the way. I'd spend my afternoons interviewing some 8,000 professional engineers we had listed during those years, giving them either relief funds or trying to get them jobs or what not. What they wanted to do at that time, and this is creeping up to 1935, was to make me the head of it, which would have taken my full time that I didn't have to give, because I decided my last year was approaching. I had my work in the armory; in fact, I had four armories to get around to at night. In addition to that, I was doing the Command and General Staff course, so I just said, "No, I cannot take on this much extra burden." The next year, of course, is when WPA came up and this is when this background of knowledge that I had acquired doing strictly volunteer work, non-salaried, started to pay off. That was one of the big turning points in my life.

Q: What was your motivation for the volunteer work?

A: Really, it was a service to people in my profession more than anything else. As I say, it was without compensation, so that certainly couldn't have been the purpose. There were no jobs. As I told you, in Hawaii I hadn't realized the severity of the depression, and I didn't understand it that summer when I was in Camp Perry shooting in the national rifle and pistol matches. When I got to New Jersey and started looking around, suddenly I found that even though our Army pay had been cut back and I was only a first lieutenant, I was fairly well off compared with thousands of high-grade, professional men. The committee said, "Won't you give us a hand," and I said, "Yes, I will." I started going over a couple of afternoons a week. First thing you know you get really intrigued with something, and I was over there every day. Then Wilgus wanted me to take the responsibility for it, and I know the engineers in this were the ones who put him up to it, you see. I just couldn't quite take it on.

Q: Did you get involved in the CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps)?

A: Yes. As the summer of 1933 came along I was pretty available, being in Englewood, New Jersey. I suddenly got orders to Camp Dix, New Jersey. This is an interesting episode of what could happen to any officer. I went to Camp Dix, and here were a number of officers from that area who were organizing the CCC. The orders for Camp Dix were for 115 companies,

mostly to go to the West. These were 200-man companies with cadres of six, eight, or ten each from the Regular Army. So I walked in there and, as you see, 115 companies is 23,000 men. By the time I arrived there were about 9,000 men. So the colonel called me and brought in the adjutant and they made me the Mess Officer.

The story of the mess is simply this. They gave me a company of 343 teen-aged Harlem negroes to cook for 12 1,000-man mess halls, together with some privates, corporals, and a few mess sergeants who had been pulled in from various elements of Regular Army. The first thing I had to do was to run a large-scale cook and bakers school -- never mind the baking -- but the cook school primarily. I must admit, as those people poured in on us, I can't say that I was proud or would recommend it as the approved solution, but at least everybody was fed. They were fed under great difficulty, but they were fed. That was one of my first jobs. There was no talent whatever, no cooking talent or experience, in probably not over 13 out of 343 in my company. Of course, there were a lot of desertions in the camp. They would take off in all different directions. Eventually more people arrived. We got them well fed. I then took on additional personnel functions.

One fine day in July when most of these companies had been shipped to the West, I was informed that I was one of a number of officers who were going to Plattsburgh Barracks, New York, to activate a CCC camp for 13 veteran companies -- these are World War I veterans. They were the veterans who were having the greatest difficulty for a number of reasons, not excluding liquor, around Newark and New York. I was then a first lieutenant, but they figured that they needed World War I officers in command of these companies of wartime veterans, so I found myself as a lieutenant in a company. We organized 2,600 veterans who came in to Plattsburgh Barracks into 13 companies, and then on July 31, 1933, we were ordered to take them over to Vermont and detrain at Montpelier, Vermont, the capital of the state where my benefactor, Governor Weeks, was then the governor. I want to tell you about the movement of these 13 companies, some 2,600 World War I veterans from Plattsburgh, New York, to Montpelier, Vermont, where we were going to build a camp and an earth-filled dam. The date was July 31st, and that naturally was payday in the Army. However, realizing the fact that many of these veterans used to

imbibe in a little too much alcohol at times, and that money burned their pockets, it seemed wise to postpone paying them until we got over to Vermont, which was to be the next day, the 1st of August, to be sure we got them all there in fair condition. Our desires in this connection were circumvented by the Plattsburgh Chamber of Commerce, who insisted that they be paid before leaving for obvious reason that they wanted to get as many of those dollars as possible spent in Plattsburgh that night before the group left. Judging by the condition of the veterans that night when we got them back to camp, or rounded them up in the city of Plattsburgh, I think they must have left most of their dollars there, because it seems to me, and I don't think I'm exaggerating, at least 25 percent were completely inert, and had to be carried onto their trains. A terrific rain came up as we were leaving about 3:00 or 4:00 in the morning. We were feeding breakfast in the mess hall about 2:30, a final breakfast, and terrific showers and rain came up about midnight, so that the place was almost a quagmire. We had trucks round up these men in the bars and other places where we could find them . . . hideaways down in Plattsburgh. The power went off, and so the breakfast had to be held in candlelight, and to say that things were a mess in the mess would be underestimating the situation as it existed. We finally rounded up most of them, together with their baggage, although we had truckloads of baggage that were picked up later and tossed into the baggage cars. We got them down to the rail siding in Plattsburgh. It was in a deep cut and I remember we tried to line our men up on the bank, and some of them, either due to their condition or getting overly anxious, would fall down the slope in front of them, or roll down, a matter of 15 or 20 feet right down to the level of the cars. One chap, in particular, did this two or three times, and I sent him back each time because I was checking the men in my company onto the cars assigned to us. His name was Tony Vanelli. He was a little Italian bricklayer from the Newark area. So about the third time, I said, "Tony, will you get back." He said, "I've lost my baggage." I said, "We'll find it for you." He said, "I've got to have my baggage," and he kept accenting the importance of it. I couldn't imagine in his suitcase, or barracks bag, what was going to be of such tremendous value, because there was little that any of these men had, even collectively. In any event, Tony got back down and was checked in at the end of the company, when his came up at the proper time. Finally, when I

got him on the train, I said, "Tony, what have you lost?" and he said, "In my baggage is my union card, and I can't live without my union card." I said, "Well, at least for the next few months, that won't bother you much." But little did I know that during some of our construction, the problem of which union you belonged to or what you could do did come up. In any event, I assured him that we'd find his bag. We moved over into Vermont.

It was approximately 7:30AM on a beautiful August morning in Montpelier, Vermont, which was a little city of about 6,000, and people from far and near had come to see these troops appear. If there was anything a professional soldier was ever sad about it was the appearance of this absolutely terrible bunch of poorly dressed men, half of whom were drunk. Some of them were kept in the cars purposefully until later, hoping that the crowd would disperse so that we could move them out. It was a sad picture, but it was typical of trying to command, or exercise command of, a unit over which you had little authority, and of politicians who could get men paid when their commanders knew what was going to happen if they got a dollar in their hands that night. In any event, we moved in and got to work. We had some very interesting experiences. One of the assignments I had, being an engineer, was to build a camp. We had tents, but a Vermont winter lay ahead. It was a rather interesting job, but the majority of the men immediately went to work clearing the dam site and building the dam.

There were many amusing incidents that occurred. One of the very interesting ones was when Tony Vanelli came around and told me that he had gotten his bag. He thanked me profusely time and again, because his union card was found with his clothing.

Our camp didn't have any of the goodies that troops know today, and our cooking arrangements consisted of field ranges, a Number 1 and Number 2 field range. These are nothing except pressed iron frames as we knew in the old Army. No gasoline ranges, these were just pressed iron frames that you put usually on the ground or higher if you could, stuck some logs under it, and built a fire. You then cooked whatever you had on top in your pots. As we built the camp, I decided that we could do better than that, and I wanted to build a range so it could be at a height where a man could work on it instead of bending down

to the ground. Someone noticed some very good clay in a cut in the road that entered camp, and so I called Vanelli over one day, and I said, "Vanelli, that clay looks as though it would be excellent for setting up our ranges. You get some stones or whatever you can, build an oven under the range, and get it up where a man can really fry something on it at working level, 30 inches or so." He said "All right," enthusiastically. I showed him where to put it and talked with the mess sergeant. I came back in a day or so and here he was in the middle of building a beautiful field range. It was made out of brick, and on the top when it was finished, he put our field ranges.

Our kitchen became the pride of the camp of 13 companies. It worked fine and I congratulated Tony, but I was soon called over to the commanding officer's tent one day and there was one of the sheriffs from Montpelier. They asked me all about our kitchen and had I had any bricks brought into my company and where did I get them? I said, "Yes, there were some bricks brought in by one of my bricklayers. He had gone out and found them, and he'd built a fine stove and oven." Come to find out, he found them all right, but he found them in a chimney of a very old Vermont farmhouse, and they can look old. It was vacant and the people were away for the month of August, so Tony had merely dismantled four or five feet of what he thought was extra chimney on top, anyway, and made me a beautiful field range. I got Tony off and myself off the hook by buying enough bricks to have him go back and rebuild the chimney. Eventually the farmer had a better chimney than he started with. This is typical of what happened.

It was an interesting experience. The younger officers, who were available and had served for long periods in company grade, were found by their superiors to be invaluable. Without being critical, we served under a pretty fair number of officers who had not served in the lower grades much, if ever, and their knowledge about the administrative and supply problems of running a unit were quite limited. Many of them had come from higher ranking staff jobs. As a matter of fact, I remember one man who was a major on the General Staff of the II Corps area in New York who said, "They can't send me to Idaho," but he was due to be surprised, as they did send him to Idaho. He just begged for about three lieutenants who had been close to troops. One of the big problems here, of course,

and it was quite a test for the Army, was in keeping this diverse bunch of people busy, and of trying to exercise command and control over them with very limited disciplinary powers. It was quite an experience in this regard. You learned then what the old Army hadn't known before; that you couldn't exercise only the discipline of coercion which was that of the martinet (the way the Army had been run before), but also there had to be the discipline of volition. You really had to get these men on your team if you were going to get any results. If you could succeed in doing that, then the small minority of real trouble-makers were taken care of by the majority, and you could operate at a fairly respectable level of discipline. It varied from what we thought we knew in the Regular Army, but it was certainly indicative of what we were to face in World War II.

Q: What authority existed and supported you, especially in the disciplinary area? What were your legal rights in dealing with these people?

A: They were very limited. If it was anything that affected the civilian community, then you were to turn them over to civilian control. I don't think we had any court-martial jurisdiction over them. It was either a question of turning them over to the civilian authorities, fining them, or, as a last disciplinary measure, having them discharged. We had quite limited disciplinary authority. It was all military. As a matter of fact, when we moved out of Plattsburgh we were under the commanding general of the II Corps area in New York City. When we moved over to Vermont, we were under the jurisdiction of the commanding general of the I Corps area, which then operated out of Boston, Massachusetts. In our area, in all of Vermont, there was a district headquarters, like a brigade headquarters. When it came down to our particular camp, we had a Camp Commander, a major. Under him he had 13 companies commanded by captains and, since all the men were combat veterans, the Army directed that all the commanders have combat experience. Most of us as lieutenants had no World War I experience. We were too junior. As early as the fall of 1933, it was decided that at least a minimum number of National Guard instructors should be returned to their units for duty. As a matter of fact, it had left the Guard in a difficult position because they had few Regular Army instructors who were with them during their summer camp, in that summer of

1933. In my particular case, while I expected to be with the CCC through that winter of 1933-34, I was relieved and returned to my unit, the New Jersey National Guard, in October. On return to my job with the New Jersey National Guard, I stayed there until the summer of 1935.

Q: I want to ask you a question, Sir. It brings us to the present, perhaps, but it has been said that the Army should concentrate its peacetime pursuits on projects for the public good, such as ecology, engineering, and so forth. Now, based on your experience with the CCC, do you feel that such tasks would be detrimental to the Army's primary mission, which is, in effect, the security of the country and the defense of the country?

A: Well, I'd put it this way. Certainly, the primary task of the Army is the defense of the country and maintaining such units as are authorized at the highest state of readiness as possible. Nothing should interfere with that mission. In addition to that, of course, we have the work that the Corps of Engineers has done since the founding of our country -- improving the waterways -- and I think that should continue. As far as the third function is concerned, or the area that we're talking about here, I can't think of anything that's better in the way of physical conditioning and, to some degree, mental conditioning for either young men or others who are out of work, who are physically fit, and who can go out as we did in those days with the CCC to improve the natural resources of our country. I think that the value derived from the CCC, not only in rehabilitating a lot of unemployed people by giving them something respectable to do but in preparing them to meet the problems that came along with World War II, was tremendous. And, today, I resent the fact that there is a growing number of able-bodied men, particularly youth, in this country, who are doing nothing except getting paid on the relief rolls. I think they should be put to work. Where they can't do work for other qualifying reasons, certainly, we're going to help them; we've always taken care of our own. But to let able-bodied men sit around and do nothing except get into trouble, to be frustrated by their inability to do anything, to me is inexcusable and I cannot support any administration in that approach.

Q: In your current associations, do you see any move under way attempting to bring the administration around to this type of thinking?

A: I really don't. As a matter of fact, while Mr. Nixon didn't make any references that I know of to the CCC as such, he did say that we didn't want anymore WPA, and, with all regards to the limitations of the WPA, I still think it made a real contribution in its time, 35 years ago. I'm not sure but what something resembling it, better operated if possible, would fill a gap that exists today.

Q: Unless you feel that there's more to be gained by discussing further work with the New Jersey National Guard, which you went back to for another year plus (and I don't want to go from there unless you're ready to) . . . you have mentioned the WPA, and that was, in fact, the next major role that you played

A: I don't think there's anything more to say about that period of my life. I will say that my experience with the National Guard as a young officer was extremely valuable as I look back on wartime requirements dealing with the citizen soldier.

CHAPTER III

The Great Depression

Q: The first thing that comes to mind with your association with the Works Progress Administration is the name of Hugh Johnson. Do you want to talk about your association with him, if any?

A: Yes, I'd be very glad to. During preceding years, the four years (1931-35) that I was with the National Guard, I think I mentioned that I contributed as much time as I could to the Professional Engineers Committee on Unemployment in New York City. This then involved 8,000 men, all graduate engineers, and all hit very hard by the depression; in fact, there was no work for them to do. Through the four founder engineering societies -- civil, mechanical, electrical, and mining and metallurgical, as they were known then -- a very considerable amount of money was raised each year from large engineering firms and other large donors to try to ease the problem for unemployed engineers in New York City. I had walked into this when looking around to see if there was something else I could do because the daytime wasn't always too busy in the Guard. I soon found myself habitually engaged in interviewing these people and in making certain investigations to help them with either outright grants of money, small checks, maybe \$25.00, or a ton of coal here, or food orders there. In those days (1932-35) we were just feeling our way in what to do about our relief problem.

By 1934, I had been requested full time on this work to take over as secretary in charge, but, as I think we mentioned before, I was in the middle of trying to do a Command and General Staff extension course. It was to be my last year with the Guard, and I wanted to clean it up and do it, so that's what I did. In any event, the next summer Roosevelt decided that he was going to establish a nationwide WPA, and the Works Progress Administration, which was WPA, was based on the idea of at least 70% of the funds being expended on labor and not more than 30% of the funds being expended for supplies or hardware. He appointed Harry Hopkins in charge, with General Johnson switching over from the NRA to take charge of New York City, a tinderbox. General Johnson took charge on August 1, 1935. He inherited what was being done under the State Relief, which was called the TERA, Temporary Emergency Relief Administration. I arrived for duty

with him that day. He borrowed five officers from the Army Engineers, and then it occurred to somebody down in Washington that while these five had been sent up there cold, I was actually on the site and had been doing the work for four years. This was just an afterthought on somebody's part, so they asked General Johnson if he wanted my services, which he did, so I reported on the day he took over, August 1, 1935.

On the day I was put in charge of personnel we took over 75,000 people on the payroll from the state, and then the orders were that we employ 5,000 men a day until we reached a total of 225,000, which was quite a program. There weren't enough shovels and picks or anything else in New York City to do it, to say nothing about plans or programs existing to really put men to work. We had quite a problem. I remember about two weeks after we'd started that there was still insufficient work for them to do and that General Johnson received a check from Hopkins for \$1.3 million. We then had 130,000 people on the payroll, and while they hadn't really been put to work, each one of them was handed a check that week for \$10 as a little relief at the time. It didn't go far then, but think of where it wouldn't go now; it wouldn't do anything today. In any event, we pushed a lot of programs quickly through Mr. Hopkins down in Washington, and things did begin to move. We concentrated on the schools to a large extent because they were still in recess and some few projects had been prepared by the city before to try and get the money from the state, before the federals took over, so at least we were able to get into the schools. Schools were going to open in the middle of September, and because there was a dearth of approved projects for other departments in the city, most of the early people were put to work in the schools.

One of the amusing events was when the press got after the administrator, General Johnson. They said that he wasn't doing anything except in schools and there were too many people employed there. Well, we knew that, but we didn't have approved programs, so we didn't have the materials, we didn't have the equipment, we didn't have the organization set up to get into the many other city departments like Sanitation, Yards and Docks, and departments like that, so they had to be put in the schools if you were going to keep them busy at all.

I remember the press got after him one morning and he called me and he said, "Art, we're getting a complaint here, we've got too many people in the schools. Why is it?" I said, "Simply because the projects haven't been approved in Washington so that we can get them organized, assemble the equipment and supplies, and put them to work on the sewers or yards and docks or in other departments of the city government." He said, "Well, how many have we got?" It was a big number, so I said, "General, frankly we've got so many that we can't let the kids out for recess," whereupon the press and staff seemed to get a big kick out of that, and they eased up on the problem a little bit. But it was true, as a matter of fact; we had painters who were painting the inside of fences while painters were painting the outside of fences, and they had to be careful that they weren't painting each other as they passed, but this improved by fall. I will never put it up as a model of efficiency; it couldn't be. We didn't have the skills. We were fairly successful in getting such skills as we had in the right places. We were also fortunate in being able to hire a lot of men who had been in supervisory positions and who were either out of work or doing practically nothing. Furthermore, we had immediate call on some of the 8,000 engineers whom I knew a lot about because I had been working with them for the last four years. Many of them went back to fairly responsible positions at relatively modest pay, but not strictly relief pay. You still had to build incentive for them to do a top job. A lot of good work was done in those years. Every time I go to La Guardia Airport today, I get great satisfaction. La Guardia was one of our first projects, and we built La Guardia Field from the waste that the city had been piling for over a hundred years on Rikers Island, which was an obnoxious dump across the waterway from La Guardia Field. As a matter of fact, we had to build a bridge and then we started hauling all of this junk and refuse collected for over a century as fill for the area that is La Guardia Airport today.

North Beach Airport was also one of the projects. Six hundred other airports were built by the WPA in the country, a half million miles of roads, a hundred thousand bridges and viaducts. It is very interesting to note what was accomplished.

We removed, during one year, what New York City had set up as a 35-year program for removing streetcar tracks, replaced by buses. We had certain limitations

such as not working at night because of noise. We used jackhammers to tear up streetcar tracks; it's a little noisy, but there was a lot of work done. Old Fort Schuyler, which is the New York Merchant Marine Academy today, was rebuilt as a WPA project at that time. I moved to Chief Engineer from Director of Personnel and Director of the Five Borough Division, which had to do with the five boroughs. Later I was a special assistant to the administrator and tried to resolve some special difficulties there.

In the Five Borough Division we handled all citywide projects, such as the departments of Yards and Docks, Sanitation, and Education. Other projects were geared to borough budgets. In the smallest of New York City's five boroughs in population and probably the largest in size we built the Staten Island boardwalk. We built new harbors at Sheep's Head Bay; we paved Queens Boulevard. There was almost nothing that you could think of that we didn't do.

Another project was the New York City County Courthouse. That was a program that I acquired for some reason or other. It came under the Art Division. We had about 25,000 people who were doing work on the social side, social services and the arts rather than engineering. One of the most remarkable pieces of art is in the rotunda of the New York County Courthouse today. This was a program for which Tammany Hall, through the city administration at one time, had sought approval for \$250,000. It was turned down because somebody didn't think that they asked for enough, saying it was \$400,000. It was actually performed with relief labor, but with well-qualified supervision, for something over \$100,000 under the WPA. We did many things that were reasonably efficient.

In October of 1935, General Johnson departed and Victor Ridder came in as Administrator. This was like the change between night and day, between a man like Johnson who was direct and fast-moving and a quiet gentleman like Victor Ridder. General Johnson certainly was a man who could get things started. It was usually desirable to have someone come along later and clean up the job, pick up the pieces, because a lot of things fell by the wayside, but I'm not degrading him at all because he was a man to get things done, and to get things started from point zero it frequently takes a man of that type. When General Johnson left, however, they picked out Victor Ridder,

who was a very respected man, probably a second- or third-generation American, a journalist, a man of culture, a man who then was suffering from some kind of an ailment as his left arm was always swollen to three times its normal size. He sat at his desk in his office when he was there for any period of time with a hook in a band that came from the ceiling in which he could lock his wrist and hold his arm up. I knew this man for 30 years and while he got more crippled and ended up moving in a chair, he persevered. He was a tremendous character. He was a strong man; nothing ever frustrated him, nothing ever excited him. He didn't respond like General Johnson did, for instance, by escalation of his voice or his physical motions. He was always, we knew, in considerable pain. I enjoyed the satisfaction of knowing him over his lifetime, and I lunched with him as late as 1965 or 1966 and he was still the same fine courageous character. I'm sure that he lived the good part of his life in considerable pain, so this was a different-type man to work with, very much different but very satisfying. Mr. Victor Ridder made a lasting impression on me. Of course I also observed General Johnson closely and he had many characteristics that I definitely admired. What one tries to do is to observe what is best about various people. Here were two very different men, but each of them had a great influence on me.

During this period, Robert Moses was really moving in New York. He was another very dynamic man, dynamic and demanding. What he left behind him in New York constitutes a monument to him over a period of several decades. I was closely tied in with the Parks Department, which he directed. First, it was with respect to personnel; I think probably the most interesting of my meetings with Moses was caused by the fact that we had to hire qualified supervisory personnel to get other people to work. We had to have a fair degree of skill and leadership at the top. The first thing Moses did was to want to put most of his old people back to work. I might say also that the politicians weren't averse to firing their own people, and this included La Guardia and his own staff in City Hall, and then putting them back again on the federal payroll. This was one way to economize on the city budget and he did it. I'm sure it's been done before and since and will continue in the future.

In any event, there had apparently been a considerable number of people in the Parks Department who had been

hired off and on over the years or maybe fired recently in hopes of putting them back. So Moses came down with his chief engineer, Earl Andrews, a really gung-ho engineer, a tough construction engineer and a driver, a great guy and a capable man, but he wanted everything his own way and exactly when he wanted it. There are some times, however, when things have to be looked at from both sides. They presented me early in the game with a book in which they had the records and the requested salaries on some 700 men to provide the supervisory force for their people. Remember that the Parks Department during their peak worked up to probably 65,000 or 70,000 men, so this was not too unreasonable in numbers, but what they wanted was a blanket to hire these men at the recommended salaries. In a political atmosphere this can lead to a lot of shuffling around, you know, where men of lesser competence can be getting higher salaries and things of this sort. We were checking into their background with the Civil Service Commission of New York City and independently. I had put a small group to check records, particularly with the city government and the Civil Service Commission (local Civil Service Commission). I hadn't yet satisfied Moses and they used to call back each day from the day they had given me the list, "Did you approve it? Has it been put on Mr. Johnson's desk? Did you okay it today?" I guess four or five days went by and Moses was champing at the bit and Andrews was needling him to get the men, so Moses called up Johnson and was giving Johnson hell. Really he was giving me hell, telling him I was just holding up the wheels of progress. The general called me in one morning and said, "Moses tells me that you are holding up his list of supervisors and he can't get any work done or get organized until you do." "Well," I said, "I certainly don't want to hold them up. I've only had them for about four or five days, and I'll get them back to him in another couple." Moses said, "Well, I gave you a list with the names of the men and their salaries and that's all you need. Why didn't you approve it." "Well," I said, "I guess maybe I should have but in the meantime I've found that 12 of them, at least, are dead. This is one of the reasons why I haven't approved it." Well, this stunned him. I don't recall that there were any more, and within the week we approved it. This is typical of leaders who want to get things done, and it is probably more typical in the political field than in others; they try to stampede you, but I wasn't about to be stampeded by Moses or anybody else.

Anna Rosenberg was Assistant Administrator for the labor side of affairs. She had with her a confidant of General Johnson's and of the Roosevelt administration named Dan Ring, and their interests were to see that the interests of labor and organized labor be protected. You may recall that under the Roosevelt administration, and right in the midst of this, the CIO was born. We had people there like Joe Ryan of the Longshoreman's Union. There were representatives of the AFL side of it, too; George Meany was a name that was getting well known, and there were a considerable number of others. With Anna Rosenberg also was Jim Mitchell, who later became the Director of Civilian Personnel on the Somervell staff in the Pentagon during the war. We ran into the usual featherbedding where labor tried to get control of everything. I remember that at Fort Schuyler, for instance, we used a lot of air -- compressed air -- for jackhammers and whatnot, cutting through those massive walls to rebuild it as the New York Merchant Marine Academy. New air compressors were somewhat limited, I guess; but anyhow, we were using so much equipment that we had as many as seven air compressors hooked up in tandem in order to get the amount of air we needed, and yet each unit -- I can't tell you how many -- but each one of those small air compressors had between 8 and 11 men assigned to it, despite the fact that they were all hooked up together. Hell, they had an engine man, they had an oiler, they had 2 guys for three shifts each, and 2 more doing this or that. It was absolutely ridiculous. You could go up and watch this battery of air compressors and you could see maybe 50 or 60 men standing around there at a time when, as long as the air was coming out and the valves were working all right, there was damn little to do except refuel and check each shift. But these were the days when the CIO was born. I can't speak of the relative values of either one organization or the other. I merely point out that this was the beginning of the AFL-CIO struggle.

My work in the WPA and my closeness to the political and civilian scene paid great professional dividends. This was really my first exposure to organization in a big way, and this was big. To put projects together for 225,000 men, or even part of it when I had one of the divisions . . . 75,000 men was a good-size task for a young captain. We had a lot of authority and lots of responsibility. It was fascinating because of the way the political, the

economic, and the social problems across the board were all so interlocked. It was tremendously educational.

I want to mention briefly the other federal organization, the Public Works Administration, the PWA. I mentioned that the Works Progress Administration was set up on the basis of 70% for labor and 30% for other costs, meaning largely materials and equipment. The PWA, Public Works Administration, on the other hand, was supposed to be the hard-nose and efficient side of the construction business where it was recognized that 70% of the cost of a project usually goes into materials and equipment and 30% into labor. Consequently, if you tried to do a first-class construction job under the WPA, you had to pad your labor. This is what they tried to do. I don't want to be critical, because we have the parks and the beautiful swimming pools still available today, but when they wanted to build a first-class structure in a park, they figured out first the cost of materials and equipment, said this is 30% of the project cost, and added the rest in labor. So, the cost was worked out backwards, you see. This is why so many people were raking leaves in the parks. As they used to say, if it was a mowing job, "There's two comin', two goin', two sittin', two mowin'." In other words, about eight people doing about a one-man job. Why? Because enough money had to be justified to buy the concrete to build the swimming pools, the pumps, and all the rest of it. If you could get a project under Public Works Administration, which provided for ample materials and equipment, then you put in only for the needed labor.

Despite some administration comments, I think I'd rather have such programs than pay able-bodied men to do nothing except get in trouble or increase their frustration by sitting around beer parlors. There's plenty to do in this country. We need to clean the country up. I don't say that every man can use a pick and shovel; I couldn't anymore. I respect the fact that other people can't. But I think there are ways to do this, particularly when we've turned back to the labor market a million who had been in uniform at a time (1971) when men are still being laid off in industry. We'd better find something for all these people to do . . . or the physically fit of them, at least.

Q: I'd like to talk about the third administration when Victor Ridder was replaced by General Somervell, then a lieutenant colonel. I know that as your career unfolds you spend some years under the influence of General Somervell. What are your recollections of the general at this time?

A: When I came into the Army, he was a young officer, a major with 10 years of service in 1924. He had been sent over to Turkey in connection with the rebuilding of the Turkish railroad system as a very young officer. He was a man who I thought was marked from the start for great success. He did end up as a four-star general commanding the Army Service Forces during the war. I can think of very few others who could have done that job as well. He was a great organizer. He had a tremendous personality. He had a great sense of political values, and without saying anything derogatory about him at all, he used them to the utmost. He knew the men in politics, and they knew him, and they admired him. He always turned in a good job wherever he went.

Somervell was sent up to Harry Hopkins. Let me back up just a second. Somervell was sent down to start the building of the cross-Florida Canal in 1935. (It's been started and stopped two or three times.) He had seen me somewhere in the summer of 1935, said he was going to build an across-Florida canal and would like to have me along. I think he regarded me as one of the better young officers. When that folded up, Harry Hopkins got him up to Washington. He knew Hopkins, and Hopkins sent him up to New York when Victor Ridder was up there -- in about December 1935 -- to resurvey and reorganize the WPA in New York City. Ridder had made some modifications, but I guess Hopkins thought that more was needed to clean up loose ends left by the Johnson administration. So, when Colonel Somervell came up I saw him several times and he made a number of changes. To put it one way without attempting to get into detail, if you consider it was a vertical administration and that the subordinate elements were organized vertically, he changed it so that they were organized horizontally. He made these changes, put them into effect, and then he went back to Washington as an assistant to Hopkins. I don't know if he had a roving commission or what he did. This was in December 1935, and by June of 1936 we were informed that Somervell was coming up to take over in New York City. We wondered what that would mean. At that time, I was made

Special Assistant to the Administrator, as Mr. Ridder was coming under considerable attack for not getting the WPA bills paid in order to save the discounts to the government, which were substantial. I guess it wouldn't sound like much today, but what we're talking about then was about \$20 million of unpaid bills that were in clerk's bottom drawers or various places. Sometimes I think they were just put there for questionable reasons. If vendors wanted prompt payment they had to talk to the desk concerned, and whether this involved a gift of a bottle of whiskey or something, I wouldn't know. I wouldn't make any general accusation. On the other hand, there may have been people who would rather not take the discount but get the full amount for what they sold, and they could easily tell someone, "Don't push my papers through for payments."

Anyhow, there were \$20 million in back payments and it was beginning to be an embarrassing situation when they put me into the picture. It was a delicate situation because the payments were being paid by the Treasury Department, not the WPA. We turned all bills approved for payment to the Treasury Department, and they were supposed to handle it. The man heading the Treasury Department was a fine man. He lives in Massachusetts. We still exchange Christmas cards and have maintained a warm friendship despite the fact that I was in the difficult position of having to check into the operations at his office.

When we got the job done, I was given the job of moving the WPA from the Port Authority building at 8th Avenue and 14th Street up to the Cadillac-Uppercu Building, which was the old Cadillac main sales outlet near Columbus Circle. This was quite a job, involving 3,000 people, but we did it over one weekend. When people came in the following Monday morning, they each knew exactly where their desk was, which elevator to go to, and they had the same telephone extensions they had had on Friday night when they left the old office. In those days this was quite an accomplishment. Much greater things have been done since, but to me as a young officer at the time, it was a very intriguing thing to move 3,000 people and have them all at the right desk with their own equipment and their old extension numbers on Monday morning. It was very satisfying.

Colonel Somervell used to talk with me a lot when he came up, and we had some enjoyable dinners and

evenings together. My wife was down at the Jersey shore at the time. We were always good friends. He was a gourmet of sorts. We had a fine dinner and did a lot of talking. An interesting point here is that he talked about organization again. And I said, "Well, we just reorganized." He said, "How did you like it?" "Well," I said, "Frankly, I didn't like it too much as I mentioned at the time." "Well," he said, "Don't worry; you'll find one thing when you have a job like this to do: the best way to handle it is to get some degree of reorganization." So he proceeded to organize it back more closely to what it was initially, before he had reorganized it six months before. It was one of his principles, and it left you with no doubt as to who in the hell was running the show.

Q: I'm not sure how this comes in, but there was an individual who wrote a letter to the Secretary of War, requesting that you stay on as Administrator.

A: Yes, that happened and it got to be an embarrassment. The people in New York, particularly on the political side . . . I don't know that they were particularly feeling that I had done any exceptional job, and I don't think that I had participated in any machinations that were to give them any comfort, but they didn't know Somervell; they did know me. So they came to me and said, "We think that you're the man who ought to stay here and run the show," and I said, "Well, this is not in the cards. I'm just a youngster, I don't have any tie-in with Hopkins." As a matter of fact, they had checked already and found out that I voted for Hoover in 1932, so I wasn't expecting anything from this administration. They said, "Well, frankly, you are doing a good job and the main reason we want you is because we have confidence that you can do a job, and we'd rather have somebody that we know and have observed, than to have somebody coming in cold that we don't know." So that's about what happened there. None of this was my instigation, and it caused me some embarrassment because the Chief of Engineers wrote me, under the assumption that I was trying to perpetuate myself in New York. Actually, he had told me before that I couldn't even go to the Command and Staff College at Leavenworth until I got into River and Harbor work, so I wasn't particularly anxious to stay on this particular job and soon went to the Seattle Engineer District.

I gained great experience and insight here that proved invaluable throughout my career and later life. Evaluating the leadership characteristics of principal men I served under -- General Hugh Johnson, Victor Ridder, and then later General Somervell -- has been fascinating. We also had many amusing incidents, particularly with a fellow as fiery as little La Guardia, the mayor, who was a fascinating man because of his dedication to improving the lot of his people. There was no doubt in my mind about that, and I think that he was probably as honest as a man in his position can be. This is not saying that the people under him didn't stray from the line, but he was quite a remarkable man in many ways; anyway, we had a lot of amusing incidents with him as we went along. It was always quite a pleasure to take a trip with him. He would explode, of course. His secretary in those days was Clendenin Ryan, and he fired him about once a week and then would wonder why he wasn't there when he called him next. I remember one time when he told Clen to get out and never appear again, and Ryan went back to his office and about three minutes later La Guardia started jumping on the bell to call him in. He heard it ringing -- as a matter of fact I did, too, as I happened to be there with him -- but he didn't do anything. So La Guardia stuck his head out of the door, and he said, "Goddammit, Ryan, why don't you come in here? Don't you hear me ringing for you?" Ryan said, "Yes, I heard you, Mr. Mayor, but you just fired me and I'm cleaning out my desk," and he said, "Well, Goddammit, get in here or I'll fire you again." That's the kind of man he was.

I remember once we went over to an orphanage, over in Queens, and the Borough President of Queens was a fellow by the name of George Harvey, who had been a tank commander in World War I, and George was a pretty tough guy. He was a Republican, believe it or not, and not a supporter of La Guardia. It's hard for me to think that a New York borough could be governed by a Republican; but, anyhow, we went to Queens with General Johnson, La Guardia, and whoever was heading the Department of Education. It was a Catholic orphanage, and we were met at the bottom of some steps by the nuns and a bunch of children. As you might expect, there were a few negro children in the group, and there was one little negro boy who was right down in front. He wasn't in the front row, but he was in about the second or third row, and he stood out among the other children because he was black. He was about maybe six or seven years old. La Guardia was there

with his black hat on, George Harvey was near him; General Johnson and the rest of us were sort of taking an overview of the situation. The Mayor started speaking to the children and asking them questions, and finally he shakes hands with the little negro boy and says, "What's your name, my little man?" The little fellow said, sort of pouting, "Well, it's Fiorello, but I'm not very proud of it." And so La Guardia, instead of saying anything to the little fellow at all, turns around to George Harvey, and said, "God damn you, George, I'll get you for this," right in front of all of the kids, but that was typical of him.

We ran into lots of offers, of course, where there were cuts that could have been taken on the side. To those of us in the military, I don't think that there was any great temptation. The opportunities were certainly there, but we did our best to keep it honest, straight, and level.

CHAPTER IV

River and Harbor

Q: You moved from there to Seattle. What was your first job in Seattle? How did you get there? Did you take your family there? Let's discuss that.

A: Yes, I drove out by car in September. I took a leave and went up to see my parents in Vermont, bought a new car, and then started driving west with my wife and my two children. It was a delightful experience. We spent a little time in Yellowstone, and then went on to Seattle, where I'd never been before. We lived at Fort Lawton, initially. It was a military post, and they had quarters that they gave us until I could find a place in Seattle. I was a captain; in fact I'd been made a captain since the day I reported to the WPA, August 1, 1935, which was when the new law went into effect that made me a captain because I'd had more than ten years' service. In Seattle there were two Assistant District Engineers. One had the Administrative side and I had the good fortune to be the one that had Operations, or the outside job. It was fascinating. I had a fairly free play from the Great Divide in Montana to the Pacific; in other words, Western Montana and Idaho, most of the State of Washington except the lower Columbia River, and Alaska. We had a lot of work going on, and because of my background in the East, the civilian administrator of the WPA for the State of Washington, a chap named Nicholson, asked for me to head up a number of projects there. I had a considerable number of Engineer projects on the rivers of the Northwest; in fact, we had projects on about every river in the State of Washington. This was particularly true over on the Olympic Peninsula, where we had a lot of Indians on relief status, so we had WPA projects improving the banks of the rivers and making a lot of other improvements. It was simple but interesting as we enjoyed a lot of travel, a lot of outdoor work with good hunting and fishing mixed in. So we had four of the happiest years of our life in the Northwest.

The District Engineer at first was Colonel Herbert J. Wild. Colonel Wild retired while I was there (retirement age was 64 then), so you can see he was fairly well advanced in years. He was a graduate of the Pennsylvania Military College, a very nice person but a gruff old fellow. He'd buffalo you if you let him do it, but if you stood up to him he treated you

pretty fine, and I enjoyed a very nice relationship with him.

Our Division Engineer in Portland was Colonel John C. H. Lee. He arrived in early 1937. The former Division Engineer of the Northern Pacific Division had been Colonel Robins, who became the Chief of Engineers in Washington later. Lee was a man of splendid character. He bothered a lot of people because he seemed rather stiff-necked and rigid in his approach, but he was a very high-minded gentleman, and I learned a lot from him. I had great respect for him. He was more rigid than I was in some ways and I observed that and its impact on some people, both above and below him, which helped me, although I didn't emulate him in that regard . . . or tried not to, anyhow. Lee was a man who definitely saw the war coming. He was from the class of 1909 at West Point and maintained a close liaison with the G-3 of the 9th Corps Area at the Presidio of San Francisco, who was then Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Ridgway, later Chief of Staff and another man who became a longtime friend of mine.

In those early days, particularly 1939, we saw the war coming very definitely and we started taking extra long looks at Alaska, which included plans for shipping prefabricated barracks for cantonments both on Kodiak and Dutch Harbor. Ridgway and Lee both saw it coming, but they had to convince their superiors too as to what should be done in Alaska. So over and above our normal river and harbor work, I began to get enmeshed in what amounted to some of the early war planning for Alaska, which to me was fascinating. At that time I still had what was called Mud Mountain Dam as one of my projects, and we were starting the early work on what later became the Hungry Horse Dam over in Montana in the Glacier National Park.

Harry Kelly was the editor of the Kalispell Monitor. He was a leading businessman and one of the great promoters of the Hungry Horse Dam and anything else that would develop Western Montana. We had some work at Kalispell, on the Bitterroot River, and on the Clarks Fork at a number of dam sites where dams have since been built.

Q: I want to relate to you a sequence of events. I'll mention some names, and I've got the feeling that you had a great deal to do in insuring that work in the Clarks Fork Basin got the congressional approval that was needed. I have a letter written to the Congressman Thorkelson.

- A: Yes, House of Representatives. He was from Butte, Montana.
- Q: And then Congressman White, Committee on Irrigation and Restoration, wrote a letter to John H. Wourns, in Wallace, Idaho, and he thanked him for a speech that apparently Mr. Wourns had sent him, and Congressman White had it inserted in the Congressional Record on February 1st as his own, and he thanked Wourns. I had the impression from reading through your files that Mr. Wourns didn't write that speech, but that perhaps Captain Trudeau had written it?
- A: Yes I did. We had to find a way to get some of those things done. The relationship between Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana and President Roosevelt was such that anything Wheeler wanted was blocked for the Northwest, and it wasn't until he had repaired his relationship with Roosevelt that we were able to move beyond some of the elementary stages of surveys and engineering on the Hungry Horse. It's now a great dam.
- Q: Now, let's look through this scrapbook and perhaps bring some incidents to mind. I think you mentioned Guy Atkinson, who had something to do with the Mud Mountain Dam, which has a rather unusual name.
- A: Yes, he was the prime contractor for the Mud Mountain Dam, which was a structure upon the White River near Enumclaw, Washington, about 50 miles from Seattle. There is a little story connected with this that I think is interesting because of military implications. This dam was peculiar in that it had vertical walls almost 400 feet high and it was difficult to build a dam at the site because the rock walls only went up for 200 feet and the top 200 feet were glacial till. This, because of stress and strain, makes it very difficult to lock in or anchor a rigid dam such as a concrete dam. So we decided that we'd build a rolled earth-filled dam; as it finally came out, it was modified into a rock-filled dam. But I think the most interesting story from the military standpoint has to do with the naming of the dam. Obviously, Mud Mountain Dam is not something that assures you a feeling of safety, and it used to bother us that people down below on the river didn't feel too comfortable about a 400-foot Mud Mountain Dam above them.

I started looking for the name of someone to name this dam for, and in doing so I came across the name (by going to a Professor of History at the University of Washington) of the man who had most to do with the development of Washington into a territory. He later became its first governor, and his name was Isaac Ingalls Stevens. Having found that out, I went into his history to quite an extent, and then after convincing our own people in the Engineers that we should give it a better name (because this required Congressional approval), we got Senator Schwellenbach to do whatever was necessary to put in a bill to name it after the first governor of the territory, Isaac Ingalls Stevens Dam. The war came along, however, and it never passed Congress. What makes it still interesting is this, really two points: first the history of the man, and second the way I had occasion to tell his story.

In the early 1850s there was a terrific contest between the North and the South as to who would build a railway to the Pacific and open up the country. You remember the trek to the West through the center of the country and the California gold rush in 1849. Well, we knew a lot about northern routes, of course, because of Lewis and Clark's exploration in 1807. We knew something about southern routes to the West, although that had only been taken over, as you remember, a few years before from the Mexicans. When President Pierce came into power in 1853, he decided to send an expedition to the Pacific to see what routes should be developed. Captain Isaac Ingalls Stevens of the Corps of Engineers was selected to head up this job. Stevens went to St. Louis to organize his supplies and then moved north to St. Paul.

On the 20th of May 1853, he moved west with about 200 Indian scouts, soldiers, and surveyors, and he reached Olympia, Washington -- 2,000 miles to the west -- on Christmas Eve of 1853, having surveyed in a very general way the Dakotas, Montana, Idaho, and Washington, and having marked out to a very large degree what became the routes of all three of our major transcontinental railroads: the Great Northern, the Northern Pacific, the Chicago-Minneapolis and St. Paul. He was then appointed the first governor of Washington Territory.

Back in Washington, D. C., however, the southern interests said, "We must get these routes to run through the South, we've got the better climate, and

they can't get through the North, anyway. Jefferson Davis was the Secretary of War, so he picked out another Army officer named George D. McClellan, of later Civil War fame, to prove a northern route to the Pacific was not feasible. McClellan took the portage across Nicaragua, which was the quickest way to the Pacific in those days, then took a sailing vessel to Seattle, and arrived in the Puget Sound area. He faced the Cascades Mountains and made two or three passes to get through the Cascade Range and satisfied himself that no railroad could ever be built through the Cascades. He went back to Washington and so reported to Secretary Davis. On the other hand, Stevens came back in 1854 and reported that they could, and he had the topographic data. In other words -- to finish this part of the story -- Stevens won and thereby was developed a lifelong enmity between Stevens and George B. McClellan.

All right, now what about these fellows, both graduates of West Point, both serving under Robert E. Lee in the Mexican War in 1846. They knew each other and had a pleasant relationship at that time. As a Governor of Washington Territory, Stevens went back to Congress annually as its delegate. When the Civil War broke out, he volunteered for active duty and became a colonel. McClellan was then a brigadier or major general and still hated his guts because Stevens had disappointed him by showing that the railroad could be built through the North. McClellan was not a Southerner, but he'd been serving a Southerner and his findings had been proved wrong. Out of spite, McClellan gave Stevens a couple of dirty jobs, one of which was to take over a regiment of New York Zouaves that had rioted around Baltimore. Stevens got them back in shape, and then he got his star. He eventually was killed about a year or so later at the Battle of Chantilly while leading his troops in a charge.

I said there was a second reason why I found this story of interest. I was the chairman of our annual West Point dinner in Seattle in 1939. We alternated those dinners . . . one year at Fort Lewis and the next year in Seattle, as there were quite a number of officers in Seattle on duty. The 1939 dinner was scheduled for Seattle. I had asked the G-3 of the 3d Division from Fort Lewis to come up and give the talk, then Lieutenant Colonel Dwight Eisenhower. He was in quite some demand even in those days; at the last minute he couldn't come. I talked it over with our

committee and since this happened so quickly, they said, "You give the talk," so I picked on this Isaac Ingalls Stevens story. I think I knew it before, but as I reviewed his biography I realized this was telling a very interesting story about a young officer in peace and in war and the political repercussions he faced. It was also very interesting because he was the number-one man in the class of the 1839 at West Point and this was the 100th anniversary year.

A year or so ago, my friend Bob Stevens, former Secretary of War and a man that, I think, along with Ridgway picked me to be G-2 of the Army at the time of the McCarthy hearings, gave a talk at the Carl Mundt Library dedication in South Dakota; in this talk, he identified as his ancestor Isaac Ingalls Stevens. Bob knew that he had the mission to the West, and we have enjoyed reminiscing at length about the interesting matter of his distinguished ancestor.

Q: We've just about wound up your activity with Rivers and Harbors in Seattle, and obviously the cloud of war was starting to form in 1939. You've already indicated that many of you there recognized that something was soon to happen.

A: Yes, we thought we saw it definitely coming. As a matter of fact, it might surprise people to know that as early as 1936, when I was with the WPA in New York, I had a certain offer made to me to help the British get set up to buy munitions from us in the United States. The day war was declared between Germany and Britian, after the advance into Poland, I was in an Engineer yacht pulling into the harbor of Victoria, British Columbia, early on a Sunday morning, when a boat put out to meet us. It was only then that we learned that the war had been declared, at least by Britain, and to us it just became a matter of time when we'd be in it.

I was anxious because as I said I was more inclined toward the combat soldier end of it, the military end of it, than I was the engineering. I'd gone into the Engineers because I thought there were exceptional opportunities there to get a lot of responsibility at an early age -- and this I found was true -- and avoided a lot of repetitive training that seemed unproductive to me. I think I mentioned once before that the Chief of Engineers said that I couldn't go to Leavenworth (our Staff College) until I'd been on River and Harbor work. Now I thought I'd had enough

of it, and I was hoping I'd get ordered to Leavenworth. I was quite happy in that fall of 1939 to find that I would go to Leavenworth in 1940 to take the regular course. With war in sight, things developed rapidly, of course, so the next thing I knew I wasn't going to Leavenworth because there wasn't going to be a regular course at Leavenworth; I was ordered to troops. I was ordered to the 8th Engineers, 1st Cavalry Division.

CHAPTER V

Getting Ready For War

A: My orders to the 8th Engineers at Fort MacIntosh, Texas, were countermanded during the winter and I was ordered to Fort Ord, where the 7th Infantry Division was going to be activated. I arrived in early July 1940, and much to my satisfaction I found that I was going to be assigned to the 13th Engineers. The 13th Engineers during World War I was a Railway Regiment. It later became a General Service Regiment, and it was my first assignment. After it was inactivated in the 1930s it became a reserve unit, I think at Iowa State University. In 1940, it was reactivated as a Regular Army unit in the 7th Division, which, of course, had been inactive since World War I, too.

There were 12 officers there when I arrived, including General Stilwell, so I found myself as a captain in command of the 13th Engineer Battalion, my first organization in the Army. I was also commanding the 7th Signal Company. This lasted pleasantly for six weeks or so. Of course, the Signal Officer came along, and then a major came along and took over the battalion, so I dropped back to executive, but at least it was very satisfying. I wrote and found out where the colors were from the Chief of Engineers and he said they were up at Iowa State. I got them to ship the colors and the typewriter, and some other items that they had as part of the unit equipment. Then my daughter arrived in time to present the colors to the battalion. It was quite a day for me, and for her, I'm sure. She was then 15 years old. She'd been a baby at Fort Belvoir (then old Fort Humphreys) where I was first stationed. Incidentally, it occurred to me that since the organization had been inactivated around 1930, where could I find any unit insignia? I wrote back to the post exchange officer at Fort Belvoir, and, lo and behold, he had about 200-300 of the metal insignias that had been left for some ten years in storage, so I got them. I had a cadre of 20 enlisted men from the 2d Engineers. They weren't the greatest, but I felt that a little motivation could make them twice as good as they were, or thought they were, so I boosted them all a grade. We tried to develop esprit and a sense of responsibility, and I must say that these old soldiers responded beautifully. They did a great job. We were still wearing the campaign hat in those days, so in order to

preserve these insignias for the troops themselves when they arrived (Remember, I just had a cadre), I gave them each one of these insignias, which they put in the center eyelet of their campaign hats.

Then we got the troops. The strength of the battalion -- it was a typical Engineer battalion -- was 300 to 350 men. They came from the Kansas-Oklahoma area, so we had a lot of good, hard-working youngsters, a lot of farm boys whom weren't afraid to get their hands dirty and who hours didn't bother, so I had a real good tough-minded outfit. From my standpoint, we made excellent progress. The next thing I knew, the Pentagon decided that the Engineer Battalion had to be doubled in size to do the expected job, and then the new Table of Organization (TO) came out for nearly 700.

I found out that this increment was going to be filled by draftees from the Chicago area, and extra grades for noncommissioned officers were also allotted, too. I was under some pressure immediately before they arrived to distribute all these grades to the then battalion of 300 men. I said, "No, I'm not going to do it. Any of you here who are now deserving of the grade are going to get it, but I'm going to keep most of these vacancies and you're going to have to compete with these others for them." And that's just the way it worked out. These draftees from the city didn't have the skills most country boys had, but they had more education and at least the same level of intelligence. They learned fast, and this competition between the two groups was the best thing that could have happened. We tried to award promotions strictly on merit. We'd graduate them from recruit training, basic training, and give them one insignia. We found these little things, not very big perhaps, but important. When we were ordered to send new cadres out to new units, I had two cadres nominated from each company, and they never knew which one was going. The result was that, when the cadres shipped out (largely to the Engineer School and Fort Leonard Wood), we usually got letters back praising their quality. We weren't shoving our poorest men off on anybody, and it paid dividends. It didn't hurt us; in fact, it helped us in the long run because it built esprit.

Q: I want to ask the old question of which is more important: command, staff, or perhaps a new factor, contact with the outside world. Do you feel that there's an answer?

A: I think command is the more important because until you've got the monkey on your back, you never know how to get it off. I don't think there's any question but what command is the more important. I think that exposure to the facets of life other than military -- in other words social, political, and economic -- and mingling with people in other walks of life so that you can get a decent appraisal of their viewpoints, even if you don't agree with them, is essential. I think this is important in the broad development of a competent commander or of a competent individual. That is why I believe service with our civilian components in time of peace is so valuable in learning how to handle civilian soldiers in time of war.

In addition to my assignment I was also the Engineer instructor for the Engineer Reserves in the Seattle District. When I would visit a project, that would be the night for training. There would usually be a number of the contractor's people, as well as our own employees, who had Reserve commissions or they'd come in from the colleges or other nearby places. I learned a tremendous amount as an instructor with the Guard and the Reserves, maybe a little more with respect to the Guard, because it was more continuous training.

Early in the autumn I was assigned to take an assault course at Belvoir. The Assistant Chief of Engineers, General Sturdevant, visited the battalion and he saw some ingenious work that we were doing with ammunition, booby traps, assault of bunkers, and deception. This was intriguing for the officers and men; for instance, company commanders would buy 50 mousetraps and a reel of wire and batteries, the mousetraps being for setting off the detonating cap and the charge. This was fresh thinking and these fellows got real ingenious. We used to try to give at least an extra pass to a soldier who would come up with a new idea for a new device.

In the fall of 1940 -- you remember France and the low countries had been overrun -- we studied the German tactics carefully. For instance, we found that the British, in their withdrawal, had frequently caused considerable delay to the Germans by stripping the restaurants of dinner plates as they withdrew, leaving them one by one in the middle of the road. A German tank crew would stop and get out at first. Then they'd get careless, and about the tenth one they hit would really be booby-trapped, and up would go the

tank or truck. Things of this sort really slow down your movements.

About 30 of my contemporaries were with me in this assault course, which really set the pattern for Engineer doctrine during World War II. The real stimulus was probably the German assault and capture of Fort Eben Emael in Belgium, using demolitions and flamethrowers, to attack with small forces and special assault techniques.

Q: You indicated that there were no crises. I noticed that on January 26, 1941, a newspaper report mentioned your name; that the 13th Engineers brought war conditions close to newspaper men here this weekend -- almost too close -- and it talked about sending a group of correspondents and photographers scurrying for cover and smashing the camera and tripod of George Smith, Carmel freelance photographer. Smith had been warned by Captain Trudeau, Executive Officer of the 13th, that he was in a danger zone. I guess you must have convinced these people.

A: I guess I convinced them. I'd forgotten that.

Q: Sir, you eventually were on your way to Fort Leavenworth but instead of going to school, you went as an instructor? Is that correct?

A: No, that's not quite correct, but you're 50 percent right. What happened was that I was ordered to the third Special Course at Leavenworth, which was about a nine-week course, and I started in March 1941. The amazing thing was that when I got there, as I reported in, I was told that the commandant wanted to see me, whereupon I reported to him, General Karl Truesdell. He talked to me for a while and then said, "Well, I hope you do well in the course because you're going to stay as an instructor," and I said, "I am? Sir, I didn't know that." He said, "Yes, you're going to stay as an instructor, so do your best in the course." Well, I intended to do my best anyway, but that was it.

Q: Before we get you to Leavenworth, were there any thoughts you had on your duty with the 13th Engineers that you want to discuss before we go on?

A: Not particularly. It was a fascinating period of troop duty, though, because we knew what we were going to do, that we were going to be used somewhere,

somehow, and by somebody soon. We all felt that we were part of a good division. We put a lot into it, and we got a lot of satisfaction out of it. Several new officers who joined us were successful in war and they have been since; two of them, for instance, both second lieutenants at the time, are highly successful executives of very successful construction companies today.

So let's move on to Fort Leavenworth.

CHAPTER VI

The Staff College

A: You remember that I told you that I had completed the Command and General Staff Extension Course while on National Guard duty in 1934-35. This course was very condensed. However, I think the problems were hitting the right spots and it showed up best in the fact that, despite the vast increase and varied background of several hundred thousand officers during the war, we still had a system where you could transfer, lose, promote, or change men. Yet, the overall operation of a General Staff at division or higher level remained well standardized and, in most cases, was very well done. Of course, it varied according to the caliber of the commander and his staff to some degree, but I think, as Winston Churchill said, it was a remarkable performance. The Command and General Staff Course at Fort Leavenworth was really the yeast in solving the problem of pulling officers together from so many different backgrounds -- Regular, Guard, and Reserve -- from so many different branches, from so many different sources in civilian life, and developing leaders and a General Staff system that worked and worked well.

I don't think anybody could foresee what was going to happen with any clarity at all. We knew something big was going to happen but these were the men who had to be put on the starting line to be followed by those who, either through good fortune or through their own talents, ran faster and went farther than their comrades.

In June I graduated and went back to Fort Ord to get my family. My division at that time was down at the Hunter Liggett Reservaton on a maneuver. I had about ten days leave to pack up my family and move. We lived in Carmel and drove back in time to get to Fort Leavenworth in early July. I went on duty as an instructor in mid-July and I was very pleased because, while I was an Engineer instructor, I was also an instructor in land warfare that used the broader knowledge that I'd gained in the Assault Course at Fort Belvoir. I was also selected as head instructor for the new motorized division charged with preparing the doctrine. This shook some of my associates in the other Combat Arms that an Engineer should be so selected.

Later I was charged with the preparation of special problems together with Weary (Walter K., Jr.) Wilson, who became later the Chief of Engineers. We shared the same office and put together the first amphibious assault problems.

We tried to write a problem to launch ground attack in new territory and use new maps. Every problem involved fighting on the Gettysburg terrain or Fort Benning maps, so a couple of us tried to get into new areas. This didn't meet with the approval of some of the Old Guard, but we did succeed.

One we placed in Kansas. I wrote a problem which assumed the invasion of the St. Lawrence Valley, which is not an impossible one to envision even yet. Then I prepared the outline for one, with an assault on Dakar in Africa, or the area south of it, because we knew that all the gold in the Bank of France was stowed away in a place called Kayes, up one of those West African rivers. I could envision the need for an amphibious attack to get it some day since we had lost France. That was pooh-pooh'd because we were "still on speaking terms with Vichy France."

By December we were at war, and before any word of its amphibious aspects were defined we could see that the crossing of the English Channel was going to be an obvious requirement, so Wilson and I put a problem together crossing the English Channel. We wrote the problem during the winter of 1941 and early 1942 and proposed landing on what became Omaha Beach. As a matter of fact, we were so close to a large part of the operation as it was carried out in 1945 that eventually our problem was changed and restricted.

Q: Now, when you say we worked up, or we considered we were going to have to get involved in this, are you talking about Wilson and yourself, or were there people at the school who were thinking ahead. Could you feel this movement developing? I was interested in your comment about fighting the Civil War, because that's what I meant when I said, "Did you learn anything at Leavenworth?" I suspect that we were prepared to fight the last war better than the present one.

A: Well, there is something to that, but, as far as staff planning and education, it was not badly done. There was too much repetition there in the long course, in my opinion; maybe some people needed that degree of

repetition, but I don't think the majority of the better students did, and it must have been deadly when they had a two-year course there (1930s), because they were not covering anything beyond this scope, and they were taking twice as long to do it. We were doing it in three months. I don't say we were doing what they did in a year, but I bet you we were damn close to approximating it.

Q: In 1960 I went to Leavenworth and your son-in-law was there. We had a conversation one day, and I recall very vividly when he said, "I was fortunate, because I went to the associate course, and my father-in-law has remarked many times that it seems almost a waste of time to spend so much time doing something that you can do well in four months." So what you're saying now is something that you had said over ten years ago that I think is interesting.

A: Well, I still believe it, and, you know, there were graduates of classes before World War II that took with them their book of approved solutions. And cases have been known -- I don't want to generalize -- but cases have been known where the actual operations orders for units in combat were literally written from one of those old problems at Leavenworth with as few changes as possible, depending on the terrain.

Q: Let's talk about this for just a bit. What is it that set you aside perhaps and had you surge ahead? I just wonder if we don't perhaps train some fast thinkers and a lot of slow thinkers. In other words, if we set the stage to give someone lots of time to do something, he may never learn to do it any other way except with lots of time. Would you like to talk about that?

A: Well, I think in education as a whole, that we have been very backward in evaluating capacity. A and B may be able to turn out work of the same relative quality given a week, but if A can turn that same work out in two days and it takes B a week to do, then obviously, one A man can do the work of two B men. There hasn't been much attention given to that factor and, with the trend in modern education to drop the level of the curricula to the level of the majority of those present, we may be aggravating it even more than it has been. If it gets more aggravated in the future than it has been in the past, you can see what we may be leading into. On the other hand, the present attitude at West Point, which is to give credit for

accomplishments and not force needless repetition by providing elective courses for either broadening in scope the effort of the individual or advancing him in a particular field, is certainly a major step in the right direction.

Q: Sir, on 15 December 1941, you wrote a letter to Terry Allen that you were concerned about the role of armor. You said that it was road-bound and the tactics were helter-skelter. I'm just wondering; did we make proper changes, or were our improvements finally written in blood in North Africa? Did we really learn anything? You seem to have had some perceptive comments there.

A: I was on the Carolina maneuvers in 1941. I was down there as a major observing for the Command and Staff College. My particular forte or field was to look into the tactics, techniques, and mobility of the new motorized division which was just being organized. It was one of our first efforts to recognize the critical need for increased mobility on or near the battlefield. Of course, we've come a hell of a long way since then. Terry was on this task force as the commander, and he made me the chief of staff of this fast-moving outfit. It was quite obvious from what we had available that we were not going to do much cross-country unless we had exceptional opportunities like the desert or on wide-open prairies. We've certainly come a long way since then. The new tanks, while they're heavy, have terrific maneuverability. I think the next generation probably will be better; I think they should be lighter. We've still got to get them so the ground pressure is getting less and our offensive power, our armament, greater and more accurate. I'm beginning to think that as far as the armor, or armor plate, is concerned, that we'd better change our attitude because it is now possible to develop armament that can penetrate about anything that you can build. If that's the case, then I think that we have to get away from our old idea of making it so heavy it can't be penetrated and make it light enough to stand anything except a direct hit at a critical point and give us the added gun accuracy and range, mobility, flexibility, and maneuverability to counter the threat. That has always been my attitude, but it's not the attitude of a lot of people in heavy armor. I can't speak as an expert on it, although while I have never experienced a tank battle, I certainly think that during my career I was exposed enough to combat and R & D to qualify.

Q: On 29 December 1941, you wrote a letter to Bill Russell and admonished him, "Don't let the fetish for speed lead to inadequate orders." I used to get the feeling as a youngster that we really weren't paying too much attention to detail, and sometimes it's not necessary. Obviously, this is your admonition here. Do you think that they have improved?

A: Yes, I think we've improved. I think one reason we've improved is because we've vastly improved communications. If any commander's worth his salt, he ought to be able to maintain good communications, as a rule. If he can't do that, then he's not a good commander.

Q: We might, before we go on here . . . You just mentioned that you were with Terry Allen, and the last time we talked about your rank, you mentioned that you were a captain. You became a lieutenant colonel on the 24th of December, 1941.

A: That's correct, so I must have been a major. That was September or October.

Q: But I think it's interesting that when you went to Leavenworth, you went as a major (you were promoted to major on 31 January 1941) but then you were promoted to lieutenant colonel on 24 December 1941, which was 17 days after Pearl Harbor, and later on 24 June 1942, you were promoted to a full colonel. So in a period of 18 months, you went from a captain to a full colonel.

Thinking back -- and I know we always feel that it's about time -- do you feel that you were ready for each of these grades, in your own perception of things at the time? Okay, let's talk about the other aspect. You were 17 years waiting to move out of the company-grade ranks. Do we ever want that situation again? Are there good points to it, are there bad points to it, would you like to discuss that?

A: Yes, 17 years is a long time. Everything is relative. Your classmates, your associates, those with the same time in grade . . . if it took five years to go up to the next grade, that didn't bother us particularly. My class thought we'd wait -- I think it was 22 years -- to get our captaincies and would retire as lieutenant colonels. People as capable, and let's say ambitious, too . . . people like Clay, Casey, or Leavy . . . I could name a

hundred in there . . . weren't discouraged, although they were lieutenants for 17 years. They might not have liked it, but it didn't cause them to give up their career; and, by the same token, neither can you buy a good Army simply by thinking you can go out and pay for it. This is what I'm trying to say. I think promotion has gotten too rapid in some grades. I don't believe that a lieutenant really learns his job, except in a superficial way . . . I mean his real job, his overall job, a real intensive knowledge of his job, in 18 months. I think that well could be three years. I'm not just trying to slow it down, but we used to laugh at a Mexican Army where everybody had to be promoted once a year, and while we're not that bad, we've gotten a little bit like it. On the other hand, I do say this; that certainly when war comes, you want to be getting your general officers from people with around 15 to 25 years of professional service. You don't want to wait until they're 55. The physical and mental demands are too great on them then, much too great; and by the same token I think your battalion commanders need to be down around 30 or 35.

Q: We've seen now promotions to a captain in two years, promotions to a first lieutenant in one year. The Army has attempted to justify this, not on the fact that it needed to be done but on the fact that it is enough time. You've made that point that we're doing it too fast. I agree with you.

What do you think . . . now you said three years, and I'm not sure whether you're talking about three years as a second lieutenant, and then another period as a first lieutenant. What do you think might be a good ballpark figure for time and grade as a first and second lieutenant? Obviously you're a separate individual when you're a captain, different responsibilities.

A: Yes. I would settle on two as a first lieutenant, five to captain and ten to major, total service. Seventeen years to a lieutenant colonel and maybe up to 25 to colonel.

Q: On 8 December 1941, you responded to a letter from a General Lee. I think he'd offered you a job and you made a comment that the outlook at the present time was that a successful G-3 has a better prospect of getting higher command. What you were talking about then was that a Division G-3 might do better than an Engineer battalion commander. Do you want to discuss that?

A: Yes. Well, an Engineer officer almost never got combat command or staff assignments. This has been dominated always by the Infantry, Armor, and Artillery branches. Since the Civil War, an Engineer officer had about as hard a time of qualifying and being accepted as a combat commander as a negro with some white blood does of passing over to the white race, if you know what I mean. That's been less true of later days, but it still remains a challenge for anyone in the technical services, as far as I know, to ever get as far as the Vice Chief of Staff, despite the importance of logistics to the Army.

You know, I found out another thing, and I'll tell you this. We haven't come to the War College yet, but I analyzed, but never published, the composition of the first classes of the War College. I'm talking about combat branches, but not entirely; the man in the bottom third of his class at the Military Academy had twice as good of a chance of getting to the Army War College as the man in the top third of his class. What does that tell you? Is academic achievement that much of a handicap?

Q: I've seen your rundown in some of your files on this, and I was wondering what you were doing, and why you had those figures. Sir, on March 30, 1942, you wrote a letter to C. L. Adcock, the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and it seems to follow on from what you've been saying. You'd like a Corps combat regiment slated to work in an Armored corps. You were quite sure that you could do the job and that your sights were set high. I mention this because I think that positive thinking is good now. Were you leaning in this direction? Were you interested in Armor?

A: I was interested in Armor. I had the Motorized Division at the time and I was in on much of the Armor instruction. I didn't get it, because this amphibious assignment came up.

Q: Was there any connection with your work on amphibious tactics and subsequent assignments? In other words, was there a connection between what you were doing at Leavenworth and the fact that your next assignment had to do with the amphibious work?

A: Probably. I really think (I don't know this and these aren't the things people tell you.), but I really think that when the Assistant Chief of Engineers inspected the 13th Engineers he was impressed with me

to the degree where I was recommended as a student and possibly an instructor at Leavenworth. I think he personally selected me as Chief of the Staff of the Engineer Amphibian Command. I had never served under General Sturdevant. Whatever impression he had of me was from reading my record, or observing me for about two days. That's what I believe.

Q: It's your career, Sir, and I'd like you to think about this in general. You mentioned that the general only observed you for two days. Is it not true that you can perhaps pick an individual who has the qualifications, the talent, in that short a period of time? Haven't you done it yourself? If you'll recall, when we talked earlier I asked you about your interests in being one of the leaders at the Academy, and the importance to you. And then I also asked you about whether you felt you were developing a knack of being able to single out leaders. I have a feeling that our senior commanders many times have to use this technique, and they're not very often wrong, so my question is, "Do you consider this a very reliable method, and do you pick this up from an accumulation of experience? Do you think it's an innate thing, that you were born with it?"

A: No, I think it's a question of maturity and judgment. There are some people I know who couldn't recommend anybody to me whom I wouldn't want to take a very hard look at myself. In other words, I don't trust their judgment very much, and they may think the same about me. I think it's a question of maturity and balanced judgment. Some people have it. A lot of people don't. I think you can pick some youngsters out with relatively little observation and, unless they stub their toe, I think you know they're going to the top.

Q: Sir, while you were at Leavenworth, you had a chance for a lot of thought and planning. Was there anything that you can perhaps put your finger on as a windup to Leavenworth that might be most significant to your tour?

A: Well, there were a lot of things that were significant. The preparation and presentation of problems was always a big challenge to me. I tried never to present one in which I didn't feel fully prepared. In every one I tried to inject something in word or action -- not to be overplayed, but sufficiently dramatic -- to help from time to time to

keep the attention of your audience, and they used to tease me about it occasionally. Somebody will still say, "I remember when you did this or that." Well, okay, I made my point, because I got their attention, and they haven't forgotten it yet, you know, so I think these things were important. It certainly gave me great training as an instructor, and that's another aspect of leadership, in speaking to people, in making presentations.

I formed a lot of warm friendships there between the people going through and the faculty that stood me well in my later career. As I mentioned earlier, perhaps that would have been one of the rewarding factors at West Point, if I'd gone there before the war as an instructor. The contacts there were extremely valuable. My friendship with Tom Watson (IBM), who was one of my proteges in a class at Leavenworth (In other words, I was one of the faculty advisors) has resulted in a lifelong friendship with him, and later with the rest of his family, when they were alive.

The articles I wrote for the Military Review still give me satisfaction, although they are outmoded to some extent by the 40 years that have gone by since I wrote "Mobility and Motors" and "Tell Them Why," which was even the forerunner of the Information and Education system in the Army. And then the Gettysburg Map problem on the use of armor that I worked up for Fortune magazine was a fascinating project; and, of course, the amphibious problems were interesting, but all was preparatory to the next opportunity that came along.

On the side of recreation, we used to have treasure hunts on Sunday mornings. It was in the days when we still had horses. We would end up down at the hunt club for breakfast around 11:00, and we usually had a little music as well as food. There were always a few officers who played instruments. I played my banjo, another chap played the piano, and another played the saxophone. On this particular morning I heard a darn good banjo player in this negro orchestra that was playing as we arrived. Lo and behold, he was playing left-handed. I couldn't believe my eyes. I had never seen anyone playing left-handed and damn if he didn't have it strung right-handed, in the normal way. This was unbelievable to me. So I went over to them as we (officers) were going to take over the orchestra and said, "We are going to give you a break. We'll take

over the piano and the banjo; I'm left-handed, too." He said, "Well, Sir, I don't think you could play this banjo." And I said, "Why not?" He said, "Well, Sir, I don't think you could play this banjo because I play left-handed but it is strung right-handed." So I said to him, "Oh, what the hell difference does it make?" Well, his eyes popped out, and I guess he thought if you're that goofy why should I tell you. Believe me when I sat down to play -- not because I played so well -- but because I could take a banjo strung right-handed and play it left-handed, he just broke up. He couldn't believe it. We are the only two people I've ever seen who could do that.

Q: Sir, I consider that we've discussed Leavenworth in sufficient detail. I know that at one time you showed an interest in stereoscopic photos; the ability to come up with stereoscopic photos. You made the comment that it was an unexplored field, just another aspect of your thinking. You discussed and analyzed significant time factors involved in controlling the disposition of vehicles in columns for night movement, which I think are such diversified problems that people sometimes are amazed at the wide scope of your interest. Maybe, as a parting note here, was your comment that you were not sold on the half-track. You thought the two-and-a-half-ton truck was good, but you also thought that there should be some long-bodied trucks for bridge timbers and heavy cargo; that, I think, came out of your Motorized Division studies. But I could see a man that was very definitely concerned with not just one aspect but the whole spectrum of activity in the military. The next move that you made, which was to Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, I think became almost a turning point in your life, certainly a significant milestone, and I'd like to discuss now the Engineer Amphibian Command.

CHAPTER VII

The Engineer Amphibs

A: In March of 1942, General Somervell, together with Admiral King and General Marshall, went to London for conversations with the British in connection with Operation Overlord, which was to be the next offensive action taken against the Germans. The essence of the problem was that Admiral King admitted that our fleet was largely on the bottom of Pearl Harbor, that our Navy had major combat missions to carry out, that they had severe problems in providing security for our transports crossing the ocean, and that they really couldn't take on a cross-channel amphibious operation in 1942. The operation in view was a cross-channel operation to be conducted probably in September 1942, with a force of approximately two divisions each (British and American) if it appeared that the Russians were being forced out of the war. This was hoped to be sufficiently diversionary, as far as the Germans were concerned, to force them to send more troops back to France to protect against this invasion. Consequently, while the Navy said that they couldn't do it, the British were not anxious to do it, let's say, because they had tried to convince the rest of the world ever since Napoleon said he was going to cross the channel 150 years ago that you couldn't cross the channel with an army. Of course, sometimes I think they had their head in the sand, because they did get 30,000 men out of Dunkirk -- under great difficulty, but still it was an amazing evacuation with any and all boats they could get their hands on. In any event, Somervell, with his engineering experience -- and this went back to flat-bottomed boats on the Mississippi and the development of the Higgins boat, later called landing craft but built for working in the Gulf of Mexico and in the reeds and rushes on the Mississippi River for bootlegging, bringing in liquor and landing it on the beaches at night -- Somervell said the Army could take it on. The Combined Chiefs of Staff approved planning it as an emergency operation.

I didn't hear about this until May out in Leavenworth, but I'm sure the staff planning had been in Washington since April. As a rather amusing interlude, we had then been at war for four months and everybody was getting itchy feet at Leavenworth -- "When the hell can we get out of here and go where things are being done, where the action is!" -- and this had been true

ever since December 7, 1941. There had been three or four cases of loss of people there that came up, so General Truesdell called us in and gave all of the instructors a very nice talk that he knew there was a war on, it probably would be a long war, that there was time enough for everybody to go, and that there would be no more defection from the faculty for a minimum of a year and a half or two years . . . two-year cycle.

Well, that lasted from about Wednesday to Friday, when I received confidential orders to report immediately to Washington as Chief of Staff of a projected force for special operations larger than a corps. It so happened that there was a cocktail party that afternoon, and it didn't take the word long to get around. I had nothing to do with it. The orders came out of the blue sky. I didn't know any of the people involved and didn't even know the subject matter. General Truesdell called me and I told him, "This is as new to me as it is to you," and he said, "Well, they called me up and they told me that they really want you for something very special, so I'm going to let you go." When I got over to the cocktail party, I hardly had time to get a drink because all of my fellow instructors were besieging me: "How in the hell did you do it, how did you manage to get out of here?," and I really hadn't had a thing to do with it.

I reported to Washington, to Colonel Daniel Noce in the Chief of Engineers' office. General Sturdevant and others briefed us on what the problem was and we got a briefing from the General Staff. We were told to put this force together, and I was told to go back, check out at Leavenworth, and report back into Washington immediately. I did, and we set up what came to be known as the Engineer Amphibian Command.

This was put under Somervell and, while I think this was the right place to put it because it largely was a logistical and transportation problem, it caused us trouble from almost the day we were born until the day we were inactivated, largely because of jealousy on the part of the Army Ground Forces that it was not put under their command. As a matter of fact, I was frankly told by a member of the General Staff that if I could arrange to get this transferred over from the Army Service Force to the Army Ground Force, it would almost insure our continuity. This is a fact; it isn't written in the papers, I'm sure, but this became a great problem. The problem was how to cross the

English Channel with relatively small craft; the problem was shore to shore, and our basic concept was to move the essential elements of an infantry battalion in a company of landing craft. We could get a platoon -- 36 men -- in the smallest landing craft, and we saw bigger and better ones on the horizon, but they weren't here then. As a matter of fact, the smallest ones weren't really in mass production.

The Navy, BuShips, had control over landing craft at this time. The Navy naturally favored the BuShips tank lighter; the Army favored the Higgins tank lighter in the next size, 50 feet long. The difference between the two was that in the Higgins tank lighter the metacenter was lower; in other words, the center of gravity afloat was lower in the water. The Navy had a few for tests, but BuShips, because they weren't invented by them, didn't like them. The main difference between the lighters which any layman can understand is that the deck of the Bureau tank lighter was above the normal water level when loaded. They had a bilge pump. This raised the center of gravity, or the metacenter, of the whole thing to a higher point than existed on the Higgins, and this adversely affected its seaworthiness. This was not a problem on the smaller 36-foot landing craft. The advantage of the Higgins lighter was that the treads of the tank, when loaded down, were below the water line, but you had to have confidence that if there was leakage your bilge pump could handle it. The Navy didn't have confidence in their bilge pump. If a bilge pump doesn't handle the problem, you can sink no matter where the hell the metacenter is.

This led to a very interesting test about the time that we were physically activated in June 1942. I'll get back to those dates later, but we ran two tests down at Little Creek and at Norfolk. One of them was the test on the Bureau tank lighter versus the Higgins tank lighter, and I told you the difference between the two. The result in that test was that the Bureau tank lighter almost floundered with the tank aboard because of the high metacenter. It couldn't stand the kind of currents we were in, while the Higgins tank lighter looked beautiful. We encountered tough cross-currents and high seas at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay.

The second problem was more interesting. The British said, "You cannot cross the English Channel in these small landing crafts" and we were talking about these

36-foot landing craft, 50-foot tank lighters, and maybe a few others that were available; there were no big ones yet. The British were very interested in showing we couldn't cross the Channel, and here's what happened.

Shortly after we were activated on June 10, 1942, Washington agreed, since the British said that you cannot cross the Channel in small craft like that, that tests would be made. I was put in charge of the tests, and I directed my people to get a 36-foot landing craft, personnel, ramp-type. When I got down there on this particular day that I was going to make the tests, the Army turned over to me a lieutenant and 36 men from the 21st Aviation Battalion, which was stationed across the bay from Little Creek at Langley Field with the Air Force. We had on oilskin coats, which, of course, are no help in the sea: you get soaked anyway and they stick to you; you're uncomfortable, and the water was cold. My plan was to take this craft out and follow alongside a 100-foot tugboat that was going to sea that could keep us from drowning if we swamped. There was quite a wind and the seas were rough. We set out early and the plan was to take us out past Cape Henry into the open sea and then head us to shore at 1:30 in the afternoon, at which time the Navy, the British, and all the people from Washington were supposed to be down there on Virginia Beach to see that men just couldn't come ashore in fighting condition after braving rough seas in small boats.

We kept going. Most of the men were sicker than hell. These landing craft were not very flexible and not very seaworthy. Their sea-keeping qualities weren't good, so we had a lot of green water over the bow. We had rough water going out, everybody was sick, and things were pretty well messed up in the boat. We got out to the point where we were going to turn about. This was six or eight miles offshore and it was probably noon or so, so I said, "We'll soon be on our way, men, so you'd better get yourselves straightened out, get your faces washed off, and see what you can do to pull yourselves together here." Well, some didn't. Some didn't care whether they lived or not, you know; it's easy when you're seasick. We got started toward the shore, and I saw this gang -- Navy admirals, British admirals, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army -- hell, we had more people there than you could shake a stick at -- on the skyline along the shore near Virginia Beach or

northern Virginia Beach. There was about 100 yards of beach from the water line until you'd get up to the crest, so, as I got in close to about half a mile, I said, "Okay, now every goddamn one of you stand up." So I went around and inspected them all standing up. I looked at them all as I went around, and I said, "Can you make it in here?", and some of them said enthusiastically, "Yes, sir," and some of them said, "No, we don't think we can make it." So as we got in a little closer I said, "Now listen, you see that line with all the goddamn admirals and generals there," and they all said, "Yes." "Well," I said, "Chase them off that ridge. That's where we're going; and if there's any man on this boat that doesn't get up and charge through that line, you're going to be put back on the goddamn boat and go back the way you came." Well, I got a lot more sprucing up, believe me. So when we get near shore I said, "All right, take off those goddamn raincoats, throw them in the boat." They had on their cottons and they were soaked, there's no question about that. They had their rifles and they had bayonets, so just before we got there, I said, "Get your goddamn bayonets out, get into your three-squad formation, first one straight ahead, the second to the right, the third to the left. You go up there in a line of skirmishers and keep moving." And, by God, they did. It was the damnedest thing I ever saw. These youngsters broke their damned backs going over that crest. They didn't figure I was kidding, and I wasn't. We wrote up a report and the Chief of Engineers put his ribbon and his sealing wax and all on it, and that was the document that showed that men probably could cross the English Channel with difficulty and still be fit to fight.

There is a sequel to this, which I ought to tell right here because it's related, and then we'll get back to the Amphibian Command. In 1944 General John Deane, Johnny Deane, who'd been at Leavenworth as an instructor with me, was then the chief of our military mission with Ambassador Harriman in Moscow. Stalin was getting pretty well fed up that we hadn't crossed the Channel. He keeps saying to Harriman, "I can cross the Dnieper River so why in hell can't you get across the Channel?" General Deane wanted to show him some of the difficulties in crossing the Channel but that we could do it and would do it eventually. So Deane sent a cable over to the Operations Division at the War Department and said, "Have you got anything that shows the difficulties in crossing the Channel as against just crossing the Dnieper, because Stalin

thinks it's the same thing." So they came to me as they couldn't find a damn copy of our Virginia Beach report. I was then the Director of Military Training or Assistant Director in 1943. They sent Colonel Bill Baumer to see me, and he said, "We've got this message from John Deane. Do you have anything that will show the difficulties in crossing the Channel? Stalin thinks it's just a damn river crossing." I said, "Yes, when they got up this report, I purloined a copy and I've got it all together with the red sealing wax and the ribbon from the Chief of Engineers and all," so I sent that over, and that's the last I've ever seen of it. They tried to prove to Stalin from the report that there were real difficulties, that we were going to do it but that it took more time. That's the byplay on that.

Now, to get into the story of the Engineer Amphibian Command. We did a lot of talking in Washington, a lot of organizing. We got a staff together and put them to work on their particular duties. We had a Colonel named Vandenburg as G-4 of the Command. He was Naval Academy, so we figured he knew something about the Navy -- where to go, what to do, and logistics. He also happened to be the son-in-law of Admiral Ernie King. We got officers to fill out our staff and started recruiting.

Recruiting was interesting. We had special authority to recruit from any source where we could get personnel. You may remember that we had to use a knitting needle in those days to go through Form 20s for information. All the Form 20s in the Army were gone through and, from records, all that had any amphibious connotation to them the Army made the men available. This gave us a fairly large number of men. We were assembling initially around 9,000 to 12,000 men at Cape Cod as fast as we could get them. In addition, we had several Regular Army units, including two or three Engineer battalions, a ponton battalion, certain engine maintenance companies, and some ordnance. In the meantime, Colonel Noce and I flew up over Cape Cod where we were to locate. We were ordered to set up our base at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, and then to search for additional sites on Cape Cod. We would fly up there on weekends after we got through with work in Washington, and finally selected several sites. We took over Washburn Island where nobody had been in 20 years. We had to wade ashore the day we went there, but that's where we made our forward base. We went into Oyster Harbors, we

went into Cotuit; and this was on the 10th of May that we made our first visit. We activated the Engineer Amphibian Command and the 1st and 2d Brigades on the 10th of June, one month later. In addition we had to draw up the tables of organization, equipment, the training programs, and start procurement of everything.

I must inject this little story because it shows such stupidity on the part of a Regular Army colonel; it's hard to believe. Camp Edwards was largely a tent camp with a few frames for latrines, mess halls, and supply. At the center of the camp were three concrete buildings for the division commander and staff of the 26th Division, Massachusetts National Guard. Three small concrete buildings -- the center one of which had a poop deck and a couple of offices upstairs where the commanding general and his aide, his chief of staff, and his secretary were. Directly in front of this was the monument to the 26th Infantry Division in World War I in France. It had a gun, a plaque, and a flagpole maybe 90 feet high. The post was commanded by an old Cavalry colonel, who was certainly senior in permanent rank to Colonel Noce but was about to be promoted to brigadier general very shortly. And the Cavalry colonel was determined to have the tallest flagpole in front of his headquarters anyway.

One morning we saw men out in front and they were removing the cannon from in front of the building. We didn't think anything about it. The next time we knew anything was going on, later in the day, we heard a terrific crash and, in looking out, we saw that the Post Commander had sent some welders over to cut down this 90-foot flagpole in the middle of the 26th Division monument; whereupon a tractor was hooked on and dragged it about three-quarters of a mile across the parade ground to an old wooden World War I-type building that was the Post Commander's headquarters. There they were going to erect the pole. But in dropping it, they had put a permanent kink in the pole, so that they were leaving it there while they were trying to straighten it out. There were still people from the 26th Division who hadn't cleared the post yet because we had said, "Keep your buildings on the side and take your time." Believe me, they got this report to their commanding general in no time. The next thing that we knew General Miles, who was then commanding the I Corps Area in Boston, showed up and there were some red faces around Post Headquarters. The colonel, I might say, didn't even

get to spend that evening on post; but he got a nice bill for a new flagpole, which he bought and we put back up. You can't imagine anything as stupid as that.

The Navy was not at any point cooperative. They never supplied any personnel. The Coast and Geodetic Survey was fine in its field, and the Coast Guard was wonderful. We had a company of 200 men from the Coast Guard, together with a chap -- then a commander, who later became Admiral -- Harold Moore, a great guy and a good friend -- and a number of very fine officers. The Navy simply was not cooperative. They did have a couple of Marine officers assigned who showed a modest interest and were helpful, although the Marines had an attitude that they were way out in front amphibiously. Actually this was not the case, although they had been exposed to it as a basic mission. The Navy was not very interested, and even for the next two years after the Torch Operation in Africa, they still used to advise young officers that unless they were successful, they were going to get shoved into the amphibious and supply forces. We had a very substantial number of Army people in Army elements. We had a fine Coast Guard detachment. We had good support from the Coast and Geodetic Survey. We had some support from the Marines.

The next thing that we did was to recruit Cape Cod fishermen, and this gave us the rough and tough know-how. The third thing that we did is we had special recruiting authority -- we went to all of the power squadrons in the United States; the men in civilian life who do other things, but love their yachts and power boats as a pastime. They came in droves and brought their maintenance mechanics from the marinas. So here we had the know-how and the brains, we had the tough know-how of the sea in the Cape Cod fisherman, and we had the Army element; these three elements put it together beautifully. It was a great team, and there was a hell of a lot of talent there, so we went to work training them and at the same time we started training ourselves.

We had 50 civilian yachts turned over to us, and these varied from 25- to 60-foot boats. No two had the same kind of engines; these were the kind that wealthy civilians turned over to the government for a dollar a year. The government maintained and operated them, and assured the owners they'd get them back in the same condition. From a maintenance and training

standpoint, they drove you nuts. Furthermore, we had two or three kinds of Navy landing craft -- not many, but we had two or three kinds, about 30 -- they had about three kinds of engines in them; so as far as having a uniform fleet speed or anything uniform, this was impossible. But for basic training and getting used to boats, it was great. Then the Higgins boats started coming out, and we started getting equipped so that by July we must have had a good 200; and 200 would move a regimental combat team.

At the same time that we were training, however, we had first the 36th and then the 45th Division on our back; they were getting lined up and ready for the Torch Operation which was scheduled for November in North Africa. So we had the problem of joint training, as well as training ourselves. It was an absolutely fascinating period; it was tremendous, and the proof of the pudding was that while we activated the command on June 10, that on August 10 we shipped one brigade of 7,000 men to Europe, fully equipped as far as their individual and basic unit equipment was concerned. This was quite an accomplishment. Colonel Henry Wolfe, our G-3, was promoted to brigadier general and given command of the 1st Engineer Amphibian Brigade. We had established a unit concept where an amphibian boat company would handle an infantry battalion, an amphibian boat battalion would handle an infantry regiment, and a boat regiment of three battalions would handle a division. We were looking for other types of support craft which were on the horizon, such as the 105-foot tank lighter which was being built up in Manitowoc and the duck (DUKW), a new two-and-a-half ton amphibious General Motors truck. The first tests that were ever made of those were off Princetown on Cape Cod. We were interested in many other new items including the use of rockets aboard ships and trucks for the assault, infrared lights and glasses for night driving, and other items -- just enough to make the Army Ground Forces want us, but we were in the Army Service Forces. I could see how it could benefit the ground forces, but it didn't make sense at that time to try and make this change. It would be as appropriate in the ground forces as a support element as it is for the Marines to have their own air squadrons behind them, which I think is great. It's the same type of relationship; there was nothing wrong about it, except that it would be hard to do in the melee that we were in.

All doctrine had to be written. We wrote the doctrine for this. You've got a box full of it up there, some of the early publications that we had. The sea horse, our insignia -- the little red sea horse on a white field with a blue boundary -- was designed. Let me explain the sea horse, which is something I fell in love with when I was with the WPA in New York City. This may sound a little far-fetched to you, but if you ever go out to Jones Beach State Parkway on Long Island you'll see the little sea horse. Jones Beach State Parkway was built by the WPA in New York City; at least it was renovated the same as Jones Beach was, and the little sea horse was the insignia designed for it -- just the horse itself. When I became the Chief of Staff, in looking for something amphibious, I thought of the sea horse. So I went up to Bob Moses' office and got the original drawing and from that, through the Quartermaster Corps, we had this insignia of the red sea horse on a white background with a blue border developed to the same design as the sea horse used on the signs along Jones Beach State Parkway, which is an interesting little story. We wore this on the pocket of our shorts and jackets. We started wearing it on the left shoulder, but later the decision was made that we would wear the amphibious patch of Combined Operations, Mountbatten's outfit. That was the British patch and you see the eagle, the gun, and the anchor; in other words, Army, Navy and Air Force, combined operations. The Navy had that in a different color. We had ours on a blue background with gold. The Navy had theirs in a black background with red, and I've forgotten the British color scheme. The design for all services was the same, so when they said, "That's your shoulder patch," we got special authority to wear the sea horse on our pockets.

Q: I see. I read some correspondence that you had where you attempted later to get even more of a distinctive insignia of some sort for your people, but you were turned down.

A: The Quartermaster heraldry staff had some weird ideas. They tried to force us to use ichthyosaurus as our symbol but I finally talked that down by saying, "Well, how in the hell when a man goes home is he going to tell his wife that the insignia on his shoulder is an ichthyosaurus, when he can hardly pronounce it or even spell it." So we stuck by the sea horse.

We had some operations in such places as Chappaquiddick and other places on Martha's Vineyard. That has become quite a familiar name now, but in those days we trained our crews in the use of sounding equipment at Chappaquiddick. For instance, whoever was leading one of these attacks had to have a fathometer and be able to know something about the bottom of the sea where he was.

Chappaquiddick and that vicinity was very interesting, because we had to cross the outlet of the river before we struck the right beach there, and obviously the depth of the river channel was greater than on either side; so when they went far enough south and turned back on whatever the proper course was and crossed the river channel, they knew that the beach was going to be on the other side -- elementary, but necessary training.

We developed a great many things -- beach photography, the use of colored lenses in photography from the air to determine the nature of the beach, the runnels, the depth of the water, and things of this sort. Both green and red lenses told different stories. It was extremely important that the direction of flight of your aircraft and the direction you focus your camera be exact with respect to the sun at any given moment if you were going to get results. A lot of these things we learned, and we learned many from the first European to be commissioned in our Army after we went to war, a splendid chap named Hugo Van Kuyck.

Hugo was a Belgian; he was a lifelong friend until his death some years ago. He escaped from Belgium, was an air and yacht pilot and a lover of boats. He was lecturing at Yale on city planning before the war. He was one of the outstanding architects of Europe. When he escaped, he came over to the United States and soon received a commission as a first lieutenant. Van Kuyck was quite a remarkable man. We found out about him and got him assigned to us. He did some remarkable work with photography and many other things. While I never knew I'd ever be Chief of Research and Development in the Army, at least in those days, I had gotten \$3 million from the Chief of Engineers, which was a lot of money, to do our research. We also came up with an underwater exhaust for the landing craft. One of my missions in Europe in 1944, when I was sent there by Somervell, was in connection with amphibious planning and operations for the upcoming invasion. I went to Inverary and then

down to Slapton Sands for one of the final training exercises. At the headquarters I found Van Kuyck, who was then a lieutenant colonel with the G-3 section in planning, and he made one contribution there that was a real one.

He discovered that the data base, the control data for British hydrographic maps, was different than the French data base. It had never been checked before, but when you consider that the beaches we were to land on in France had a very flat slope, and the difference between high and low tide sometimes made a difference of about a mile and a half between the actual shore line, then an exact knowledge of your mean datum, or the actual level, became very important. It could have been very, very embarrassing if this hadn't been found out, because there would have been many more ships that would have floundered or gotten hung up in places where this wasn't supposed to happen because of this difference in the data base. That's really a remarkable thing to have only been discovered in 1943 or 1944. We did a great deal in developing beach photography, in improving landing craft . . . and in navigation. The landing craft that were available up to that time were literally hard to navigate. A soldier could shift his rifle and the compass would swing ten degrees. We found that we had to rely on better navigation equipment, but this couldn't be done before the Torch Operation. We weren't handling landing craft in the Torch Operation. That was a Navy job and that brings up a rather sad story in itself.

I told you that we sent the 1st Engineer Amphibian Brigade to Europe in August. Admiral Stark sent back a cable saying, quote, "The honor of the Navy is at stake if anyone, except men in Navy blue, operate landing craft." Well, this sounded all right to General Eisenhower, so he ruled against using the Amphibian Brigade as such. At that time the brigade was organized with a boat regiment of three battalions, each to carry a landing team, a regimental landing team, and a shore regiment of three battalions to perform engineering services on the near and far shores. That regiment was used for shore work, and the maintenance company was used in support of the operations and the repairs of ships. I'm sorry, very sorry, to say, but I think that this should definitely be in the record about the misuse of the boat regiment, so here's the story on the boat regiment.

The boat regiment consisted of 3,700 men to operate and maintain the landing craft, except for third- and fourth-echelon maintenance, which was done by a separate company. This regiment was largely formed of the men who had been brought in from the power squadrons and from Cape Cod fishermen. These men were skilled small boat operators, but since London "didn't need them" to operate landing craft, they made them, in the great un-wisdom of the Army at that time, into a truck regiment. They served as a truck regiment landing at Arzew Bay in North Africa, and stayed there as a truck regiment. This is a disgraceful episode in the misuse of talented men badly needed for amphibious operations in the Pacific, too. I went to the higher echelons of the Army and said, "For heaven's sake, do something better with them. If we can't utilize these men better, let's transfer them to the Navy. Let them put on blue uniforms, but don't waste this kind of talent, which is irreplaceable, by using them as a truck regiment." They didn't do it. The Navy landed that operation, but they were unskilled too. So were their small boat men, and from launching points six miles off the North Africa shore, they missed their assigned beaches by at least six miles, which is quite an angle of approach, I must say. It's just a crime to think of our skilled boat handlers not being used to better advantage.

The force commander on the Torch Operation was Admiral Hewitt. Hewitt was never too friendly toward our command. Admiral Dan Barbey was in charge of amphibious training for the Navy. When the Chief of Naval Operations found out about the Army's progress, he told Barbey to get up to Cape Cod and see what the Army's doing. Remember, we'd been activated on June 10. Barbey came up and spent the weekend of the 4th of July with us; I remember that very clearly. He was amazed at what he saw. This was July 1942, three weeks after we'd organized, after we'd been activated. He was impressed by what he saw and he went back and told Admiral King, "The Army's got more there now than I've got for you at Norfolk." Another part of the story which will come later was as to whether or not he was sent later to Australia to see that the Army didn't take over all of the landing operations for MacArthur. Barbey was a very fair-minded man; I liked him.

Q: I noticed on 21 December of 1942 you wrote a letter to Hugh Casey, who was then MacArthur's Chief Engineer, and you made the comment then that Barbey might have been promoted downstairs by the Navy.

A: We've got quite a little story on this Amphibian Command, and this needed telling.

Following the Torch landings and the non-use of our skilled boat crews, the future of our command was up in the air. The war was concentrating on Europe. If we weren't going to be used in Europe, where would we be used? As you know, minimum attention was being paid to the needs of the Southwest Pacific at that time, and I don't say that was wrongfully so. I mean the U.S. was concentrating our somewhat limited resources at the time where they thought they were needed most, in Europe and Northern Africa. This is not a criticism of our strategy, but it did leave MacArthur out on a limb. There already was competition within the Army on the part of the Ground Forces, who were still somewhat teed off that "Amphibs" were under the Service Forces. This didn't help us any, because much of our staff came from the Ground Forces. On the part of the Ground Forces there was a terrific amount of needling and nit-picking; General McNair, the commanding general of the Ground Forces, was a great person for detail, and because the Army General Staff consisted largely of Ground Forces personnel, despite the fact that we were an Army Service Force element, our tables of organization and equipment were given to the Ground Forces to analyze and approve. We had to satisfy General McNair and his staff, and it became a real nit-picking operation. In other words, if you said that you needed ten trucks, they'd say, "Why can't you get along with nine?," and a couple of weeks later they'd say, "Well, why do you need more than eight per company?" just to pick an example. Then it would finally get down to where after considerable delay they said we only needed eight trucks, "Why do you need two-and-a-half ton trucks? Couldn't you get along with two halves and three one and a halves?. Then, if you can use one and a halves, couldn't you use jeeps instead?" It was a real goddamn nit-picking operation, I'll tell you, and it hurt. In any event, the 1st Brigade was broken up in Europe. It had been organized into a boat regiment and a shore regiment, because it was a shore-to-shore crossing that was envisioned -- which, I suppose, is why they found some question as to how it would be used in a ship-to-shore operation, such as in the Mediterranean, instead of crossing the English Channel, for which we were organized. The Shore Regiment had near-shore and far-shore elements, battalions, and companies. In other words, we could take care of the beachheads on both sides. This was

anathema to the Navy, because they had their own beachmasters. They wanted to control the beaches, so we had a few doctrinaire problems to solve. The worst thing probably that happened was that they took the boat regiment . . . which consisted of three battalions, each prepared to haul one infantry regiment, and it had three companies in it, each prepared to haul one infantry battalion. And they took this regiment of 3,700 men, and this is where we had really melded our Marine talent -- in other words, our power squadrons, their maintenance men, the fishermen, and the soldier. They took this outfit -- which had skills that they couldn't replace, which didn't exist anywhere else -- and converted them into a truck regiment and used them in Arzew Bay; this is the point today where you read a lot about the port and Algerian oil coming out of it and all. This was on the road from Oran to the east and those poor chaps never did get back on a boat, or use any of their talents, except in maintaining trucks. We did have, at the brigade level, a base-shop company, to perform third- and fourth-echelon maintenance, work beyond the battalion or regimental capability. We had the highest skills that we could assemble in this engine rebuild effort; it was really Ordnance in the way of marine rebuild. This organization was kept together -- this one company, probably 300 men -- and they did a tremendous job. They did most of the work in patching up ships that were damaged at sea. A year later when I went to Naples, they were the only ones that were doing the job of marine maintenance in the Naples, Italy, harbor.

It was quite apparent by September that there was a change in the mission of the Engineer Amphibian Command. It was planned to be organized with six brigades. We had then organized three. At Cape Cod, the 1st Brigade had trained itself and, in addition, was also training the 36th Division, Texas National Guard, which left by early fall to participate in the North African landings. After the 36th Division, General Ridgway brought in the 82d Airborne Division and they went through this phase of training with the 2d Brigade.

The basic task was to acclimate these troops to the loading and embarking techniques, take them out to sea (at least giving them some feeling for the ocean) and show them the problems that they would encounter in debarking under fire on a hostile shore. Our job was to take them from the time they got ready to embark on

the landing craft until we put them on the opposite shore. The Ground Forces supervised that training by what they called an Amphibious Training Command, under Brigadier General Frank Keating; as usual, the interface between their command and our people who were doing it created some difficulties, but not insurmountable ones. There was a lot of goodwill expressed on both sides, and we tried to work things out as best we could, because after all, it would be our troops as well as the 36th Division that would suffer if the operation failed.

In the early days then, the 36th arrived -- in early July, only one month after we were activated. We were quite limited in the number and types of landing craft we had. Most of them, like the 50 civilian yachts, probably were no two of the same make or using the same engines, so the maintenance problems were severe. We did have the people who could handle them well, and we had good marine mechanics. We took over most of the marine shipyards and repair shops along the coast -- like at Falmouth, Cotuit, and Oyster Harbors -- so we did fairly well, considering our problems. Parts were difficult to get. Landing craft -- we eventually got about 50 from the Navy, but they were of several types. There was the Bureau type which had two or three different kinds of engines. Some of them could do about five knots, and some of them could do about nine. Consequently, problems of fleet speed and maneuverability, and keeping them together at sea, particularly in tough weather or with poor visibility, was a real problem in control.

Q: I visualize, as you describe this, that the forces that were involved would probably become discouraged, frustrated, perhaps because they didn't think they were getting the right type of training.

A: I'm sure there was some of this, despite the fact that we acquainted their commanders with what we were up against. We started training troops of those divisions when we ourselves had only had our own men together for only a matter of three weeks, and this is pretty rough. Our troops were literally in basic training, and yet we were taking units -- elements of a division, perhaps a company or a battalion at a time -- out to sea. I'm sure it wasn't later than August when we had a couple of pretty good-sized landing operations over on Martha's Vineyard.

We would put out at about 11:00 or 12:00 at night. These were movements at night by sea with comparatively green forces, and this is where we were so fortunate to have the skilled yachtsmen who understood what they were doing and just not a bunch of landlubbers in these cruisers and landing craft or we would have had some bad accidents and losses. We were very fortunate; our accidents were very few, and I really don't know of any casualties that we suffered at Cape Cod. I do remember one that occurred later down on the Florida coast, which was severe. But in any event, we went ahead with this program. The 36th Division moved on to somewhere like Patrick Henry or Pickett, because they were to mount out of Norfolk for the Torch Operation. They sailed, I suppose, in late October. In any event, it became apparent in the fall that our mission was being reshaped and, after we activated three brigades, no more were authorized at the time. So what were we going to do with the 2d and the 3d since Eisenhower wasn't going to use them in Europe? The idea came about, and I don't know who initiated it, but, "How about helping MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific?" He was trying to get along on a shoestring. So we worked and worked on the general staff in operations, and finally got authority to visit MacArthur.

Let me back up just a little bit. In August, a couple of very sharp young lieutenants named Henry Hoskins and Frank Walk came to see me, because they were aware of this problem, and they said, "You know, we could prefabricate these landing craft and move them in large numbers on ships to Australia, whereas now all the Navy can do is carry a few on deck where they are running into competition for space with fighter planes and tanks and other large items that can't go below deck." This made real sense, so we took a separate building and locked them up with a few other people and we plotted and planned. The Chief of Engineers allocated \$3 million for research. General Noce approved the concept. We wrote our own travel orders and high-tailed it down to Higgins Boat Works in New Orleans where they were turning out the best landing craft. We talked it over with Mr. Higgins and his people, who were enthusiastic. Our initial idea was to fabricate, but not assemble, the 36-foot plywood craft using a standard Detroit diesel engine, in other words, a General Motors diesel with a Grey Marine transmission. Our people came up with a final plan and Higgins bought it. The plan was to build all of the parts of the landing craft with troops, even to

enlist some of the men working in the Higgins plant as part of a base shop battalion, send it over to Australia, and assemble the craft for MacArthur. We finally sold this idea to the Army. We had great opposition from the Navy -- it couldn't be done, they were short of this and short of that; but one time, one commander sort of led with his chin. He was worrying about such things as sea anchors and knives for the boats and little things of that sort. We dispatched this with a couple of curt remarks, I guess. When that kind of a red herring was being strewn across our paths, the staff overruled them. We were authorized to send our team to MacArthur, explaining that "We have this kind of an Engineer Amphibian organization and could furnish you two brigades since they're not going to be required in Europe, and would you like to investigate it." And he said, "Yes, send somebody at once." And so General Noce sent me with a team to Australia. Our 2d and 3d Brigades were still available. When the 3d Brigade was activated in September at Cape Cod, the 2d Brigade had been moved to Carabelle, Florida. Let me get into that briefly.

It was quite apparent as the summer moved on that all operations on the Cape would stop by November because of the severity of winter weather. So where was the winter training base to be? General Ogden, who commanded the 3d Brigade, myself, and a couple of others were delegated as a task force to go and find a place for our winter training. We investigated St. Catherine's Island, which is near Savannah, Georgia. We investigated Fernandina, which is at the mouth of the St. John's River, just below the Georgia border. We looked into Fort Pierce, where the Navy was just starting to do something. In none of these, however, was there suitable surf for our training. In any event, to make a long story short, we finally settled on a place called Carabelle, Florida, on the Gulf of Mexico. It has an island called Dog Island offshore in front of it. It is east of Apalachicola on the western coast of Florida, and this is where we decided to train.

From a standpoint of terrain, it was really a horrible place. It was all jungle, poor beaches, and mangrove swamps, but it was just what we were going to encounter in the Southwest Pacific. We built the cheapest kind of structures to put troops in there for a short period of time. Our greatest problem was getting the Medical Corps to approve it, because they

said, "This is a terrible place to train. You'll get all sorts of dysentery and malaria and all other diseases." We said, "So what? Let's find out about that here, and not wait until we get into action in Australia before we find out about it." This was a good point to make, because in Australia, where our troops were going, the 32d Division had frightful problems from disease when they got into combat.

The Japs were almost into Port Moresby, over the Owen Stanley range at that time, and the 32d had put one regiment behind the range to cut them off in the Buna area. In no time more than half of these troops were down with jungle diseases and were totally ineffective. As a matter of fact, they were worse than ineffective; they were a burden because it took able-bodied men to take care of them. So we had said, "Gee, let's learn the problems of the jungle right here and not after we get there," as far as health and men taking care of themselves.

I have forgotten exactly what divisions came down there to train, but I do remember the first division was the 4th Infantry Division. The 28th under General Omar Bradley came later in 1942.

In any event, we'd just moved our 2d Brigade to Carabelle, the 3d was still at Cape Cod, winter was approaching, and I was on my way to Australia.

Q: One of the things that we're interested in is decision-making. You mentioned that you looked at four different places, Fort Pierce and then Carabelle being the last two. I was wondering about Carabelle . . . we sometimes have the idea that there are deep studies that go into making these decisions. I'd like you to tell us specifically, how did you select this place -- from the air -- from lots of study of the area, or just by looking at it and saying "this looks like the Southwest Pacific, I think we should use it"?

A: Somehow we'd gotten a lead to go and look at this area; I don't know from whom or where, but we made the decision to use it. General Noce recommended it to the War Department, and what he said was usually approved by General Somervell and the General Staff in Washington. We got wonderful support.

Q: Okay, Sir. I believe you left San Francisco on 4 November for Australia. Did you make a trip again down to New Orleans and other places before you took off?

A: Yes, I did. At that time we were drawing up plans with Higgins for a base shop battalion of three identical companies. This was to operate an assembly line on a three-shift basis in Australia. That is what we were planning. This required about 750 men, and I think that was organized before we left for Australia as we wanted to get training started. We inspected them in New Orleans just before we took off for Australia. Captains Walk and Hoskins went with me, and also a very capable marine maintenance man, Warrant Officer Barney Grabau. He still lives in the Buffalo, New York, area, I think, and runs some marina. There may have been one or two others; I'm not sure. It seems to me that there was a total of five or six of us.

In any event, we left for Australia, and I think we arrived in Australia the day of the Torch Operation, which was the 8th of November 1942, and promptly reported to headquarters in Brisbane. We were received by General Sutherland, the Chief of Staff -- no, I take it back; Sutherland wasn't there. We were received by General Chamberlain, G-3. I was taken to General Chamberlain, largely by the Chief Engineer, Major General Hugh Casey. Since ours was an Engineer outfit, MacArthur looked to him (Casey) as his technical advisor and, of course, under him was Brigadier General (and later Major General) Jack Sverdrup, who was a great fellow and a great engineer. I explained our plan to Chamberlain and members of his staff and they said, "We think you ought to go to New Guinea right away, but you ought to look and see what we have right here."

As I recall it, what they had there was literally nothing. There were two places where what they called amphibious training was going on. One was at Newcastle, where they would use a typical, say, 35- or 40-foot cruiser, and would tow three or four row boats behind it filled with men; this was sad, but typical. At least they were thinking about what they needed to do. The other site for amphibious training was at Turboul Point, where some work of this same sort was going on; utterly worthless.

General MacArthur had just moved his forward headquarters to Port Morseby in New Guinea. General Chamberlain notified General MacArthur that our team had arrived, and he said, "Send Trudeau right up here." I well remember the flight. I don't know whether I put it in my diary or not, but in any event

they sent me out on a C-47, a freighter, carrying some freight. I boarded this plane after a very pleasant dinner in Brisbane with General Casey and some others at about 2:00 in the morning, because they wanted me to arrive in early daylight, which was rather essential because they didn't have much in the way of navigation equipment. I think I mentioned, or maybe I didn't, that on the way down we had to stop and take a look for Eddie Rickenbacker, who was then down in the South Pacific as we went by Fiji.

Q: No, you didn't mention that. You had a note that mentioned your flight and Rickenbacker, but I couldn't understand the relationship.

A: Rickenbacker was down at sea and we learned this as we stopped at our second stop, Canton Island. I think it would be interesting just to diverge for a minute here, and talk about Canton Island in those days. It was heavily fortified. They channeled underground -- it was all coral, of course. It was heavily fortified, and there was about a regiment under the command of a classmate of mine named Bob Elsworth. In any event, this was interesting about our aircraft navigation. We'd stopped in Hawaii -- flights took longer in those days; you weren't moving over 130 or 140 miles an hour. The pilot decided that we would leave at 2100 hours, 9:00 at night, to go to Canton which was two degrees south of the equator. Our plane was really heavily loaded. We sat under extra gas tanks, for instance, and that wasn't the most comfortable. They called it an LB-31 in those days, and it was a converted bomber. It was probably a B-25 or 26; in any event, it wasn't the most comfortable ride. It was slow, but the point that I'd like to make here is that I talked to the navigator, a petty officer loaned by the Navy, and asked him, "What about this 9:00 take-off?" He replied, "Well, we need to get across the equator in the vicinity of Canton Island (two degrees south) at sunrise as it comes up over South America to our left as you'd be looking at it from our plane, because we're flying the sunline." I said, "What does it mean to fly or navigate by the sun line?" He said, "We allow for the maximum drift; we don't have very good meteorological data, so we allow for the maximum drift due to wind. I set my course so that I'm sure to be west of Canton Island. I have also scheduled our time of flight so that as the sun appears on the horizon, I can head directly into it and Canton Island should be in our path." "Well," I said, "I hope you find it." And we

did, but this shows you the state of navigation in those days. All this was done with a sextant. Obviously, an error of ten miles per hour in your estimated flight speed, if you ran into head winds, could lose you miles if you didn't gauge it correctly. He got out with an old-type sextant and took a reading of the stars as we flew over the Pacific, but obviously with a difference of 50 or 100 miles in position while you're still heading into the sun, (you) can miss an island like Canton, which is less than three miles long. This is what happened to Rickenbacker farther south. When we got to Canton, there was a message saying that Rickenbacker was down in the South Pacific and that we would follow a certain course and take time to look for him. We didn't find him, but he finally came through. So we arrived in Australia after refueling in Fiji and New Caledonia.

In taking this plane to New Guinea, it was about 3:00 on a Sunday morning. We had had a very pleasant evening and a good dinner. We had a lot of fun, a few drinks, and some singing. When I got on the plane, there were some very large boxes and a half-dozen blankets. There were no other passengers and there were no seats. The crew got in the cockpit and said, "Here are a bunch of blankets, just make yourself comfortable." So I went to sleep. Sunrise was about 5:30 or 6:00, I don't know just when it was, but the pilot came back, shook me, and said, "You'd better get up, Colonel; there are some Zeroes in the area. We're just off the New Guinea coast and you'd better be on the alert." I got up, but I felt terrible. I had a headache, and I knew I hadn't been drinking very much. It's easy to say that, but when I tell you why, you'll realize; I found out then why the smell was odd. I found out that what I was riding with was a cargo of sterno that troops use for shaving and heating their K- or C-rations.

At this altitude this plane was just saturated with sterno fumes. If I'd happened to light a cigarette, none of us would have even got to Moresby, and there was no warning about this hazard. In Moresby, I was billeted with General Casey. I enjoyed a very pleasant three or four days there. General Sutherland and General Aiken, the Signal officer, were there. I explained the program to General MacArthur personally. He was terribly interested, and his staff later quizzed me at great length about communications, operational and maintenance problems. Apparently I

satisfied him and them because he sent word back to the States immediately that he wanted three brigades and wanted the boats to be assembled in Australia. I went back to Brisbane after four of five days and started up and down the coast looking for a place to build an assembly plant.

Q: In your diary you have a note after the conference with General MacArthur: "He was particularly cordial when he learned I was the class of 1924." Do you feel that not only was your project one from which he could benefit, but your reference to West Point helped in bringing him around to buying your proposal?

A: I don't think so. The sea was his only highway to Manila and I feel my story stood on its own merits. He was always most cordial to me and all members of our class. We entered when he entered as Superintendent and he always felt we were "his boys." In later years when I was sent on missions to him on a couple of occasions, he'd never forgotten and always remembered. He always gave me an extra warm welcome. This isn't always the MacArthur you usually read about.

Q: Well, I think this is interesting, because today we find barriers that exist because people don't really know each other. I just throw this in because I think it's a point of human interest that should be mentioned. Next, you were looking for a port facility.

A: Yes, this became very interesting. First I flew south to Sydney, which of course is a great port. I learned, much to my surprise, in looking over the area for facilities to build landing craft, that a company (I've since met the owner but I've forgotten the name) largely in sporting goods -- making tennis rackets and items of this sort -- had in their yard a Higgins-type boat covered up. They must have gotten it off some Navy ship and were getting ready to copy it. My team started exploring up and down that coast. We wanted to locate as far north as practicable. In fact, the most advanced point that I suggested was Milne Bay on the eastern tip of New Guinea. The Japanese had attempted to overrun it. There'd been some Australian troops there, so between the Australians and a bunch of cows they excited, they charged the Japanese as they were landing on the beach and scared them off. We held it. This is on the easternmost tip on New Guinea. You have to round Milne Bay to go to the

north shore, which was where MacArthur wanted to go, northwest toward the "slot" toward New Britain along the north shore of New Guinea and on to the Philippines. Buna and Salamaua, all places you associate with his campaigns, are on that north shore. What we planned to do was to outflank the Japanese who were then at Dobadura. When I reported to Port Moresby the Japs were at Dobadura, which was only 35 miles away, over the crest of the Owen Stanley Mountains on the south side. It seemed to me that the sea was the only highway. This is obvious; there was no other way to move from that jungle country to Manila. The sea was the highway. What we were giving them were the only vehicles that could move along it. At that time, he only had a couple of ships called luggers -- which would carry about 100 tons of cargo -- up at Oro Bay on the north shore, which was as far as he could advance. But that was all; he had no transport. He was elated when he found he could get some transport under his Army commander to start moving his troops. He knew that with pressure on to support Europe first, he wasn't going to get too much from the Navy. So he wasn't looking a gift horse in the mouth to get 20,000 Amphibian Engineers. After we looked at Sydney, we visited New Castle and then went up to Rockhampton and there spent a weekend at I Corps, General Eichelberger commanding. It was not yet the Eighth Army. There was only one division, the 41st Division, from the Pacific Northwest, in that vicinity. The 32d Division, the only other one then in Australia, was partly in New Guinea. I visited Turboul Point as a possible site for amphibious training with its very beautiful beaches there. I had a very pleasant weekend and explained our capabilities to General Eichelberger. I have frequently talked about it since with General Byers, who was his chief of staff and knows this whole story, too. They were tremendously interested in our potential. That very night -- it was a Sunday night -- there seemed to be a lot of excitement in the headquarters. They were all billeted in a hotel in Rockhampton on the east coast of Australia. I found out the reason for it the next morning, because General Eichelberger and Byers and the staff took off for Port Moresby in New Guinea. Things were getting pretty bad there. The 32d Division was in very bad shape physically, and it was "touch and go" about turning back the Japs. They sent Eichelberger up there to get things moving or "Don't come back."

I still went up the coast looking for different places to locate. There was a nice little city called Mackay. Then we went on up beyond the Great Barrier Reef to Townsville, which was our northernmost port in use at that time. Then we went farther to the northernmost port on the east coast named Cairns, a small port. It looked as though this might be the place.

Interestingly enough, the Navy at this time was very much concerned about us coming to the Pacific. Admiral Barbey, as I told you before, had been up to Cape Cod and looked us over after we'd been operating for about three weeks, on the 4th of July weekend in 1942. When he reported this back to Admiral King, King was very upset. When we were assigned to Australia, Admiral Kinkaid headed General MacArthur's naval element. When it was announced that the Army was going to send over three amphibian brigades, Admiral Barbey was ordered over. I always felt he had the mission of, "Since the Navy let this happen, go over and get it back under control of the Navy." Barbey came over later, but he was not there during my mission. What was happening was that the Navy was very much concerned about our getting into the picture, and everywhere I went, right along at the same time, looking over the same port would be a certain naval commander. I wish I could remember his name. He contacted me some years ago, and said, "Do you remember this?" He remembered it, and I did too. Everywhere I went the Navy was looking at the same spot, because, they said, "We've got to establish Lion or Acorn bases." This depended on size and content and purpose. This was brought to General MacArthur's attention with recommendations as to where we might locate. The Navy would say, "Well, I think we've got to put a Lion Base there or an Acorn Base." Finally MacArthur said to Admiral Kinkaid, "Make up your mind where you want to go and then the Army can take what's left if that suits them." That sort of backed the Navy off a bit and, to make a long story short, we chose Cairns, Australia. Cairns was a deep enough port for most of our transport in those times -- our Liberty-type ships -- so that didn't concern me. We knew we could put 300 prefabricated landing craft in the holds of one Liberty ship. Now get this, because it's important: the average Navy cargo ship, which had been taking occasional landing craft to Australia if they had nothing else on their decks, could at the best take 12. So when I asked back in Washington initially, "What about getting

landing craft to MacArthur?", they said, "We're getting them down there." And I said, "How many can you get?", and they said, "Twelve on a freighter." I've forgotten how many freighters they could spare to do this, but I said, "Well, that's great. In three years, he can put one division afloat, but this won't win the war." This was one of the punches that helped to get us down there. I said, "We'll go down; we'll deliver 300 a month." This was all done by prefabrication and no wasted space. We baled up side sections, 20 at a time; we could put all the ramps together. When General MacArthur sent back that he wanted the three brigades, the 2d Brigade, which was then at Carabelle, was ordered to Fort Ord, California. The base shop battalion was put into production on the assembly line at Higgins: with its three companies, it operated on a three-shift basis. They learned every manufacturing technique and had the skills to perform. My associates and I in Australia were drawing up plans then with MacArthur's logistic, or Services of Supply (SOS), people to set up operations in Cairns. We drew the design for everything. We started sending specifications back to our Amphibian Command on Cape Cod to buy and assemble what we needed. One of the problems we thought of early was that there'd be times when we wouldn't be operating on commercial electric current; therefore, all of our generators, and all of our power equipment, had to be operable on 50-cycle, 220-volt current. It's a good thing we remembered that, because frequently on the way to Manila we set the Base Shop up in places where there was no commercial current. While we were on the mainland of Australia we had commercial current, so that simplified it.

The 2d Brigade sent an advanced headquarters over. They made the mistake of sending it under a colonel who raised some questions as to his real competence. He damn near killed the operation by indifference and poor management, but I don't think we need to go into that too much. Anyhow, General Heavey flew over shortly thereafter and his 2d Brigade followed by sea. As soon as the 2d Brigade had moved out of Carabelle it opened up that space -- to move the 3d Brigade out of Cape Cod to Carabelle. By this time it was December. Nothing much could be done on Cape Cod; you can't go to sea in small boats on Cape Cod in December or January. The cycle worked out just right from that standpoint.

Then the War Department decided, "All right, we'll establish the 4th Brigade." So the question was where to establish the 4th Brigade. Remember the 1st Brigade went to Europe. There were anti-aircraft troops in Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, then. This was a National Guard camp where we originally established our base, so the Army decided to put the 4th Brigade at Fort Devens, Massachusetts.

Before I get to that story, we probably should wind up the story on getting established in Australia. My little team worked with the Engineers and the other services. We designed the assembly plant and other structures and began improvement of the port facilities at Cairns. Our production schedule called for the complete assembly and launching of ten landing craft daily -- 300 a month. This was our schedule, and when this was approved in December of 1942, I came home. I'd like to jump to the point where I can tell you that on April 11, 1943, which was just over three months from then, the first landing craft was launched at Cairns, Australia, and a production rate of 300 a month was reached shortly thereafter. I'll come back to the launching, because it involves LCVP Number 1, as we designated our first craft launched in Australia. I'll tell you about that one in the Philippines two years later.

The 4th Brigade was ordered activated in January and I was put in command of the brigade by General Noce. The Chief of Engineers, who still had assignment jurisdiction, would not assign me the brigade because, he said, he had some older and more senior officers who were entitled to the command. I organized the brigade and commanded it for six or eight weeks until the officer selected could be released from his River and Harbor assignment and take over. I activated the brigade and commanded it through those first months at Fort Devens. A couple of interesting points here.

Fort Devens had been an anti-aircraft center. We activated the brigade in January 1943. So we had 7,000 new men there for basic training during the very toughest time of the year; quite obviously there could be no amphibious training involved. All of our boats, almost without exception, had been taken by sea from Cape Cod to Carabelle, Florida. This meant that they had to go all the way around the Keys to get there. That was quite a trip in itself. It was done successfully and was a great training exercise to move all of these boats that distance; and it was well

done. By that time, we had fairly large numbers of landing craft with standardized engines of the Detroit Diesel type, so it was possible to maintain something close to fleet speed. In addition, we had gotten the 50-foot tank lighters for carrying tanks, and we had some 105-foot tank lighters, which would take trucks or six tanks. We had some fast patrol boats which were also used for command boats. We were fairly well staffed by that time. The winter training at Devens, of course, constituted good basic training, together with special courses in navigation, marine maintenance, and other subjects. For that purpose, we sent some of our men -- after their basic training -- back to Cape Cod itself, where we still had certain engine maintenance special training. Of course, communications were still a big factor, too -- how to control the ships at sea; we didn't have radar or radios as advanced as they are today. We did use radar, for instance, because we realized that when you got into the over-the-horizon position or in bad weather, you can't see a small craft more than about five to ten miles. One of the tactics we used in order to control and navigate them and still not have the boats talking by radio might interest you. We used balloons. Behind a certain craft, part of a fleet, you would find a balloon on an 800- or 1,000-foot tether, which permitted a control radar to tell them whether to go so many points right or so many points left to hit the right beach which, again, might be over the horizon. This could be done up to a distance of many miles depending on the height of the balloon. So our line-of-sight radar tracking the balloon and knowing the location of the proper beach could direct them how to adjust course. Yet no signal had to emanate from the craft itself to give away its position or draw fire. This was quite novel and it worked.

We had a good brigade: we had excellent training, we worked hard, and I've often thought that my work there was one of the reasons why I had much broader opportunities in the future. General Ralph Huebner was the Director of Training, Army Service Forces, and a top combat officer in his own right. Shortly after the time I'm talking about in early 1943, he was ordered over to North Africa to take command of the 1st Division; that indicated what the Army thought of Huebner as a soldier. In any event, while he was the Director of Training he came up to inspect my new brigade and he went down to the range to observe the firing on what we then called known-distance ranges.

In some cases, our men were firing through channels in the snow (because there was deep snow) and shooting very well. He was so intrigued that he came back a second time and went down to the pits to check on that brigade which qualified on the known-distance range at an 83 percent average. This was a time when whole infantry divisions were averaging sometimes 39 or 45 percent. He was so impressed with it that he went back to Washington and, in one of the meetings there, he chided some important people, I understand, about the quality of training and told them what he had seen in my brigade. In any event, when he was ordered to the 1st Division in Africa he apparently had been so impressed by what he saw that when General Weible, his deputy, was moved up to be Director of Training, I was the one selected to take the Deputy Director job. Shortly thereafter Colonel Henry Hutchings, who was an excellent man in his own right, arrived from River and Harbor work to take command. He hadn't been with troops for years but he was the one the Chief of Engineers decided to promote to brigadier general, so I had to give up my command. At that time General Somervell was over at Casablanca to the conferences (this is early in the spring of 1943). When he came back and found out what the Chief of Engineers had done, he, too, directed that I be pulled into Washington and put into a prospective star slot. He was really teed off that I didn't keep the brigade, after my success in Australia. I moved to Washington in April of 1943, left my family on Cape Cod until the children finished school in June, and then moved them to Washington.

I could see that in Washington I was still going to have many things to do for the Amphibians; remember, only the 2d Brigade had then departed. The 3d was moving to Ord. The 4th was to follow, but the 4th was still just in basic training and ready to move to the shore. They went straight to Carabelle in early spring when the 3d went west to Fort Ord. I can't be sure of those dates because, as I say, I was then detached. But the minute I got to Washington, General Somervell assigned me as the Amphibious Advisor on his staff, so I wasn't getting away from this at all. I was assigned to the Joint Strategic Amphibious Subcommittee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in addition to my other duties; but one of the toughest jobs was this. In the first place, the Navy was less than enthralled with the idea that the Army was going to the Pacific in some numbers to do an amphibious job. We envisioned clearly the scalloping operations up the

coast of New Guinea and beyond, the sea being the highway; that's all it amounted to. We sensed fully that our real problem was going to be supply. If there's one thing the Army knew how to do, it was to supply people, and that was the purpose of Somervell and the ASF, the Army Service Forces. We never had adequate support from the Navy regarding supplies, because our problems were different. The people down at the level where they were actually doing this work in the first place hadn't much experience in amphibious work themselves. Secondly, they had no appreciation that while a Navy amphibious craft is carried on the deck of a transport, and is only lowered into the sea perhaps once in three months, our little craft, the same type, were in the water every day, all the time, never left it; so the problems of supply and maintenance were entirely different from what Navy experience told them it would be. Furthermore, in connection with propellers or "wheels" as they're called in the yachtsman's language, it's practically a subject for court martial to damage the propeller on a ship. That means you haven't navigated it right, or you've gone aground. Well, in our job of landing craft we wanted to go aground, and when we hit a shore we rammed the hell out of it so that the boats wouldn't broach; in other words, turn sideways and get stuck in the sand or overturn. The factor we used for propellers or wheels was something like 20 or 30 times the Navy's. One of the problems we had on Cape Cod . . . we had about 50 ships at first, so the Navy allowed us something like 20 propellers for six months' replacement. Fortunately, we had enough rapport with the War Production Board, at it's Boston office, to get priority on brass propellers, so we went out and bought 1,000 Columbia wheels, as they called them. When the Navy heard this they just about fell apart; they never heard of anybody ordering 1,000. Well, we ordered 1,000 and they were all used -- and a lot more before we got through the Southwest Pacific. The point I'm making is that, despite the fact that these were standard Navy craft, once they were assembled in Cairns and put to sea we could not depend on adequate logistics support from the Navy. Frequently they weren't around or they didn't have a local base there. So I established with ASF authority a direct pipeline to Australia, and we shipped them the parts that ensured good maintenance and good operating capability on the part of our landing craft. Otherwise, they never would have functioned; they couldn't have functioned. So that became, in addition to my Director of Training job, a continuing

function; to advise General Somervell on the adequacy of landing craft, the time of production -- and, mind you, this was not only with reference to the Pacific. This was the planning for the cross-channel operation coming up in 1944 that we were dealing with primarily in Washington.

Q: General, (didn't) most of your correspondence during the time that you were the Director of Training tie in with the Amphibian Command?

A: It had to. If they had been cut loose from support direct from Washington, they couldn't have functioned. That's all there is to it. You see, while most of the landing craft themselves were coming from Higgins, nevertheless there were engines, communication equipment, and all sorts of items that had to be obtained from many vendors. We took over a large warehouse at the Stockton Depot, and there we would assemble 300 units of every item from boats to insignias. When we knew we were going to have 300 complete units ready we'd call for priority on a ship. This would take a whole ship, and 300 boats and supplies would be on their way to Australia. That's how and why it worked. In addition, it soon became apparent that we needed larger craft so we stepped up to tank lighters. You remember, even the Navy chose the Higgins-type over their own design.

This is an interesting story on tank lighters. The Army changed from a 30-ton tank to a 34-ton about that time, but they hadn't told the Navy about this; the result was that the LCM3, as it was called, wouldn't carry a 34-ton tank; it was really considered an overload. What happened on this was that at Higgins, where they were manufacturing tank lighters for us, they would build a complete tank lighter, except for putting the ramp on. We would then take that tank lighter and with blow torches cut it into twelve pieces -- believe it or not -- so that we could store it down in the hold of a ship. When we sent that to Australia, it was a sight. A tank lighter, for instance, had two Diesel engines in its rear; the smaller landing craft have only one. You'd be amazed to see the stern of a craft staring at you with two of these engines sticking out and the rest of it cut up into eleven other pieces plus a ramp. But this is the way it was shipped. When they arrived overseas, men with welding torches and rivets and gussets and fish plates put all the pieces back together again, and we had something stronger than ever. While developing

this technique we ran into the 34-ton tank problem. So here's what we did. The men were cutting these tank lighters in twelve parts anyway, and one of them said, "Well, why don't we add a six-foot section in the middle when we're welding it together again. Just add another six-foot section of the same cross section and stretch it to 56 feet." The result was most interesting. It not only would take the 34-ton tank by providing additional buoyancy, but it gave us two inches less draft and two knots more speed per hour for the same fuel consumption by increasing the length. We had less displacement. That's the net payoff that we got on that one, which was amazing. That became the Navy standard craft, known as the LCM6, which means 56-foot. That's just how it was developed.

Q: The question that I have pertains to General MacArthur's staff, General MacArthur's tactics. You indicated that when you went to his headquarters, you were able to provide him with means that he didn't have. The question that I have is, weren't they asking for something like this? Didn't they recognize that their roadways were the water? How did he anticipate that he was going to do his island hopping?

A: Only by sea, getting ships of some type which the Navy didn't have. It never occurred to them that the Army was also in the amphibious business.

Q: But he really hadn't made a case back in Washington?

A: Not one that had been listened to too much. I don't know what representations he had made, actually, but Washington was concentrating on Europe.

Q: It's an interesting thing that you arrived with just the things that he needed.

A: That's right, and at just about the right time. You see, while these were small landing craft, there was nothing else available at the time. The Navy was coming up with a 105-footer and then the LST, which was about 300 feet long. We took a 105-foot tank lighter to him. This also is a very interesting story.

We used to get a Navy LST as the larger craft came in; the landing ship tank (LST) is around 390 feet long. It has giant jaws that open up and in it you can put a large number and tonnage of vehicles and equipment.

The question we faced first was how to get the 105-foot tank lighter over to Australia. Now, the 105-foot tank lighter would take six tanks or trucks or about 200 tons of cargo. It was 105 feet long. It was also interesting because one of the smart things they did was to power this ship with three General Motors Diesel engines; the same engines with the same parts that the LCM tank lighter has two of and the 36-foot landing craft had one. This was wonderful for standardization. In any event, the question came up, how do we get 105-foot lighters over there, which is 9,000 or 10,000 miles and a rough voyage at eight or nine knots speed. What happened was this. A way was found to lift these tank lighters; put them on the deck of an LST and lash them down. Then when they got over to the theater, they would shift the ballast on one side of that tank lighter so that it got about a 15-degree list, cut the ropes holding it on the LST, and slide it into the sea. It made quite a splash, but it worked; that's the way the 105-footers got down to Australia.

Q: Let me ask a very direct question, personal. I noticed that some of the older people were getting promoted around this time, and you didn't. I don't know the reason, but I'm wondering if perhaps your enthusiasm, and your interests in this activity might have had anything to do with delaying your promotion.

Perhaps the problems with the Navy I know you're a fighter.

A: I don't believe so. Actually, I am aware that my name was on a list, which was personally passed on by General Marshall once a month, for something over a year before I got the promotion. Priority was given to those who most needed the reward; the combat commanders in the front line.

Q: General, do you feel that there's more to the Engineer Amphibian Command story? I know you wrote volumes about it and we have much information. I'm wondering if there might be any other clashes to be brought out that might be of interest or provide good lessons.

A: The competition with the Navy and the failure to have good support from our Army Ground Forces in recognizing this as an essential part of Army operations to my mind was part of it. The Marines had been doing what little was done before World War II, but it wasn't really much despite their claims. I

think our concept of shore-to-shore operations where it applies and under Army command made a lot of sense. This could be particularly true today, where we have higher-speed landing craft and helicopters, if you're in an area where they can be utilized, such as a water gap of 50-100 miles. There are a lot of questions about the future of amphibious warfare, particularly when you've got the ability to land troops by air, and there are many limitations, but I haven't had any reason to study it from a strategy standpoint for many years now.

CHAPTER VIII

Director of Military Training

- Q: Sir, let's move to your job as the Director of Military Training with General Welibe. Before you start there, am I correct in saying that General Heubner's association with you on a closer-than-just-acquaintance basis actually began at the time of his inspection of the Engineer Amphibian Command, or of the 4th Brigade?
- A: I don't think it practically began there. The first time I ever met General Heubner was when I was an instructor at Leavenworth, which would have been well over a year before when I was engaged in developing the tactics and techniques of the motorized division.
- Q: The reason I ask is that I know General Heubner plays a very important part in much of the next decade of your career. Sir, let's start with General Walter Weible. Would you like to talk about him, his position, and then your relationship to him?
- A: I enjoyed a very satisfying relationship with him. He was a Coast Artilleryman, a gentleman and a very able man, sensitive to many of the winds of change to which we were subjected during the war. I think he probably was an excellent counterpart to General Huebner in this regard, Huebner being more the tough-minded infantry soldier type. No one should ever underestimate General Heubner; he was a man of the keenest intellect, very objective, very astute. He is an example of the occasional man who, without the benefit of much formal education, really had the innate talents, together with the motivation and ability, to develop them into a really outstanding individual in every respect. In 1943, we were still fairly early in the war, of course. The Service Forces had a tremendous program on. General John C. H. Lee had been sent over to England as the top man in the logistics field. Either then or later he was assigned as Deputy Commander to Eisenhower for performing this function. He had recognized the need for tremendous logistic support; in other words, for all types of units to be provided by the technical and administrative services. Consequently, the program in the Army Service Forces for Europe was very large. In numbers it didn't equal -- but to some degree it approached -- the requirements for combat elements. It certainly was true as MacArthur said in the Pacific that this

was "an Engineers' war" or, to put it more broadly, a logistics war. This was found to be true in all theaters if we were going to give the kind of support necessary to the combat elements. We realized that in at least two checkpoints when we were pressed -- to a degree that probably delayed the termination of the war. One certainly was in connection with the shortage of fuel for Patton's army, the ability to push it forward fast enough. It was there, but the physical means of delivering it rapidly over a wide and deep front became extremely difficult and slowed us down at a critical point. The second one was the very great shortage of ammunition that developed toward the end of the war in Europe; to a point where it was being flown from production plants to ports in this country and sometimes to Europe to get it moving. This was not due to a mistake by the Service Forces. It was due to certain assumptions that had been made at the General Staff level which didn't materialize. There were seven technical services, and probably five administrative; I'm not quite sure.

One of our annoying problems seemed to be constantly moving schools around -- depending on the availability of places -- or attempts to consolidate or reduce overhead. We had to some degree some of the less desirable training centers, although, looking across the board, they probably averaged out as well as those of the Ground Forces. The Air Force, while it was still the Army Air Corps, of course, had a great deal of freedom to do as they pleased. To all intents and purposes, they could have been separate although we still had a very considerable amount of technical support to provide for the Air Force in those days, more than we do now. This applied to Ordnance, Signal, and Engineers in particular.

We had the service school replacement training centers and also unit training centers. There were continuing changes in policies during these five years, and it was probably then that the first serious impact was felt with respect to the negro soldier. That concerned me very much at the time, and I directed and supervised the development and the preparation, not only of the curricula in Officer Candidate and other schools, but the preparation of the first text ever written in this regard, called "Leadership and the Negro Soldier." I happened to run into the man who was in charge of assembling that data a short time ago here in Washington.

Q: What was the problem with negro soldiers as you saw it then?

A: Well, by and large, their IQ's were many points lower than whites on the average. When you analyzed a negro unit, you found the majority with little or no education and with even less motivation. There was a great problem in training and great difficulty in getting many of them to accept responsibility. This was true even of the noncommissioned officers in those days. This is being overcome now, but there was no quick answer to this problem. There were some great pressures exerted in those days that, since Blacks were 10 percent of the population, they should have 10 percent of the officers and 10 percent of the noncom's slots. But even the leaders of the negro people themselves saw that this was not an appropriate answer. If this had occurred then -- if they were allocated 10 percent by grade -- they would fall so flat on their face that it would set their race back another 50 years. It is fortunate their own leaders realized this; I knew them well and I know what I'm talking about, but I don't think there would be anything gained by naming names in this connection. We've reached a higher plateau in solving this problem now.

Q: Is it true that you had a special training type unit developed?

A: We established special training centers for several reasons. In addition to operating as I did, General Somervell, for his own reasons, used me on several occasions for special missions and some of these were extremely interesting. One of the first ones was to North Africa. This was in connection with the poor use of replacements and in retraining of convalescents, men who had been wounded. We observed where and why a lot of men needed retraining, even back in the States. To some degree these were psychiatric cases; in other cases they were men whose physical capacity became limited for one reason or another. In the United States, we had the problem of the negro who may have had a low IQ and limited education. We had some problem with foreign-born people, or even others in our country who didn't have sufficient use of the English language to do a good job or understand English -- let's say some French-Canadians, maybe, from Maine, who had come over the border from Canada. Then, of course, we had others, white now, let's say from the South or the mountain

country in some of our states, where they had literally no education. The result was this: when you tried to put these people with the ordinary cross-section of men coming into a training center, two things happened. You had to either slow down the schedule so that these people could absorb it, or you set the schedule at a normal pace where they couldn't absorb it. They then suffered from frustration or physical inability to do things. It became apparent that there was a certain group of people who didn't have sufficient knowledge of the language, or the equivalent of a fourth-grade education, or for other reasons who needed to go into special training groups. At one time this had grown to a point where it involved 300,000 men -- maybe that was the total -- I've forgotten which, but 300,000 men were put through this training. By and large, in a period of eight weeks we salvaged 80 or 85 percent of them. Now when I use that term, I can only say that the commanders then felt that they could fit in with their contemporaries -- regular basic training and keep up, not too frustrated, not holding the others back, and having some degree of motivation. Whether you say we advanced 75 or 85 percent, I can't argue that point. I will only say one thing -- that of the negroes involved, their proportion of men who "graduated" (shall we say, for lack of a better term) was about the same as the white men and others who were there for other reasons, such as lack of previous education or inadequate understanding of the English language. We were also trying to salvage men who had neuropsychiatric problems in Europe and were returned to this country. At first they were happy to get back, but most of them were merely seeking a discharge to get back to civilian life. We had been sending them home and letting them off the hook while somebody else was drafted. In many cases they were just malingerers and something had to be done about it. The answer in these . . . I don't know any answer, but it was interesting to me that we did not have equivalent problems in Korea, at least in the year that I had my division in combat. I visited a division in Italy during this trip, where the number of NP cases -- psychiatric cases, bug-outs if you want to call them -- was about the same in two regiments whose commanding officers operated under entirely different philosophies. One would let a man go back as easily as he pleased to the rear, just accepting the fact he was an NP case. Of course, at first, they let them go all the way back, and then they realized that the thing to do was to keep them as near the front as they

could, give them warm food, beds, blankets, sleep, and then get them back up front. Like somebody that's in a crash; the best thing to do is to get back in a plane and fly again. The regiment next to them was commanded by a very hard-nosed commander who wouldn't accept anybody leaving the area, but he had about the same problem when it came to combat because, while his men didn't bug out and go to the rear, they just stayed in their foxholes. These were two regiments in the same division.

There still is, thank God, some degree of pride and esprit left that if your comrades can do it, you can do it too. I wish I knew more personally about Vietnam. I have not been there since the fighting started in 1965, but I still have the feeling that the American soldier over there is a good soldier and can do a good job under good leadership. I think this is being badly exaggerated here in the reverse by the American press and it bothers me. I feel the press is doing us a very great disservice. You'd think everybody was being fragged and nobody was obeying their officers. This is ridiculous.

Q: General, I think we're talking about your trip to the Middle East and Africa. You referred to it when you were looking into the NP problem. You began this trip on 31 January 1944.

A: My primary mission, given to me initially by General Marshall, was to go to North Africa in connection with the reorganization of the 2d Cavalry Division, which was a negro division. This was a square division and about 20,000 other troops, a total of some 35,000 or 40,000 troops, and reorganize these units into service-type units for the Anvil Operation, which was to be the landing in Southern France. That was my first mission. The second function was to look into training, the operations of ports, and the handling of replacements. I've mentioned the replacement problem, so I don't know that I need to get into that much more, but let me say that it was being very poorly handled whether we're talking about replacements fresh from the States or those who, for one reason or another, were convalescing. As I wrote in my report to General Marshall, the bad name of Canastel would resound in the conventions of the American Legion for years. It has. People still mention that place with disdain. It just wasn't being handled well. There were hundreds of officers and thousands of men who were rushed from their station to the port to get over

to Africa for an important assignment. They had been sitting on their duff in a tent camp at Canestel for months with no action being taken: no assignment, no training, complete frustration. At the same time, they'd get a letter from their wives saying, "Don't worry; we're short of gasoline and we're short of this, but the kids and I are well taken care of."

Q: Let me try to trigger some thoughts on your trip. One point you marked in Dakar on 3 February said, "Looked around to see how my old plan of operations would have worked here. It looked okay."

A: Yes. I mentioned before that while I was at Leavenworth that one of the problems I tried to get approved was an amphibious operation against that particular area to seize the gold of the Bank of France which was stored at Kayes, up one of the rivers. I've forgotten whether it was the Senegal or which one. It gave me a chance to just take a quick look around. I even got the pilot to fly over a little bit of Gambia to see whether we might have made the landing on those beaches and come in from the flank in the manner I'd planned it.

Q: In Oran, you said that you'd talked with Larkin, Gillem, Albert, and you said, "My plan is the only thing they have," and you talked to Dan Noce at that time.

A: This had to do with the plan for reorganization and retraining these 40,000 negro troops. It was the 2d Cavalry Division square -- which was unhorsed, of course, by that time -- and about 15 or 20 anti-tank and anti-aircraft battalions, which had become supernumerary.

When I was called in by General Somervell and taken up to General Marshall, I was told -- very quietly, in order not to raise any problems here in the United States -- that 40,000 negro troops, combat-type troops, ground troops, were being sent to North Africa; that it was necessary to retrain them for the invasion of Southern France, the Anvil Operation; and that I was the officer selected to coordinate it. I was notified that there would be no release of information in the United States on this in order to avoid any clash with the negro press or the NAACP. I met the commanding general of the division, who was General Harry Johnson. Harry Johnson was a National Guard commander, or a Reserve officer -- probably

Reserve -- from Texas. He was a fine officer. He was a prominent businessman, a potential governor of Texas, and at that time he was a vice president of the Gulf Oil Company. But that meant nothing special to me, as I never knew I would go with Gulf Oil after I retired from the Army. In any event, he met me and said, "I understand you're going over there in connection with my training program for the invasion of France." I said, "Yes, that's right." "Well," he said, "What do you know? What special problems are there?" "Well" I said, "I'm not aware of any special problems at the moment, but probably we'll get more instructions when we report to General Devers in Algiers." So with that I said, "When are you going?" and he said, "Well, I think I'll go over on the first convoy of fast ships. [I think this was called a UGF] into Casablanca," and I said, "Fine, I'll see you there. I'm flying over." The way they routed me was down through Natal over by Ascension Island to Dakar, and up over the Atlas Mountains, eventually into Oran. This is where the remark about Dakar came in that you were mentioning. We were delayed a couple of days before crossing the South Atlantic at Natal or Recife. Then I was delayed again. We had a forced landing at Tindouf, which is a little French Foreign Legion post on the south side of the Atlas Mountains, and this was quite fascinating; we had to stay there a couple days.

This little French Legion place called Tindouf was out of this world. It's one of those settings that, if it hasn't been used in American movies, should be, because it was exactly what I had pictured of as being a French Foreign Legion post, and the troops were just as interesting, too. It was a real fascinating interlude that we spent there. We moved to Marrakech, then on to Oran, where I was the only one who was a full colonel, so I was entitled to the hotel for colonels and generals, but I didn't stay there because I wanted to keep my staff together. We went to, I guess, what must have been a third-rate hotel, but at least we were together and we got a lot of work done outside of business hours.

When I'd been there a couple of days and checked around, I decided that I'd better go up to Algiers and report to General Devers. General Noce was there, incidentally, my old commander, as G-3 for Devers. I went and was warmly welcomed by General Devers and General Noce. I stayed with Noce during my visit.

General Devers asked me about this mission of mine and, of course, I explained to him what my general plan was and he said that was fine. I not only knew what was ahead, I knew what he expected me to produce. I had a list of all the units, and naturally their tables of organization and equipment, and other data, and we were prepared to back that up, get in requisitions. I had men from most of the Technical Services, one from each of the major Technical Services at least, about seven or eight of them.

General Devers finally said to me, "Art, do you know this General Johnson?" and I said, "Yes, I met him, General, but I don't know him too well." He said, "When is he coming?", and I said, "Well, he told me he was coming over on the first fast convoy to Casa." He said, "Well, I want to see him as soon as he comes. Do you think he'd make a good mayor of Rome?" I said, "Well, I don't know, General, I don't know him well enough, but I do know that he's a well-established businessman in Texas. He's a major general in the Reserve, and apparently they thought well enough of him so that he's keeping this division. He's a vice-president of the Gulf Oil Corporation, and a prospective governor of Texas. It seems to me as though he would make a good mayor of Rome." "Well," he said, "I'll get in touch with him when he comes." I left with General Noce for the guest house.

There were maybe six or eight of us at lunch when who comes in that very day but General Harry Johnson with an aide. We were surprised to see each other, and I said, "How in the world did you get here this soon?" He said, "Well, you know I got anxious about my division and its training, so I decided I'd fly over, and they let me fly instead of by convoy. So here I am." I got right on the phone after we got up from the table and called General Devers's aide. I said, "Tell General Devers that General Johnson has just arrived by air and he's already here. Would the general like to see him this afternoon?" He called me right back and said, "Yes, General Devers said to tell him to come down at 2:30." I said to General Johnson, "General Devers would like to see you at 2:30. He didn't know you were coming in, but his aide says to come down at 2:30." He said, "Fine." He saw him, we had dinner that night, and I was there another day or two, but he never mentioned anything about what Devers said to him and, as a colonel, there certainly was no reason for me to ask him.

About two days later there was a demonstration of new weapons down at Oran. This had to do with a few tank killers, some special grenades, and items of this sort. General Devers and General Noce were going and he said, "I'll take you back on my plane. I want to see this demonstration of new weapons." As we got off the plane, I was walking alongside Noce and General Devers, when General Devers said, "You know, Art, you were right about Johnson. I think he'll make a good mayor of Rome." "Well," I said, "I'm delighted, General, because I didn't really know too much about him except what I told you, but he appeared to me to be the right type of man." Devers said, "Yes, everything you said to me was right, but I'll tell you the reason he'll make a good mayor of Rome. He's a 32d degree Mason, he's got a Catholic wife and four children." This is a tremendous story. Later he was made the mayor of Rome.

Well, of course, Johnson did keep pressing me as to what was going to happen to him and his division, but until Devers told him, it wasn't up to me to say. We kept the basic administrative structure of each of these units. The 1st sergeant, mess sergeant, and supply sergeant were still doing their jobs; so were the company clerk and noncoms, and so did the officers until I could shift a technically trained and better qualified officer to run it. In some cases we didn't even do that. For instance, they were very short of doctors, and I remember I had a damn good lieutenant colonel of infantry who knew something about medicine but he wasn't a doctor, but I left him in there. He did a great job starting that battalion, but the Medical Department almost fell apart with the idea of anybody but a medical officer commanding the battalion. This is understandable, I guess; this is branch pride, although this man was perfectly capable of commanding it as a battalion. He did well during this period until we could get a field-grade doctor. We had to shift other people, leaving as many as we could and placing the technical skills where they were needed. We then established regular training programs to raise the level. It was a fascinating project, really.

The division was entirely broken up in nine weeks into separate engineer battalions, truck companies, signal companies, and others for a total of 160 service-type units.

I went from Africa to England. I was asked by General Lee, General Eisenhower's deputy for logistics, to survey the amphibious preparations for the landing in France. I went to Casablanca, stopping at Rabat a couple of days to look at places. We had been working pretty hard, so we had a couple of days rest on the coast. I remember the night we got on a plane for Prestwick. We were delayed for a while, and then we found that they had to change crews. The pilot had been buzzed apparently by a German plane that approached him when he was over the Bay of Biscay on his way south from Scotland and he just wasn't about to take off that night. They put another crew on and we took off. As far as I know nothing untoward happened, but they were having to fly out farther over the Atlantic because German fighters were coming out to strafe them if they came close to the French coast at all as they went north over the Bay of Biscay. From Prestwick we flew to London; nothing untoward happened there. Mountbatten, of course, who had their commands set up before . . . combined operations had gone on to India. He came through the United States on his way to India in 1943 and I had occasion to spend some time with him. He was interested in invading the Andaman Islands and Burma; what we refer to as Southeast Asia today. He asked about some plans for converting certain types of landing craft, like the 105-foot LCT, and for the movement of horses and mules over into Burma. Incidentally, while our people in Italy thought they would never have to do that, they did use LSTs to haul mules from Sardinia. Of course, to the Navy, this was really sacrilegious to use what they considered at least a semi-combat type unit to fill it with mules -- and whatever mules left behind them -- but this had to be done. In any event, Brigadier Rockingham, who had been Mountbatten's chief of staff, was then running it. I went up to Inveraray with him where a lot of amphibious training was still being carried out -- at least by British troops and some Americans -- looked over those facilities, and witnessed a small demonstration. Then I attended the final rehearsals, the Fox and Tiger operations on the southeast coast at Slapton Sands. I went to call on General Heubner and he offered me a command. I was still a colonel, so he offered me command of the 16th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division for the attack on Omaha Beach. I accepted with glee and even got General Lee, the Deputy Commander, to ask Somervell to release me so I could get the combat command, but Somervell wouldn't do it. This was in April 1944, two

months before the invasion. In any event, I had to come back. I couldn't get in on the cross-Channel operation.

It was quite an interesting visit to Inveraray. In addition to the amphibious training there, we had the pleasure of staying on the good ship Sister Anne. The Sister Anne is the yacht on which Edward met Wallis before they were married -- years ago -- and, of course, that brought back ideas; I can't say memories. Our host and the yacht's captain was a lieutenant commander in the Navy named Roland Teacher, the producer of Teacher's Highland Cream, so the ship was well stocked, as you can imagine. He was a personable chap and a noted sailor, so we didn't suffer any -- outside of duty hours, anyhow. That's about it; I got back to the United States about mid-April 1944.

Q: Let me ask you some questions concerning your job. In many of your folders you identified such activities with Officer Candidate School, Army Specialized Training Program, the Training Centers, and so forth. I'd like to talk about the Officers Candidate School. One point that comes out clearly is that you always faced the problem of some good students -- academically good -- who just didn't turn out to be good leaders. I don't know whether you solved the problem -- I'm not so sure we've solved the problem today. What was your feeling about that at the time?

A: I don't know that I can respond to that well. There certainly is a lot of difference between good leaders and good students, and they don't necessarily match. On the other hand, for the regular officer you need the man who is a fairly good student and is well educated if he's going on to a higher rank. Battlefield commissions are something else. They usually go to the man who has produced right there. Some of our schools were castigated and higher-ups wanted to change commanders because they wouldn't graduate a higher percentage. Of course, it costs you more, obviously, if you graduate only 60 percent of a class. I always stood up for school commandants if, after a careful survey by knowledgeable people, I found that they were only throwing out people who deserved to be thrown out. Of course, there was always a lot of skulduggery that went on behind the scenes, trying to get somebody's son into schools for which he was not really qualified, to get them commissioned and then stash them away in a place safe

from gunfire. We'll always live with that to some degree, and I always supported our commanders when they tried to clean house.

Q: I'm interested in the Army Specialized Training Program from a personal standpoint, because I entered World War II by going into the ASTP, and the only note that I could detect here was that two percent of the highest IQs went to the Navy and Army; the Air Corps was getting 98 percent.

A: Let me say this about the Army Specialized Training Program, and nothing I said about officers training before had anything to do with it. We were talking about Officer Candidate School and perhaps battlefield commissions. The ASTP was a very valuable program. No one knew how long the war was going to continue. We had to siphon off some of our best minds and upgrade them as officers. The Navy did a superb job on that. Maybe they overdid it, I'm not sure, but they started with a V-12 program at the very beginning of the war. They siphoned off the best and put them through what amounted to four years of civilian college. Later they compressed it to three years with a trimester setup. We were fortunate in the Army in the competence of the people that ran that program. It was a peculiar thing, but as it turned out -- particularly after I got my promotion in 1944 as a brigadier, but even as a colonel -- I was senior to both of the people who ran it. The officer in charge was Colonel Sandy Chilton, class of 1907 at West Point. He had been one of my English professors and a marvelous man; we couldn't have found a finer, more competent officer, and he and I always had the greatest rapport; we have had a long friendship since the war. His deputy was Herman Beukema, who was one of the outstanding professors at West Point, and a geopolitician of note who stood out for the accuracy of his predictions. Under them were several other fine officers named McCleod -- I've forgotten where the old Scotchman came from -- and another chap, whose name escapes me for the moment but later became the president of Georgia Tech after the war. Another, Major Andy Holt, later became president of the University of Tennessee. These were very competent men and we had a very fine program. If you were going to have a competent Officer Corps for the future and fight a war of unknown length, this was what we had to do -- instead of making the mistake the British did, by stripping their colleges in World War I, then having them all get out with a swagger stick in front

of their troops and have nobody left to lead the next generation. We didn't want to see that mistake made again. Frankly, we were very critical -- some of us -- of General Marshall in 1945. I can only assume that he knew much more than we did at the time. But, as I say, our Army, at least the planners, had underestimated the demands in Europe; they thought the war would terminate sooner. We not only started running out of artillery ammunition, as I mentioned, but we also started running out of infantry replacements. The problem got so serious that in either March or April of 1945, General Marshall took most, and perhaps all, of the 90,000 students out of the Army Specialized Training Program and sent them to Europe as Infantry replacements with about three weeks training. Thank God the war was about over, because if it had continued for a long time this group -- who were not the most expertly-trained infantry replacements -- would have suffered very high losses that we could have ill-afforded. That's a tough statement to make, but assuming the war had to be carried into Japan and we'd suffered the losses then expected under the Coronet and Olympic Operations, we would have been very hard pressed to supply really top grade officer personnel who combined the leadership as well as the mental properties for leading the Army for the next decade.

General Marshall, I think, must have counted on not only the war in Europe being over but, with the advent of the Manhattan Project (atom bomb), that there wasn't going to be too much more land war in the Pacific.

Q: How about the training program itself? That problem always exists with us. Do you have any philosophy you'd like to talk about on training?

A: Yes. The relative competence of our training officers was low in the early stages and what we needed was to bring back more battle-experienced officers from overseas after a reasonable period of time. Some of them stayed overseas for four or five years. I think more of them should have been brought back to supervise this training. We did have some, but we didn't have enough. On the other hand, the ambitious officer isn't going to want to return and capable officers aren't going to be released willingly by their commanders, so this is a hard one to evaluate. I don't know just how you'd do it. We made numerous changes to try and give better continuity to

training. We tried to use returned noncoms and officers wherever we could in our programs. We put a lot more accent on the readiness of our troop units than had been initially done. Of course this became easier as we had more time in which to train them and qualify them and get them ready to go; there's just a multitude of problems and details. We changed our replacement training system quite a bit as time warranted, but the years would prevent me from giving you the real pro's and con's of why we did it or what we thought we gained. Sometimes you don't gain as much as you estimated.

I just responded to the professor of history at West Point, where they've got a committee on institutional research asking about history. They want to make history a career field. Every officer ought to be interested in history, and the best officers love history; they're highly motivated toward studying it. There should be specialists who teach history, but I don't believe that history should be a function like intelligence or logistics. To follow up on the point you just made, I tried for years to get the Army Center for Military History put at Carlisle, the Army War College, along with an Advanced Research Institute, because I consider this the focal point for Army development. They still want to keep them in Washington. Yet whenever they get a new problem for the General Staff, they think only of it as a new subject; but you could send somebody to research it at the History Center and they would find that there isn't much that's really new. We might save a hell of a lot of wheel-spinning, but some people would rather spin their wheels. I am glad to see that a Military History Institute has now been established at Carlisle. I bought the two books right behind you yesterday. These are what we need to keep alert. They are concerned strictly with military history, which they define as the art of war. Our knowledge of history today has to transcend that; we have to understand the social, economic, and philosophical aspects of international power contests as well; the past is prologue. If we don't understand the past, we can't have a really intelligent vision of what will probably happen in the future.

After I returned from Europe in 1944, General Weible was put on special duty, full time, with the Under Secretary of the Army, Bob Patterson, to develop a plan for universal military training. While I didn't

have the full title at that time, I was Acting Director of Military Training during the last year of the war.

Looking back on General Weible's efforts in those days makes me wonder how much further ahead we'd be if we'd had universal military training and established the principle then that every young man owes certain service to his country. I see it coming again when they talk, even though we have a volunteer Army. In good times, you'll largely get those who can't get better jobs -- or any job -- elsewhere. When the going gets a bit tough, they won't be volunteering; it gets just that simple. I have many reservations about the volunteer Army. I think a national service of some sort is needed. I think the universal military training program would have been excellent. I think now that a national service program, requiring perhaps 12 or 16 months in the military or 24 months elsewhere, would have merit at very modest pay rates; I'm not for competing with industry or our professional Army. This would give the young men of our country a lot that they are lacking today. Excessive permissiveness is only another word for lack of discipline, whether it's in the home, the church, the Army, the school, or wherever you see it today. This is the atmosphere in which we live. I don't know that it'll get better before it gets worse; sometimes I'm afraid it won't. I thought then that the Army's effort to establish universal military training was certainly worthwhile, but it was also quite obvious then -- and certainly more obvious in the hysteria that followed the end of World War II where everybody was to be demobilized overnight, and practically were -- that we were not a tough nation, and we were not going to take care of our security to that degree. When we see the way the Army was whittled down in the years immediately after the war -- all the services for that matter -- and the price we paid for it at the time of Korea, at the time of Czechoslovakia, and on other occasions -- it makes you wonder if we'll ever learn or not. Look at us today (February 1971).

I was sad but amused the other night; someone asked me, "Where are all these experienced units going that are coming back from Vietnam?" Well, hell, some of them were inactivated before leaving Vietnam, so I told them that they're going nowhere; we haven't got them. This is exactly the point, and that's exactly what will happen if liberals and do-gooders force us to reduce our forces in Europe or anywhere else. If

Congress decides to recall them, they are out; we're just that many shorter. There's nothing left. There's no strategic reserve that's worthy of the name now, and our training base has been whittled away to a point where no rapid mobilization is possible.

My next interesting mission was when it seemed apparent that the end of the war in Europe was in sight, about late February 1945. At that time I was again selected by General Marshall, based on General Somervell's recommendation, to go to Europe in connection with the planning for the redeployment of troops from Europe to the Pacific. I arrived in Paris on the 11th of April 1945. The reason why I remember it well is because it was the day that President Roosevelt died. The first thing I remember about Paris was going to Mass in the Cathedral of Notre Dame in honor of President Roosevelt. I remember how impressed I was to hear the "Star Spangled Banner" played on the great organ of Notre Dame. It was tremendous, very impressive. At that time, it appeared that the war was about over. The 6th Army Group, General Devers, was in Heidelberg where they were headquartered. The war wasn't quite over, of course; this was still April. Our offensive was still being pushed toward Czechoslovakia and into Leipzig. General Devers had already been given the job of planning for the redeployment of troops and also the establishment of whatever occupation forces were going to be set up in Germany. This was to be a very large force at that time. It seems to me General Devers was to head it, but I could be wrong.

I remember also that we were preparing the way to set up a military government in Berlin, and my friend, General Lucius Clay, arrived to head it. He was living in a chateau up near Paris, in Versailles. I remember having dinner and discussing with him and other mutual friends some of the problems he thought we would encounter when he eventually went to Berlin to take over, as well as some of the redeployment problems. These were the final days of the war, mid-April of 1945. I then went to Italy, where General Noce was still the G-3 in that theater, and the forces were under General Mark Clark.

I remember the final day of the war (We didn't realize it was the final day, but we knew it was close.) going up to Florence in a bomber with one of my friends, General Charlie Born, who was in command of the 15th Bomber Command or some part of it. We flew up over

the Po Valley, the Tyrol, and up over the Brenner Pass. We could see horse-drawn German artillery being taken back through the pass. South of there everything was flat from Milan to Venice. All of the industrial towns were absolutely flat. We came back and landed in Florence that afternoon and then flew back to Rome. That evening a few of us were sitting in King Emmanuel's box in the opera. Between the first and second parts of Aida, they came and announced that the armistice had been signed. That was the first official notice we had, although we saw it coming. I spent a great deal of time with General Noce talking about the redeployment of troops from that theater to the Pacific. The first division that reached Manila in July -- and I was standing on the shore of Manila Bay that day -- was either the 86th or 88th Division which had been in the Trieste area straddling the borders of Italy and Yugoslavia at war's end.

I flew back to Germany and reported to General Devers again. He suggested that I go over to visit one of his frontline divisions, which I very much wanted to do, so it didn't take any arm-twisting. I went to Pilsen to see General Heubner, who then had the V Corps. He welcomed me warmly and I spent most of two days with him talking about the problems. We went over to "no-man's land" between the Russian zone and ours; the barrier was located in a little village about ten miles east of Pilsen. I remember the Americans were being blamed for the lack of milk in Pilsen, which was due to the fact that the Russians had slaughtered all the cattle for meat, but we were picking up the blame already. There were tremendous camps for refugees; some coming through from the East who were allowed to pass on. Most of these were Poles or Czechoslovakians, and I remember meeting with some people from Warsaw that night. At the same time, we had a camp right near the boundary with tens of thousands of Russian prisoners who, by agreement, unfortunately, we were forcing back into Russian hands. They wanted no part of going back to Russia, and Heubner wanted no part of sending them back to Russia, but he had no alternative. They were penned in a fairly large area; some of them hanged themselves rather than go back; suicide was not uncommon at all, but somebody said that they're Russians and the Russians wanted them back. Well, all they wanted them back for was to kill them or torture them, but we were stupid enough to send them back. Who made that decision?

The problem of food was severe because the Germans had no food themselves. The entire population, other than our troops, were limited to one can of C-rations per day. There just was no food; it was almost exhausted. Blown-up highways and bridges were being repaired behind our troops, but there was still a terrific logistics and transport problem in trying to feed people. Those who were being fed -- and of course this went on for a long time among the German population, for the next year or two -- were down to about 1,100 calories a day. It was the best we could do at the time.

I went back to Paris, and by that time they had determined that they were going to have a Redeployment Command. This was established at Rheims, and it was under the command of Major General Roy Lord. Lord was a man of many capabilities and proclivities. He was an able man, but he had irritated some people in Paris at our headquarters in the Majestic Hotel. Those were the days when we established the great cantonments on the Channel coast, most of them named after cigarettes: Old Gold, Lucky Strike, etc. Our combat divisions were sent there and filled up with men who had low point scores (short overseas service) to go to the Pacific. The others with long overseas service were put in other outfits that were to go back to the United States for inactivation and disbandment. I was in Europe from April until the 25th of May. The program seemed to be working, but it had changed materially from what they had intended to do in the European theater.

Q: Let me go back to that point. On the 30th of April 1945 at the Hotel Majestic, General Jonathan Seaman was one of the representatives of the 6th Army Group who attended a conference which you chaired. General Shephard was the 6th Army Group representative.

A: Yes, he was the Deputy Chief of Staff for General Devers, and I think was assigned responsibility for coordinating this task force.

Q: I'd like to tell you what General Seaman said and have your reaction. General Seaman said, "I was in the G-3 section of the 6th Army Group and General Devers was the commander. Along about March of 1945, I was asked to plan for the return of certain units to the States for demobilization upon the end of the war, deployment of certain units from ETO to the Pacific Theater and so on. I happened to be a member of this task force

which was sent to Paris to do this and it was headed by Brigadier General Shephard, a very capable officer who later was the Assistant Commandant down at Fort Benning. One of the other members -- it was then a very small group -- was then Colonel Russell Vittrup. There were only about six or eight of us, and we made very, very detailed plans to move. About that time they sent a task force over from Washington headed by Brigadier General Arthur Trudeau. All plans that we'd made were thrown out the window to a large extent, and a much more hasty return to the States occurred for certain units; some to stage in the States for trans-shipment to the Pacific, and others to go directly from a port in the Mediterranean, directly to the Pacific. In any event, I'm not completely familiar with General Trudeau's plan, and I'm sure that you can dig it up someplace. The 6th Army Group was disbanded and General Devers returned as commanding general of Army Field Forces, and General Barr, who had been chief of staff of 6th Army Group, was designated as the G-1. I have worked very closely with General Barr on many occasions." I'd be interested to get your reaction now to what General Seaman said.

A: Well, I certainly had something to do with changing their plan, but Washington was also aware of their plans and considered them too grandiose as far as the continuing occupation of Germany was concerned, and not sufficiently realistic about the problems in the Pacific and the need to get troops over there very fast. It should be recalled that Coronet, the invasion of Kyushu (the southern island), was scheduled for November 1945, six months away; and that Olympic, the invasion of the Tokyo beaches, was scheduled for six months later. These were truly major operations and all these troops, particularly blooded troops, were needed from Europe. Many of these divisions were going to be degraded to some extent by the fact that the high-point men, decorated for heroism and with long service, were going home. But they were still better than any we had in the United States. The need for many of those "blooded" divisions together with Corps and Army headquarters to go to the Pacific was fully recognized in Washington. It's entirely possible that these plans hadn't been disclosed to the people in the European Command. The idea over there of an occupation -- the number of troops, and the number of senior headquarters that were going to be retained -- was greater than I was given to understand it should be.

So we whittled at that, and in doing so, I guess we changed a few plans that existed in the Shephard task force. The planned assault on Kyushu involved risks and difficulties quite comparable with the Normandy operation as far as the land battle was concerned.

That was the point in sending someone over from Washington who was briefed on the intercontinental aspects of the war. I don't think anybody suffered by it. More people may have gotten home earlier, perhaps.

Q: Well, apparently you moved things much faster than they had planned.

A: We did. We moved them plenty fast. As a matter of fact, I left there on the 25th of May. Remember, the armistice was on the 8th of May. We had these discussions between the armistice and the 25th of May. I returned to the United States and left for the Pacific, which is my next story, about the 4th of July. I was on the beaches of Manila Bay when we welcomed the first division from Europe, which was probably the 15th of July. Things were moving. We were able to do it in those days. We had the greatest military force the world's ever seen, and we could move; we could operate, we could fight.

Q: Well, before you go back to the States, a couple of notes that I picked up from your diary. One was the stop that you made at Omaha Beach where you visited the 538th QM Battalion, a representative or a portion of the 6th Brigade. You wrote down at this time (I'd like to state what you wrote): "So many of us lived to make that landing possible, and so many brave men died in doing it. They did what we planned. Never have I felt the real accomplishment of the Engineer Amphibian Command as keenly as when I walked those sands. It could have been Martha's Vineyard all over again."

A: Did I?

Q: Apparently you were certainly moved by the experience of going back to Omaha and looking at it.

A: That's right. Remember, it was the place about which Weary Wilson and I had written that Leavenworth problem in 1941.

Q: What type of conversation did you have with General Lucius Clay? What were some of the problems that he anticipated?

A: Well, the major problem that he foresaw was trying to deal with the Russians; he knew how intransigent they were. He was never deluded -- like some still are, that they're really a bunch of fellows who want to get along and have no sinister intentions about us of any sort. He knew exactly what he was going to run into and he was prepared for it. It's a fortunate thing that we had a man as tough minded as Clay at the time. He succeeded General McNarney in Berlin, and General McNarney was an excellent man. McNarney was a man who had Marshall's complete confidence, but undoubtedly Clay did too or he wouldn't have had that job. Clay also had the confidence of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Hill, and the President. He was an excellent choice for that very important assignment.

I don't have anything more, in particular. I remember one little aside that might be interesting. I was in Rheims, which was Eisenhower's headquarters, and not too far from Bastogne. It was there that I found that the initial troops that were in Bastogne were not the 101st Airborne Division at all. I'm not taking any glory away from the 101st Airborne Division -- later they had to hold it -- but when the Germans were about to pass freely through Bastogne, the first troops that slowed them down in order to give the 101st and other troops a chance to get there were some Quartermaster units that had been shot up there from Rheims or that vicinity. I remember meeting this unit, including their commander, and being told about this by people on General Eisenhower's staff.

We stayed that night with Count Guy de Polignac. This is an amusing story about him. He undoubtedly was a collaborator. He was one of these fellows who could always get along and compromise. There are a lot of them who can do that -- and maybe they shouldn't be called collaborators -- but, in any event, he provided certain aid and comfort to the Germans in the way of Clicquot champagne. De Polyniac owns the Clicquot champagne vineyards and they produce one of the finest French champagnes. When the American forces arrived they came upon warehouse after warehouse of champagne, bottled and labeled, "Bottled expressly for the Wehrmacht, 125 francs" and 125 of those francs weren't worth too much. When the Americans came in they

revalued the franc quite a bit. De Polignac talked our military government people out of seizing this material because he said that, while it had been bottled for the Germans, the Germans didn't own it and hadn't paid him for it; consequently, it was his property. Our civil government was very good-hearted, of course, so they let him off the hook completely. Whereupon he proceeded to have all of the labels washed off the bottles, immediately relabeled them for 150 francs, and sold them to the Americans. I don't know what the moral to the story is -- you can draw it to suit yourself -- but again it shows some of our soft-headedness. That's about the end of the story. I visited these various camps up in the Le Havre area -- I don't remember whether there was one at Cherbourg or not -- also down at Marseilles as some of them were coming out to the Mediterranean. All in all it was a very satisfying and informative mission. I hope we got a few things accomplished.

Q: When you came back, or shortly thereafter, you received another set of orders. Before you move from this position, do you recall any basic changes in your thinking as a result of being involved in this type of activity or your several special missions?

A: No, it's just a further outgrowth from having trained a platoon, company, battalion, brigade, and planning and executing the training program for the Amphibian Command and the entire Army Service Forces. Just an outgrowth of them, application of the same principles: organization, decentralization, strengthening of policy, procedures. It was very satisfying except that I didn't want to be serving in Washington. I wanted to be in other places.

CHAPTER IX

The Philippines

Q: In June of 1945 (I don't have the exact date), I think, you were given a new assignment to be the G-3 of the Army Forces Western Pacific.

A: That's right. There were many shifts coming about. There were a lot of people coming back from Europe and they needed places for them. We also needed to step up the size of our forces in the Philippines for the assault on Japan. Consequently a lot of us who hadn't gotten out to the war in Europe, at least on a permanent change of station, were assigned to the Pacific. I was one of those and, as I say, I was assigned as G-3. The Army Forces Western Pacific were the forces that really were to remain in the Philippines after preparing for and supporting the invasion of Japan, which, of course, was to be made by the old and new divisions which were being assigned to General Kruger's Sixth and General Eichelberger's Eighth Armies. These were the assault armies. I think it was probably quite natural that I would go over as the G-3 of AFWP forces since the commanding general assigned was General W. D. Styer, who had been General Somervell's Chief Of Staff all during the war. Consequently I reported normally to Styer as G-3 or Director of Training of the Army Service Forces. So when he went to the Pacific I went over on his staff. I lived in Manila; the war was still not over. There was scattered fighting in several of the islands and still quite a bit of it in the Baguio area, in the northern part of Luzon. That struggle didn't end until probably the middle of July -- something like that. Then there were sporadic little groups . . . you know, the diehards who wouldn't give up, who were shooting here and there. They hung onto the Baguio area pretty tightly. But, in any event, Manila was terribly shot up. We hadn't been back over three or four months and Manila was badly destroyed. General Styer asked me to live with him.

One of the tasks I didn't mention in my mission to Europe and Africa. I made a fairly extensive study of the operations of the port and base at Oran, which was one major port in North Africa. To a lesser degree, I surveyed operations in the Port of Naples in Italy. Consequently, I had absorbed considerable knowledge about the Transportation Corps and the Technical Services, their operations and training, whatever

their functions were. When I lived with General Styer he was very unhappy about the operations of the Port of Manila. It was in very bad shape. We knew it had to be built up to a capacity of 10,000 and preferably 20,000 tons a day. Only three piers were in full operation, including a temporary one of Quonset cubes, those heavy but useful Navy steel cubes. The harbor of Manila was filled with over 100, mostly Japanese, cargo ships half out of water that had been sunk by bombers. A number of them were American, but there were over a hundred -- and we're talking anywhere from 6,000- to 15,000-ton ships. Wherever you looked, there was another hulk half out of water. Attached to the port was a naval officer named Commodore Sullivan, whose business in civilian life was ship salvage. Sullivan was attached to the port to help clean up this harbor, but the harbor operations were not going well. The individual in overall charge, whom I met on two or three occasions, didn't seem to me to be devoting much time to really running the base. He was sort of running the people who were running the base, but all he was doing was listening to them. I don't think he was giving them much direction, if I do say so. I don't want to be overly critical, but, as an example, I went into his office one day while he was still in charge. I was just looking over the port at the time, and he said, "Sit down, I'll be with you in a few minutes." Well, I found out that what he was doing daily was to sign something in the neighborhood of 150 traffic violations by soldiers in Manila that had been made a matter of summary court-martials. I said to him, "How in the hell do you have time to do that sort of thing and still run this port and the depots and base areas around it?" "Well", he said, "I don't know, that's easy," or something of the sort. But it wasn't so easy, and Styer was very unhappy with him. General Styer, several times after dinner in the evening would say, "What are you doing tonight, Art? Let's drive down through the port." Well, we'd drive down through the port, and I guess I was getting myself in the position of the guy who criticized the mess, because he'd say, "What about this?" I'd make some answer which I thought was appropriate and which did have validity. Finally one day he called me in and he said, "You know I got you over here to be my G-3, and you can have that job as long as you want it. But you have frequently said how you would enjoy a command. I've got to do something about that goddamn port. Would you take command of the port?" "Well," I said, "General, I'm here to serve you in any way you want."

Yes, I'll take command of the port. I know what it's going to be, because General MacArthur and his staff ride through it every morning on their way to work, you ride through it every morning on your way to work and your staff does, but if you want me to take it, I'll take it." He said, "All right, it's yours." I guess I was asking for something, and I got it. It was really intriguing, but we did get the job done. I don't say it was a perfect job, and I caught as much hell as you would expect from all of these people who had authority and were passing through or by the fringes of Base X, Manila. There were fantastic problems involved and it was challenging to solve them.

I commanded that port and all depots and facilities in the Manila area -- designated as Base X, Manila -- from late July to the end of the year and then served on the War Crimes Tribunal. I only stayed in the Philippines nine months, but it was really a tremendous experience. We had to greatly expand the base and we were in the midst of the rainy season. The forces I had under me totalled about 300,000 men -- 88,000 American troops, 150,000 Filipinos and 60,000 Japanese prisoners. This constituted quite a force to keep busily engaged. I had some excellent commanders and excellent men on the staff and we got a lot done. There were wartime problems and we got wartime results, but it worked.

Truck transportation was a big problem. We had a few heavy trucks, only a few, and Styer immediately wired Somervell in Washington who immediately sent over a shipload of 100 to 200 heavy tractors and trailers, because we needed something heavier than our 2.5- and 5-ton trucks. They were operated seven days a week, 24 hours a day, in two 12-hour shifts, by negros, Filipinos or white drivers. They had their assigned drivers maybe on one shift, seven days a week, but then somebody else -- a Filipino or another soldier or somebody -- drove the other shifts. To hold anybody to even the responsibility for first-echelon maintenance became damn near impossible. In addition to that, these were all Class C trucks; in other words, they'd all come up from the Islands -- maybe Australia -- and most of them were in pitiful shape. When I took over the truck fleet, very few of the six-by-sixes -- the 2 1/2 ton trucks -- had dual wheels on them because it was "too much trouble" to fix a flat tire. What had happened was that all the duals disappeared. Where did they disappear to? Manila was

a shambles. We really destroyed that city -- we had to: it was a building-by-building job to knock the Japanese (mostly Navy) out of there, with the results that you had shards, pieces of mortar shells and artillery, all over the place. You couldn't go a mile on any road without getting a flat tire. The simple answer for the driver, as long as he had six wheels, was to chuck the four duals when wheels went flat. They got rolled off into the rice paddies by the side of the road and couldn't even be seen. I finally used L-5 planes (We didn't have helicopters in those days.) flying as low as they could spotting these wheels out in the rice paddies that couldn't be seen from the road and reporting back to trucks on the road, the pilot talking to the truck driver with a walkie-talkie. This was a hell of a job.

Finally what we had to do was this. I took one Quartermaster Service Company (200 men) and made it a Truck Repair Company. At the entrance to the port, when trucks came into the port, any that didn't have all ten wheels and all ten tires on it were immediately stopped. They put on other wheels and tires and, if you had flats, they repaired them. Now this was 200 men who did nothing except repair tires; jack them up and put them on. Later we shifted to Filipinos. The only way I could get proper truck maintenance was this: I had one gate where trucks came into the port -- maybe two; I've forgotten. But in any event, I had control at these gates. Every truck had to be serviced one day a week; and every truck was serviced on a particular day of the week and worked seven days a week. Now, if this is Tuesday; and you're to be serviced on Tuesday when you come in, I see that you've got a white dot on your front bumper. You're siphoned over here, and you go through complete first- and second-echelon maintenance. You don't do anything else until you get serviced, and when you go out you have been serviced and there's a red dot painted on the front bumper. So next Tuesday you'll be nailed if you show a red dot. The next week you may go out with a blue dot, and somebody else has got a square or a triangle or two squares or a vertical line or two vertical lines or a horizontal line for other days of the week. Well, every truck did get serviced once a week, first- and second-echelon maintenance; that I could be sure of, and they had all their tires. That's just one example of the damn problems you run into. I had 8,000 people in Ordnance, and I don't know how many I had cannibalizing old trucks and vehicles to salvage

parts. The greatest work gang I had on that work were Japanese prisoners. They did all of the cannibalization of old trucks, and did a great job of it. The main problem was to keep Filipinos off their backs.

Q: About the same time that you're talking about the damage to the city because we had to fight our way through it, you received a letter from a fellow by the name of E. J. Morro; he was the President of Morro Electric Company. He was complaining that the U.S. troops were tearing up the streets of Manila. He was an American who had been over there. He was ashamed; he thought this was terrible. I don't know if you recall it, but your letter set him straight. You pointed out that we were supplying water and oil and everything that was really needed, and that in time the repairs are going to be made. I thought it was interesting to see an American who had been interned over there complaining to the Americans because we had caused damage to free them. It's very strange. I don't know if you had a lot of that type.

A: No, I don't think a lot, but you're always surprised with some people. Of course, men running American industries started returning and they had nothing whatsoever. These were businessmen who had been there before the war whether they were in copra or hemp or sugar. I reorganized one of the hospitals which was no longer needed as a hospital because the war was over, and we had to supply the American businessmen everything when he came in. This went right down to jeeps, food, and shelter. We did it and they had a hell of a lot to be grateful for, believe me, because they were well taken care of.

Q: I was interested in some of your responsibilities, one of them being to get two breweries back in operation, San Miguel and Balintowoc Brewery; I think you were "Mr. Brewery" then.

A: That's right. The Balintowoc Brewery was one that I think the Japanese had started and somebody wanted that put in shape. It was located in the northern part of Manila. The other brewery was the San Miguel and, of course, this was owned by a Filipino from one of the old grandee families and the wealthiest man in the Philippines. There were a lot of wealthy ones, but this was Colonel Andres Soriano. Soriano was a great friend of General MacArthur, and he had been taken out of the Philippines with MacArthur. He was a

very valuable man to have as a contact back to the Philippines. There were others of that group like Pete Grimm, an American who helped to run the port, and people of that sort. Soriano was one of them, and he wanted to put his brewery back in shape. At that time, the brewery provided the only refrigeration available for all American perishables. We were starting to get in some of the portable and prefabricated ice boxes or refrigerators that came in a couple of sizes: 1,800 cubic feet, which is about as big as this room, and 4,200 cubic feet. They all operated by separate compressors and air conditioners. You'd see 50 of them in a row, or on two sides of a street; we built up to 700,000-cubic-foot capacity eventually. Until October, however, we depended on the San Miguel brewery for ice, reconstituted milk, all soft drinks, and for ice cream. I'd met Andres Soriano when I was in Brisbane, Australia, on the amphibian mission in November 1942, so we knew each other pleasantly. I'd been in command of the base for maybe a week in early August, and things were happening fast. Soriano called me up one day and he said, "General, do you remember me? I'm Colonel Andres Soriano." I said, "Of course, I do. I remember you back in Lennon's Hotel in Brisbane, but I haven't seen you here yet." And he said, "Well, I'm here. Do you know that I own the San Miguel Brewery?" I said, "Yes, I do, and I don't know what we'd do without it, because it's really our only source here yet for ice and ice cream and reconstituted milk and things of that sort." (This was before they asked us to restore the brewery division.) He said, "General, could you do me a favor?", and I said, "I don't know, I'll try." He said, "I don't have an automatic ice box in my home, and I'm back living there now. Could I get 50 pounds of ice per day?" "Well," I said, "That doesn't sound too unreasonable for the man that owns the brewery." He said, "You know, you've got that lieutenant up there, so nobody can get anything out of him." I said, "That's great. That's the kind of lieutenant I want running that place. But in your case, I'm giving him a slip that will entitle you to a 100 pounds of ice per day. At least the owner of the establishment should get that much." He was tickled to death. Then they went after this brewery rebuild to get the brewery operating to provide beer for the troops. At the time, we had beer running out of our ears. We had shiploads of beer that were being rolled up from the South Pacific, Southwest Pacific, or coming from the

States. At that time, there were 900,000 cases (Yes, that's right.) piled 40 feet high along the south end of Dewey Boulevard.

I got two cases from the Manila Times every year at Christmas for many years. I still have some friends over there. I used to get fine cigars for years -- because I helped to get them back into the tobacco business up around the Cagayan Valley to the north -- until I stopped smoking.

The pressures eased after September 2 when the Japanese surrendered. There was still much to be done, but the pressures were certainly less than when we thought we were going to have an invasion force land on Kyushu in November. It would interest you to know, as an indication of what we thought the casualties would be, that through prefabs and other construction, our hospital facilities for handling casualties in the Manila area were 37,500 beds. This is besides air evacuation, ship evacuation, or facilities in Okinawa -- 37,500 beds. When people tell me about the terrors of the atom bomb -- and it was terrible -- it saved us 500,000 lives, I'm sure; 500,000 casualties.

Base X was charged with completely re-equipping the Sixth and Eighth Armies before they set off on the invasion. When the armistice occurred in September, MacArthur flew to Tokyo and all his troops followed him right in by ship; they were freshly equipped with everything new, including trucks. We had 30,000 new 2.5-ton trucks to equip our forces going into Japan and Korea, where the 24th Corps went in for occupation. We had over 5 million tons of supplies in our depots; the quantities were fantastic.

Our depots were limited somewhat by the roads. We had to go out into the hinterlands, and we developed the land. Much of the work was in the rainy season. I've seen a D-8 tractor pulling a 2.5-ton truck through the mud, which is not good for the D-8 and it certainly isn't good for the truck. I have seen an acre of cases of mosquito repellent set in the mud, and then having to be three deep as it sank in the mud in order to make a platform to put other items on that had to be kept in the dry.

Q: You must have had a tremendous amount of pilferage.

A: Yes, we did. It got to the point where you could lose whole trucks. . . . We had men killed driving trucks. We used guards on trucks, and some were killed. There was always a tendency to hijack trucks. We took every precaution we could; this was particularly true with post exchange items and perishables, particularly meats.

Q: Was there any recognition at the time of the Huk problem starting to rear its head.

A: Yes, up north around Angeles. But I guess we had too many things on our mind to think that was a major problem. At the same time, you see, we were beginning to reconstitute the Philippines Army.

Q: This being your first large command, I could imagine it was quite a headache.

A: Well, it was in a way, but I got an early start. I told you about sweating it out with at least working direction of some 225,000 people back in New York back in 1935. These are the opportunities that begin to get you organized so that you can make decisions, establish broad-gauge policy, get organized and still decentralize, and develop better judgment in picking your people. It all fell into place rather nicely. This is not belittling the difficulties; there were plenty of them in this regard.

We went over to Corregidor and made quite a study of it. We went into some of the old fortress and the tunnel. When we entered we still found some food and medical supplies and ammunition. Off the north dock of Corregidor was the spot where all the silver from the Philippines Bank had been dumped; this was a lot of money. Commodore Sullivan and his salvage people were salvaging that silver. I remember when I took over from my predecessor he had a box of silver on his desk. I said, "What are all those pieces of silver?" He said, "Take a handful. This is some that we dug up from Manila Bay." Of course, it wasn't his to give away. We found very loose handling of finances. For instance, I hate to say it, but our Finance Officer shot himself after a while over there. He exercised no control over what he was doing -- no security, no guards -- and I guess he found himself in a bad way after the Inspector General got after him. One interesting note, since we mentioned money. We found that inside the Philippine banks, the records, funds, and whatever else was in them had

never been disturbed by the Japanese. Isn't that amazing? It is absolutely amazing. They are ruthless on the battlefield -- there is no question about that -- but maybe we are too much the other way.

After the war ended we helped with the rebuilding of Baguio, which the Japanese hadn't damaged much, and it became a delightful place for the men to go on R&R. Then we rebuilt the Army-Navy Club. Both officers and enlisted men had excellent clubs in Manila, particularly after the armistice in September. There weren't many difficulties in that connection. One of the first things we faced, of course, as the war ended was a mission from Washington. We had some senators and others who came over to investigate reports that we were throwing away property and doing things of this sort, which didn't turn out to be anything too serious. We always had a few -- and you always will have -- disgruntled people. Some of them were causing us a tremendous amount of difficulty when this "Send the Boys Home" hysteria hit. They would be sent home with a certain number of points, and we suddenly found some of these men -- and I'm including officers now -- who figured three days ahead when they would have the necessary points and on that day they disappeared. They hadn't turned their company over to anybody, just walked out and got on a boat somehow. You can't imagine the breakdown in discipline caused by this hysteria in the States. It was very hard to prevent, but we did our best. But it was also promoted and abetted by Communists and other dissidents who were anxious to do anything that would break down discipline.

I know some of these false claims that were made caused congressional investigators and senators concern, but seldom turned up anything substantial. Then we were visited by Mr. McKabe, who was head of the Federal Liquidation Commission, the FLC. The job of the organization was to dispose of the fantastic amount of equipment promptly; a great deal of it was sent to China and I'm sure it has been shot back at us. They have been moving a lot of Communist armies around in these trucks for years, bailing-wire jobs to keep them going. An awful lot of equipment went to China. Of course, we forwarded a lot to be stockpiled for the occupation forces that we saw were going to be in Japan for a long time and also to the 24th Corps that went into Korea.

I remember one of the interesting items that we had to dispose of. We had 8,000 cases of bonded 12-year-old bourbon whiskey. That was a great question -- how to handle that as a surplus, particularly since we had nothing except local brew and wines and some Tori, which is a lousy type of Japanese artificial scotch. The question was how to get our hands and the Army's hands on that bourbon; it was all bourbon whiskey for hospitals. It was finally worked this way: we had plenty of money in the Army-Navy Club in Manila (and from clubs all the way back to Australia), so the Army-Navy Club of Manila bought this bourbon -- 8,000 cases, 96,000 bottles -- for a dollar a bottle. We wrote the check for \$96,000 to the government, but we only got it with the understanding that at least 50 percent of it would go to MacArthur. Forty percent of it would go to Japan, 20 percent would go to Korea, 20 percent of it would go to our troops in the Philippines, and 20 percent was the share that the Army-Navy Club got out of it. This took care of everything, at least on the initial ration.

Q: General, I know you were given additional responsibilities while you were the Base X commander, and I believe you were assigned to a military commission to bring to trial war criminals. One distinguished person that the commission tried was General Homma. I would like to read to you excerpts from a letter that you wrote back in 12 February 1946 to Colonel Harry Hoskins. You said that you finished the Homma trial yesterday and that you are glad it is over. I wrote this down; I think this will be a good introduction: "I still have a hard time deciding how high up a man can actually be held responsible to the extent of demanding his life for the errors of men in the lower echelons, particularly when they are the product of a civilization -- or rather of barbarism -- that had educated them to the belief that life is relatively worthless. However, his pound of flesh will be taken and perhaps, for purposes which escape me at the present time, let us hope it is for the best." That was written in February 1946, the day the trial was over. I know that your feelings have not changed but I would like to go back and talk about the tribunal. I'd like you to describe your duties there, perhaps some other individuals that came before it, and what were your feelings about this case.

A: To me this was a very unpleasant type of duty. Before the Homma case, we tried three or four Japanese officers who had related responsibilities on two or

three of the Central Islands of the Phillipines. They were being charged with the deaths of two or three American airmen who had had to parachute to safety when their planes were destroyed during an air attack. This raised the question as to how many echelons above the man actually committing the crime were seniors responsible, or what do proximity and distance and knowledge have to do with it. For instance, the overall commander in the Central Islands was on a different island than the commander on the island where these airmen were unquestionably tortured and/or killed. There was no evidence of any order that he had issued. Of course, orders could have been issued, sub-rosa, to kill or torture them. On the other hand, there was no evidence to prove that anything of this sort had been done or that the action went beyond the local commander condoning the action of two or three civilians on his island who said, "This is the hated enemy; let's get rid of them." The background raised a lot of discussion and concern. Our War Crimes Tribunal for the early trials consisted of Major General Basilio Valdes as President and Brigadier Generals Bob Gard, Warren McKnight, and myself as members. Major General Basilio Valdez was a noted surgeon in Manila from one of the really outstanding old Spanish families. He also was the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army under MacArthur despite the fact that he was a surgeon primarily. He was a marvelous man and a good friend of mine for many years. Being next senior in rank, I served initially as the law member, so this court first tried the Japanese colonels and majors.

The temper of the times was such that emotions ran high and sometimes, it seemed to me, superseded the use of reason and judgment. I was troubled by MacArthur's instructions, which were presented by the prosecution, the Judge Advocate. I'm sorry I don't have a copy of them, but these instructions really said that circumstantial and hearsay evidence may be admitted if you run short of sound evidence. This bothered me and others, but I can only speak for myself in this regard. The result was that during some of the early stages of the colonels' trials, I ruled against the admission of hearsay evidence. I soon found out that this was being reported back to headquarters. Then, without a complaint or a ruling against me -- which would have been unethical for a higher command to take exception to a member of a court's actions -- the policy was suddenly changed so that the law member would be the president of the

court. The president of the court was General Valdes in these early trials, of course. So Valdes became the law member of the court. Since General Valdes was perhaps not as familiar with American military law as I was, he would frequently ask advice and I gave it to him. This still resulted in the rejection of some questionable evidence and still made certain people unhappy. When he found it desirable, he would adjourn the court to discuss the matter. Two or three examples may indicate the temper of the times; I think they are interesting, and we will discuss them in commenting on the trial of General Masukara Homma.

We next found ourselves confronted with this trial of the overall commander, General Homma, who was in command of the Philippines at the time of the Japanese invasion in 1941 and through the fall of the Philippines in 1942. There were a number of charges against him and probably 50 specifications. These included everything that those arraigning him could think of to charge him with, not only what he had done personally but anything that any of his troops had ever done. In the spring of 1942, the Japanese forces -- as well as our forces -- were suffering from dysentery, malaria, scurvy, and beriberi on the Bataan Peninsula. They weren't that much better as far as their health condition was concerned than we were. So the struggle reached something of a stalemate with the result that Homma, the Japanese commander, appealed for fresh troops, and the Japanese High Command sent him the 26th Japanese Infantry Division which had been fighting on a no-quarter-asked, no-quarter-given basis on the Chinese mainland for something over four years. These troops arrived at Lingayen Gulf and were quickly put into action with the final assault that overran the Bataan Peninsula. They are the ones who were largely to blame for any atrocities or torture that occurred on the so-called "Death March of Bataan," where our troops, after surrender, were marched north for 75 or 100 miles to this camp. Some who fell by the wayside from disease, illness, or lack of food were bayoneted or shot. The question that is brought up here is not whether this happened or not; it did happen. The question is whether or not the senior commander of all forces in the Philippines could exercise control down to the last Japanese private who had been under his command for maybe three or four weeks. Could he have prevented these brutalities or, to put it another way, was he even indirectly responsible for what happened here to a degree that he should pay with his life? This is one

of the questions we have to ask ourselves and it keeps arising again and again.

It concerned us at the time because we used to turn to each other as we would walk out on the seawall at the American Embassy in Manila where we tried this case. We'd walk out when we had a break or adjourned the court and say, "Thank God we didn't lose. This could just as well be General MacArthur." Then, much to our amazement, our Supreme Court came up and found Yamashita guilty for quite a similar action where some private soldier had committed some atrocity. Our Supreme Court found, without regard to echelons, the top individual responsible. This worried us a little bit more and then when we heard what happened in the Nuremberg trials we were even more concerned. Now we see it happening where we're doing this to ourselves in the Calley case; this should concern us because if it was General Koster who was to blame, why not General Westmoreland? Or do we eventually blame the President? Since most of the people in the so-called My Lai case were only under military direction and supervision for a brief time, perhaps we should hold their parents responsible. Just where do you draw the line? These are thoughts I've lived with since World War II. There is just as much question in my mind now as there was then. I'm not talking about cases like Dachau or Belsen; I'm talking about the incidents that occur in connection with combat; with the battlefield which is organized confusion at best, and where the curtain really should be dropped at the rear of the battlefield because of things that do occur. The emotions, terror, and frustrations that occur to men there permit some to rise to heroic levels and others to descend to cowardly criminal levels if you want to put it bluntly. These are uncontrollable forces and they can't be judged by either judge or jury or press or by people who have never been really exposed to what these pressures are.

Q: Well, General, since you were judge and jury, and since you have firsthand information as to some of the things that General Homma was charged with, I think it would be interesting to hear your account. What were some of the major offenses the general was charged with, and what was the conclusion of your court?

A: I really can't get into sufficient detail just from memory. There were some 50 specifications, as I say; let me refer to a few of the most prominent. Some of them had to do with police blotters in Manila. For

instance, things that happened in the city of Manila: many of them had to do with rape and the fact that the Japanese took no serious action in punishing rape. Question: Do you punish them according to our American code for rape or the Philippine code or the Japanese code? Under what law are you operating under such a wartime situation because actually it wasn't found that the number of cases of rape, at least on the police blotter, was any greater during the Japanese occupation than it was before the war or even after the Americans reoccupied Manila. There was not significant difference as far as the records were concerned. Now there may have been things off the record that we don't know about, but we can't go behind the record because we believe -- or used to believe -- in even the death penalty for rape. And now we do little here except turn them loose. We might convict them, but we turn them loose so they can go out and commit it again. The Japanese considered this as a relatively minor offense and this was a matter of maybe a month's punishment. How are you going to condemn a commanding general because there are some cases of rape on the police blotter? Now there were cases of torture; there's no question about it. Whether they were actually condoned or whether they were not clearly reported to the commander was a question, and this is the kind of question that exists in the My Lai case. How much did the commander know about it? Was it completely submerged by the fact that so many casualties were found on the battlefield -- whether they were combatants, or women and children who were booby-trapping our troops as part of their tactics (which was frequently the case)? When men see their buddies shot down -- and these things happen around them in the confusion of a battlefield -- they aren't too likely to ask many questions about who appears to be one of the enemy in that particular area.

Q: Wasn't it true that there were such charges as firing against the white flag (the flag of truce), the Bataan Death March, the open city. The fact that General Homma was the Commander in Chief of all the forces, how did this fit in?

A: I don't recall too much about the firing on the open city. There was not too much damage done to Manila in the early days because the American forces had moved

to the Bataan Peninsula. We were the ones to destroy Manila before we could recapture it from the determined Japanese.

Getting back to the Bataan Peninsula; the 26th Japanese Division had been fighting in China on a no-quarter-asked, no-quarter-given basis for something like four or five years. They were suddenly brought in when the Japanese found that their troops were either not adequate or in good enough condition, at least, to run the Americans off the Bataan Peninsula. They were tough, hardened troops; they were thrown into battle quickly and provided the necessary force to overcome our American troops, resulting in the surrender of our forces on Bataan. These were the troops also that were undoubtedly guilty of most of the atrocities during the Death March. There's no question but that some men who were either weak or wounded were shot or bayoneted on this Death March. The question is how many echelons of command up is a person responsible to the point where you should condemn him for murder or crime, and that is what General Homma was accused of.

An important charge was of firing on a flag of truce after our forces tried to surrender the islands in defense of Manila Bay -- Corregidor and the other islands which were still manned. General Wainwright was left in command of all of the Philippines when MacArthur withdrew with his retinue to Australia. Major General Moore was in command of the defense of Manila Bay. The physical condition of our troops and their morale was certainly not good; they saw no prospect of relief, food was short and being rationed, the medical supplies were getting shorter. So General Wainwright came over in a boat to Cabcaban on the mainland under a white flag to seek terms for surrender. With now-General John Pugh, then his aide (who was probably a major about that time), General Wainwright met with General Homma's Chief of Staff at Cabcaban, which is a little town on the south end of the Bataan Peninsula. Wainwright appealed for terms on the surrender of the forces guarding Manila Bay -- the defenses of Manila Bay -- whereupon the Japanese commander, being very astute, said, "Well, General, since when can a commander surrender only part of his command?" Wainwright replied, "I have released the rest of my command in the Visayan and Central Islands to the local commanders." Whereupon the Japanese asked another good question: "Since when does a commander voluntarily relinquish a part of his command

without orders from higher authority, and where are those orders -- your orders -- from the War Department permitting this?" He didn't have any, and after some further discussion in which General Wainwright wasn't getting very far, they told him, "We'll give you 48 hours to go back to Corregidor and consider this. At that time if you don't surrender your forces, and we mean all the Philippines, we're going to seize Corregidor," which is what they did. But the charge and specification, of course, written with more emotion than judgment, was to condemn Homma for firing on a flag of truce in violation of the laws of war. We could not convict him and we didn't convict him. To make a long story short, in connection with Homma we felt that there's a definite limit on how many echelons up above the officer who violates the laws of war. Or how many echelons above him can you hold those in the chain of command responsible? Unless orders had been definitely issued by a commander or the matter is condoned, consideration should be given to the peculiar conditions that result in isolation with men operating largely on their own in the confused situation on the battlefield. This is one of the reasons why, when all of these factors are taken into consideration -- and again I'm afraid with more emotion than good judgment at that time -- we need to cogitate about our wisdom in condemning General Homma to death. I must admit I was not much in favor of it. In fact, I opposed it but I could only oppose it to a point that allowed him to be shot as a soldier and not hanged because that took a unanimous verdict, and I would not vote to hang him. I thought he was an outstanding soldier.

Q: General, I think we got the lesson from those trials. Do you desire to discuss anything further concerning the Homma case of the commission?

A: Only to repeat that I thought at the time, and still feel, that we were setting a bad pattern for ourselves and one that still is unrealistic of the problems and conditions that exist during major military operations and particularly in close proximity to the battlefield. I thought we'd pay a price then, and I felt more sure of it when they held Yamashita guilty for the actions of one of his privates. I felt it again at Nuremberg and I was sorry that we found ourselves in this embarrassing position regarding My Lai. Personally, I'm glad that the case against General Koster has been dismissed since there are certain unfortunate matters beyond control even of the most

conscientious commander and even with well disciplined troops, when the exigencies and actualities of the battlefield confront some individuals who may be the other extreme from heroes.

Q: Sir, I went back to perhaps just a few weeks after the Homma trial and the end of the military commission as far as you were concerned. You returned to the States and went back to your job as Director of Military Training but were soon appointed Chief of Manpower Control of the Army.

CHAPTER X

Pentagon II

Manpower Control

A: In late March 1946, I returned to the United States as Director of Military Training, and there was a lot to be done in returning our troops and reshaping the Army. But when I got back I found that I was coming back as the Deputy Director of Military Training again, the job having been filled by a returned division commander from Europe. In fact, in the few months I was there there were two such directors who arrived. Neither was interested in the job. They were being placed there for convenience. One of them was in the hospital practically all the time looking forward to retirement, but he would not agree to being placed on the hospital list or to surrender his title as director. I served under both of these men really as Deputy Director of Military Training, which was less than the assignment I had had when I departed.

However, the War Department at that time was getting into quite a bad situation with respect to counting noses. In other words, we didn't really know how many people we had. I'm speaking now of the Army and the attached Air Corps. It was decided that someone should set a system to get better, more accurate, and more timely information on the strength of the Army. In other words, what they would have liked was a daily morning report that was 100 percent accurate. This was impossible, but we were doing so badly at the time that they recognized something had to be done. I guess because I was an Engineer officer they thought my arithmetic might be better than some; I was loaned for two months to G-1 to set up a better system and made the chief of what they called the Manpower Control Group. This is not a manpower study board; this was a manpower control group. My job really was to determine the requirements for officers and enlisted personnel in the Army within the authorized strength, and establish the number to be drafted, enlisted, commissioned, or discharged. It was really a very interesting job. Actually, I started in the early summer of 1946 and it was two years before I left. We found that summer that, while the Army was supposed to get down to a strength around 1,640,000 men by September or October, at the time we first got a recount we were running about 10 percent over strength; we were running about 1,800,000. This

created great embarrassment, with the result that congressional pressures became great. The General Staff was forced to take hasty actions, not realizing the adverse impact of action A before they adopted action B, and so the result was that a lot of confusion continued.

For instance, one of the first things Congress decided to do was to release all fathers -- right now. Let's say there was some minimum service required; let's say 18 months service. Well, the result was we were landing new troops in Japan, sending those men to the replacement depot and returning about 75 percent of them on the same transport to the United States for discharge. So they really got a free trip across the Pacific and back, but the waste of money, time, and effort was terrific. We got in touch with IBM (International Business Machines) and a system was soon worked up in which we developed a worldwide system for reporting with data computers and electronic data machines. This was called GPA-45. It was put into effect by early 1947 and became the system which quickly gave the Army a much better read-out than they had ever had before. It was far from perfection, but for the first time we were able to know more about the specialties (MOSs) of men who were being returned sufficiently in advance so that we could train new men with the right MOSs; otherwise you could get a surplus of welders in a unit who had to be retrained as cooks. We were not only counting noses, we were counting grades and skills and predicting requirements three, six, and nine months ahead; it was a great positive step in the right direction. I'm sure they've greatly improved it from there on out.

Q: But we haven't perfected it yet.

A: No. There's a human equation that affects all of these problems that will prevent us from ever reaching perfection. When I was in ASF during the war I was in a cross-fire about something that has become an accomplished fact; that is, that the individual training should be under the Director of Personnel, who is supposed to know what the Army needs. It always appeared to me that that was the appropriate place for it. In the Army Service Forces during the war the director of military training worked very closely with the director of personnel. In that directorate there were two groups, civilian personnel and military personnel. There were many difficulties in this regard, and I am very happy today to see that

they have finally put individual training where it belongs: under the Director of Personnel, or G-1. One of our biggest problems was in balancing out our estimates with what was occurring in the overseas theaters. As I mentioned before, I was in Europe as V-E Day arrived and had been charged with assisting in making certain plans and establishing certain policies for the withdrawal of troops from Europe either to the United States for demobilization or to the Pacific. I was sent back there in the summer of 1947. I had been loaned, as I told you, to the director of personnel for two months in 1946, a time when the Army was concerned about the great overstrength in the Army and congressional pressures resulting. Secondly, it was not inappropriate because, at that time, the Army Service Forces were starting to be phased out; consequently, the number of general officers was being greatly reduced. I was fortunate enough to be one of 25 officers with less than 25 years' service who held their grade after World War II. Most of us were brigadiers. I think a few were major generals. So General Paul sent me to Europe at that time to study the situation there and assist in whatever way I could in easing and improving personnel policies and procedures. It, of course, provided an excellent opportunity -- I was gone about six or eight weeks -- to look at everything that was then in the European theater in all countries. I hope we did some good while we were there, and certain new policies did evolve as a result of my visit.

We also found at that time -- while we had some interesting studies going using German generals or senior personnel to study problems regarding strategy, tactics, and logistics -- nothing was being done with respect to studying how the Germans handled their military personnel situation. I was able, through the help of people there, to establish a program in which we also employed a fair number of senior German military personnel who made studies laid out by our office back in the United States. They had to do, as you might expect, with the physical and mental requirements, induction and drafting procedures, promotion policies, leave policies, rotation policies, and everything else that has to do with the handling of military personnel. This was a very interesting aspect of it, and fortunately I was in positions where I could observe the results over the next several years -- first back in Washington, where I returned and was there until the summer of 1948, and then back

to Germany, where I had the First Constabulary Brigade, from 1948 to 1950.

The day I returned from Europe I was advised that I would immediately take off for Japan, for General MacArthur's theater, to study their problems. This was to be a most interesting visit. At that time General MacArthur had not returned -- repeat, not returned (I think that is still correct) -- any of his senior general Regular Army officers to the United States. Many of them had been with him since even 1940 or 1942 and, while their wives were able to join them by this time, the War Department was very insistent that he start rotating some of his senior personnel. General Eisenhower was the Chief of Staff and I wasn't aware as to what pressures might have been exerted at that time. But MacArthur was not a man on whom it was easy to exert pressure, even from Washington. One of the deficiencies that had been permitted to occur, in his theater -- and I'm speaking of September, 1947 -- was that while his strength had been established at 225,000 men, because of the serious impact of this rapid rotation and of change of policies I mentioned to discharge men early, the actual strength in his theater at that time was not much above 125,000. Which meant that he was literally 100,000 men understrength. I was sent over there to investigate the personnel situation and also to see if General MacArthur could be encouraged to start rotating some of his general officers. Well, again, I was made most welcome. He remembered the Amphibian Command in Australia and the fact that I was from the class of 1924 at the Military Academy -- his class, as he called it. I had what I felt from General MacArthur was a warm welcome.

Needless to say, I didn't get very far in getting an agreement out of him to rotate his general officers soon. As you might expect, he did most of the talking; he stressed the serious condition in which he found himself, because of this terrific understrength. This was strictly an occupation Army, and while the Japanese were really overly obedient and causing no trouble -- they were such a well-disciplined people -- nevertheless, between the language problems and the extent of the area that he had to occupy, his troops were suffering badly from being over-extended, together with this very rapid turnover that was occurring. Some correction was made to this situation. Nevertheless, when the Korean War occurred almost three years later in 1950, the adverse

impact of his being so badly understrength in so many diversified jobs -- in civil affairs really -- with no opportunity for real military training by and large (except perhaps for the 1st Cavalry Division), was perhaps one of the most serious problems that he had to face when Korea was invaded in June of 1950. We paid heavily for it.

One of the items that I was concerned with in Korea . . . and at that time I was with, but not a member of, the party with Under Secretary of the Army, General Bill Draper; he was over there on a number of missions. I'm sure he was talking to General MacArthur on a number of matters, the problems of the pacification of Japan and others. But one of the problems was the question of power, electrical energy for South Korea. It so happened that the Huachon reservoir was really under control of the Russians. They had the power and I guess they exercised it a couple of times, shutting off the power when they wanted to for any good reason or otherwise. In any event, power was scarce and continuity was important, so I was able to make a suggestion that they do what we had to do in the Philippines toward the end of the war; that was to use a couple of power barges that were available -- the Jacona and the Impedence, both of which were diesel-electric generating plants of 30,000 Kw each. Those two were brought in shortly thereafter; one was located at Inchon and one at Pusan. For a long time they eased the power problem greatly. It wasn't until other plants were built, such as coal-burning plants in the vicinity of Seoul and other locations, that they really began to get the power that was needed to develop that country. I went on from there to Okinawa, where I ran into the midst of the housing feud between the Army and the Air Force. While I wasn't able to resolve it, at least I tried to bring back some of the facts.

I then went to Manila which, of course, had been my old wartime command. There I noticed that they were still suffering from the problems of World War II, because all the equipment and supplies were being rolled up to Manila from the islands, all the way from Australia up. They were all being brought into Manila, despite the fact that in 1946 we were shipping out as much as we could to China and Japan and other areas. Remember, nothing could come back to the United States that would interfere with new commercial production: no bulldozers, no trucks, nothing that could reduce production rates or employment in the

United States came back to this country -- by order. It was a matter of policy; otherwise we would have accented the unemployment, which was already occurring, first, due to cutbacks in military production of such items, and secondly, the discharge of millions of men from the Armed Services. In any event, it was a pretty bad situation and when I went back I reported to General Lutes, who was then in charge of what remained of the Army Service Forces. American troops had been withdrawn and most of the work being done in the depots in sorting out this equipment and identifying it was done by Filipinos who couldn't read the English in the first place, and secondly many of the crates were so weatherbeaten that you couldn't make out what they contained. In any event, I returned to the United States in the latter part of 1947 and was then informed that I would be going to Europe the following spring. What did I want to do?

Q: General, before we get to that, there were a few rather significant actions that had occurred during the period 1946-47. I would like to ask you about some of them. One was the Haislip Board on unification of the services and separation of the Air Force. I know that we have mentioned it, but I would like to ask you about the unification that took place at that time, the 1947 act. I'm sure you were involved in the planning. Did it turn out the way it was actually planned; the way you had been thinking about it in the Pentagon?

A: I guess the answer is yes. Although my limited view of that, which is largely from the personnel but to some degree from the training standpoint, didn't permit me to view it from the higher levels such as were being approached by General Haislip, who probably was the Vice Chief of Staff at the time, or from Wedemeyer who was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, or Director of Operations, on this board together with Norstad and others from the Air Corps. We didn't envision, for instance, that there would be a complete duplication of all the logistical and administrative services required; but perhaps we should have. I don't know.

Q: Let me ask you this. Do you feel that as the years have gone by that we really did the correct thing as far as denying our commanders the ability to control their own tactical air?

A: No, I never have agreed with that, and I suffered from it in Korea in later days. I think that the commander in combat must have all the things he needs under his own direct control. They can give you a lot of reasons why it should be otherwise, some of which are valid, but, by and large, there is no substitution for being able to order someone who is a part of your own command to do something and have him do it.

Q: Sir, in October 1946 there was a great amount of discussion about policy regarding permanent general and flag-rank officers. I know that you sent a memo to General Paul in reference to the relative rank of senior officers. Specifically, the problem was how the Army equated to the Navy with their one-star, two-star system. Would you like to just discuss that?

A: Yes. That was at the time we were about to organize the Department of Defense. The Navy was sitting pretty in this case. Once they were selected for rear admiral they immediately put on two stars, whereas a man selected for brigadier general only put on one. Furthermore, they just rode freely from a rear admiral of the lower half (as they called it) to a rear admiral of the upper half; no change in insignia or date of rank. They didn't have to be selected over again as we did to be a major general. In the Army you started over and all brigadiers were again in competition. This was not true in the Navy. So we felt that they had a very definite edge on us, and where we felt it most was in seniority when you sat on a joint board. Any admiral in the upper half, by and large, had to be senior to any major general by virtue of the fact that his rank came from the day he was made a rear admiral of the lower half. This was in respect to the Navy. With respect to the Army, the situation was that the Air Force was promoting its people so young in grade that they also, by the time that they served on boards on the Joint Staff, would always be senior to their opposite numbers in the Army. As a matter of fact, I've heard certain of them in very high places say, "This is the way we planned it." Well, I guess it was, but the Army was soon going to be bringing up the rear end of everything if they got by with it. I fought diligently to get them to retain the grade of commodore, which was a one-star grade and from which a man had to be selected to be a rear admiral. The commodore would have substituted for the rear admiral, lower half, and would have been the equivalent of our brigadier general. But the Navy fought and they said, "You can't do that. Other

navies of the world would always outrank us," and all that. Of course, we were thinking of the Navy always outranking us in the Army when we got into joint operations, and this became rather distasteful. In any event, they got away with it then but there have been intermittent modifications on our selection and promotion processes that have equalized most qualities.

Q: I understand that at one time you had an opportunity to brief Field Marshal Montgomery. Does that bring back anything of significance?

A: No. I don't recall that I did. Montgomery came over because the British were trying to reduce their indebtedness to the United States. They tried to get us to give them \$100 million credit for that project of making breakwaters and jetties with old ships and whatnot when we landed on the French beaches, which we didn't go along with at all. But that was the substance of it. They came over with a high powered program, really a PR program, to talk us out of \$100 million, and they didn't get away with it; they called it "Reverse Lend Lease."

Q: General, another action ongoing at the time was in reference to cadets at the Military Academy. There was a strong effort made to enlist all cadets in the Army and only send them later to the Academy. What was this all about?

A: Well, this was all a part of the charges about the caste system which were so loud and vociferous during those days after the war. It was another attempt to break down respect for the Army, much like we are going through today, castigating the Regular Army for every error or failure that had been made by some 90-day wonder who was doing his best but still didn't have much background to go on. These are some of the errors that lieutenants still make, and I suppose they will always make them in a large citizen Army; but what they were trying to do was to blame the Regular Army. I sent memoranda to General Paul and suggested that perhaps with his closeness to General Eisenhower, he could get General Eisenhower to say something good in defense of the officers of the Regular Army. I didn't succeed very much in that respect. If you were reading the papers about Churchill's visit here years ago, you may recall that he gave a talk in Fulton, Missouri. What he said was that it was a marvel to him that the United States, with its very small

Regular Armed Forces, could have developed the leadership in its Officer Corps that resulted in such a tremendous victory. It had to come from Churchill; damn few Americans have ever said anything that favorable before or since about the Army.

Q: As long as we're on that note (I know we've been following a chronological order here), I would like to discuss your concept of professionalism, and ask you specifically what you mean by the military as a profession. What makes a professional? That's the first question.

A: Well, when you speak of a professional today, and we'll limit it to the Army, you're still looking at men who acquire a wide variety of talents in different balance. The successful combat commander (or any commander) is quite different, in many respects, from many successful staff officers. This is why a successful staff officer doesn't necessarily make a good commander. If we look at the psychological approach to men, we see that there are three things: the id, the ego, and the superego. I would call it the physical, the mental, and the spiritual, to put it in other words. The combination of those qualities or characteristics will vary in people doing different jobs, and also in rank to some degree. For instance, obviously at the junior level, for the noncommissioned officer the physical requirements are of the utmost importance. The mental requirements are important, too, but on the field of battle itself it may be that the superego, or the spiritual qualities, are not as important -- at least at the moment. On the other hand, you get to our senior leaders and the physical requirements drop off, while the mental and spiritual demands increase. As you go toward the higher grades or rank or seniority, more and more do I feel that the moral ascendancy of the individual is of great importance. I also feel, naturally, that this goes for mental attainments to a high degree, but I'm not talking about the Ph.D., as against a man of sound mentality in the upper third as far as his mental characteristics are concerned. Men respect and look for physical ability and energy on the part of the commanders that serve. They look for higher mental and spiritual levels more and more as they go up in rank and years, and the spiritual aspect has great impact. Those are some of the points I see.

In a country like this, with a relatively small professional Army -- again we speak only of the Army

-- when we have to undergo such terrific expansion during the time of war, the effort of raising the level of the whole to that of the professional Army is a worthy one and one that we strive for, but one which can never be quite achieved. I say never; however, if a war lasted for years, God forbid, then perhaps you could. The trouble in war is that you always lose the best in battle. They are the ones who are always with it; they're the men who keep moving. They're not the men who sit in the foxhole and count their points until they go home. You have to get along with the rest. I know from my personal experience with nine battalion commanders at any one time commanding infantry battalions integral to my division. I would say that as a rule I would have three I could really depend on for anything; I could assign them any task. I had three I could take a chance on; I was more sure of them in some situations than in others. Very frequently, I hate to say it, but we normally had three that I wished I didn't have. Very frequently I had to find some job off on the side, some special mission for them, and let a major, or sometimes a captain, take their battalion to get a man whom I could depend on when the chips were down. I don't know, human nature being what it is, whether we can do better or not. Of course, in a time of major emergency -- with problems greatly enlarged and expanded, less controlled, less direction, less adherence to policies -- then I suppose the situation gets all the worse.

This is one of the problems with discipline, or the lack of it. I think the quality of our leadership today, or lack of it, is best indicated by the lack of discipline. Whether this is a problem that is now getting too big for the military to handle, in view of the fact that there is no real discipline in any element of our society, is a serious question; whether the Army can field a competent and motivated civilian Army composed of youngsters who enjoyed -- if that's the word -- all this permissiveness during their teenage years is a serious question. We can only do it if we can crack down hard from a disciplinary standpoint. But with courts and courts-martial being as liberal as they are, and the leniency in the criminal courts, civil courts, and every other place, I don't know how we can restore discipline, the respect for authority or patriotism in our beloved land.

Q: Do you see a further breakdown, or an increase of permissiveness, if, in fact, the volunteer Army concept is approved?

A: I'm not one of the ones who puts much faith in a volunteer Army as far as a good Army is concerned -- or even having a dependable Army when the chips are down. In time of depression we will get more men and better men; the more severe the depression, the better the men we will get. But, by and large, they'll be mostly from the lower half of the population as far as overall education and quality are concerned. Then when the chips are down, you will find even this level drying up, so what do we do then? Go back to the draft, and get people who meet the mental and physical standards that we really need; no exemptions. They're not going to be forthcoming as volunteers. You can't buy this sort of thing. Some sort of a national service is the only decent answer to this. I mentioned universal military training earlier; this is probably not feasible today by itself. I do feel that national service with small or reasonable pay and a shorter period for those who choose or are assigned to military service in contrast to those employed otherwise, would be justified. I think I suggested 12-16 months for military service, 24 months for non-military service, but every male to perform some service.

Q: I noted that in 1947 you spent a lot of time considering a volunteer Army; in fact there was a lot of pressure at that time. You were concerned -- when I say you, I mean you and what you represented -- about the fact that the GI bill was going to expire. This would certainly not be favorable to the volunteer Army. You were concerned about education benefits. You were concerned about quarters, the type of uniforms, the fact that people were engaged in menial tasks (which is the exact thing that we are doing today), that the grade distribution needed to be more equitable to the Army than what we are seeing in some of the other services. The re-enlistment bonus was necessary; the re-enlistment furlough. We are considering the possibility that maybe we should allow people to purchase their discharges, which we had previous in the earlier times; do away with that short-term enlistments, because they were detrimental; increase per diem, restoration of clothing and money allowances, and a two-year overseas tour and an assured two years in the States when they came back. These are items I got out of your papers, and they are

exactly the same things we're talking about today, not anything new.


A: No, they are the same. You can go back to the Office of Chief of Military History and you can find all these things have been studied and restudied before. There's nothing new about it. Since you mention that, I would tell you that one of my most interesting experiences in front of the Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower, was in this connection with this. He had one of the very top generals of the Air Force, still the Air Corps then, and also one of the top four-star generals of the Army in there. The Army general agreed to let the Air Force take all the people with AGCT (IQ) ratings of above 100 while the Army took the others.

I rose up as a lowly brigadier, which I probably shouldn't have done, and said, "What do we do in the Army when we need special skills and officers if we only get men up to a 100 IQ? That is just about a high school graduate level and it insured that the Air Force would get all the people who were going to be sweeping out their hangars with better than high school and up to a college-level education. That was blocked, but it is an indication of some of the very specious thinking that sometimes goes on at high levels.

Q: At that time, 1947, we also had a very major change in military justice. Did you see a decline to the negative rather than to the positive?

A: Oh yes, it was quite apparent. It just followed on the comments I made before regarding the military tribunals; the attempt to destroy military discipline, to destroy the respect for authority, to destroy willingness to accept responsibility, to exercise authority. It was all a part of it. It's gone from bad then to worse now.

Q: General, I think that wraps up the years that you spent with the Director of Personnel as Chief of Manpower Control.




Arthur Trudeau as a West Point cadet.



Port of Manila. Under Trudeau's Base X command, Manila handled 20,000 tons of cargo daily in preparation for the invasion of Japan.




Trudeau found music good for the soul and relaxing. The troops loved it. Here with banjo, he and his staff relax at their Manila headquarters in August 1945.



General Trudeau with other members of the War Crimes Tribunal in Manila, February 1946.



Handing out Abraham Lincoln cards to the children of Hokkaido, Japan, 1952.



Lincoln card with penny and text of the Gettysburg Address and Lincoln anecdote.



Trudeau meets with Emperor Haile Selassie on a trip with heads of U.S. Intelligence agencies to Africa and the Middle East, April 1954.



President Rhee visits Operation Snowflake, the largest training exercise in Korea since the end of the war (1957).



President Syngman Rhee and General Trudeau unveiling memorial to Corporal Mitchell Red Cloud, Jr., as I Corps Headquarters was renamed Camp Red Cloud on Armed Forces Day, May 1957.



General Trudeau, Commanding General, I Corps, Camp Red Cloud, Ui-jong-bu, Korea, 1957.

CHAPTER XI

First Constabulary Brigade

Q: We now know that you're going to Europe to command the First Constabulary Brigade in Germany, but there are always reasons why people go off to take brigades. What were some of the activities that occurred prior to this that led up to your good fortune in getting a brigade command?

A: I told you about going to Europe as Chief of Manpower Control in the summer of 1947, and that General Huebner had a great impact on some of my assignments after he once became impressed with my efforts with the Engineer Amphibian Command at Cape Cod. Apparently he still believed that I had the qualities of a combat commander. Although I was still a brigadier general, AUS, I was literally subject to control by the Chief of Engineers first. General Huebner offered me the position of Chief Engineer of the European Theater the following year. He knew it was becoming vacant, and he may have already checked to see that I would soon be assigned overseas again. On the other hand, he also said, "You ought to have a combat command over here, but you have to make up your mind what you want to do. Do you want to be the Chief of Engineers some day, or do you want to get into the line as a combat commander and go from there wherever it takes you?" I said, "That is what I want to do." So he held a brigade command open for me, the 1st Constabulary Brigade, from something around the end of 1947 until I physically arrived there in March of 1948. There were at least six officers who were pressing him hard for this job, a couple of them on his own staff, and they told me so themselves. But he said, "Nope, I'm holding that for somebody." He held it for me. So I arrived in late March and took this assignment. It was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life and it certainly opened the door to broader opportunities for me. It was an absolutely fascinating command. I told you that he had offered me a regiment in the 1st Division for the cross-channel invasion, but I hadn't been able to take it. Now this was a peacetime operation, of course. I arrived the day that the Russians moved into Czechoslovakia in 1948. Having been in Japan the year before and having spent quite a little time looking at MacArthur's troops and the way they were deployed principally for security and civil affairs jobs,

living with his officers in billets and hotels, plus my observations in Germany in 1947, when I began inspecting my brigade, I saw and sensed exactly what was happening. By and large this is what they were doing: they were raiding DP camps -- displaced persons camps -- and trying to keep them under control. They also had extensive civil affairs jobs. The third task was what I call "showing the flag," or shows of force. In other words, a motorized troop would pass over a certain route through the villages with the flags waving and the horns blaring and whatnot. As far as military training is concerned, there was very little of it over and beyond the basic training that was needed to make a soldier know that he was still a soldier and not just a civilian.

Fortunately, I was able to make some changes; I got authority and I started rotating whole units so that they could really concentrate on military training for a period. It had been over two years since they'd seen anything of this kind. I started talking about parts and not paint, so that vehicles just didn't look good, they were good. They were working better and readiness was stepped up. We did more firing on the range. We did a great deal of maneuvering, rapid movement, communications, gunnery, tying airplanes in with ground troops. We didn't have helicopters then; we had little L-5 planes and maybe other little spotter planes. I equipped them all with radios and we got to the point where all my air and ground units as they moved could communicate; well, they knew better than to lose communications. This wasn't under way more than six weeks when my brigade was given the job of distributing all the new money from the Reich Bank to the banks in Western Germany in the American zone. This was when the new money was issued, the weekend of June 22, 1948.

We had air observation over our columns all the way, and it was really quite a nice exercise in itself. General Huebner, being a great troop man, was pleased, too. From then on larger maneuvers started picking up. General Huebner ordered the first large-scale, postwar maneuvers for September at Grafenwehr, and I was selected to be the Chief Umpire. He was testing me in all sorts of jobs, and they were all fascinating. I thoroughly enjoyed the experience there.

Q: Before you go on, you mentioned that twice now and I think it's interesting. You mentioned that General MacArthur's troops were engaged in civil affairs. We talked previously about the role of the Army. It seems to me that what you are criticizing now is a role that we have attempted to take which obviously degraded the primary role; and, at a certain point in time, it starts breaking down the ability of the command to do its primary role. I have a feeling you were observing this both in the Far East and in Germany about that time. I'm also aware that the Constab was formed on 1 July 1946 with its mission as the enforcement arm of military government, which in fact became sort of a police force -- a civil affairs type thing. The reason I make this point is that it appears that we can't do two things at the same time for long. We either have to be oriented towards our power role or we have to have forces that can do the other. But we really can't do both. Am I right or wrong?

A: Both roles were important, but assigned theater strengths were inadequate. I stated that MacArthur was nearly 50 percent under even the strength allocated. That's one reason we paid such a heavy price when Korea was attacked in 1950. Except for the 1st Division, by 1947 there was no other major combat element in Europe -- well, let's say in Germany. There were a few troops in Italy and Austria but not very much, perhaps one understrength division. That shrank to nothing. The forces in Europe were reduced in 1947; the Constabulary itself went from five regiments to three. I got over there just in time six months later, the next March, to pick up the pieces of one of those regiments, and in my brigade, for instance, I ended up with only one regiment. I had a few other units and later I had several attachments. The point is that we were down to a point where you might say, except for very limited and minimal military training, we were entirely engaged in civil affairs or military government activities. When this is going to persist over any period of time, I feel there must be a hard core of "ready to hit" military forces; how big depends upon the circumstances. But some outfit should be there that is really ready to go and strike effectively if you've got a major problem facing you, even internal disturbances. These outfits were not ready. I then helped to push defense plans through, also. Planning was developing rapidly under General Huebner. General Milburn had the 1st Division;

General I. D. White had the two constabulary brigades; I commanded the 1st. Ed Seabee, and later Bruce Clarke, had the 2d. There were two regiments in the 2d Brigade; I only had one, but I had certain other attached troops. I had a couple of negro infantry battalions, and in an emergency I had the 18th Infantry and the 32d Field Artillery from the 1st Infantry Division attached as part of my command. That was approaching the time that the United States started recognizing that we faced a growing military threat. The Russians were still completely intransigent. Czechoslovakia was occupied in 1948. This sort of awakened us. It wasn't until two years later that NATO came into being and really began to build them up. But in 1948 we had only the Constabulary and the 1st Infantry Division. That was it as far as Western Europe was concerned. General Clay was in Berlin then -- he had good sound judgment -- and, of course, General Huebner was his deputy and ran the military part of the show while Clay ran the government. But they were a great pair; they had great faith and trust in each other and they had different characteristics, but they complemented each other beautifully in those two jobs. Clay saw the necessity for putting Western Germany in a better state of preparedness. He realized the intransigence of the Russians and saw what was happening to Czechoslovakia and to the East. Defense plans advanced and more intensive training developed throughout the theater about mid-1948.

Being an engineer, in addition to being a combat commander, and knowing that if we were ever attacked we would be holding on by our teeth, I concentrated a great deal on demolition of major targets. For instance, I remember taking a boat I had available that had belonged to a Nazi, going up to Wurzburg and returning through maybe 25 locks down the Main River and into the Rhine, stopping at each bridge and deciding just what would be required to demolish that bridge. When we went away, we had a sketch and a bill of materials, a plan. Then we implemented it by having it followed up by infantry details and other teams who certainly could place the demolition charges. There was no great secret about that, and so we advanced our defense plans considerably.

There were certain sites where it was hard to get authority to do anything. For instance, the main telephone cables between Paris and Berlin ran through a certain part of my zone. I could never get authority

to mine them if an emergency occurred, but I can assure you that if the Russians had come through in that location, there would have been no further communications getting through. Another one of the most important plans came up for discussion. You've heard of the Edersee Dam. As a matter of fact, when our 7th Armored Division went there in 1946 I'd been told by Jack Ryan, who then was commander of the 14th Cavalry as part of my brigade, that the dam was ringed by some 700 anti-aircraft pieces around the Edersee. This was one target where the British lost quite a few planes. They bombed out about 30 feet of the dam by skip bombing; I don't remember the height of the dam, but let's say 150 feet. On either side of the dam there were small generator plants where the water would flow through and produce electricity, but they were relatively small. Yet out on the plain, about 30 miles from there, at a place called Borkum, was a power plant that picked up lignite, brown coal, and pulled it in by dragline and buckets from a mile around. This plant developed 240,000 Kw of firm horsepower. At the peak, the ones on the Edersee developed 15,000 Kw each; and yet all of the effort was made to knock out the ones on the Edersee, and nobody on the Allied side ever knocked out Borkum. This was the kind of arrangement sometimes made in connection with bombing runs as to what was going to be spared depending on who owns it and where they have friendly interests.

Q: Is it easy to knock out a dam with conventional munitions?

A: It's not easy. It would have been easy for us because we had it planned and I was planting my explosives in the chambers on either side of the bottom. If I had to blow it up we'd have blown out more than 30 feet, but from the air it was difficult. On the other hand, Borkum would have been a cinch if you could hit anything because it stood out on a wide-open plain. It's still there, near Fritzlar, which is where the 14th Cavalry was headquartered.

The other interesting situation resulted from my headquarters being in Wiesbaden. I was east of the Rhine river across from the French forces and decided that I must really build up good collaboration with the French. I made an appointment to call on the French general, who later became the Inspector General of the French Army, General Cailles. The day I called on him I had boned up on my French, which I had used as a boy

and later studied at West Point. He was a three-star general, which is equivalent to our two. He was in his headquarters awaiting me. When I inspected the honor guard (They had an honor guard from the Third Spahis [North African troops] drawn up in front of his headquarters at Bad Kreuznach.), I then addressed them in French. Before I could get to his office the word had gone out that I was speaking French to the honor guard. From that day on, I was "in like Flynn." I could have had the French Army, I guess. Long before there were any written agreements as to what to do in an emergency, between General Cailles and myself we had an arrangement regarding the defense of the Rhine and the Main Rivers from Bingen to Worms, where Patton crossed going in the other direction. We knew what we were going to do if they, the Russians, attacked. We had an excellent rapport and exchanged a lot of visits -- business, social, and military. It was really a rewarding experience working with the French there.

Q: Your comment on speaking languages is so interesting because even today we have resistance on the importance of speaking someone else's language. There still remain many people who say it is not necessary.

A: I know; I faced that once as G-2 when I was working on this language problem. Somebody in the Pentagon, in G-3 training, said, "Well, hell, we are giving them the money, let them speak our language." I said, "By God, it's a good thing, Colonel, you don't work for me, or I'd fire you right now, and I mean right now!" That kind of an approach solves nothing.

Q: I think it must be part of our make-up, though, because there still remain in the military a great many people who think that it doesn't add anything; it doesn't contribute anything.

A: They're the ones who don't have the energy or the talent to acquire a language, by and large. Men who have the use of another language are very proud of it. I wish I had fluent use of the French language; I don't. I've lost it; I can't really use the language. I wish I could.

On my left flank, the British were in Kassel to the North. I had many contacts with the British. The British commander was a friend of mine; we used to exchange visits, particularly hunting visits. By and large, when he came down he would usually be going to

higher headquarters, but we'd known each other during the war, so we had our pleasant weekends together.

The Berlin Blockade was next; we lived through that beginning in late June 1948. I was in Wiesbaden at the time, the western end of the air lift at Wiesbaden Airbase, so those were pretty hectic days. In my 1947 visit I had made the friendship of General Halder, who had been Chief of Staff of the German forces and had been in command at the time of the thrust into Russia. I had some interesting discussions with General Halder. One of the discussions revolved around the logistic support for the armored forces in Germany and the air forces in Germany, and the air force in the assault on Russia, because they were in a very tight spot. Many times he had to decide whether to replace the tanks or to use that tonnage to haul enough ammunition forward by rail for the tanks that were remaining. They had some fantastic problems during winter. Of course, when the Berlin Air Lift came along (This is what made me think of it.), General Halder talked about the impact of air and what it would have meant to him. As much as he loved his Stukas (fighters), if he could have had something for air transport he could have moved troops and supplies by air. For instance, in a force of maybe five divisions, he might have two armored and three infantry divisions. He would advance those armored divisions perhaps 100 miles, but then he got to the limit of what he could do with them until his infantry, which was averaging 22 miles a day, could arrive four or five days later. Then they would advance again. He said, "Just imagine if I could have had air lift. We could have moved these infantry divisions up by air in back of my armor and saved two days out of five, or three days out of five. What an impact it could have had in speeding up a breakthrough."

Later on we managed to get authority for more operations research (This was resisted at first.) to bring over the G-3 for the Russian front. I've forgotten his name, but he was a major general. We finally got authority (after some State Department resistance) to bring German officers over here. We wanted to pick their brains. We got our choice over on a visit, and we finally had him cleared to come back and spend two years so we could study this operation in Russia (which we still don't know much about), when he died.

Another task, which you may know about, probably my most challenging week or ten days there, was the organization of Task Force Trudeau to go into Berlin against possible Russian opposition.

The Berlin Air Lift was under way but it was rather inadequate. General Huebner and General Clay, among others -- Clay looking at it from the international Four Powers agreement, at least the three Western powers positions -- decided one solution was to send supplies over the autobahn from Helmstedt into Berlin on authorized access routes. I was selected as the Task Force commander. This force was to consist of one of my armored battalions, an infantry battalion from the British, the 3d from the French, the 32d Field Artillery (which was frequently attached to me anyway from the 1st Division), the 1st Engineer Battalion of the 1st Division, and a Quartermaster truck company. It had 48 tractor-trailer trucks, which we were going to load with food and supplies for the people of Berlin. The nature of the cargo would be written in German and Russian on the sides of trucks. We were to advance and force our way forward if necessary. For weeks the Russians had been repairing the bridge at Magdeburg, although all you could see when you flew over it was about one board removed; but it was just part of their delaying tactics. The plan was brought back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff here; this was during the Truman administration. The U.S. had to decide what it was going to do about the blockade. I guess they decided it wasn't worth the trouble but we were pretty hepped up and ready to go, with air support promised within the corridor. One thing was discovered, and this is hard to believe but it brought another problem to light -- there was very little bridging in the theater. I don't think anybody knew this at the time, because there hadn't been anything done in the way of training for river crossings, but there was so little bridging in the theater at the time that if we had put a ponton bridge across the Elbe at Madgeburg we would have had to pick up part of it and lay it down again for other crossings because there were some 25 lesser crossings on the route between there and Berlin. We would have had to pick up the bridge behind us. The principal question was, "What were we going to do if somebody stopped us?" We couldn't say, "We're sorry," and just turn around and go back. If we were going, we had to be ready to shoot our way through. We were ready. We were in that mood. Washington wasn't. The Russians bluffed us out.

I was in the unique position of being the only Army general in Wiesbaden. It was the headquarters of the Air Force. I had excellent relations with General LeMay, and later with General Cannon, who replaced him; in fact, I lived near him. There were seven Air Force generals in Wiesbaden; I was the only Army general, but I certainly felt right at home.

As it developed, the command post I had at Camp Pieri was named after an Engineer battalion commander of the 4th Armored Division, who was killed in the vicinity after the crossing of the Rhine. My camp was occupied by an Air Force squadron (my Brigade Headquarters), and when they decided to do something about the protection of the Rhine, I had a Naval detachment. It was quite a combined command for a post of only about 700 people. We had pretty rigid standards of discipline in the Constabulary, particularly in dress, discipline, and training for that matter. The point I make here is that the senior Air Force commander insisted that his troops be held to the same state of discipline that mine were, which pleased me to no end. We had just the finest relationship during those two years -- all services.

Q: Sir, I have a series of unrelated points that I would like to talk about. On 26 May 1948, after you had just been in command for a couple of months, you went to a commanders conference that you attended with General White and General Sebree and you made a remark after you came out of there. I quote: "In the exercise of command, General White is very insistent that responsibilities must be fixed in each case, and that subordinates, other than the ultimate individual to be disciplined, should also be considered when infractions of discipline have occurred." I feel that this is absolutely correct. That struck me, because I wonder if it was too broad an interpretation after discussing with you the last time the Homma case.

A: I wouldn't want it misinterpreted. But I do think that an officer in any echelon is certainly responsible to see that his orders are carried out fully by the next echelon below him. What I've always stated is I think there's a limit; I think two echelons below is about as far down as you can be sure orders are going to be carried out in due process. As a rule, I think to influence the commander two echelons above you is also about as far upward as you can make your impact felt,

by and large. Of course, if you can really convince the commander two echelons above you, he may be able to carry the ball two echelons above him. This is true. I think an officer is definitely responsible for the performance and conduct of the units immediately below him.

Q: I'm going to ask you another unrelated question. This is the relationship of commanders. This was your first troop command. You did have Base X as a general office. My question pertains to your relationship to General White and his staff; there was a letter I spotted and it said this: "The development of any resentment on the part of any member of your staff, which would result in the impairment of the splendid relations that exist between us would be extremely unfortunate." The point I make is that certainly commanders have to relate to commanders. I want to ask two questions and make an observation. First of all, what do you consider the proper relationship to be with your commanders up and down, and your staff? That's the second question -- with you and your staff and the loyalty and so forth. Then I observed that once this letter was written, which was seven months after you were there, there seemed to be an increase in the suggestions that you, as the brigade commander, made to General White. I got the impression that you were taking Colonel Uncle's role. Because of this it did establish rapport, and General White looked to you quite frequently, and accepted and usually executed your advice.

A: General White was Armored and Cavalry all the way through. I was not; I was Engineer. I had to make my way to a certain degree, and the only way I could do it was by producing. I think I did. I'll make that statement in comparison with certain others. But in getting to that point, I had some difficulties where certain members of his staff would try to block me from certain proposals or actions. Or I'd make some comment to General White which would go back to them. One of them said, "What are you trying to do, put me on a spot?" I said, "No, I'm not. I'm discussing with the commander the things that need to be discussed." I never tried to go over or around the head of a man on the staff. This individual came to be one of the more senior officers in the Joint Chiefs a few years ago. My attitude was always this; my first loyalty was to my chief of staff and my commanders. Now the chief of staff is the one to whom I looked to run the rest of

the staff. I didn't want to run every lieutenant colonel and major on his staff. But neither did I permit my commanders to be blocked from getting to me by any member of my staff, including my chief of staff. My commanders were number one. When the chips were down, they were the men I had to count on for results. I always treated my subordinate commanders that way, and I always tried to establish that kind of a rapport with my senior commanders, without trying to complicate any staff relationships. Of course, some staff officers may resent this; G-3 sometimes wants to tell you that he's running the whole damn show. He isn't, unless his commander lets him get away with it. Very interesting; I hadn't realized that there was anything like that in the file, but I know exactly what it infers.

Q: What was interesting to me was that from that moment on I could very definitely see that General White looked to you for suggestions and very frequently heeded those suggestions.

A: He did, particularly in setting up adequate logistical support. As I said, one of the earlier remarks that I made, which I think might have bothered White as well as some of his staff, was that we had all these proudly painted vehicles with the double yellow stripes on them and all. This was fine to see, but a hell of a lot of them didn't run and this is when I made the statement, "What we really need is parts, not paint." Of course, that raised a few hackles, but we finally got more parts and a system set up that worked.

Q: General, as a combat commander, at least of an Armored or Cavalry-type organization, looking back now some 20 years, did you find that your troop-leading techniques changed when you took over at this level from what you were when you were commanding at the company level?

A: Not substantially. In scope, of course, they varied, and in professional knowledge there had to be a difference, but the approach to good command is the same.

Q: Do you feel that there is a need to be more tuned toward your superior commander at the higher level than at the lower level; more tuned to his needs, his desires, his problems? Or should we say it is all relative?

A: Yes, I'd say that it's all relative. I think we covered it pretty well. It was a very interesting assignment -- a very valuable experience, very satisfying. Life in general was pleasant. Side trips were frequent; one could go to Berlin, Switzerland, and other places that were famous and interesting. When I look back on it, I wish I'd done more of that; maybe I stuck too close to my job. We had many pleasant times traveling up or down the Rhine. That's about the end, of course, when I had this sudden warning and orders to come back to the United States for the founding of the Army War College.

Q: Could we talk about that? That is your next assignment, the Army War College. I'd be interested in the fact that you just made that point that you came back a year earlier than you expected. Who were some of the people who were responsible now for bringing you back for this type of assignment?

A: Well, I think General Ridgway had much to do with it, in Washington. In fact, I'm sure he did. While I had known General Ridgway before, I had never served directly under him. I'd had some relationship in the late 1930s when he was G-3 of the IX Corps Area in San Francisco. I was in charge of some river and harbor work in Alaska that I told you about. I'd known him, of course, as a cadet at West Point when he was in charge of athletics. I've often felt that he must have been the one who selected me for the Army War College when the Army decided to reactivate it in 1950. In any event, I had recently had a talk with General Huebner -- the date is probably early in 1950 -- and he had said to me, "I've left you there about two years now, with another year in the theater." (It's a three-year assignment as a rule.) "I've got to be thinking of moving you to a staff job, because that is about all the command a person can expect to get these days." I said, "Yes, sir, and I appreciate it." So nothing more was said. It wasn't over a week later that he called me up and said, "They want you to go back to the United States as the Deputy Commandant of the Army War College that's going to be activated this summer. Do you want to go?" I said, "Well, that's up to you, General." He said, "What do you mean, it's up to me? This is the kind of thing you've been waiting for." I said, "Well, perhaps it is, but after all, I'm here serving you. You've given me a great command for two years, and I'm certainly not asking for relief from it right now. Whatever you want me to do, I'll do." I think he was pleased at that. So he said, "Well, this is your

opportunity. Of course, you'll go back and take this. You will get more information in a couple of days." I did; I got orders sending me back. I immediately made arrangements to visit all the senior military schools in France and Britain. I had known something about the British schools before but not too much about the French, except the local ones they had up in the French Zone of Germany. I went to both countries, to Paris and to London, to the British schools, and had about a week in each place; it was a very valuable experience. Then I returned to the United States about the end of March 1950. I left my family in Washington and reported to Fort Leavenworth again.

Q: Before you start telling me about Leavenworth, am I wrong in assuming that you did have a desire to be the Superintendent of the Military Academy?

A: This had come up once before, but it didn't appear to be in the nature of things for an Engineer to have it. General Wilgus had it during the war. The Army wanted certain changes made, and there were many leaders with good battle records. I don't know that I made any definite approach; I would have been highly honored to have been selected, of course. If you don't ask, people may not realize that you are interested.

General Bull in G-3 had always been a good friend of mine. When General Paul was Director of Personnel and I was Chief of Manpower Control under him, I lived next door to General Paul and he lived next door to General Bull, so the three of us knew each other well. General Bull, quite senior to me, had been one of my instructors at West Point and was always a great supporter. It's not impossible that a vacancy was in sight at that time and that the suggestion came from him. I don't recall, but I would have been pleased with the assignment.

CHAPTER XII

The Army War College

Q: Well, Sir, I think you were saying that you arrived at Fort Leavenworth to help start the Army War College. We'd be interested to hear what happened there.

A: I am very proud of having participated in the reactivation of the Army War College in 1950. There was a great contest going on at that time between two schools of thought. The one thought that the War College should in effect be a second-year Leavenworth, or just an extended Command and Staff College. This was represented by General Manton Eddy, a fine person who was then the Commandant at Leavenworth. There was another school of thought that believed that there should be a break between an officer's education and what he had absorbed at Leavenworth and then, after a few more year's experience, re-selection of a smaller number to go on to higher schooling that would reach into higher departmental and joint service levels. This was quite a clash, apparently, some of which I was not in on.

General Joe Swing had been selected for the task of Commandant of the Army War College. I didn't know Swing at the time and consequently I thought perhaps he was the more reserved type of person. Because I wasn't known for being that way, I thought perhaps the War Department, in their wisdom, were picking two people who complemented each other in their talents, or limitations, if you want to put it that way. I soon found out that I was quite wrong about this. If there was anybody who needed to do a little holding back in the place, it was Trudeau holding back and not Swing holding me back. This made for a very interesting relationship, not without some problems, because we were both men of some temper and a fair degree of decisiveness, but we always managed our way through. We were good friends and we ended up good friends. By and large we advanced down the same path. The school plan for a year at the Leavenworth level and later a year at the War College level was approved.

The Department of the Army decided to locate it initially with the Staff College at Leavenworth so we would have the benefit of the fine facilities there -- the library and all the rest -- for the first year, and seek a place for a permanent home. Some of this information arrived even when I was still in Germany

and it immediately occurred to me to get it located at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. I'll tell you why before we go further. During the war, when I was Director of Training, I mentioned that the Medical Field Service School was there and we had to expand it by buying land for training and ranges and farms for what's now the golf course and more areas for training areas. As a medical training center we saw that it had really outgrown the needs of the modern Army, as we knew that the Army was going to be a million men or so after the war. The Director of Training of the Medical Department and myself seized the opportunity to start lining up the 9th Infantry Quadrangle at Fort Sam Houston when the Ground Forces decided they would not put a division there after the war, which amazed the hell out of most of us. I think the Ground Forces or the Infantry are still sorry that they didn't put a division there, but they didn't. We grabbed it, and as I also said before, that meant filling up Carlisle with whatever we could shift. This consequently meant the small schools which were easy to move; it was hard on them, but we did. Military Government, Information-Education, Adjutant General, Chief of Information; you name them, we had six or eight of them. That solved it then.

This site always stuck in the back of my mind as being the ideal place for a small college. When this opportunity came it looked like "the" ideal place: far enough from Washington where you wouldn't be bothered by the Pentagon every day; yet near enough that you could get there quickly if you wanted to; and ease of transportation -- air, rail, road -- from the big cities where we would have to get our lecturers from. It just had everything as far as I was concerned. It had a beautiful countryside, good American people, a great area. I immediately started stumping for Carlisle and it wasn't any too soon, because Senator Lister Hill of Alabama had the pressure on and didn't see any reason why we couldn't go to Camp Rucker, Alabama. He said, "The Air Force is at Montgomery, and that would put you both down here. You'll be near each other." Well, there was nothing there we needed that the Air Force had, and while they could fly their speakers down from Washington, we didn't have the kind of planes to fly our speakers around, so we finally licked that one. I went to Somervell for help; he was president of Koppers in Pittsburgh and subsequently to Mr. Richard Mellon. They sent me over to Harrisburg

and I talked to Governor Red Duff. We did a lot of good spade work and we got ourselves into Carlisle.

The first problem, of course, was at Leavenworth in getting set up for the first year. We had almost carte blanche in picking the people we wanted for the staff: 25 officers. The list of colonels that we brought in there were just about the pick of the young colonels in those days and, almost without exception, they all became generals with one- to four-star rank. The first class was limited to 100 students because of limited facilities. They were 100 excellent men. I think most of those people became generals, too. A few of them later wore four stars, I know. But we ironed out our problems fairly well. There was a feeling, and it was unfortunate, at Leavenworth by both the faculty and the students of the Staff College that they were being downgraded, that another school came and set down on top of them. It didn't go well. It had its problems on the post, but it only had to last for one year and we all lived with it as best we could. I found myself commuting to Pennsylvania getting the place ready for the 1951-52 school year. The next June (1951) we got out of Leavenworth and settled into Carlisle.

Q: I might add, before you talk about Carlisle, that it is interesting that you had Westmoreland on the staff and Bruce Palmer and Abrams as students.

A: General Swing brought Westmoreland in as secretary. Swing thought a great deal of Westmoreland. General Swing only stayed the first year and was replaced by Almond who came back from Korea and brought McCaffrey, his right hand man; so that's the sequence there. Then I left after nine months at Carlisle; I went to Japan in March 1952 and then on to Korea.

Q: Before we talk about Carlisle, were there any other significant problems while you were at Leavenworth? I think the point you made about resentment, perhaps, at Leavenworth is the most significant.

A: I think that is the most significant, and the fact that by and large, we lived through it pretty well. We had great class esprit, and I did something there that I still believe was right, and I was sorry to see it done away with some years ago. With General Swing's approval, we instituted at Leavenworth a term -- even in our telephone directory -- that all of us, whether we were staff, faculty, or student (well, largely

faculty and students), were "members" of the Army War College. I thought it closed the gap, or prevented one from showing. Of course, with 100 students and 25 instructors, we had the very closest rapport with this class anyway. It was a wonderful class.

Q: General, I have some specific questions. First, when you established yourself in Carlisle, looking at the proposed organizational structure without going into details, you didn't bring much administrative support from Leavenworth.

A: We were trying to keep it streamlined. In other words, we felt that there was sufficient talent and experience in that class itself that we could give them certain work to do that they could do equally well, and perhaps better for their own development, than by having some of it done by some member of the faculty or staff.

Q: I'd like to talk to you about the library. I know that when you came here you had no library, only a fine building.

A: That was a tremendous task putting one together. I've forgotten who really gets the credit, but we had to go back to the National War College, the Library of Congress, and all our service schools when we went to Leavenworth.

They did a remarkably fine job while at Leavenworth. Then, of course, we had to move it and continue to expand it at the War College. That summer our service schools loaned us several catalogers for the 60- to 90-day period, and we used the Harrisburg library and the one at Dickinson College. General John D. F. Barker, Deputy Commandant at the Air War College, also helped us.

Q: I wonder if you would address yourself to the graduate program. What was your effort? What was your interest? How did you think you were going to handle that?

A: I felt that these men were in a professional status where they should have additional recognition on the outside as well as in the Army -- something more than their rank, which tells a civilian nothing about academic achievements. I still think it approaches the course at Georgetown now, in which you get a master's degree in international relations. I thought that if

we could prove that point and got certain credit for on-post instruction, it would go toward earning the credits necessary to get that degree. Furthermore, a lot of these officers were coming from the Pentagon. We had 5,000 officers in the Pentagon who were taking instruction at night toward college degrees, either undergraduate or graduate. I saw no reason why they couldn't start taking a course when they knew this was going to be a part of their curriculum. On the other hand, a lot of them not only came from the Pentagon, but a lot of them leave the War College and return to the Pentagon. If they didn't have their credits earned when they left Carlisle, they could pick them up here at George Washington and complete their degree. That was exactly my thought then, and I've never changed. The next opportunity that I had, before it came to light, was almost ten years later, around 1959 or 1960. Upon query, I found this was being considered again, and I put my shoulder to the wheel and for a couple of years it was done, in the early 1960s. I think maybe there was a little over-enthusiasm in that one. I think that was pushed to a point where if an officer didn't get into this program he felt he was being left behind. Also there is a difference in people's interest, and there's a difference in their capacity to absorb. Some people had all they could do with the War College work. Other people could do the War College work and still read a novel a week, or take three hours in international relations; but it should have been made strictly voluntary. They should keep it strictly voluntary. It shouldn't be anything a man feels is against his record if he doesn't take it. This should be entirely voluntary, but to stand up to these people in civilian life who not only know their own particular discipline but, if they have a Ph.D. behind their name, think they can solve everybody's problem, then officers with advanced degrees and accomplishments should be recognized. When I left for Korea in March 1952 there hadn't been time to bring this to fruition.

Q: There were problems that you had with Wherry housing, with the legal aspects of it; requirements for 12-month occupancy and so forth. This is where you wrote to a retired general, Otto Nelson, for help on 6 July 1950. You did get it approved in January 1951. There was a Mr. Walter K. Durham involved. Is there any

story about the housing? Was there something you wanted that you didn't get?

A: Yes, it was quite obvious that we were going to need housing. There was practically none there and everything that we could scrape up was not going to be enough. I went there in 1950, and I even went as far away as Gettysburg and talked to Dr. Hanson, President of Gettysburg College, about housing and what could be done in the area, what his experiences were in a growing college. I asked my brother-in-law who the best architect was in Philadelphia. He said, "Walter Durham." So I called Walter Durham and I said I'd like to meet with him. He said "All right. Come up and meet me at the Racket Club in Philadelphia." So we met on a Sunday morning and we went out to see an area where a very wealthy client had had part of his farm on the outskirts of Philadelphia subdivided, put in utilities, roads, and built a lot of homes of the type that are now at Carlisle -- split-level houses. I felt that these were fine; and they were just being sold at the time. I knew the price was about at the limit as far as the law governing Wherry housing was concerned. I had to look for something in that price class -- \$9,000 -- but we thought that we might get away with \$10,000 or \$11,000. Those houses were then selling for, let's say, \$9,500. This included the land, utilities, roads, and homes developed from scratch. I felt that if these were \$9,500 there shouldn't be any problem in getting them on our Army post where we already had heating capacity, the land, all utilities, and the roads. I could see no reason why we should have any problem in being able to build these for less than \$9,000. Well, I didn't know my politics; by the time the housing people got through haggling over this and kicking it around from one door to another, who was going to get the contract and all, they came up with ridiculous figures. What we had to do was to reduce that house about two feet in length and two feet in width, and this is quite a bit of footage when you apply it to the whole house. It made a lot of difference. Then they did certain other things where they cut corners. They didn't finish the upstairs room which was to have at least a lavatory and another bedroom. They did all sorts of monkeyshines. As I say, I got away before this was done. It wasn't finished until 1952, I guess, but if anyone could bring a red herring across where another dollar could be siphoned off, this was pulled on us. Fortunately, we came out fairly well, but not as well

as we should have. Well, they were penny wise and dollar foolish, all the damn Wherry housing and the politics of it all.

Q: I noticed some correspondence with retired General Menninger on the Committee on Present Danger.

A: Bill was a great friend of mine. He was the top psychiatrist in the Army during the war. He was a brigadier general. A great psychiatrist, and a great fellow also with his feet on the ground. I had him give a presentation at the Army War College the first year.

General Swing didn't come to Carlisle, but General Almond arrived about the end of July 1951. I had charge of the transfer and rebuilding job that summer until Almond arrived. General Almond was very much interested in Tac Air, and also in tactical atomic weapons. He brought Colonel McCaffrey, who had been his Chief of Staff when he commanded the X Corps. McCaffrey was engaged for months trying to assemble battle data and complete a study as to when tactical nuclear weapons could have been used. I think McCaffrey came to the conclusion that they'd never had sufficient information that would have justified their use against a timely and appropriate target. By and large, they didn't have sufficient information of the enemy's exact positions or movements to select a worthwhile battlefield target.

Q: Well, I sort of got the impression from some of your correspondence that General Almond was very determined on this; he just didn't want to let go, and he kept attempting to get his views incorporated somehow. I think he wanted this taught at the school, or at least studied at the school. One of the things that came out -- and I think it's rather important -- was the mission of the school and the relative standing of the Army War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. There is quite a bit of correspondence that requests that we get this straightened out -- that the Army War College is a pinnacle for the Army officer; that the mission of the college should not be one which is only teaching Field Army and Army General Staff operations but involves the social, economic, and political factors as they affect the Army missions. Could you talk about that?

A: Well, I'd only say that that was our position. We felt it was the highest Army school and that by the

time an officer had graduated, this should be his final preparation for a general officer's command. We did not envision the college as being subordinate to the National War College. This was another reason why we justified teaching as much as we did about the diplomatic, political, and economic aspects of problems dealing with our own and other nations as well as potential military plans and problems. It was not only a problem in the leadership of the Army. We didn't envision it that way and we had a lot of contests about what the curriculum should offer. Those who had favored it being just a second-year Leavenworth thought it should be restricted to where we talked about leading an army instead of leading a corps. We didn't see it that way. We didn't feel that officers, when they reached that senior point of service, could spend more than a year at a war college, very frankly. This is why we didn't envision somebody going on from the Army War College to the National War College.

That's what he (Almond) wanted, but, of course, it got worse before it got better. Because in the McNamara years nobody could get anywhere unless they'd had "joint experience," including the National War College, or joint staffs here or joint staffs there; you weren't supposed to know anything or be able to deal with people decently up at those levels unless you had dealt with them before you got to a senior level. It became a block to promotion or at least it was supposed to have been; I don't know whether it was or not. By and large, I felt many times that McNamara was trying to find out how well officers could be manipulated, so that they could promote those who could be further manipulated rather than to find out who could stand on his own feet and be counted.

Q: General, as a wind-up to our discussion of the War College, I wonder if I could refer you back to some remarks that you had made at the conclusion of the 1950-51 course. I was taken by the perceptiveness of the remarks made and, oh, how true they'd been. I'm just wondering if you'd like to discuss them briefly; summarize what you said then and perhaps relate it to today.

A: Well, it might interest you to know that while I gave these at the conclusion of the 1950-51 school year, this subject had been bothering me for the whole year I was at Leavenworth. Having been in Germany for

those years from 1948 to 1950, of course, gave me a particular awareness of what the Russians were trying to accomplish and their strategy for doing so. I have to admit that during the war, I was one of the group of "young Turks" in the Pentagon who thought and said we were playing with fire in helping the Russians at the time (to the degree that we did). When we saw that we were stopping at the line of the Elbe and let the rest of Germany go and all of Eastern Europe, we couldn't help but disagree strongly with the decisions that had been made. We didn't have anything to do with it, and we couldn't do anything about it. As we got into the new school year here I remember that I asked or said the substance of about everything that is in this paper to the great Father Edmond Walsh, who lectured to us. He was the founder of the School of Foreign Relations in Georgetown and one of the great geo-politicians of our time; a man who had gone in, as a young man at the end of World War I, to the Ukraine and Russia, and had seen what was happening. A man of great astuteness as far as understanding what moves things in the world. I tried to get Father Walsh, during the question period, to commit himself or discuss a little about this. I could see that he didn't want to do it but he had dinner with us the night before in my house -- the Commandant's house -- and I'd discussed some of these problems with the Soviet. I'm not sure why he was reticent about discussing these problems before the class, but he did recognize them; nothing that's happened in the last 20 years has changed my feelings about this at all, except in this way. The situation is worse than I thought it was in 1951. There had been no resurgence of Japan yet. You see, Japan didn't even regain its sovereignty until April 1952. So this is when Japan was nothing as far as its industrial build-up was concerned. Today, with 90 percent of Japan's oil coming from the Middle East, you have to add Japan. Their people are more dependent on it than Western Europe. Whoever can supply oil to Japan as well as Western Europe also has that great power -- maybe the greater power -- of being able to shut off the faucet and bring them to their knees. So, if anything, this situation is more critical today than what I thought it was 20 years ago.

To summarize, in 1967 I had an opportunity to appear before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, and the subject got on Russia and communism; it was largely on communism. It turned to what the Russian

objectives were and still are, the Middle East with its oil and Africa with its minerals. Before I was through, the Chairman of the Subcommittee had asked me to submit my views so you'll find them in the records of that subcommittee as of 24 May 1967, which was 12 days before the blitzkrieg that the Israelis launched when they defeated Egypt and took over control of the Suez and the Sinai. I don't really know what more we can say about it. The pattern of what Russia is trying to accomplish -- whether you say that world communism is using Russian imperialism as a vehicle for world domination, or if you want to, you can say that Russian imperialism is using world communism as a vehicle for world domination. I don't care which way you put it, but I think the objectives are clear. There's nothing that changes; she modifies her strategy, or tactics, for convenience, but there is nothing that is changing this pattern at all. The efforts now to move into the Indian Ocean, to support the war in Indochina -- which could have been over long ago, or could be over in months, if the Russians would withdraw their support -- these things are still bothersome. The opening of the Suez; our own stupidity in making things difficult for South Africa and Rhodesia when it's the only way we've got to get around the tip of South Africa with all that oil from the Middle East for Western Europe, or ourselves; and to keep the gates to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf open. There it all is; it's right in front of us if anybody can read a map.

Q: General, as a concluding comment, I was struck by the little scroll that the class of 1952 gave you. I don't know if this brings back any memories to you.

A: I've got a scroll signed by everybody in the class. Bill Train and Ralph Haines were the characters behind it. That's about the time I'll tell you, that was my farewell shortly after they had inducted me into the Cavalry, after my branch transfer to Armor was announced.

Q: I wonder if you'd talk about the branch transfer. I have the order here. It was special order number 200 dated 4 October 1951, paragraph six. It said that "Colonel Arthur G. Trudeau, CE (Brigadier General, AUS), Army War College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is relieved from assignment to the Corps of Engineers and is assigned Armor, effective 4 October 1951, with

Regular Army date of rank 10 June 1948." Now, I have to ask you about this, because I don't think I've ever heard of any general officer changing branches before. I may be uninformed.

A: Well, I don't think that the branch situation is as important as it was in those days. It's true; no officers except those from the primary combat branches have ever gotten to be Chief of Staff, or Vice Chief of Staff yet, but much of that sort of folderol is by the board. When an officer, who's been a general officer for seven years, still has to transfer from one branch to another to insure that he has continuing opportunity to advance, something is wrong.

The circumstances were as follows: I told you in my early service that I was prevented, or at least delayed, from getting to Leavenworth by my branch -- then the Engineers -- because my service wasn't considered balanced. In other words, I hadn't been on river and harbor work. The Chief was then very anxious that his young officers get some experience in the junior grades on river and harbor work. So, despite the fact that it doesn't make much sense that you have to have river and harbor work to help you at Leavenworth as far as the development of your career is concerned, that was policy and I can't contest it. In any event, that was the situation. But what happened next was that I had this choice offered by General Huebner of going over as Chief Engineer of the European theater, or going over and commanding the 1st Constabulary Brigade. He said very frankly, "This you have to decide, whether you think you want to push on to be the Chief of Engineers, or whether you think you want to go the other way; the way of the Army as a whole." I said, "I'll go the other way, the way of the Army as a whole." I didn't want to get assigned to rivers and harbors again. I'd had some of it; in fact, I'd had enough of it. At that time, I talked with General Paul, who was the Director of Personnel, and I was Assistant Director of Personnel, as Chief of Manpower Control. I said, "What about this? I'm still carried as a lieutenant colonel of Engineers, even though I'm a brigadier general," and he said, "Oh, that doesn't make any difference, that doesn't make any difference." So then I was promoted; I got to be a full colonel, Regular Army, in 1948. That's why they dated me back to 1948 in rank as a brigadier general; that was the same date of my rank as colonel in the Regular Army. Of course, I had held my rank as

a brigadier general since August 1944, but they were "playing musical chairs" with general rank and seniority.

I had to return from Europe in the fall of 1948, so I went in to see General Brooks. He was then the Director of Personnel, and he said, "Oh, that doesn't make any difference," so I went back again. When I returned to the U.S. in 1950 and looked into the situation, I found that the Chief of Engineers was definitely not going to recommend me for a promotion until I came back to the Engineers and had some river and harbor work, by God. So here I was back to take over as number two at the War College, but I couldn't get a recommendation out of my own Chief for promotion. I was then six years as a brigadier, so I then went in very frankly and talked to the new G-1, General McCauliffe, and he took me to General Collins himself -- the Chief of Staff, Joe Collins. They checked me out, and they said, "Listen, you'd better transfer," and I said, "What to?" "Well," he said, "It doesn't make any difference; go Infantry or Armor." Well, I'd just commanded the 1st Constabulary Brigade for two years and I loved the Armor side of it. I said, "Alright," so I put in and I transferred to Armor. That's the story. So then I got back in the good grace of somebody where I could at least be considered for promotion. In 1952, I was sent to the Far East, got the First Cavalry Division, and was promoted to major general. That's the story on it. I think that this branch stuff has largely disappeared; it's ridiculous. The Chief of Engineers now welcomes assignment of his senior officers to broader opportunities.

Now I'll tell you an interesting one, though. The DA during these recent years had to send many officers to combat units who never had combat command, or who never had command in combat or even commanded combat troops in peace. They sent them out to purify them. They sent out quite a few, gave them a division or smaller unit for six months, and that qualified them. I had one case, no less than my great good friend, "Tick" Bonesteel, when I was commanding the I Corps in Korea. Bonesteel was Assistant Division Commander, but an Engineer colonel. The Army knew Bonesteel had plenty of stuff, and they were giving him a break; and he finally came to me one day and he said, "What the hell do I do about this?" "Well", I said, "I don't know how they're operating in the

Pentagon now, but if you want to have the door opened to you all the way you'd better get out of the Engineers and transfer into some different branch." So he did; he transferred into Infantry. Now, I don't know how many others there are like this, but I'm sure of that case because I remember the conversation and I saw the order later.

Q: Well, General, we've been talking about the Army War College. You were the Deputy Commandant at its inception. We all look upon you as being a pioneer, and I'm just hoping that you might have some final thoughts on it before we move on to the next stage in your career.

A: I don't have any words of wisdom. I think whoever made the decision that the Army must have the Army War College again is entitled to the real credit. It certainly was needed -- it is needed -- and from my viewpoint, it's been a very highly successful operation. I've known the officers that came through there when I was a student, and I certainly have observed a tremendous number of graduates since. I think the selection by and large to the College has been fine, and I think the benefits to the Army from its graduates have been tremendous. I don't see how we could have gotten along without it, really. I know that we get some fire from people like Fulbright, because they would prefer, apparently, that we didn't know anything about the world power struggles, diplomatic problems, or other peoples or nations, except in the military sphere. Fortunately, we didn't buy that from the beginning, and while the emphasis has varied from one Commandant to the other as to how much effort should be devoted to this aspect -- whether political, economic, psychological, psychopolitical or socio-political -- nevertheless, by and large, the curriculum has gone along the same broad general pattern. That was the original concept of General Swing and myself and the others who organized the college. This in itself is a matter of great personal satisfaction to us, to have the ideas that we had started with 20 years ago continually validated in principle, if not exactly.

CHAPTER XIII

1st Cavalry Division

- Q: Thank you, Sir. You'd mentioned earlier that you left the War College to go to the 1st Cavalry Division. I recall reading that you made the comment that you were being transferred to an Assistant Division Commander position because that was the next step you had to take in order to get a well-rounded career.
- A: I think that's probably true. I'll tell you this because I think it ought to be on the record for the people who will read these manuscripts, so I'm not pulling any punches. I've omitted a couple of names, but other than that, I've told you already just about everything I'm going to tell you. I went to Tokyo and reported to my old friend and supporter, General Ridgway, then occupying MacArthur's old desk, and I said, "I hope you're sending me straight to Korea, General." He said, "No, I'm not. I'm going to send you north to the 1st Cavalry Division as Assistant Division Commander." I think the day I got there that there might have been some thought that I was going to the 24th Division in Sendai. Whether that was the case or not, it was determined immediately first, that I was not going to Korea, and secondly, that I was going to the 1st Cavalry Division. I reported to the 1st Cavalry Division, then commanded by General Harrold, who was a friend and acquaintance of mine from West Point days. General Jark was the Artillery Commander, and General Eddie Post was the Assistant Division Commander, being transferred to the 24th Division. I replaced him. I remember my impression on that early March day amidst the heavy snow of Hokkaido, to have a review given for me when the 7th Cavalry passed by on skis, snow shoes, akios, and weasels. I saw shades of the old Cavalry then; the old boys would have fallen off their horses if they could have seen this one. It was a picturesque scene, a great experience, and a fascinating year on Hokkaido. We had great opportunity to get around the island and getting around was hard; it was particularly hard in the winter and this was March 1952. There was only a dirt road between headquarters and Chitose, 25 miles away, and it took an hour and a quarter to get there by road. However, for the first time, I ran into the helicopter. We did have helicopters in 1952.

This division was just coming out of Korea after a year and a half in combat, so any concept that they might have about proper conduct, appearance, etc., in garrison life was purely coincidental (as they would say in the movies). It was a ragtag, battle-scarred bunch of men, and they needed a lot of shaping up. They needed a lot of whipping into shape as far as peacetime soldiers were concerned, or soldiers on garrison duty, or soldiers anywhere, except when they're scattered around in trenches and mud and dirt where the problems are so different. One of the first things that was apparent was that there was going to be a problem with V.D. because at that time the 187th Airborne under Westmoreland moved out of Kyushu to Korea. When they moved out, some 5,000 gals of the Rose Society promptly moved from Kyushu, I guess under their own steam, to Hokkaido. While that wasn't on the ratio of one per soldier, it was a pretty fair number of females on that island and, needless to say, we did have our problems. With some work, we got some excellent support out of the local police, the village mayors, and authorities. It was quite surprising. I don't mean that there was anything in the way of total absence of sexual relations, but they did take some very drastic steps -- which I was surprised at -- to improve the situation as it existed on the island, to control these gals and all the problems that went with that. Our training was very good; we had a lot of it, it was interesting, and we tried to keep the men plenty busy.

Also from my standpoint, going around the island, getting acquainted with the people and building respect for the American flag and the American troops was very important. Of course, after I'd been there for a few months, General Harrold was moved away to a logistics job down in Yokohama (around the 6th of July), so I acquired the division early. I was still a brigadier, and I wasn't promoted to two stars until about September. That didn't make any difference. I was commanding the division and Bill Bradley came in as Assistant Division Commander and a very good one: old Armored Cavalry type, and just a great guy throughout; we had the finest relationship. Jark was still with me and was an equally fine professional and friend. I couldn't have done better as far as my senior officers and an excellent staff were concerned.

It was certainly interesting dealing with the Japanese. About this time -- in fact, I think in

CHAPTER XIV

7th Infantry Division

Q: Could you tell me a little bit about your assignment as commander of the 7th Infantry Regiment?

A: Before the invasion of France, and only about six weeks before the invasion of France, I had been offered command of an infantry regiment in the 1st Infantry Division by General Huebner for the cross-channel operation, and I was very much disappointed in not being able to accept. That desire to command troops in combat also led me to my decision later to choose the assignment as Commanding General of the 1st Constabulary Brigade in Germany in 1948, instead of being Chief Engineer of the theater. All of my pointing was in this direction. I told you I had to transfer from Engineers to Armor, because I was going to be severely restricted in opportunities if I didn't. After the Korean War started, on one of my visits to Washington while the War College was still at Leavenworth, I volunteered for service in Korea. I went to G-1, who I think was then General McAuliffe -- I could be wrong about that, McAuliffe or Brooks -- and asked for the assignment. Well, I didn't get it then, but apparently my turn came up, and it was just 19 years ago, right now, that I got my orders. This became very clear in my mind when I thought of you driving down in the snow today, because I had the same situation with apparently more snow than we have today and almost missed my plane for the West. It's 19 years ago today. In any event, I also reminded you or told you that when I got over there I was somewhat disappointed in asking General Ridgway for an assignment in Korea as an Assistant Division Commander, that I didn't get it. I guess he felt that I should prove myself a little more, so I was sent up to the 1st Cavalry and, of course, three months after I got there I was made the Division Commander. After another nine months, or after just one year on Hokkaido with the 1st Cavalry, I went to Korea assigned to command the 7th Infantry Division. This was most welcome as far as I was concerned.

I would remind you of a couple of other things that made it especially meaningful to me. My first organization had been the 13th Engineers as a second lieutenant. This organization became an integral part of the 7th Division when it was activated by me in

1940 after having been dormant, of course, since World War I. Consequently, I'd had a year's service with the 7th Division before it left the United States, but in the meantime I'd been pulled out for many other things. It was very meaningful to me to know that I was going to get command of the 7th Division. I went by way of Tokyo and I dropped off my wife for her return to the United States. I reported directly in to General Taylor, who was then commanding the 8th Army and the United Nations Command. I was sent without much delay -- taken, I would say -- by then General Paul Adams, his Chief of Staff (who, of course, had been a member of the faculty at the War College with me), to the 7th Infantry Division.

I assume that it probably was the next day -- I'm not quite clear on that, but I think it was the 21st of March -- that I took over the division in a formal ceremony from Major General Wayne Smith. I don't recall where General Smith went at the time, but apparently his tour was up in Korea. Smith took me around; we took two choppers, two H-13s, and went around within the first day or two, and quickly called on all of the regimental commanders. Of course, there was a staff meeting and briefings at headquarters. I did quickly call on the regimental commanders and the battalion commanders, at least all of those in forward positions at the time. The division had gone into line sometime around the turn of the year, but because of winter conditions there had been no activity on the front until that time. The day I reported, however, it just seemed as though things were warming up and there was a considerable increase in artillery fire, according to Smith and his people. I hadn't been there, so I couldn't judge it relatively, but it looked as though something might be getting ready to happen. Well, the day after I took over it picked up even more and I got concerned with some of the positions. The winter had taken its toll on the condition of the forward positions. It may have been too severe for the men to work, but it seemed to me that more could have been done to strengthen those positions. I was particularly concerned about Old Baldy, which was then occupied by one company of the Colombian Battalion. Smith had gone by now and General Daniels was my Assistant Division Commander, an excellent Infantry officer. As the fires picked up, there seemed to be an indication that Old Baldy, one of the most exposed spots, might be the objective. I reinforced the position by putting the

Colombian Battalion, less one company, there. The position was not well wired in; it had only been occupied recently by the Columbian Battalion and there was a question in my mind then as to their ability, frankly, to hold this position under any severe attack. And the massing of fires indicated that that could be a prime objective of the Chinese. The Colombian Battalion was with the 31st Infantry, which had that sector, and Colonel Kern was then the Regimental Commander. The battalion attached to it. We didn't have to wait too long; the attack suddenly came within 72 hours of the time I took over command (the 23d) and almost before we knew it, Old Baldy had been overrun by the Chinese. Some of the men with that battalion we found coming back through the valley that led back from Old Baldy to Pork Chop. As a matter of fact, we found some of the officers there, too. They were turned around promptly and sent back to the front. This battalion fell apart, including its commander. And while we protected him, although he was replaced later, his performance in that particular episode or battle was far from anything desired.

His name was Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Ruiz Novoa. Ruiz was a fine man, but his battle experience was limited and the pressures were just too great. He came back with the feeling that his whole battalion was lost and had disintegrated. He was partially right. It had disintegrated, but it wasn't completely lost although the casualties were very heavy. (They sound like what I hear coming out of Hill 31 in Laos in the morning paper.) They had really concentrated tremendous strength against him. The question came up as to what to do about a counterattack, and the Corps Commander, General Paul Kendall, appeared and approved planning a counterattack.

General Bull Kendall was familiarly known by many. We did plan a counterattack. We took a reinforced battalion, picked out a site that approximated the conditions and the topography of Old Baldy, and trained for about three days. Then it was decided at a higher level that the position was not worth retaking. It had been lost a couple of times before; this wasn't the first time that it had happened. Also, it had been lost and then retaken by General Sam Williams, who was at this particular time in command of the 25th Division. Williams came up to provide assistance and give the benefit of his previous

experience in what to do with such a situation. The planning was good but it was never executed. The concentration of our artillery fire on Old Baldy was terrific, but as you know the Chinese burrow in like rats and while we could knock out anything on the surface, the minute the fires lifted they were right back in there. It may have been wise, under the circumstances, not to retake it. The negotiations at Panmunjon were dormant at the time; nothing was happening. The bad thing about losing Baldy was that it opened the entire rear of my position on Pork Chop Hill to complete observation, which gave me difficulties twice after that. From the standpoint of the solidity of my division position, I would certainly like to have gotten Old Baldy back.

Q: I understand that General Taylor did come down to you after you had practiced with the 2d Battalion of the 31st Infantry, which was the unit that you had chosen to make the counterattack. General Taylor, in consultation with you, decided that it would be best to abandon the terrain. This is what is recorded.

A: I'm sure that was the decision. My feeling about it was not sufficient to override General Kendall's and General Taylor's views, let me say; so that's that. It would have been a costly operation, and you had to be prepared not only to take it but to hold it, or else you were merely sacrificing men. The overall decision at the top side was that it wasn't really worth reclaiming. Everyone topside was hoping against hope that the war would soon be over. We'd had the statements of General Eisenhower widely published. You'll recall that he was the Republican nominee, and there seemed to be little doubt about his winning the election in the minds of most of us. I think the view at the top was that things would be easing off and probably an armistice would be forthcoming. I think it was somewhat the view that General Marshall had when he figured, with the war over in Europe, that we could quickly bring the war to a termination in Asia (knowing, as he did, the availability of the atomic bomb). It's one of those reasons why down at the lower echelons you can't be too sure of what the estimate of the situation is that brings about such conclusions.

Q: As long as you mention the atomic bomb, there had been written quite a bit about consideration that it would be used. Perhaps to jump way ahead, it had also been

stated that one of the reasons why it wasn't used, besides many political ramifications, was that we really didn't have a target for it, or we couldn't really get a target that was suitable. I'm asking you now, Sir, as a Division Commander again, . . . were you aware at the time, while commanding the division, that any consideration for the use of atomic weapons was being given?

A: We didn't have them except for strategic purposes. Sure, they could have used them at the Yalu River crossings and to the rear, but you must remember that we were very limited in what we could use for tactical purposes. I mentioned also that I observed the study that General Almond and Colonel McCaffrey made regarding where Almond used them when he had the 10th Corps and went into Wonsan and finally got thrown out of the same area. They never came to an acceptable conclusion that the bomb could have been used on a worthwhile target, considering time factors and a lot of other factors. Now, since then we've developed an artillery round and maybe other small tactical atomic weapons that could change that picture, but actually at that time we didn't really have the means.

In any event, my reception to the division was a warm one. It was made warmer by another factor that's making our operations more difficult in Vietnam. This was the beginning of the presence of newsmen at the front, at critical points, in places where to my mind they had no business being at that time. They had a young reporter from a prominent periodical, and he happened to be standing in an area while General Kendall and myself were having a discussion. As a result, he wrote a very derogatory article about me because he did not understand the situation or certainly did not understand the way a man like Kendall would talk to his division commanders, or even how I would speak back to him. These fellows are so soft that they don't understand the toughness of two men in relative command positions on a battlefield who lay it on the line and say what they think. He misinterpreted to the embarrassment, not only of myself for the moment, but also of General Kendall -- to the point where he (Kendall) felt it important to reply by a letter to the editor of that particular magazine. You've seen this thing grow now, and here we are in Vietnam paying for it every day with some of these people who are still wet behind the ears and others even who are knowledgable and fairly well

balanced but unable to absorb all that's really happening in the particular area in which they're involved. They are not experts in this field, but they pose to be.

Q: To add insult to injury, they are able to film and immediately show on TV statements of analysis which fit whatever description they want.

A: That's right. Then the public understands the situation even less. I must say -- and I do want to say particularly to you -- that this young journalist went on to other stations, largely in the Far East. I ran into him between five and ten years ago, but at least ten years after the incident. He was most apologetic about it and said that he had learned over the years that certain things did occur there that he was not able then to put in proper perspective. It was gratifying for him to come up and tell me that; I think there will be more of them, ten years from now, that might say the same thing about Vietnam.

Q: Sir, I don't want to move too fast through this area, because I think it's an extremely critical one. Since you did take over and had a rather warm reception, almost an initial baptism to fire as a commander of the division, do you feel that having commanded the 1st Cavalry Division the year before allowed you to free yourself of the minutia of the job so that you could, in fact, concentrate on the battle at hand?

A: Oh, yes, I think so. As I say, spring was coming, it was the latter part of March, the snow was disappearing, and the position was in what I considered very unsatisfactory shape. This may be perhaps because my Engineer background in field fortifications came to the front. I put on a tremendous program there. General Sam Marshall has written about it, and there's a lot on the record about cleaning up and strengthening these positions. Of course, it not only strengthened the positions, but it was good for command and for morale. I frequently inspected these positions, down to the lowest echelons, and that was one way I could tell whether my instructions were getting all the way through the chain of command. That was part of the satisfying experience.

Q: You mentioned when you first took over the division that you and General Smith helicoptered around. This was just about the beginning of the helicopter. How did the helicopter affect your ability to command and control?

A: It certainly was different than anything I had experienced with the 1st Constabulary Brigade, because although we had various types of light planes starting with L-5s, L-16s and 17s -- which are no longer heard of -- these still took a landing field or an airstrip. Fortunately, I had choppers when I was in the 1st Cavalry Division; not very many, but we had two or three. I learned of their great value for overhead observation, for getting the wounded out, and particularly for being able to exercise command and control by being able to promptly move to the scene of the action. I wonder sometimes how we did the job before. This has become all the more important, and it's one of the reasons why, when I moved up to the Chief of Research and Development, I was so anxious to see better helicopters developed. I don't think there could be a more interesting study than one that would discuss how many troops it would have taken to do what we have done in South Vietnam without the troop-carrying helicopters. You could have several committees working on one like that and come up with different answers. But they would all be in favor of helicopters. I don't know how you'd do without them as far as tactics is concerned.

Q: That would be a very interesting study. There's no question in my mind that the helicopter had a major role in troop carrying. I think that we may be beginning to question how far forward we should take the helicopter as a tactical weapon.

A: This is being questioned; there's no doubt about it. You get forward with the helicopter into a little higher intensity of warfare into anti-aircraft weapons of the quick-reacting type near the front, and you do wonder how close to the front you're going to operate. Of course, again with a broken front, or these islands that exist now more than the front (I prefer not to say "front" anymore; it's getting to be more like naval warfare at sea, where you hold islands or big pieces of ground.), the distances may be less because you're trying to defend in between them, or penetrate in between them if the enemy is holding them, and get around to their rear. We can see in

Laos what's happening right there now as the ability of the enemy to use SAM missiles increases.

Q: You know, General, you just mentioned the analogy to the naval situation. We've been discussing this at great length and no one has ever used the naval analogy, and I think it's beautiful.

A: I mentioned it 20 years ago. It's exactly what we're doing; change your scale, but this is what we're talking about in modern war.

After the loss of Baldy, I put heavier demands on my subordinate commanders and I followed through to see that they were being carried out. The morale in the division was low; I'll have to say that. It was very low. There'd been a certain abortive attack that had been made before I arrived, and I'm told it was almost deliberately for the benefit of newsmen to view from the rear. It hadn't gone well, and the result was that there was a feeling topside that this division was not a winner. I had to overcome that and try to build morale. I did so by a number of actions such as activating patrols. We did much more in the way of patrolling, penetrating the enemy positions. There were some losses, but we had to know where they were, for we hadn't known their positions too well. Not much had been done for months, since movement was difficult over the winter ground; let's assume that's the reason, anyhow. They had not closed with the enemy to the point where they always knew where they were. They were in front of this position or that position, so we pushed to contact. Where there was good performance, we stepped up the decorations and recognition for good performance by our men.

It was only three weeks later that the battle of Pork Chop Hill occurred. I knew it was going to occur, because the minute we lost Old Baldy they were looking down my rear. You couldn't get out to Pork Chop Hill without being completely exposed to what was on Old Baldy. That was important. We did win that fight. We knocked them off. This was the first battle of Pork Chop Hill, 18 April 1953. At that time both Pork Chop, which was then occupied by the 31st Infantry, and Arsenal Hill, occupied by the 32d Infantry, were hit. As I recall, Arsenal Hill did not cause much of a problem, but Pork Chop did require reinforcements. The Chinese were always trying to put on diversionary attacks, or at least place heavy artillery

concentration on other areas, like the Alligator Jaws and the T-Bone, which was really the back end of Arsenal. But at Arsenal, hell, I'd been out in those positions early in the morning, and there were areas where actually you were looking across at their positions at around 85 yards. It was very close, and at about the same relative elevation as our forward position at the spot.

Q: General, were you getting any ideas about the employment of our own artillery? We've talked about Baldy, which was March, and we talked about Pork Chop, which was April. You mentioned that the Chinese were quite good in getting holed in so that they were protected. They used to be able to walk themselves in with their own fire and our flash fires. Our barrage fires were really too late; they were already through them. Your emphasis on repairing the positions and reinforcing the bunkers permitted the tactic of calling for and bringing fire on top of you. Personnel could get themselves into a bunker and call for fire. I believe you're the one that started that.

A: Well, I won't claim that, but we certainly did. I couldn't have done it with the condition of the forward positions when we went in there. It was only after we really worked on the positions and reinforced them so that we could get our men under cover -- that they felt some security under cover -- that you could start doing this. Once we did this, particularly if we were using VT fuse, we reduced the probability of knocking out a bunker and things of this sort. We were getting the kind of distribution of those shards, you know, from the air that wasn't doing much to the stuff down below, but anything moving or living in the area was going to be knocked out. We did a tremendous amount of work in front of our positions by placing all sorts of land mines and wiring them in. We didn't have some of the devices that we have today. We had to improvise a hell of a lot, with gasoline cans, five gallon cans, and things of this sort; trip wires. The Claymore mine would have been very helpful but we just didn't have them.

Q: General, I have here a speech that you made to your incoming officers. It's a down-to-earth leadership talk, which essentially told them to get with their people; get to know them, work with them, don't put yourself above them, because this is much bigger than that. I know that when you were up at Carlisle you

started off with a talk similar to this. Do you have any comments on that, because it is a good, straightforward, down-to-earth speech.

A: No, but you're reminding me of something I haven't thought about in almost 20 years. When this division moved over in position from the Chunchon area, which is probably 60 or 75 miles generally to the east in Korea, they moved their forward echelon into the battle area but they left their rear echelon, the administrative and logistic support echelon, back in Chunchon. When I got there, all the recruits who were arriving and everything else, all the administration, was over there 75 miles away. The first thing I did was to bring my tail up behind me and I put in this replacement center where I could quickly get to it on a frequent basis. It made an awful lot of difference in our logistic and administrative operations. You just can't operate that way; you've got to close up, close ranks.

Q: General, before we talk about another battle . . . since we mentioned the Colombian Battalion, you also had the Ethiopian Battalion with you, frequently called the Kagnev Battalion.

A: It was a part of Haile Selassie's Imperial Bodyguard. Kagnev was a famous horse, the Emperor's horse, and they had four battalions in the Imperial Bodyguard; they were rotated to Korea on about a one-year basis. They were great soldiers. Most of them were mountain men; there were very few of them who came from the hot jungle areas. They were tough; that's why the Emperor picked them. They were lean, and they were mean, and they were tremendous fighters. They took no prisoners; as a matter of fact, that was one of my big problems, to get them to take prisoners. They lost no prisoners, either, to speak of; they even brought their dead back from the battlefield.

There was great carelessness in the maintenance of equipment. While I can accept all of the problems that evolve in and around the battlefield, from the dirt and the conditions under which men have to live, there is a necessity for men to keep their equipment in fighting shape if they're going to be able to use it when the time comes. This was particularly true of reserve ammunition boxes. Reserve ammunition boxes, as you know, are frequently stored in the front wall of trenches and in other places. They were dirty and

the ammunition was rusty; some of it would have jammed, I'm sure. We had a complete salvage operation that went on as part of putting the division back to work. This produced results in reclaiming and salvaging a lot of ammunition and getting it cleaned up. We also devised and mounted telescopic sites on our 50-caliber machine gun, which I had tried out before with the 1st Cavalry Division on Hokkaido; this added greatly to their effectiveness. The 50-caliber machine gun is not a gun to be used in more than short bursts anyway, and with a little practice and a good scope on it -- I've forgotten whether it was a four- or six- or eight-power scope -- we did some very effective work with these machine guns. With training and experience we got results from 1,200 to 1,400 yards and usually they were much closer than that to us, down to 100 yards. For the most part, you don't get direct fire from your artillery. It's not even easy getting a tank where you can have direct fire at enemy bunkers that are looking at you from 100 yards or so.

I think I mentioned to you the importance of awards and decorations, and I accented that. I was fortunate in having General Sam Marshall with me. Sam stayed about six weeks and added greatly to the system we had for prompt recognition of good performance. We'd go out, maybe at daybreak or whatnot, when a patrol would come in and get a firsthand report of action from the night before while it was still fresh in their minds. While it seemed a little brutal when they needed sleep, we didn't make it overly long. We found it extremely valuable to get the impressions that these men had right then and also to reward them very promptly as soon as we could make a determination. We didn't pass out awards unless they were deserved. It gave us information that we could promptly act on, probably the next day or at some formation after they bathed and rested up, or when I went to the hospital to see the wounded. I used to try to make a daily visit to the hospital in the afternoon when things were quiet.

Q: What was your authority as Division Commander as far as awards and decorations? Were you permitted to give the Silver Star?

A: Yes, I was. I could give up to the Silver Star. I found one situation where one person felt that every time he stuck his neck out he should get a Silver Star. I didn't go for that very much. Combat

commanders are supposed to take their risks right along with their men. You can't pin something on him just for doing his job, and that's what it can get to be if you don't watch it.

Q: Here's something that I ran across that I think is interesting (music score in green leather case for 7th Division).

A: Yes, it is. That was given to me by Horace Heidt, the great band leader. Horace and I were good friends; he came up to the division, as a matter of fact. He stayed some time and when things were quiet and the guns weren't shooting, I had a little orchestra for my Division Commander's mess. If we weren't out around the troops or his fine orchestra wasn't playing for them, Horace would join me and we had some real fine evenings then. After I came back to the United States, I got to know him even better over the years.

Q: I thought you might discuss your daily operation code; I'm sure that was yours.

A: Oh yes. That's mine, and those are my letters on it. I developed this in Germany. I've always felt that codes for quick action on the part of commanders, say within the division, have been inadequate. Some have been restricted because of Army security regulations. On the battlefield, there are times when it's more important to get a message through than to wonder if the enemy's going to be able to decode it and not send it. I had developed one method of doing it; there are several of them, but this is one workable method. I went for this when I was in Germany with the 1st Constabulary Brigade, and I always resorted to something approaching this system to really get through to my commanders. I'll admit I was a nuisance to them on communications, but there was nothing a commander could do that was much worse for him than to not be able to get in touch with me, and he soon found that out. And, by God, when they found that out and got working on it, they found it could be done, whether they got to relay it by plane, radio, jeep, or on foot. I always had relay stations at critical points, high points where, since the line of visibility was an important factor, there was a radio that could take it and either retransmit or relay the message to its destination. I used it in Germany effectively with the 1st Constabulary Brigade, on Hokkaido, and in Korea.

Harry Lemley was my Chief of Staff and he complemented me very well. You understand the terminology in which I'm saying that; he was more methodical and paid more attention to details than I did, particularly in orders and correspondence. He had an exceptionally fine mind and he had a pleasing personality. I never knew of Lemley antagonizing anybody. I may have occasionally, because I was more abrupt. Lemley was an extremely valuable man as Chief of Staff and I've not been surprised at his future success. I was particularly pleased when I saw that he was in command of the Staff College at Leavenworth a few years ago, because I know his competency and the breadth of the man; he's a splendid character as an individual.

Q: I must remark about the comments you just made that he was more detailed in his writing than you were. If there's anything I've discovered in going through your papers, you have an amazing ability to place on paper your thoughts in great detail.

A: Well, okay, but when I give orders or come up with a program or a decision, I'm likely to highlight it to the point where I think the people under me can develop it, and not take the additional time it needs to spell out all of the details. If that wasn't done sometimes, you might have to go around and pick up the pieces. With a man like Lemley, I could make myself sufficiently clear in the objectives I wanted and how I wanted them arrived at. He then came up with the plan. It's just like saying I want to move from A to B today, and somebody's got to say, "Well, what routes, what times, when does such and such cross a path, truck road, and all of that stuff," and that was Lemley's job; he could get the staff to execute it.

Q: Are you saying, Sir, that commanders or high staff officers or people working with them should let their people do their jobs, and the command give the order and the guidance?

A: Well, if the commander tries to do it all -- and nobody has that capacity -- he will fail. If Napoleon could have done it all, he wouldn't have established the principle of the general staff. Unless the commander does only the things that are essential, relieves his mind, reserves time to do other things, and sees that his orders are implemented and carried out in detail, then he's not going to get it done well. The one thing we fail to evaluate enough in this world is the relative capacity of the

individual. While anybody might do a job in a week, the guy that can do it in one day, and has got four days to do other things, is obviously a more valuable man. You can't do it if you waste your time on things that your subordinates should be doing for you.

Q: I think this is a lesson that we have to keep relearning for some reason or another. How about Ralph Cooper, who was your other brigadier general and the Artillery commander?

A: Well, I couldn't say enough good about Cooper, either. He's just a top-grade combat commander, a thoughtful man, knows his artillery, a real professional when it comes to putting his artillery together. Under Cooper's direction there we could frequently mass up to 11 battalions of artillery. I'm not going to put it in terms of minutes, but I mean right now, right fast.

Q: We talked about Artillery, and we talked about soldiers (doughboys), but we haven't talked much about Armor. I'd like your evaluation of the importance of the three combat elements of power that you were manipulating as the division commander. I know you were interested in the employment of armor before you even left for the Far East, while you were at the War College. Let's talk first about Armor.

A: Well, there's so many things that affect it; for instance you can break it out one way between the offensive and defensive. In Korea, we were definitely on the defensive; nobody ever let us move north of that line we were holding. We paid a heavy price for holding what we had at times, when they would concentrate as they did at the second battle of Pork Chop Hill. We ran up against a division of Chinese that apparently attacked in a column of battalions, about nine of them, over a period of four or five days. We were in a defensive position in mountains or rugged terrain -- narrow valleys -- and the valleys were largely wet rice paddies because it was spring, and we could not use our armor in a mobile manner. I felt sure that by June or July it would be sufficiently dry so I could use armor, and I had a company of armor which I thought was all I needed to go in and overrun a position that stuck out over on my right flank toward the Chorwon, around the right flank of the Alligator Jaws. My armor officers would go out after we were ready for the attack and they would sample the condition of the terrain. We sent patrols

out just to sample the condition of the terrain, just to see if Armor could get through. Otherwise, you get out there and you've got a battalion bogged down, and that's not good. Believe it or not, with the rain occurring every two or three days, with the dikes that were up to hold the water, we might have destroyed them, but it still is muck in these rice paddies; we never were able to launch a mobile attack with even one company of armor as long as we were in that area. Now, if you could break out of that, then that's something else about the use of armor. You can also use it to the point where all you do is destroy it, get it in a bottleneck on a road, as we see could happen right now in Laos and other places. The terrain governs to a large extent, so you first need reasonably favorable terrain, and you need to be preferably in an offensive situation. Now that's armor. Now what else could I do with it? Well, I was fortunate in having the main and only Chinese supply line on the left of my division come in at a fairly sharp angle to my flank, and there was about three miles of straight road on that line of sight. So we worked back on prolongation of that road and emplaced some of our armor in positions on higher hills that looked straight down that road and zeroed in. I used to send my L-5s out at night to reconnoiter, and they would fly up and down that road. They could always tell whether there were trucks there or not because they weren't getting any return fire. Frequently they would have the lights on every third or fifth truck coming down the road and the old L-5 would be coasting along and spot them. We'd bring fire on that road, and frequently we destroyed more vehicles than you've seen in some of those pictures of Mu Gia pass on the Ho Chi Minh trail. The best way to do it was from emplaced armor. Then, also, we were able to bring direct fire to bear on certain bunkers, but not always with a degree of accuracy you'd like to have.

As far as this night firing against a piece of straight road that was loaded with trucks, we would just alter the ranges slightly to cover that three miles; we knew the azimuth and elevation. By and large, it wasn't until the next morning that we could get a reading from our aircraft as to what damage we had created. Frequently we'd hit them and trucks would catch on fire but, by and large, we had to wait for daylight. We did do severe damage to traffic on that road.

Q: Would you say as a general assessment that the tank did not really play its primary role in Korea except for its fire power?

A: It certainly didn't play its primary role. It was not possible in a defensive position with that kind of terrain. They were very useful in fair numbers, but when I got there, the whole tank battalion was in reserve; not even the fire power was used.

Q: General, I wonder if you could comment on a statement by the head of the Selective Service System, Dr. Carr. Former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, he served in World War II and he made this comment about armor: "When you get armor, they're always so far ahead of everything that they really don't get involved." I don't think you'll accept that remark.

A: No, I won't accept it. I told you about the Germans in Russia, where the armor got out 100 miles in front of them and then had to wait for four or five days for the infantry to catch up with them by foot marching. That's the only way they had to move.

We should talk about the second battle of Pork Chop Hill -- which really was a prelude to the end of the war -- occurring in early July. After the first battle of Pork Chop Hill, the position was completely shattered and I had it rebuilt with heavy timbers. I used my KSC units. (Interviewer hands a schematic to the general of Pork Chop.) I'll be darned! How about that! That's it, all right.

Q: This is a schematic of Pork Chop, and I think it's the schematic that shows what you had rebuilt. I think this is as it looked around July.

A: No, no, I think this is what happened in the midst of it. I'm sorry, but whoever made this up didn't give us a date, because the attack came from this direction here. This is the part they overran, and I suspect this is what we were hanging onto when we finally withdrew.

Q: Just to make this clear on the record, I just want to state that I've laid this schematic out in front of you which does show the various defensive positions on Pork Chop. I'm also showing you a schematic photomap of the area which places Pork Chop in relationship to Chinese Baldy -- Hill 200 -- which was a very important part of the 6 July battle. And there are

other pictures in here that might help recall some points. This paper I'm showing you here actually is a report that was made after the battle to show the importance of the armored personnel carrier, the T-18, which I think we'll talk about. I would like to talk about the battle first.

A: No question about that. I'm sure that this shows the situation, and you notice that the hatched part here says "friendly control." Before the major counterattack was to be made, this indicated that part which we were still holding; the rest was Chinese controlled. I watched some of our counterattacks from a very short distance away. I remember this bunker right here. When they tried to break through I could see from Hill 200 in back of it. When the Chinese took Pork Chop they came up through here when they knocked us off. They came up here and the Chinese artillery fire was in back of their front-line waves; they literally were chasing them up the hill. I remember seeing one of our rounds of ammunition hit a chap who looked Mongolian. The man was one of the largest we'd seen, and I was looking at him through glasses from just a few hundred yards away here. A round of ammunition hit sufficiently near him to lift him, and he must have gone 75 feet in the air with his arms and his legs out; he fell with a hell of a big kerplunk over here. Some of our men saw him later, and said that he was about six-foot-four. We were counterattacking the area. We had flame-throwers and whatnot in the nose of this bunker here, for instance, and I'm sure some of the others like Number 7. At that time they launched their final counterattack and swept us off the hill again. Then the question was to really counterattack with sufficient force to clean them out and keep counterattacking, but since they kept putting in fresh units the decision topside was to abandon the position.

Q: I know it's been a long time ago, but you had mentioned previously that the Chinese were moving in a whole division with battalions in column. The information I have is that you committed 12 rifle companies to this attack; in other words, you committed almost your whole division in rotation to the attack. What did you think about your reserves? What was the situation on your reserves? Were you holding back something?

A: Yes, I had the Turkish Brigade available, and also one regiment of the 25th Division was earmarked for me.

CHAPTER XV

Pentagon III

- A: On the 24th of November 1953, I was sworn in as Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army for Intelligence. They gave me a few days' leave; I made a couple of short trips, and understudied my predecessor. General Dick Partridge was a fine officer but he'd been put on the spot by Senator McCarthy for lack of either interest in or knowledge about communism, which became an important subject in those days. Apparently that resulted in his being given a change of station and my being brought in to replace him.
- Q: Can I ask you why you were being brought in? Had you become known for your very articulate comments concerning the threat?
- A: Well, I don't know about the articulate comments, but I certainly was known as a person who had very great concern about the advance of world communism and the Russians using it as a vehicle for world domination. As a matter of fact, these feelings had come to the surface, I guess, a number of times -- even during World War II, when some of us in the Pentagon saw this threat arising, while they were supposedly our great allies. This may have had something to do with it. I never was really told and I don't really know.
- Q: At the time that you were called to Washington, Bob Stevens was Secretary of the Army, General Ridgway was Chief of Staff, and General Bolte was the Vice Chief of Staff. General Weible was the Deputy Chief of Operations and Administration.
- A: Weible might well have had something to say about it. Weible was very close to General Ridgway, and of course, as I said, I'm sure Ridgway was an important factor in my selection as Deputy Commandant of the War College. He'd given me the opportunity with the 1st Cavalry Division, so undoubtedly all of those people had something to do with it. Secretary Stevens had visited my division during combat; Henry Cabot Lodge, Secretary Dulles, and naturally a great number of people had been up to that division.
- Q: I've had a letter that I didn't discuss with you from Secretary Stevens. Actually, he visited you twice. I

think it is an important relationship that begins to develop here between you and him.

A: Well, I had the highest regard for him and it could possibly be that he was the man; I'll never know.

Q: Well, I'm asking these questions for one reason, and that is that it appears to me that if a man makes his reputation -- if he has established it -- his name probably appears on the lips of men when they're looking for somebody. It's obvious you weren't looking for this job, but it is also interesting that Stevens had visited you not too long before. You were well known to Ridgway, and Weible was on the staff; obviously these were men who respected you and thought you could do the job.

What happened when you got to the Pentagon? How were you greeted, what was your briefing, and what were the ground rules laid down? What was the problem?

A: Well, the main problem as it existed at the time, or at least the one that came into the most discussions, of course, was Senator McCarthy. I had met him before; I didn't know him very well, but I met with him on a few occasions. (Interviewer hands an organization chart to the general.) Well, since I'm looking at the organization chart here, Bob Schow was a man who had long experience in G-2 and as an attache. Frederick had a good background on foreign operations. Paxton was an Engineer, I had known him before. All in all, it was a small but competent office. I think General Bolling had it before General Partridge.

Q: Was Colonel Lemley there?

A: I'm not sure that he would have been there then. I brought him in there later. The problem concerning us at the moment was probably how to approach McCarthy. At that time he was making these serious attacks on the Army about Fort Monmouth, about General Zwicker and some of his operations. I remember being called to the first meeting. He came over to the Pentagon and we had a meeting. It was a luncheon-sandwich-type meeting, with the Secretary of the Army (Secretary Stevens), General Ridgway, myself, Senator McCarthy, and Roy Cohen, his attorney. This was the time that he was making charges against the Army. I feel that others outside of the Army very skillfully built up

the Army-McCarthy struggle in order to get people's minds off other things he was doing, such as trying to ferret out numerous Communists who then certainly did exist in government together with people having that leaning and inclination. I felt at that time that, rightly or wrongly, there was fire here; there was no question about it. He was making some serious charges against the Army. Secretary Stevens, who is rather a gentle man and a gentleman, too, was modest but really incensed at the attack on one of his officers. I think he had a right to be. So out of this grew that great struggle that became the McCarthy Hearings of the next April. The Army, to my mind, was used as a vehicle to move the scene away from what McCarthy was trying to do, to surface to a greater extent the Communist threat to this country. And they succeeded. McCarthy, to a considerable extent, and Cohen along with him, and Shine, one of his boys, are to some extent to blame, too, because neither their strategy nor their tactics were conducive to alerting the public interest. On the other hand, the powerfully integrated forces opposing McCarthy -- opposing the surfacing of the real Communist threat to this country -- were not to be discounted either. They prevailed. It's a very strong statement, I know.

Q: I was going to ask you if the Army was being used. Was General Trudeau used?

A: No, no, I wasn't. The circumstances had occurred before I was there. I was even excused from the McCarthy Hearings the next April, when I found myself in the Middle East on a month's trip. I was not even present at any of the McCarthy Hearings. The Army was the stalking horse.

Q: I'm interested in your comment that the Army was used. Was the attack on Zwicker?

A: The attack was on Zwicker, and Stevens made it an attack on him -- as it was on the Army as a whole -- and he stood up valiantly. As a matter of fact, I wish the civilian heads of the Defense Department and of the Army would stand up as valiantly today for their officers. Civilian control is fine, but I think civilian responsibilities lie there, too. And I think responsibility normally means defending your subordinates the best you can -- your family, you know. Well, we'd better leave that alone, because we're in the midst of it again.

Q: I want to get with the beginning before we really get with the main issue. Do you want to talk about the Davies Board, Doolittle and Clark?

A: That came somewhat later, I think. Davies, I suppose that's Paul Davies of FMC. I'd almost forgotten about that one. The other boards came later. The Doolittle and Clark Board were investigations of the CIA and I think they were a little bit later in my career, because here I'm just barely beginning to get into things, you see. The Davies Board I don't quite place as such, but I remember that there was a board in the early days. It seemed to me that Karl Compton may have been the head of it, but again I'm not sure. Scientists were always concerned about secrecy -- nothing could be a secret, nothing could be classified -- and they were giving us a rough time, particularly in G-2, when it was quite obvious that some things did need to be classified. You can argue this point all day, of course; it's been argued for years, so there is nothing that I can gain here by discussing it. But this was one of the problems that we had at the moment.

Q: Let me ask you a question in reference to your job. G-2 has changed, and ACSI doesn't have the same responsibilities that it had when you were there. You had a tremendous responsibility for the entire attache system worldwide. Maybe we should just start our discussion of G-2 with a little survey of the responsibilities that the office had at the time that you moved into it.

A: Well, first -- and then we can leave it aside for the moment -- was the question of internal security, particularly as applied to industrial security. That was quite a problem, because our industrial capacity had been again expanded during the Korean War. Industrial security became a big problem, so this was quite a strong side of the house. Furthermore, we had records on subversives and on others in some detail. I hope to God they don't destroy them all because, after all, there's information on a lot of people in this country that should be kept on file and not destroyed just because Senator Ervin wants them destroyed. They're not there unless they're true, and they're not there unless they record something that is adverse to the overall security of the country. I hate to see this sort of destruction. I'm not saying that we may not have overstepped our bounds and got

overly enthusiastic in the last few years. I'm not qualified; I haven't been tied into that at all. I think in ferreting out the troublemakers in this country -- the people who are subversive, the people who resort to violence, and to other actions that are criminal and affect the nation's security, the security of executives in our country, or the security of the capital if that's involved -- while that is not the Army's primary responsibility, everybody in intelligence should lend their shoulders to the wheel. Now, as to personnel standards, I have a little note on that. I observed -- not particularly the people on the staff, but as I moved around to more than 50 different countries and observed our attaches of all services -- I was impressed that there was too much mediocrity in the overall intelligence set-up for it to be a really successful operation. The old concept of an attache was that he was off on a nice cushy job with a lot of expense funds and generally he dealt with his military counterparts and the socially elite. This was all fine, and occasionally he had something to report that was meaningful. To me there was a changing concept of what an attache needed to be and to do. The result was that, I guess, I moved a few people. I also had an arrangement -- and I was quite insistent about it -- that I be given a better choice of officers for the higher jobs. I made my ideas stick. I had a second objective in that intelligence had never been highly respected by the high command of the Army for the most part. That was one reason that the people who engaged in intelligence never got to the top. The reason for that was that the people who engaged in intelligence were really just not the top officers of their grade who were going on to be the generals. So I decided that, if intelligence was ever going to have its appropriate place in the Army, we had to start bringing in, at as early an age and rank as possible, extremely capable officers who could rise to the top, who, through mid-career and cross-career training, had an opportunity to become general officers. I've lived long enough now to see that materialize. It was one of the better things that I did for G-2. It was based on the caliber of personnel that I insisted be provided to my office, and I hope that still persists. Language training I was very keen on. I'm not the linguist that Max Taylor is, but I did a lot to build up the language training in the Army. I had done it during the war in establishing language training at the University of Minnesota and other places where I had

ASTP and was the Director of Training for the Service Forces. The importance of languages to me was first grade, and that's why we built up the system that we did; that has since been expanded in Monterey and other places.

Technical intelligence had never been adequately recognized. I hope it is today. The officers who were serving as attaches, by and large, were officers of the combat branches, I might say almost to the exclusion of technically trained officers. It seemed to me that there were certain places where it was more important to know what could be produced in a certain type of plant if you went by it in a street, than to be able to talk just to your opposite number in the uniform of the country you're in about the order of battle -- which is practically an open and shut case in damn near all countries that you serve in, unless it's behind the Iron Curtain. Even if you're behind the Iron Curtain, I still maintain that it is, I'd say, equally important -- if not more so -- to recognize whatever you can see or are permitted to see in Russia than it is to determine the order of battle. I greatly expanded the number of technically trained officers in doing this, and it paid dividends to me later. When I became the Chief of Research and Development (R&D) a few years later, I looked to these same people who knew what the enemy had and had some technical background to come into R&D. There's nothing more logical than the cross-training, or particularly the cross-experiences and details between intelligence officers and R&D. They can't be one and the same or you compromise their value, depending on the job. So technical intelligence was greatly expanded. I found the foreign attaches to be a very interesting group of people and, as much as I could when we were together, I tried to treat them as fellow military officers doing their job with respect to the overt collection of military intelligence. I knew in some cases, of course, that this was not true. As a matter of fact, even the friendly ones ought to be looking for other information; we were not naive about that. I tried to prevent any feeling that attaches, even those representing countries inimical to our best interest, were not treated respectfully. There were certain conferences to which some were not welcome. Naturally I formed closer friendships with some of those who were allied to us than those who I knew were apparently our natural enemies. I guess that's the only way I can say it.

Q: The Soviet Union had a representation over here during the time that you were G-2. I know you had conversations with these people, though not very meaningful conversations, from what I've picked up from some of the records I read. The junior officers looked very superficial.

A: No, conversations were quite limited with those behind the Iron Curtain, less limited with some others. If we felt that they were going to serve with third parties -- third country intelligence -- and anything that we told them would go straight to the Soviet bloc, why naturally we were a little more reticent about what we discussed. This is understandably so, I'm sure. We set up a number of trips for them except for certain restrictions that had to be placed on the Soviets from time to time, because we believed in a quid pro quo situation. I mean, if our attaches had the opportunities for certain visits and trips and freedoms, that was fine; we extended the same courtesy. We finally tried to constrict them in those countries where our people were constricted; I think that's the only way you can play the game with these birds.

I found the visits to foreign countries, naturally, among the most interesting. My first was to Europe in 1954 -- January, I think. I went to most of our NATO countries in Western Europe and also to Scandinavia. One of the interesting things I recall about Sweden, for instance, was when I arrived there. I reported, of course, to my opposite number in the Swedish Army Staff. I was quickly taken to the Chief of Staff and then to the Chief of the Defense Staff, and then the next thing I knew I was in the Minister of Defense's Office, all in about 20 minutes. Well, I couldn't imagine what had caused this tremendous interest in my presence. I found out shortly, because the Defense Minister said -- and he spoke fine English as far as I could see; but for purposes of the record, I guess, he said -- "Do you mind if I address you through an interpreter?", and I said, "Of course not, Your Excellency." The gist of his conversation was this. He had just read our latest issue of Time magazine, which said that we really have the answer to all military problems now in the nuclear bomb, so you can forget about all ground forces. I said the latest issue, but it had probably been out two or three weeks; it hadn't been out long; it was relatively current. He was already under pressure for two

things: to reduce the length of service and also to reduce the number of men being drafted for compulsory service. This got a little bit hard to explain, and it's another reason why I've always thought that in any of our magazines, or in almost anything that we do that involves international relations, we ought to have someone who's the devil's advocate, who looks at it from the other side. Because we do say and write and distribute statements that sound absolutely stupid to the man on the other side because he's in a different position. For instance, with the Swedes right up against the Russian border, what were they supposed to do? Whose nuclear bomb? What would they do without forces on the ground? You could well see the man's concern, and this was a little hard to explain.

Q: Did you satisfy him?

A: I think so. I tried to put it in this context: that somebody was talking about the viewpoint from where the United States sat, and not from somebody who is up against the threat of an attack any minute across a land border. But it was not easy to do. I don't recall there was a reduction in the Swedish land forces at that time. They have a pretty good system. As a matter of fact, part of their farm equipment is subsidized so that their tractors can haul ammunition and supplies. Most of the ground force is civilianized and called to active duty when needed. They haven't fought a war in a long time, and I don't know how good they would be.

The other visits I made were extensive. These visits were set up to include Africa and the Middle East, the Pacific and Southeast Asia, and Latin America. They were organized to include people from all of the intelligence agencies. I succeeded with one exception: to be perfectly blunt, the CIA wouldn't have a representative go along unless they ran the show. I saw no reason for turning it over to them. I did have good collaboration. There was always an Air Force and a Navy representative of intelligence, also a State Department, FBI, Atomic Energy, and, on some of the trips, JCS representatives. We knew our area; we had a definite schedule, we had recording equipment and, sometimes, a secretary. We would travel with about eight or ten people. We'd take off for a month at a time; we would study our black books before we arrived in a country. We knew what we were looking

for. We had different people looking for the answers to different questions, or the same question(s) seeking confirmation from two or more different sources. They were very pleasant -- they were very tiring -- trips, but they were very successful. They were tiring particularly in Latin America, which was a long trip with little time in flight between countries. On the longer flights, where we had a few hours between each country, we'd get aboard and we'd all relax a bit. Then we'd get together, collaborate and record the notes we wanted to get down on the last stop, get out the black book on the next stop, and shift clothing if we needed to (this varied according to climates, of course). By the time we got to the next country we again knew what we were looking for. So, while we weren't in these countries long, it was a valuable orientation. I think it also resulted in some excellent contacts and some very good collection activity. I remember our trip to the Pacific and going to Indochina in July and August 1958. Dien Bien Phu had fallen by that time, but only in April of that year. In other words, it wasn't until we really let them off the hook in North Korea that their forces and supplies could be concentrated southward so that they were able to eventually cause the collapse of the French (which occurred nine months after the Korean Armistice).

An interesting aspect of this particular visit to Saigon to me was this: I got a call one night when I was in General Mike O'Daniel's (General O'Daniel was the MAAG Chief) quarters and I picked up the telephone. This voice said, "Just a minute, General Eli (the French Commissioner General and French Commander) wants to speak to you." He said, "Can you come over and have a cocktail with me?" and I said, "I think I can." He didn't invite General O'Daniel, but anyhow I reported that to General O'Daniel and I went over. What he was concerned about was that we were going to back Diem to head the effort in South Vietnam and he was making quite an issue about it. He said, "You're picking on the wrong man, you're picking on the wrong segment. I know you're over here to support this," which was giving me credit for more authority that I really had. He said, "I'm taking off for France at 8 PM tonight, but I want to get this message back to you Americans before I leave. I think it would be a serious mistake." Well, of course, they resented the fact that they were getting quite unwelcome and that we were getting more welcome over

there. I'm sure there are probably other points from his level that I didn't appreciate. But it was very interesting because, of course, shortly after that we did recognize Diem as the head of the government. We would have done better if we would have stuck behind him in 1963, instead of causing his demise. It's never been quite that satisfactory since. Despite the troubles with the little guy, you can't tell me that the power of the United States couldn't have really gotten him to where he would have accepted some of the Hao Hao and Cao Dai and some of the other sects into his government to some degree. I guess we have paid a price for it since.

Q: You made a comment that I want to question you about, that he gave you more credit than you were actually over there for. You've traveled in high circles, and you've been a responsible individual in many positions. Do you feel that the perception that others have of you -- that you have more authority than you really do have -- plays a very important role in dealings between countries? They really think you're capable of doing more than you actually can?

A: Yes, I think so. Let me go back . . . I'll tell you a very amusing one. We were talking about Sweden a few minutes ago. One of the nights I was in Sweden our attache had a dinner out at his house for me. I had gotten to be very good friends during those two or three days with my opposite number, the Army Chief of Staff, General Ackerman. But in any event, the time came to go home and all day I had been plied with the question, "Who is going to be our next ambassador?" This was in addition to the Time magazine item I was telling you about. "Who is going to be our next ambassador?" "Well," I said, "I really don't know." They thought this was amazing that the Chief of Intelligence wouldn't know that. We were riding home and we had our schnapps and our aperitifs. We were doing all right and were on a first-name basis. Finally he's driving the car and he nudges me and says, "Now, Arthur, tell me who is going to be the next ambassador." I said, "I told you all day, I really don't know. I've been asked this question all evening and I really don't know. If I knew and couldn't tell you, I would tell that I know but can't tell you, but I don't know. Now why is this question coming up continuously?" We had just transferred our ambassador, Wally Butterworth, from Ambassador to Sweden to be, I think, Minister in London under Jock

Whitney. In other words, London wanted a career man there in the number two spot. Butterworth went there to take this job. He finally tells me, "Well, Norway has had a woman ambassador, Denmark has had a woman ambassador. We don't want a woman ambassador in Sweden." So there it was. But I was supposed to know that answer. He was sure that I was holding out on him a great secret. There had been a gap of maybe two months. Actually I think John Lodge was sent over. I think that was the sequence, if I remember rightly. That's been so many years, it's hard to remember . . . but these trips were quite fascinating.

On one to Africa, for instance, I started out in Rabat. I found all along that northern coast that the French governors of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia were all French officers who had been with the TOA, the French Army on the Rhine, when I had the 1st Constabulary Brigade in Weisbaden. I had the most wonderful reception from these people because I had known all of them quite well. General Guillaume was Governor General of Morocco. General Cailles, Governor General of Algeria, who became the Inspector General of the French Army later, had been the Group Commander for the French forces in Germany. General Schuneukel was Governor General of Tunisia. This was a very interesting visit across the sweep of North Africa. You could see then that the French position was definitely deteriorating, which had been obvious ever since the war. I stopped in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli, then in Egypt.

This was the first time I'd been in Egypt and this was 1954. Our position looked as though it was deteriorating at the time. Nasser hadn't been in very long, less than a year. He wanted certain things from the United States, principally military logistic support. A senior member of our Defense Department had been over there recently. They had searched out the terms, but then the United States government refused them for reasons I'm not sure of. I'm afraid it is again that question of trying to insure a balance between Israel and Egypt and still keep both sides happy, which becomes a rather difficult thing to do. But in any event, things started in the other direction, and then shortly the Russians came to build the Aswan Dam. When I went back to Egypt a year later the Russians were just about to move in with naval power and military supplies. From there I went down to Ethiopia.

This was an interesting visit, because you remember I told you the Kagnew Battalion, the Emperor's troops, were under my command in Korea. I was royally welcomed by the Kagnew Battalion officers, who had great parties for me, and also by the Emperor personally. I remember an interesting little story about Haile Selassie. I went in to see him one morning and, of course, I was in uniform. But my FBI friend had to borrow a morning coat and striped trousers. (The State Department man did too, the civilians did, and then, I think, two other people -- our attache there, and one other -- came with me. The rest of my little mission didn't come in.) Anyhow, we marched down this long room where the lions used to be straining at you from the chains at the wall; you've seen pictures of it. We went in and you have to bow. There were six of us, so we bowed carefully inside the door, stopped and bowed half way down, and then we bowed again when we got in front of the Emperor. Well, the second bow was too much for my FBI friend, who weighed about 240 pounds. The borrowed striped trousers were a little too small for him; they completely split. He had on a morning coat with tails, so he covered that part of it, but he was uncomfortable for the rest of the half-hour or so he was in there. Well, anyhow, I had boned up on my French, which I had used to some degree in Germany but not fluently. I knew that with royalty you're supposed to use their language if you can, and they appreciate it if you do. I decided I'd do my best with Haile Selassie. So I did. I was getting along fairly well, and the rest of the group were excused, including the Ambassador. I was sitting relatively on a foot stool compared to Haile Selassie, which is the way royalty like to make you feel -- so you look up at them, you know; something like Mussolini and his high balcony. I was sitting there talking to the Emperor and I knew that he was coming to the United States shortly because I had been designated as his Presidential Aide by President Eisenhower. In G-2, you know, I had the function of nominating a general officer to be his aide, so I nominated one of my friends, George Smythe, who was the Deputy Commander of the Second Army, thinking he could be spared from that job. The Chief of Staff came back and said, "Well, his troops were under you. Why shouldn't you do it?" I said, "Okay." I didn't mind; it was really a very pleasant assignment. Well, anyhow, we got to talking and Haile Selassie said, "You know I'm coming to the United States?" Let's say, next month. I said,

"Yes, I know it, your Imperial Majesty, and I've already been designated as your aide by President Eisenhower." "Well," he said, "Is that so," and I said, "Yes." I don't think he knew it before, because when I left he was not satisfied with the quality of the gift he had planned to give me, and told his aide-de-camp or whatnot to take it back and get me a much better one, which was a magnificent one. In any event, to go on with it, he said, "Now tell me about my visit to the United States. Where am I going?" He probably knew all of this. I said, "Well, of course, we're to meet in New York when you come in." (He was coming in by ship.) I said, "We'll meet in New York, and we're going down to Washington to spend several days, with possibly a trip to Williamsburg and then Gettysburg; then we'll come back to New York and visit the UN." Then I said, "Then you're going to Canada and to the West Coast and to Oklahoma." (We were providing them agricultural support from the University). He said, "Oh, yes, that's fine. Are you going to Canada with me?" I said, "No, your Majesty, when you leave our country to go to Canada, I'll say good-bye at that time." "Well," he said, "Tell me about Canada." Well, I said, "Canada is a great country. It's larger than the United States in size but much smaller in population. It's a country with great natural wealth; they have oil, they have gold, they have timber, and they have wheat." He said, "And uranium, General?" Mind you, I'm still speaking in French -- trying to. I said, "Oh, yes, they have uranium in Canada, your Majesty." He said, "Tell me, General, does the United States use all of the uranium that's mined in Canada to make atomic bombs?" So I looked at him, and I said, "Your Imperial Majesty, that question is too delicate for my poor French. May I respond to you in English?" He said, "Yes, General, go ahead," so I tried to answer him in English as best I could and get us off the hook. He's quite a man; a very impressive man. There's a tremendous dignity in that man. I liked him very much. I had some wonderful days with him, about a week.

Q: I have a lot of pictures of your visit with him there, and then his visit here. I know I have pictures of your visit to the Military Academy.

A: The Military Academy, and then we went up to see John D. Rockefeller, I think, from the Military Academy that day. Then on Sunday we had a great trip which set the pace for something that I've forgotten to tell

you. We stayed in New York in the Towers of the Waldorf, and I'd go up each morning, having had my breakfast, and he'd be having his when I got there. He'd say, "Come in and sit down, General." I'd go in and have a cup of coffee with him. I'd always address him in French when I went in in the morning, and then I'd address him in French when I said good night. This particular morning was a Sunday morning, and I knew we were going to have a busy day. Being a Catholic, I went over to St. Patrick's, which is just a couple of blocks away. Then I went up with him to the Greek Orthodox Church, which is up around 125th Street, where he presented them with a Greek cross. We then went up to Eleanor Roosevelt's home in Hyde Park, where they had an Episcopalian service, and we drove down about 4:00 in the afternoon to the Abyssinian Baptist Church, where Adam Clayton Powell preached. I felt I'd had quite my day religious-wise, you know. I thought of it once later in connection with some stories, and it occurred to me then what happened in Korea.

In Korea I had Turkish troops -- in other words, Moslems. I had Catholic troops, I had Protestants. I mean, they mixed in as far as we were concerned with French and Belgian battalions and whatnot. And, of course, I had some Jewish boys in my division. The time came for Yom Kippur, and I was being visited by Harry Henshel, the head of the Bulova Watch Company, and two very prominent rabbis who were overlooking how things were handled for men of the Jewish faith. So we had this ceremony and meal during Yom Kippur, and I was there; it was after the war. I had all of the Jewish men in the division there. We were talking about religion and mutual understanding and respect for other people's ideas and beliefs. I gave them this talk, which was used later by one of the rabbis. I think his name was Lowenstein, but I'm not sure; very prominent in the Los Angeles area. I told them this: I said, "You know, I had quite a week here. On Friday our Arab friends have their ceremonies; on Saturday, of course, it's the Sabbath for the Jewish men of the division; On Sunday -- I'm Catholic -- I go to Catholic mass, and I try to attend one of the Protestant services in my division. And on Monday," -- and this is where the Thai Battalion came in -- I said, "we've got the Buddhists here on Monday. Now that's Friday, Saturday, Sunday, and Monday. If we could just get the Russians to pick up the other

three days, perhaps we could all live in peace together." It hit the point.

My visit to Ethiopia was very interesting, and I flew from there to Saudi Arabia. While I didn't meet with Ibn Saud, because I was over on the shore where the oil is, I did meet with Sheik Bin Jilui and some of the others from the Trucial States (United Arab Emirates) and along the Gulf. This was very interesting. I went to a party at the American Consul-General's house, I remember, at Dhahran, and here were these sheiks sitting inside. You could hardly get through, because all of their bodyguards had the door blocked and they were sitting on the stairways with their rifles between their knees in the home of our Consul-General. That's the way they do things. Now, it was a fascinating trip, very fascinating.

I think the other story that I'd like to tell in connection with that visit is when I went to Karachi and then to India, to Delhi. Then I flew west to Rawalpindi and went up to Peshawar and through the Khyber Pass over Afghanistan.

When I came back from Afghanistan it happened to be the night of the dedication and dinner at the Medical School at the University of Peshawar, which is just on the Pakistani side of the mountains there. I was invited to it because I had met General Ayub Khan, who was the Commander in Chief of their Army, but he hadn't yet risen to political power. I was invited to this dinner as one of the guests because the Governor General of Pakistan was there. He was the first Governor General, Ghulam Mohammad, so I was very well treated; as a matter of fact, he used me as a sort of a foil to keep the provincial governors off his neck most of the evening. That's what really happened. So, after dinner -- and it was a long summer evening; not summer really, it was late April or early May -- we sat out with these beautiful Persian rugs, or the equivalent of them, on overstuffed furniture. I sat beside the old man, who had a bit of palsy; his mind was clear, but physically he was not in too good shape. He said to me, "Have you been to Karachi?", and I said, "Yes I have, your Excellency." He said, "Are you going back to Karachi?", and I said, "Yes, I am," and so I told him what I was seeking. I said, "Well, one of the things I'm looking for on this trip is not just the military aspects entirely, but I'd

like to learn something more about the philosophy of the men of the East." That apparently sank in. He said, "Well, when will you be in Karachi?" I told him whenever it was to be and he said, "You'll have dinner with me Monday night." I said, "Well, I'm sorry, your Excellency; your Minister of Defense is giving me a dinner on Monday night." The old man turned and looked at me and he said, "No, you'll have dinner with me Monday night," and I said, "Yes, Sir." So that was that. So I said to our attache who was with me -- his name was Wyman; he was a brother of the Congressman Wyman -- "Now get me off the hook on this. The old man says come, and so I'm coming." Well, anyhow, he started radioing and when we got to Karachi, whatever day that was, he said, "It's all fixed. The Governor General wants you for breakfast at the Presidency the next morning. We can go ahead with the dinner with the Defense Minister Monday night." So I did. The next morning I went out to the Residency and, knowing the sensitivity of the State Department (they had a political appointee as Ambassador), I thought I'd better take him along and tell him about it so I wouldn't be accused of lese majeste, which I was accused of later, anyway. So I took him and we went there and had breakfast. There was the Governor and his protocol man, whoever he was, and the Ambassador and myself. Toward the end of the breakfast somebody came in and whispered in the Governor General's ear. He said to me, "One of my men wants to meet you, General. If you'll follow my assistant here, he'll take you and then bring you right back." He said to the Ambassador, "You might as well stay here with me." He took me out, and what do I do? I sit down at a meeting with the Pakistan cabinet, who had the big question on their mind as to whether they could trust the military aid agreement with the United States, or whether it really interferes with the sovereignty of their country. The cabinet was headed at that moment by Zafrullah Khan, who is now a member of the World Court and was then the Finance Minister of Pakistan. There were about eight men there and they plied me with questions; they were all beautifully English-educated, so there was no problem. They plied me with questions as to what this meant, and how much it would interfere with their sovereignty. I think I finally assured them, because when I went back in, and before we left, somebody came in and whispered to the old man again. He said to me in a very meaningful way, and with a very meaningful handshake, how much he appre-

ciated my coming to breakfast. And now we get to the most important or interesting part of the story.

He said, "You told me in Peshawar that you wanted to learn something about the philosophy of the men of the East." I said, "That's right, your Excellency." He said, "Are you going to Turkey?" I said, "Yes." "When?" I guess it was in about ten days or two weeks, because I was stopping in all of the other countries in between. He said, "Would you take a message for me to one of my friends in Turkey? He's one of my dearest friends. He's an old man like I am and he's laid up with a broken hip." I said, "Certainly I will, your Excellency." When I left by plane that next day, he gave me not only the letter, but a lovely mahogany case with his inscribed photograph in a silver frame. Next I went to Iran, and when I got to Teheran I was advised that our AID agreement with Iraq was approved and that I could deliver my message in Baghdad. I carried that message to the then-Governor of Iraq. From there I went on to Jordan, Beirut, Cyprus, and then to Turkey. I was on a schedule in Turkey, because the State Department had been kind enough to invite me to attend a meeting of the Ambassadors of the Middle East, which was a fascinating session. Again, this non-career Ambassador from Pakistan was there. I called up the party that I was supposed to see and they said, "Yes, come and see us" at a certain time, some afternoon when the meeting's over. The individual in question was Rauf Orbay, who was the first Foreign Minister under Kemal Ataturk. Now we go back to 1923 -- way back a long time ago -- when he had been an admiral in the Turkish Navy. He was a very brilliant man. He'd risen to power, and recently he had fallen and broken his hip. When the Ambassador and I visited him that afternoon, I had a basket of fruit for him and the letter from Ghulam Mohammad. We rang the bell to his very modest apartment, went up a typical little French-type elevator, got off on his floor, and were met by a young man who was the old man's nephew and was taking care of him. We went into his apartment, which was very simple, and Monsieur Orbay was propped up in a brass bed just recovering from a broken hip. Across his bed he had what we would call a breakfast tray and some mail. I introduced myself and the Ambassador, presented him the basket of fruit and the letter, and he said, "Oh, do you mind if I read the letter from my old friend Ghulam?" We said, "Of course not, your Excellency." So the Ambassador and I

sat down, and he opened the letter and read it. Then he turned to me and he said, "General, you know this is one of the great days of my life." I said, "Well, how can that be, your Excellency?" "Well," he said, "I've received two letters today from my two dearest friends." "Well," I said, "That's wonderful; that is just wonderful, your Excellency." And he said, "You'd never guess who," and I said, "No, I couldn't." He said, "Well, you just brought me one from Ghulam," and I said, "Yes, that's right, and it gives me great satisfaction to do that." He said, "The other one is from Pacelli." (He's the Pope in Rome.) I said, "Your Excellency, that's amazing. How could that be?" He said, "Many years ago when we were representing our respective countries and I was a representative of India at the time, we were all stationed in Munich and Pacelli was there. I was there from Turkey and Ghulam was there from India and Pacelli was the Nuncio, and we've all been close friends all of our lives. Now I hear from both of them on the same day. I'm nothing, Ghulam is a Moslem and . . ." It's a meaningful story in these days of ecumenicism.

One of the interesting special trips I made was to South Africa. I'd gotten acquainted with the South African Ambassador in Washington after I'd made several of these trips or while I was making them; he had been their Finance Minister. He was a very, very fine man indeed. And he said to me one night, "Don't you like my country?" I said, "Yes, I like South Africa very much. I think it's a very important country." (I still do, and for many reasons.) He said, "Well, why don't you go? Why haven't you been there? I understand you've been to most of the countries in the world." I said, "Well, really I try to go to all of the countries where we have diplomatic representation, but it's such a long way from Cairo to Capetown that I haven't tried to make that jump." (Of course, now you've got thirty more countries in Africa, but you didn't then.) So he said, "Would you go if my government invited you?". I said, "Yes, I'm sure I would and I think I could; I think the Army would send me." So lo and behold, an official government request comes through for my visit to South Africa, whereupon the State Department had to take off their glasses, or put them on, and look around and say what the hell's going on here, a military man to go down there. In any event, I was permitted to go, but I was only permitted to take an aide with me; State said they didn't want a military party down there.

But I went and it was a very valuable meeting. I think I was able to square them away on a lot of misconceptions that they had in very high places as to where their security lay. They thought their security was in building a DEW line, an early warning system at the northern border of South Africa, and I said, "Your security lies in the Middle East," which is where it does lie. So finally they saw the light. Of course, the South Africans have been difficult about dealing with other people; that's been one of the problems. But after that they took a brigade and had an exercise moving it from South Africa to Kenya -- to Nairobi -- and that's quite a little trip.

I think the other story that ought to get into the record has to do with my visit to Latin America, and here we visited all 20 of the Latin American countries in about six weeks. I started in early February -- or the last day of January -- which ran us through their carnival time; you know, February -- around Ash Wednesday. It was a pretty wild trip with the late hours they keep and the American habit of getting up early and working all day. We were absolutely exhausted when we finished. There were lots of valuable contacts made. In some places certain people tried to prevent me from seeing the top man but I succeeded in every case.

The highlight I'd like to tell is about the man that's now out of power, and I'm sure won't be back in; it's about Juan Peron and the Argentines. I flew into the Argentine and spent three or four very fine days with his ministers and generals. I didn't really expect to see Peron. While I'd had a considerable number of gifts of different types to give to people, depending on their level, I didn't have anything suitable for Peron, because I didn't expect to see him. My aide from the Argentine Army told me, "I think that the President is going to want to see you tonight." I said, "All right, I'll make myself available." Well, he didn't, but the aide came around and said, "No, he wants you to come out to Olivas, his summer place, tomorrow morning (Saturday morning) at 9:30." "Well," I said, "that's fine. I can do that." I didn't have any plans for the next morning. So I went out there with this aide the next morning and met Peron. He was in sports clothes; we sat down and had a good chat. I didn't chat about the military problems. Hell, I knew what his tables of organization were and his so-called order of battle and other conventional information. I

started talking to him about the economic development of his country and his relationship with the United States. We had a very interesting conversation, with the result that when I wanted to leave about 10:30 -- I'd been there an hour -- he said, "Oh, you can't go now. I want to talk more to you." We talked for another hour or so, and then I got up to leave, but he said, "I want you to see what I've got here." And this is all an area of playgrounds. We went out. There we met this girlfriend of his and the three of us walked around and watched all sorts of games and activities. It was a great outlet for youngsters, teen-agers mostly, and young people. When we got all through about noon we were down where he's got a marina and a little lake that the kids swim in. He said, "What are you doing this afternoon?" I said, "I'm going out on the La Plata with your Minister of War and some of your staff. He said, "Oh, you must go on my yacht." I replied, "Well, I'm sure the yacht they have is quite satisfactory." "No, General, you must go on my yacht," so we did the Alphonse-Gaston act a little bit. When I got down there, I found out I was on his yacht. We had a fine afternoon and we came back toward evening and went to see the championship soccer game between the Argentines and Uruguay; they were over from Montevideo. This turned out to be quite a long, drawn-out affair. After a light supper, the game started at 10:00 in their wonderful stadium with the moat around it, a moat about ten feet wide and ten feet deep so nobody could jump onto the field, they thought. In any event, the Argentines were leading 1 - 0 in the first period when the Uruguayans also got a goal. But just before they got the goal, the whistle blew (Somebody was off-side or something.). The goal didn't count, whereupon the Uruguayans all fell upon the British referee and beat him up. He was finally carried off the field and a general melee occurred. About 800 or 1,000 young people found that they could leap the barrier, and that field was a mess. The game was finally over about 1:30. I had to be very appreciative; I'd been in the box with Evita and Peron and his staff.

I finally arrived back in the United States after visiting several countries. We were traveling up the coast and went to Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, and Venezuela. We checked in to Panama again and visited all the countries in Central America. We made them all.

When I got back to the United States, I reported to General Ridgway, who had a great feeling for Latin America, and told him about all these visits. It was agreed that it would be appropriate for me to send something to Peron. I had a very lightweight revolver made up by Army Ordnance, with a walnut box for the revolver itself and a walnut box for the 50 cartridges, to send down to Peron. I sent it to the Army attache and said, "Please present this to President Peron whenever you have an opportunity." It had a brass plate on it -- not from me, but from the United States Army -- "with kindest regards" or something of the sort. The attache, who was Colonel Arthur Tyson, received it and told the Ambassador about it. Ambassador Nuefer, who was there at the time, said, "All right, the next time I have an appointment with the President, I'll take you along, and when the appointment is over, I'll see that you have an opportunity to present it." This is what happened.

This particular morning the appointment was over and Ambassador Nuefer called in Tyson, and Tyson presented the pistol with the greetings from the United States Army to Peron, who opened it and snapshot around the room. I think it was a titanium pistol I had made up especially for him -- very lightweight but powerful. He was snapshotting around the room because he liked guns, pretty girls, and motorcycles. Everything ended fine. They left the Presidential office and the palace in their car. Ten minutes later, a bomb went off. It was June 22, 1955, the day of the revolution. I immediately learned this through the wire services. I got Tyson on the phone as soon as I could and we discussed the situation. He said, "It has just started; we don't know what is going to happen, but they have overthrown Peron and the President is seeking asylum in the Uruguayan Embassy for security." Then, bang, the phone went dead.

The next thing we got was mail by slow boat, ten days later. We got nothing by way of official mail or anything of the sort. In that mail, I got two letters. One was signed by Juan D. Peron. He couldn't have signed it that morning; it must have been signed the next day or so. But it was to Mi Gran Amigo, to me, thanking me for the wonderful pistol. Here was this guy under this kind of pressure, taking time to acknowledge a gift. He must have signed it in the next couple of days and put it on that boat. Then

I opened Tyson's letter. He generally said, "I'm sorry that we have been so delayed, but we haven't been permitted to use the radio or to get mail out by air mail because the American Embassy has been under suspicion." He said, "The opposition found out about this pistol that we gave the President this morning." He said, "We are under suspicion because they don't know whether we gave it to him to shoot himself or to protect himself." Well, this was having its repercussions; we got a little inkling of this through State also. About August, we got a new Argentine Ambassador in Washington. They also had a new attache. They were under the new government, of course, because Peron was out. I invited the attache over to a luncheon and asked him if he wouldn't bring the new ambassador, which he did. I got General Ridgway, the Chief of Staff, to come. At the luncheon, there were 10 to 20 people. I told the pistol story, whereupon everybody had a damn good laugh and we dispelled what appeared to be a diplomatic incident.

Q: Sir, I know you made several visits. Obviously, you made visits every year, in your job as G-2. How about some of your visits in the States?

A: Well, I went to a great number of them. I was concerned about industrial security. I spent quite some time on that. I was interested in improving combat intelligence instruction and was responsible for concentrating it at Holabird. The former school on combat intelligence had been at Fort Riley. We moved it and consolidated it with certain other instruction at Holabird. We also ran a strategic intelligence school in which we trained, or I guess a better word would be oriented, our attaches. This was done in coordination with language training to a considerable extent. We sent many of them who needed the longer courses to Monterey, where they were taught in groups of from three to eight, usually with a native from the country concerned teaching the language. Many of them, who only needed a refresher, either took it here at Berlitz or in connection with Navy Intelligence, which is over at Anacostia.

Along with all this we ran a strategic intelligence school, orienting them on what to look for so that if they saw something different, they knew what they were looking at in connection with various types of plants, stills, reactors, and other structures. That's where the higher degree of technical proficiency showed

itself, in that field. I expanded the Reserve program considerably in those days. I'm afraid it has been broken up now, but we had Reserve intelligence units at a number of the universities. In some universities, they would concentrate on certain areas. Maybe one was strong on Chinese, or Urdu, or some other language. I tried to use them in reviewing and updating parts of the National Intelligence Survey. The National Intelligence Survey consists of many parts that deal with every aspect of the government: economics, social structure, and everything about a particular country. It comes in several volumes and it's consolidated by the CIA. We found these selected Reserve officers were very knowledgeable about the country in question and made real contributions to these surveys because they were interested. It kept them updated and it kept the National Intelligence Survey updated.

One of the things I tried to do was to impress on our government the importance of education in some of these underdeveloped areas. You may have found a paper that I submitted to the Operations Coordinating Board, which was then a high-level executive agency to pull things together. The paper suggested the establishment of universities in different parts of the world where we would assemble an outstanding faculty from the areas concerned, like a University of the Americas in Bolivia. I recommended two specifically for Africa, one in Ethiopia and one in Liberia. I think they could have had their impacts and at a reasonable price comparable to the cost of a day's war in Korea. Not too much had been done on that; something has been done, though, through AID and other programs.

Another effort that I tried to start was the Civic Action Program. Here I was impressed. The first place that this was applied that I know of was in Bolivia. There we were making quite some progress. In other words, my theory was that they need troops in each of these countries largely to maintain order. Our program was rather pitiful, around the early 1950s, in connection with military aid agreements. For instance, the Brazilians were supposed to train anti-aircraft battalions to rush to the defense of the Panama Canal. This is really stretching it. You would leave Sao Paulo and Rio open. What happened in Brazil was they would get this equipment, which was very expensive, and leave it in the warehouse. In

Brazil, while they kept their officer and noncommissioned cadre on a fairly permanent basis, they pulled in their draftees on a yearly basis and usually ran out of money about September. Then the draftees were sent home and the equipment lay idle for two or three months until a new group came in. Consequently, you just can't imagine an efficient organization being developed. What I wanted to do was to train them -- and I would call it as close as anything else -- as combat engineers; in other words, as fairly good infantry. They could do the job of security in the country, which is what they are primarily for. And when they weren't doing this, they would get out and open up the roads and trails, build bridges, open up waterways, and do the things our Army Engineers did in the early development of our country. We made some progress on that. I think it could be one of the really great contributions in Latin America. I don't know what its present status is today. It was talked up quite a bit a few years ago, but, as of now, I have no knowledge of whether it is really being pushed today or not. Everybody who is a soldier comes from the people; you can't get away from that. It's particularly true where a large part of your Army is a drafted Army or a civilian Army. They are all the son or brother or husband of somebody. How great it would be for the unity of a country if they felt that their army was really a part of them in doing things to help them instead of just a factor for suppression of free thought. These were all factors that could be very important in this civic action type program.

You asked me earlier about the boards that were headed up to study the military intelligence field as far as the United States is concerned. One was headed up by General Doolittle; the other one, later, by General Mark Clark. Both of them, as far as I know, were looking for answers to about the same problem: how can we improve American intelligence affecting the security of the United States? To put it in its broadest terms, this is not only military; it gets into the political, economic, and industrial fields as well. One of the areas that has caused us much concern is East-West trade, the loss of trade secrets and a lot of other matters. I don't know that either the Doolittle or Clark Board reports ever resulted in very much constructive action. They may have; I never read the reports themselves because they were never made available to me. I appeared before both of them,

as did numerous other men in the intelligence field. I never saw much that evolved after these reports were submitted to indicate that they were very productive. Interestingly, even after I retired I was called upon by a certain very senior person in the Congress to head up still another board. I stalled on this one because, I said to him, "If you can show me anything that came out of either the Doolittle or Clark Board that was meaningful, I'll take a look at it." I was never shown anything. I would rather leave him unnamed here; he is really one of the top people. There may have been gaps in intelligence. If there were, this was unfortunate. There probably were some overlaps in intelligence. This is nothing I apologize for at all, even if the Army were one of those involved in an overlap situation. Because, after all, there is one fact: when you get information, it is just that. It isn't intelligence until it is evaluated. If you can get it from two or more sources, then it may become convincing if they all agree. If they don't agree, it means you had better take another look before coming to a conclusion. You have to consider many things when you are talking about the collection of information. Is it unnecessary duplication? It is unprofitable duplication? You can't just say there is duplication and throw it out the window, because very frequently you need it. I am afraid that the tendency now, in trying to unify intelligence and derive it from one source, will lead us down the wrong path. Furthermore, I don't think one service -- speaking of the men in uniform -- representing the country in the military will get real answers, without regard to whether the man is Army, Navy, or Air Force. His real field of expertise always is in regard to his particular arm. There may be information coming from other arms which either will not be given to him, or, because of the complexity of the situation, he won't really understand the full implications even though his contemporary tries to explain it to him. We have got to be very careful about this oversimplification. As a matter of fact, I think we have done the country a disservice in connection with the Defense Intelligence Agency by taking away collection capabilities from the individual services. I don't think that this is right. I don't think that this is good. There are several areas here that certainly need further clarification, and some of it may come to light in view of the attacks on the Army in connection with industrial intelligence, which is its real justification for operations within the

United States. We never tried to take anything in the way of domestic intelligence away from the FBI. We've been very careful about it. Our field has been industrial intelligence. But when we get to the point where there are indications of violence, or implications that military force may be needed, then I think that the Army very definitely better know who is the enemy and where the trouble may come from to be prepared to meet it.

Q: Well, General, I think we have pretty well wrapped up this portion of your career, in intelligence. Were there any prospects on the horizon? You had been moving around rather rapidly these last few years. Did it look like you were heading somewhere else, to another part of your career?

A: Well, I did leave rather suddenly, which is another point. But at the time this occurred, the Army was about to have a reorganization. General Gavin, who had been Deputy Chief of Operations, was very keen on establishing the Office of Chief of Research and Development. He was succeeding in doing so and expecting to take that position himself. I had been informed that I probably would be side-slipped from Chief of Intelligence to Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, which would have been a fascinating job and one into which my past experience would have perfectly fit. I could say unforeseen circumstances, but they weren't unforeseen circumstances -- because I had been getting a sensing for the past two years that perhaps other things might happen. And they did. That ended my service as Chief of Intelligence abruptly in about August 1955.

Q: General, what I would like to do is talk about sensitive material, the Army's activity in covert operations, and those things that you think would be interesting from a historical point of view and perhaps again some lessons learned. I would like to end up talking about the reason why you left the post of G-2. Let's go back now and talk about the various activities that we were involved in, how it related to our attaches, what our system is, and so forth.

A: Well, by and large, as I said, the attache system is a system for the overt collection of military intelligence. Obviously, it is important to get all information possible -- military information -- about the country in which you are serving, but it also

becomes of growing importance to learn more about their industrial and technological capabilities as well as the psycho-political, political, and other factors that go into making up the overall strength of a country. Frequently, when dealing in a friendly country, you can succeed in getting valuable information about a less-friendly country by thirdhand means, where the attache in the less-friendly country is unable to get information himself. Consequently, the extensive search for information of all kinds on all countries through any means and through any of your contacts becomes important, and you can't simplify it to a point by saying that A talks only to B, and A doesn't talk to B about C; A does talk to B about C if he can get anything on him, and about D and E and all the way through. So third-country information becomes a very important asset. By and large, attaches should not be compromised by having them deal in the field of covert information. Not only are they likely to be dismissed from the country in which they are serving, but I think in some cases it impairs their overall value and may be inhibiting to them themselves.

Covert operations are a game in themselves; there is no easy way to explain this. Men have to be tested in every possible way -- vetted, we call it; vetted to determine their integrity and their resistance to the principal temptations in life: women, liquor, and money. No matter how reputable the homosexuals can appear to make their activities, they are still not a safe bet in the intelligence field. Nor are people who are easy victims of women or tempted by large amounts of money. Consequently, this is a field where matters have to be held pretty close and men have to be tested at various levels before additional trust or responsibility can be placed in them. One of the weaknesses I've seen in trying to build a covert intelligence capability too rapidly is that the system gets so badly penetrated that it is hardly worth keeping in existence. When the number of your own agents who are taken -- in other words, captured or controlled by your opponents -- becomes significant at all, you can be sure that the degree of secrecy that you have retained is approaching zero. At the end of World War II we had great capabilities in covert intelligence, particularly in Eastern Europe, because of the fact that they are people much like ourselves and that many of our Americans of their ethnicity had no difficulty at all in identifying by appearance,

culture, and language with the peoples of these countries concerned, including Russia itself but to a lessening degree. With the Asiatics the normal problems of difference in race and appearance and language difficulties creep in severely, as we've noticed in the countries of Eastern Asia. Probably the country in which we've done the best is Japan, where we've had many Japanese-Americans who have been extremely loyal but who have been knowledgeable in the language and customs involved. As we get into the other countries of Eastern Asia I think we are having increasing difficulty in this field. This will ease as more Orientals become Americanized.

Unfortunately, the residual capability of Army covert intelligence with cover in Eastern Europe after the war was resented by the Central Intelligence Agency to an alarming degree. I sensed this on many, many occasions; in fact, it always was a factor in any actions that we took and was a real contributing factor to difficulties that developed in my own relationship, particularly with the covert segment of the CIA. Completely unfounded remarks and reports were submitted in this regard to at least the Clark Board, which I had to defend against and fortunately had the necessary exchange of correspondence to do so. In some cases I made very substantial contributions to CIA activities, particularly if the area was one where the Army was far better equipped to do the job. One particular effort in this regard in Europe was highly productive over a period of years until it was uncovered, which happens in nearly all cases as time goes on.

One of the difficulties that developed between myself and the CIA at the U. S. Intelligence Board level was in the insistence by the Director of that agency that a draft on important subjects which had been under study and preparation for four to eight months would be handled by the Army over the weekend preceding a final meeting. After attempting to comply on many occasions at the expense of great demands on key personnel for weekend time, I finally informed the Board that the Army would not respond to any such long-term studies without at least one week of study being available before the meeting. In such cases, and even at best, we were able to get only a footnote to any objections in small print in the report, which seldom counteracted the impact of the desired language as placed into the report by the Agency itself. The

subtlety of such actions should be readily apparent when it is considered that these intelligence reports normally form the base for national security policy or actions resulting therefrom.

It was my feeling then and it is my feeling now that a Chief or Director of Intelligence should be a member of the National Security Council, someone who is separate and distinct from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Despite the fact that the Dulles brothers no longer exist to act in complete coordination, the attempted unification and reduction in numbers of the existing intelligence agencies increases the danger of a single agency or person making a major decision. I might inject here the thought that the dominating personality of a Kissinger, who controls the thought processes of his entire staff on one side and has the complete confidence of the President on the other, only accents the danger of one-man control. I think the effort to eliminate all collection operations from the individual uniformed services and to place the entire matter in the hands of the DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, is likewise a mistake. Again I repeat, the duplication in itself need not be necessarily wasteful but can be most essential to securing evaluated intelligence rather than just accepting source information.

I feel that complete dependence of the Agency on certain centers for studies can in itself be detrimental. Those, of course, who have complete confidence in the integrity, patriotism, and wisdom of the Fund for the Republic or similar institutions are privileged to disagree. Too often, however, the tendency of the State Department to compromise the situation, which is part of the art of diplomacy, with the feeling that "Things will be better tomorrow" has led us to the dangerous position in which we find ourselves today.

I found a basic subject for discussion with one of the real thought makers in the State Department in my time to be simply, "On whose side is time?" My own belief was that time was not on our side unless we used it more profitably and found ways in which to take the initiative on certain problems of vital importance rather than responding halfheartedly and too late from the defensive. I found I could always generate a lot of heat on this question despite a relative calmness

on my part. I was advised a month before I left the Pentagon from G-2 that such thoughts and philosophy on my part were damaging me to the point where others thought my presence was no longer desirable in Washington. I was advised about this by a dependable friend in a senior hierarchy and so advised the then Chief of Staff, General Ridgway. He showed no concern and urged me to have none myself. However, within 30 days of his retirement and the assumption of the job of Chief of Staff by General Taylor, I found myself on the way back to the Far East. You are getting into a deep one here.

A report was prepared in some depth by myself and two associates which analyzed the lines of communications between having decision-making or high decision-recommending powers in the White House right on back to agencies who were feeding them material. We plotted these names and their relationships, where they really had an "in." We then analyzed the statements made in a large number of national security papers and very frequently would get down to a clause, sentence, or paragraph which changed the meaning or moderated it very materially. We pinpointed these changes. We pinpointed not only these recommendations on papers submitted but also correlated them with resulting national security policy papers and showed the influence and penetration that was made in this regard which, in most cases, was weakening our overall policy. But somebody let it get in the wrong hands of a man so high that they -- and I can't explain that too much -- started screaming. It resulted in an Assistant Secretary of State's departure from here, was a factor in my departure, and also resulted in the movement out of the State Department of another man. We had the goods. One person handed it to the wrong man who is still in government -- in a sensitive position, I believe.

Q: General, who took the initiative in making such a study? I don't want to ask what the motivation was, but who took the initiative?

A: One other man and myself, because I was convinced we were being sold down the river by equivocation and quibbling in national security policy. There were other aspects also.

Q: I'm sure that there is much more of this that we can talk about. You have discussed several points that

seemed to create problems; there is another problem that arose because of your interest in attempting to establish an attache from West Germany. I would like to ask you if I'm correct in that assumption; was there a problem, and if so, what were the circumstances surrounding it?

A: Yes, that is correct and the problem arose from the fact that when the Germans got their sovereignty in 1954 and soon established an Ambassador in the United States, they did not establish any of the services -- in other words, the military, Naval or Air attaches. I was quite well acquainted with the first German Ambassador, Dr. Krechler; he was not a career man; I think he was a chemist or a scientist as a matter of fact -- a very fine person. I asked Krechler on two or three occasions when he was going to have a military attache, in our case an Army attache, and he said, "I don't know. We'll probably have one soon." After the second or third time I asked him, he said, "Why are you so interested in an Army attache?" I said, "I would like to talk to him regarding the problems that are bound to arise in connection with your development of an attache system and also with the questions as to security because, with your sovereignty, you are now becoming part of NATO and are going to share in a lot of highly classified information and war plans; I would like to work with your new man." "Well," he said, "I don't know when he is coming but I'll let you know." So he called me one day in the office and he said, "I'm having a very important guest this afternoon and you might like to discuss this question of an attache with him." I said, "Fine." He did not identify the guest. I did not suspect it was their number one man, der Alte Adenauer, the Chancellor. Some stories assert that I "talked to Chancellor Adenauer at dinner." That is completely false. I never intended to talk to him and was caught completely by surprise when he appeared.

When I got to the German Embassy for a conference, we went out under a tree, Krechler and myself, and started a general discussion for a few minutes when who appeared but Chancellor Adenauer. Well, this was quite a surprise to me. But wanting to be specific about some of the questions I had in mind (and I don't recall them now although they're a matter of record), I had with me perhaps eight or possibly ten 3-by-5 cards on which I marked down questions and problems that I was seeking answers to; my staff had

contributed to those questions. There seemed nothing sensible to do but go ahead and discuss them with Chancellor Adenauer. I suppose it was a case of lese majeste, which is certainly the way the State Department interpreted it, but this was the circumstance. So I posed the questions and the Chancellor answered some of them; he discussed them more than he answered them and said that they were important questions and he would like to consider them at length and would I leave him the questions. I couldn't refuse. I said, "Yes," and I then handed him the cards. This was in the middle of June 1955, and General Taylor took over as Chief of Staff on the first of July 1955, when General Ridgway retired for age.

The next I heard about it was when I was on a trip to the West where I visited the language school at Monterey and a number of other installations in late July. I got a call in Los Angeles from General Taylor asking me when I was returning. I only had about two days left of the trip, and I told him whatever the date was; this would have been about the end of July. So he said he would like to see me no later than, say, next Tuesday or something of the sort on an important matter, so to report when I got back. I said, "Fine."

I did that, and he seemed quite disturbed when I finally did report to him. He said, "Now we should go up to see the Secretary." So we both went up to see Secretary Brucker. I might say that Brucker had been most friendly to me even when he had been General Counsel of the Defense Department. I've forgotten several matters that brought us together, probably during the McCarthy Hearings, but in any event he'd shown a real friendship. Even before he became Secretary of the Army he told me he would like to go up to Fort Holabird where I was then establishing the intelligence and counterintelligence center and, of course, where this Central Records Facility is located that has been under so much fire recently. As a result, I realized that Mr. Brucker was more upset than General Taylor was. I knew that basically I had a friend in Mr. Brucker and an understanding person. He immediately, however, asked me a question about my contacts and said that Mr. Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA, had sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense saying that he had lost all confidence in me because of this contact I had made with Adenauer. It

became quite apparent that either the German Embassy was penetrated or that Adenauer had turned the cards over to the CIA. I mean, one of the two things had to have happened because he physically had the cards on which I had the questions I asked Adenauer. They were the same; they weren't copies; they were the same cards because I was able to identify them. As a matter of fact, I have the cards now; they're in a safe place. So the upshot was that Secretary Brucker demanded a report from me within the next 48 hours. General Taylor was the only auditor of this; he had nothing to say. So I told Mr. Brucker that I appreciated his anxiety in getting a prompt answer but I was not prepared to give him an answer in 48 hours because I had to assemble more data and background together, whereupon he said, "The Secretary of Defense is very insistent that you respond within 48 hours." "Well," I said, "my respects to the Secretary of Defense and to you, Mr. Secretary, but you cannot have my response in 48 hours. From what you are telling me here, my career is at stake, and I intend to take a reasonable amount of time to prepare my defense and respond to this charge." Which was in writing, incidentally. Well, that shocked him a little bit, that I didn't immediately give in to his demands. But he said, "How much time are you talking about?" And I said, "I want a full week." He said, "That's too long." And I said, "I want a full week." And I got a full week. So I went back and with two or three people in whom I had confidence and who knew what the problems were: I brought them into my close confidence and prepared my defense, prepared my reply.

As I recall it, I had no more turned it in than I explained that I recognized that Mr. Dulles said he had lost confidence in me, and I guess I was brash enough to say that I had also lost confidence in him and his associates. I laid it on the line; I didn't take the blame lying down, and I didn't intend to. In any event, I had no sooner turned this in when I was told that I was summarily relieved as G-2. Much to his surprise, General Ridgely Gaither, who had been a Division Commander with me in Korea, was immediately brought back from Fort Bragg. I don't believe he had been there a week because he had just been in talking to me about where he was going and what he was doing. I'm sure nobody was as surprised as Gaither to get the G-2 job. I don't remember whether they asked me where I wanted to go or not -- they may have -- but they wanted me out of the country fast. They did

quite a logical thing; they sent a cable at least to General Lemnitzer who was in command of the Far East. Lemnitzer was pretty well acquainted with me and what I had been doing; he had been Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. So he immediately cabled back, "Yes, send him over; I've got a job for him." So to make a long story short, I did go to Japan. I accepted that; I was very happy with that, as a matter of fact. I was reassured at the time because my response was pretty stiff and the Secretary said, after I gave it to him and he read it over, that he hoped it was the only copy. I assured him that it wasn't; that I had one in a perfectly safe place, and if they wanted to make a public issue of it I was fully prepared to respond. And he understood. I still have that copy and there are only a couple of people who know where it is and could get to it. He then told me after reading my reclama that he hoped I was not going to make a public issue of it. I said I didn't really intend to, but it depended on what the charge was against my career. At that time, as I told you, I had already been contacted about the possibility, not certainty, that I would move into another position on the General Staff shortly. The door looked wide open until this happened to me. I wasn't about to take it lying down but I knew that this had been sufficient so that I'd have the red tab on my record in the State Department, in the White House, and a couple other places as far as further promotion was concerned. But then I was told by Secretary Brucker what a great record he thought I had and how he regretted this circumstance. He said, "Don't make any public issue out of it. Take this assignment over there and do a good job for a year, which I know you will, and I'll see that your promotion is not lost." That was to three stars. So I left it that way. I worked in the Pentagon and I had leave. I worked in a little back room trying to pull things together and help my successor from 9 August until I sailed in September. I decided instead of flying after this pressure and all that my wife and I would do better if we just got on a transport and left. So we did, and we had a couple of restful weeks at sea because there was a lot of shake-up, naturally, in the family. She was disturbed; these are pressures that are hard to take anyway.

Q: I was going to wait until October of next year, I guess 18 October 1956 . . . I did pick up a story from Fred Weyant, Brucker's executive, to sort of confirm what you just said. When you got promoted, the letter to you reminded you of the conversation that you had with the Secretary and that the Secretary did say that he certainly wasn't going to let your file get lost. What you have just said is exactly what Weyant said.

A: That put the limit on my future, but at least I did get that much out of it. And I appreciate what the Secretary did because actually both the Secretary and Admiral Radford, Chief of Joint Staff, I understand, went directly to the White House to get an exception to the tab that had been put on my record after the Adenauer contact.

Q: Yes, that is another thing. When General Weyant, then Colonel Weyant, wrote to you, he said that the Secretary took your promotion to the Secretary of Defense and then walked it to the White House to make sure that nothing would slow it up.

A: That's right. It showed a lot of understanding on the Secretary's part, and he knew that the pressures were very great on Allen Dulles -- it was the people under him more than Dulles himself. We had been good friends but he resented, to a degree, the fact that I wouldn't accept all that his deputies and subordinates were putting in writing. In other words, maybe I was a little more firm about some of these things than he thought I should be, but he always respected me and I knew that. I know the individuals down below. One of them went off his rocker and soon died; the man who was most responsible was the individual in charge of covert intelligence operations for the CIA. I know the other two men; one of them has gone on to higher places and the other one hasn't. Both have bitten the dust. Another, an ex-German, has since left and gone back to Germany. I'm not sure which side of the curtain he is on, as a matter of fact, but I guess he is still in West Germany. When I left they were going to send him to Tokyo, and I got a message back that I didn't think Tokyo was big enough for the two of us because he had really been at the bottom of the German problem.

Mr. Brucker couldn't stand that kind of pressure. I don't mean from weakness on his part but just the fact that Allen Dulles plus the State Department Dulles,

John Foster -- the two of them -- sent strong letters to Secretary Wilson who thought intelligence was a dirty business anyway. Oh, yes, he had absolutely . . . old Engine Charlie had no use for intelligence. He was not what I would call a very astute man and I'm not sure but what was good for General Motors then was not good for the United States. Anyhow, he was the Secretary of Defense and he had that power and, of course, he had that power over Brucker. So Mr. Brucker himself couldn't have changed the picture at the moment, I don't think. There really could have been some big noises made over this because the CIA was not in too good repute anyway, and they were losing an awful lot of agents in their German setup who were being exposed -- perhaps because they built too fast; at least they were penetrated. We were worried about an outfit that already was penetrated having charge of German security in Bonn, in the area where our war plans and everything else would be exposed. Of course, since then those plans were leaked to the Russians, to the East; the things that I surmised would happen have happened. They all have happened. There have been many serious defections. I have no apologies for what I tried to do for American security.

I took a pretty positive step with respect to intelligence because I didn't believe in the concept that some of my contemporaries in other parts of government had. They said if we do nothing then things will get better with Russia; some of them still do. I adhere to a firm idea that we should develop a positive strategy that would put the Russians on the defensive, not only in a military way but also as a result of economic and diplomatic actions. This was greatly resented. There were certain areas in the world, I said then and I'll still say, where the Army at that time had a greater covert intelligence capability, with better cover, than any of our other intelligence agencies in existence. When you say that you shouldn't get into anything that has to do with strategy and policy, however, you can't avoid it because strategy and policy can only be based on evaluated intelligence. If you're in this field and you see the intelligence being poorly distorted or poorly evaluated, or incorrect conclusions drawn, then I think it is up to each individual who has responsibility to initiate and foster the necessary actions to try to offset and counteract this adverse and dangerous approach. This is exactly what I did.

I have no apologies to make at all. What has happened in the way of penetration of the West German government and the loss of highly classified war plans and intelligence is, to me, still an indication that I was absolutely right in what I tried to prevent in 1955. Read the books about Gehlen's organization. I'm not apologizing to anybody. Nor do I regret that I expended as much effort as I did, even though it put a real crimp in my Army career.

Q: General, there were some letters written to you as you left the Pentagon by your close friends indicating that they considered this a step up and that there was a possibility of a third star. As you left the Pentagon for the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in the Far East Command, did you see this as a step up?

A: No. It could only be a two-star job; I was not expecting anything there. As a matter of fact, the Secretary said, "Get over there and do a good job, which I know you can do, and in a year from now I'll see that you are taken care of." That is what he said.

Q: General, I know that at a time like this it becomes a very personal thing and, as you said, your career was on the line. I had an opportunity to go through the letters that you were writing at that time to some of your close friends: Bill Donovan, Eddie Rickenbacker, Mark Clark, and General Truscott.

A: They were letters of appreciation. They all tried to save me on the job, but they couldn't.

CHAPTER XVI

The Far East Again

Q: Let's go to your position in the Far East. Would you like to tell us how you got there, what mode of travel you used?

A: Well, very simply, after the pressures that we had been under and the harassment and all, my wife and I saw no reason for rushing over by air. We said let's make it more like a vacation for a change and go on a transport. I've forgotten what the time was, but it was the better part of two weeks at sea and we had a fairly enjoyable trip. It was in September, the weather was pleasant as a whole, and it gave us more time to talk than we had probably had in the preceding two months together. She was terribly upset at this time because it had come as a shock to her and she felt I hadn't kept her sufficiently informed as to what was happening, I guess. But these are the kinds of things that you don't talk about, sometimes even with your wife, when you are dealing in this field. I arrived over there and I was met by many good friends on the staff. I had some people who were in intelligence in Tokyo also, so I was warmly greeted and well taken care of. I enjoyed my service there immensely; as I say, I had worked with General Lemnitzer before. He had been the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in Washington when I was G-2. We also had an excellent understanding in my job as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in Tokyo which, of course, was the kind of job he had had at the Department of the Army level. I had plenty to do and I thoroughly enjoyed doing it. I found that my contemporaries -- the flag officers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force -- were enjoyable. I had known most of them before -- not all, but most of them. It was a pleasant life for the year I had in Tokyo.

Q: I noticed some of the people here, and I might mention them to bring back some memories. We had already talked about Paul Caraway. He was the J-3.

A: Yes, he was the J-3.

Q: General Barnes was the Chief of Staff.

A: Barnes was later. Originally it was Rogers, Elmer Rogers, and then Barnes.

- Q: Then the J-1 was Harlan Parks, Air Force; and John Fowler, J-2; Hubbard, Rear Admiral Hubbard, J-4; and Daniel Strickler, J-5.
- A: Dan Strickler was the former Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania. When Eisenhower had the NATO build-up in the very early fifties, Dan took the 28th Division to Germany, then remained in service for a while and came over and was on the staff there. Delightful people.
- Q: I notice the senior member on the Military Armistice Commission was Major General Robert G. Gard, who served with you on the War Crimes Tribunal in the Philippines and at Eighth Army, General I. D. White.
- A: Yes, he had been the commander of the Constabulary when I had the 1st Brigade under him in Germany.
- Q: And Bob Montague had the Corps.
- A: Right, and I succeeded him a year later.
- Q: Well, before we get back to Korea, do you want to talk about your year's duty, some of the aspects of your position in the Far East Command? I have very little information, by the way. In fact, I have no information in reference to your job in the Far East Command. I've picked it up when you went to I Corps. Would you like to talk a bit about the year on the Staff? What was Tokyo like? Did you get involved in intelligence again?
- A: Yes. Once you are in it you can't keep out of it very much. It is stimulating too. Having had the 1st Cavalry Division on Hokkaido, I was fairly acquainted with -- I say fairly well; at least I had been exposed to -- the Japanese for a year on Hokkaido. As I told you in the beginning, the Japanese Self Defense Force, up to the strength of two divisions and a corps headquarters, was organized on Hokkaido, feeling, I guess, that there would be less resistance to it there than there would have been down on Honshu. Consequently, the military men I had known before, or at least those who were given military rank, had come from the Japanese National Police. Many of them were on important jobs in Tokyo. For instance, this is where I extended my friendship with General Keizo Hayashi, who was Chief of the Japanese Joint Staff for many years -- I've forgotten how many, maybe ten. I'm

not sure it is not on this desk, but I'm just thinking of an ashtray that he gave me, for instance, which symbolized the first joint problem executed at the theater level by the Japanese forces and ours in 1956. By direction of General Lemnitzer, I was the American in charge and General Hayashi was running it for the Japanese. It was very successful and very satisfying that this could happen so few years after the war, really almost ten. It was quite amazing because of the terrific enmity that had existed between our forces and their people.

Q: Maybe we should talk about that for a minute, General. Everyone in the last several months has said that we have to consider Japan as the power in the Pacific. We know that it has the third largest GNP and that by the year 2000 it is going to surpass us, whatever that means. I question whether we should nurture Japan to really become the power in the Pacific. What is your feeling?

A: Well, I just have one question about that. If you don't, then who do you support? Japan has the same vulnerabilities in many respects that the British Empire had; in other words, it is an island that is far from self-sustaining. Again it is based on self-interest, which is trade. Who do they trade with? They can trade with the Philippines and Southeast Asia. On certain terms, eventually they can trade with China, or they can trade with Russia and the United States, of course, which is what they are doing. But they are doing it to the point where we are trying to put roadblocks against Japanese products coming in, whether steel or leather or shoes or electronics. The Japanese are in quite a spot. Japan is also, for all intents and purposes today, dependent on Middle East oil. It is quite obvious if the Russians got control of Middle East oil what could happen to the Japanese because of the Russian power to turn off the spigot or turn it on and control the Japanese economy. It would create very serious problems for Japan. On the other hand, Japan's only hope of making an inroad, whether it is from trade or other reasons or purposes, on the mainland is to stay on our side with certainly the Russians being their opponent. And perhaps the Chinese, although their trade with the Chinese is more likely than with the Russians. There is a new aspect to this thing, though, that did not exist before, and that is the Republic of Korea. Because whoever is going to have

access to the Manchurian mainland has got to have access practically through Korea, unless you would envision going straight into Vladivostok or something of the sort. Vladivostok is not Manchurian. Manchuria is, or was, Chinese territory. There are some real hurdles here -- some real roadblocks -- and I don't know which way to go. But I do know one thing; that is, it doesn't look to me that there can be any great military-industrial power in the Western Pacific unless it is Japan, over a long period of time.

This was true when I was there, when General Lemnitzer was in command, and it is still true. They are not carrying their share of the burden as far as defense is concerned. Even with their tremendous growth in GNP I would guess that even today they're probably not putting more than one percent into their own defense. In our day it was less than one percent, and it was a matter of constant pressure during that time to get the Japanese to up the amount of GNP that they were putting into their defense. I haven't had reason to check, but it is still very small. Of course, every time that we try to do anything about this, old Article Nine of the Constitution -- which was insisted upon by General MacArthur -- raises its ugly head and the dissident groups -- the minority in Japan, and the majority as well -- yell about it. The fact is that Japan has had a very hard time rearming even for its own defense.

Q: I see two more problems in the Pacific. One is the obvious reduction of U. S. forces in South Korea; we have already announced one division, and we probably are going to see more. Also, I think that we are aware now that in the Straits of Malacca there really are great beds of oil. The potential for oil, which certainly seems to be a significant strategic factor for the future, could play itself against the Middle East.

A: That is what they were trying to do before, of course.

Q: Yes. My point is that I think it would be extremely dangerous in the long run if the United States lost its presence in that part of the world.

A: Well, I do too. I thoroughly agree with you.

Q: I hope that as the years go by we don't place too much importance in Europe.

A: Yes. Of course, Japan's other hope right now is to expand the trade she has with the United States -- meaning Alaska -- in the way of timber and fisheries. There is no question what they do when they get into an area and what their fishing does, and third is oil from Alaska which has its strategic aspects.

Q: Well, Sir, I think that we had better get back to our role in the Far East Command.

A: Well, I was working with the Japanese quite a bit because of past contacts and because of the nature of my job. In Caraway I had a very able planner. We also had much to do in connection with Okinawa. Okinawa was a big problem in those days, because of the High Commissioner and the Rights that are coming up now. We recognized a residual sovereignty for Japan there, which may or may not have been a mistake, but whatever it is it has been done. This was constantly plaguing us to improve the situation as far as the Ryukyans (Okinawans) were concerned on Okinawa and also to keep in balance the demands being made on the Japanese, by the Japanese, for the return of their sovereignty and control of the islands. One of the pleasant things I did was when I was selected to go down to double-ten day on Taiwan for the Chinese. This is the 10th day of the 10th month of each year. This goes back to free China in 1911 and Sun Yat-sen. During the years that I was in the Far East, 1955, 1956, 1957, I was selected to be the U. S. representative on Taiwan. I had always had excellent relations with the Chinese and this was a satisfying little thing, not too important.

I went over to Korea, of course, and I received an even higher decoration from President Rhee this time. I had known him during the war, and it was a friendship that extended not only now but all through his life. He was a great man. He may have been getting senile and old as age went on, but you couldn't take away the fact that he literally was the father of that country in modern times.

Q: Let me jump you back to Formosa for a moment. We are going to be pushed out of Okinawa; I think right now we can see Kadina Air Base dwindling away as the years

go by. What do you consider the political-military aspects of increasing our presence in Formosa?

A: Well, it certainly is an anchor there in the Far East. When you think of that term Far East, it is interesting to note that it isn't Far East at all; it's the Western Pacific we should really speak of, or Eastern Asia, or Southeastern Asia. But, of course, it goes back to the time when the world revolved around London, and so it became the Near East, the Middle East, and the Far East. But the terms keep being used and we all know what we are talking about all right. Formosa is certainly a most important anchor there and it may continue to be, considering the difficulties we have had in the Philippines, to whom we've given everything and get goddamn little in return. It may be that we should still stick by that anchor. Of course, there are a group of people here who think that we should go for Red China and throw Chiang Kai-shek overboard. Well, he has his limitations and so does everybody else. The strategic value of Formosa increases as we lose our hold in Japan or Okinawa. I think it becomes critical for our future together with the Marianas and Guam as stepping-stones.

Chiang has finally gotten to the point where I think that the native Taiwanese are able to reach at least the rank of captain, and this may have gone up again since I last checked on it. In the early days this was impossible, as you know; they kept them down where they couldn't reach officer rank, but I think that is ironing out to a degree. Then there is bound to be intermarriage and other factors because actually they are the same people basically. I think Formosa becomes of greater importance than ever before with the dissidence that exists in the Philippines and the growing loss of power that we have in Okinawa and Japan.

The Military Aid Program was a very important program with respect to the Koreans. This was a matter which, while the recommendation came out of Korea, had to be settled in our Headquarters in the Far East and United Nations Command. Of course, it was during that year also -- in other words, during the spring of 1956 -- that the question came up about elimination of the Far East Command. I was one of the principal negotiators together with Admiral Stump's Chief of Staff in Hawaii, Admiral George Anderson. He became Chief of

Naval Operations and later Ambassador to Portugal. They didn't reappoint him, however, and were unhappy because he stood up against some of McNamara's foolishness. These conversations were intricate and, of course, they brought in service rivalries.

The Navy was bound to dominate the whole thing, and it did get to a point where a Supreme Commander was important. I suppose you say, well, we (the Army) had one in Europe so the Navy had to have the one in the Pacific and the Air Force was given the Supreme Command in Alaska. These are not too unrealistic and it is alright; it works out. I think these things have done a lot in the field to bring the services together. I have always found that the closer you get to where the problems are -- where the fighting is -- the people work better together than they do on the high staffs where everyone is seeking power.

As I said, the relationships with the Japanese Self Defense Forces were certainly interesting and important. This exercise that I talked about was called Clover-1. This was a maneuver that was held during the month of September 1956. Immediately after that I was sent by General Lemnitzer to be the American representative on a SEATO operation in Southeast Asia that was being conducted by the British Commander, General Festing, in Singapore. This was quite a delightful experience. The problem involved Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines as the battle area. This was 1956, and, of course, look at what it has since become. It was while I was there in October -- early October -- that I was notified that I was being promoted and would go to Korea immediately to take over the I Corps (Group).

This did come as a surprise. It is one of those things that you hope for, but it did come as a surprise; I had no previous knowledge that it would actually come through.

Q: General, let's talk about SEATO, collective security, multiple relationships which existed at the time in the SEATO consensus, and so forth. These come under great criticism today. Do you feel back then that we were gaining by what we were doing? Let's just look at SEATO. Do you see SEATO then as being an alliance favorable to us, and how do you look at SEATO today?

A: Yes I do, because the British were then a power. They still held Singapore and they were recognized as a power. They had a division of Gurkhas still there in Malay. They had reasonably substantial forces in Hong Kong, at least a reinforced regiment. They were looked on with respect, and I think the fact that SEATO nations -- the United States and Britain, in particular, and Australia -- stood together here and did a whole lot in convincing Thailand, among others, that we would be there to back them up; this was terribly important. I think all of those things had their effect on Burma to the west, and Ne Win, as you know, became a good friend of ours for a period. He had had his ups and downs. I was with General Ne Win; as a matter of fact, I picked him up when he was in the hospital at Rochester. He was in Mayo's and I brought him home from Mayo's. I brought him into Washington and played some golf with him. I had been in Burma when I was G-2, which was just a couple of years before. I know quite a number of people in all of those military forces. I think these things had a very positive value. Even though the British haven't come in and given us any direct help in Southeast Asia, the Australians have and New Zealand has because they could see where their bread is buttered.

I like to bring this up because I think it is a great failure on the part of the government and other people who think that we, in effect, have lost Southeast Asia. We haven't lost Southeast Asia. As a matter of fact, as Foch once said years ago, "The General who fights for the last fifteen minutes wins." I'm not sure but what if we kept fighting, and had done it in a more aggressive and positive way once we decided force was to be used, that this Vietnam mess might be over now. But even if it isn't over, you cannot deny the terrific gains for Australia and New Zealand feeling much more safe. And 110 million people in Indonesia are now back on our side and Malay is on our side. Remember Thailand drops right into Malay there and they could see the whole Peninsula and Singapore going. Now we are welcome back there, with the same man in charge, Lee Yuan Kew; he is still head man, whatever his title is in Singapore. Now we are welcome! These are very positive gains, and I'm amazed that the government itself and the media don't bring them up. One hundred and ten million people is a lot of gain, a hell of a lot of gain, believe me.

- Q: General, let me be specific about Vietnam. You were G-2 during the Geneva Conference, you were in the Far East as . . .
- A: I was in Vietnam during that time, too.
- Q: We were getting interested, obviously. I think the big question remains: why did we make the decision to fight in Vietnam? Maybe this is way off the subject, but I think it is a critical one and it is going to be discussed for years. Was it necessary to fight in Vietnam? Was it necessary to draw the line there, or could we have, as some people like to say today, let them try and if they couldn't have done it alone then just forgotten it? What is your feeling there?
- A: I don't know, but I would say this: that at the time that President Johnson decided to go in there, in 1965, there probably never was a period when I was paying less attention to military problems in any depth. I will admit that I was surprised; I was surprised when I saw we were really going to move in there in a big way. But I didn't know the background, as I say; I hadn't been living in that atmosphere. But I did think then when they started that they would realize that Hanoi and Haiphong were the key to Southeast Asia and not Saigon as far as that area is concerned. Thailand and Burma, that is still another problem to the west. I was quite amazed. I never thought that they would go in there without having made up their minds about the strategy -- since shooting was going to start -- but that they were going in and cut Viet Cong lifelines in key places, Hanoi and Haiphong. Whatever they did to Hanoi, Haiphong seems to be left alone for fear that we might sink a Russian ship.
- Q: High-level personnel have mentioned that people who were involved at the time recognized the fact that we would have limited objectives, but they didn't recognize at the time that we would be limited in our application of power.
- A: That is exactly what I'm saying. In other words, I've never gone for Gavin's idea of having enclaves there and doing nothing else about it and just waiting for them to attack you and throw you out. I never thought we would get ourselves in the position in which they put MacArthur when they wouldn't let him move north of the Yalu; same damn thing. Now here, of course, we

were worried about a third country coming in. North of the Yalu we would still have been against the Chinese; here they were worried about the Russians. If they didn't think that we had the power of deterrence -- worldwide deterrence, real power -- then we should rebuild it today if we haven't got it. If they didn't think we had the power of deterrence then they probably shouldn't have moved as far as they did. And if they did think that we had the power of deterrence, then we should have told the Russians that Haiphong becomes a target in combat and to keep Russian ships clear, period. And they would have kept them clear.

Q: I'm just wondering if a reverse Cuba occurred at that time. This is speculation. I wonder if we weren't told at that time in the event that we took action either in Hanoi or Haiphong that we would then have to be prepared to suffer damage in our own country.

A: Probably not. If we had the deterrence that we should have had in 1965 it wouldn't be true. Now what deterrence we have today is open to question, particularly when you hear Laird and the others. They almost quiver because Jackson had said that they [the Russians] have these new missiles and they say, "Oh no, they are just building a few new silos." Well there is a difference in that estimate; which is true, I don't know. I know what Jackson said, and I feel sure in my own mind from what everybody had said, that we do not have the degree of deterrence today that we had in 1965. Whether we have enough to deter is questionable. What I think the administration was afraid of was, if we did this then, there would be additional problems in Western Europe and we certainly weren't prepared to take on two or three, let's say, conventional-type wars. Or maybe more in Egypt or the Middle East, although the Israelis seem to have given bloody noses enough to the Egyptians so they must have learned something by now.

Q: General, you discussed the fact that you had gone down to this conference in SEATO, and that was when I interrupted.

A: There isn't much more. There were very interesting briefings and discussions as to what contributions we could make, and there were a lot of discussions about problems of air support and the type of planes that could be used there. Of course, in any defense of

what we call Southeast Asia, Thailand became very important because of the nature of the country, its location, and it's willingness to stand firm. They have been a very solid friend at times when they must have doubted our integrity. Thailand came in for an awful lot of discussion, when you think of it, and we since have done something about it in the way of improving routes of communication right up to Vientiane to try and shut the Commies off up north on the Mekong, in other words, Laos to the north. But there was really more play given to Thailand and to the Vietnamese area than there was to the area where we had most of our struggle along the coast and down in the delta.

Q: On the 18th of October, 1956, you were notified that you were getting your third star and that you would take over I Corps in Korea. I'm sure this was an extremely satisfying moment. I would like to get your feelings . . .

A: Well, I felt that there was some degree of vindication -- not completely but to some extent, so that was very satisfying. I liked the idea of going back to Korea and taking a command. It did separate me from my wife again, and she came home and stayed with our children, visited friends, and got an apartment -- all those things that wives have to do. But I was very pleased at getting that corps command. One of the most interesting aspects was that I found myself in command of the corps with two American divisions and the corps troops and the 6th ROK Corps of six divisions. I had a force of about 150,000 men. This gave me a lot of satisfaction and a lot of room for maneuvers, training, and supervision, things that I enjoyed. It was particularly meaningful to me that I had commanded both of my American divisions, the 1st Cavalry and the 7th Infantry; that was really quite unusual.

Q: Well, General, let's talk about your command. I think I should show you these pictures. I think you represent the Patton of Korea.

A: Yes. Well, as I say, it was very satisfying to me. I had a splendid rapport with the Koreans from Rhee down and still consider most of their generals and senior officers as my friends. While I didn't know it then, Brigadier General Park Chung Hee, Chief of Staff of the VI Corps, was to become the President of the country in another three years. It was a satisfying

experience; the Koreans had high morale, they had excellent housekeeping, they set quite a pace. As a matter of fact, the Americans had a hard time keeping up with the Koreans as far as their housekeeping was concerned. The training was active and good; we had many maneuvers and, of course, the Koreans were quite realistic about theirs. I remember when President Diem came up with President Rhee to see the Koreans in maneuvers; he was amazed, particularly in their use of artillery in close support. Just "walking a wave" up a hill in front of them and not in back of them like the Chinese do.

Q: Let me ask you about that particular visit. You had a series of correspondence with Sam Williams, who was over in Vietnam at that time. And you arranged to have Vietnamese officers come and work with your people. I sort of had the idea that Diem's visit was tied in with one of these.

A: It was. They'd have a group of possibly 15 or 18 officers at a time come up. I've forgotten what they spent, but it was like a week or ten days, maybe two weeks. It wasn't enough, but at least they got quite an eye-opener. They would come with a Corps Commander, his staff, and his subordinate divisions. Most of those names then on the rosters are the men that have been leading the forces in South Vietnam.

Many of these people have gone on to higher commands and civilian jobs. General Kim Song On became the Chief of Joint Staff over there, among others. They were fine young officers and the Koreans were young; their generals were in their 30s. I finally got smart myself. I'd go out in a chopper to visit two or three Korean divisions. I'd pull up, particularly if they were in forward positions, and drop in with the chopper, and, of course, the Division Commander would be there to meet me. We would go maybe 400 yards in a jeep and then start climbing. They loved to climb those hills. You could do all that in about an hour or so and then you could go with a jeep to another one. You would get over there and that guy would start you climbing too. I finally got smart and interspersed my stops so that I wasn't climbing one hill after another. It was one thing to keep up with a 30-year-old, which I could do pretty well, but it was another thing to do it four or five times in rapid

succession. I slowed that pace down. But there are a couple points that stand out in my mind here that are interesting.

The Koreans, on motor maintenance, felt that they lost a little face if they really did any work themselves. I ran a school like we had at Holabird; the Ordnance actually ran the school for me, of course. I went out as Corps Commander and gathered all the generals that could be gotten together. There were quite a number between these six divisions and my two and the attached troops. I ran them through a two-day course, not very long, but a two-day course on motors. I made them all put on coveralls. They were quite amazed that a general would get his hands dirty and let a sergeant or a lieutenant tell him how to take a carburetor apart and adjust it. It was a hell of a good lesson for them. They talked about it later, you know; the generals do this and do that. Another time I remember that they were firing a demonstration and I had a group of people -- I'd say they were Americans -- going down the line and a youngster was firing a machine gun, a .30-caliber machine gun. He was getting jams and monkeying around with it, and neither his instructors nor his officers would do anything. I had on a pressed field uniform because I was part of the inspection party. I dropped down beside this soldier and adjusted the head space on his machine gun. Well, these people couldn't believe it -- they couldn't believe that a general officer would get down and do that. But those are the kind of examples that you had to give them.

Then I arranged a pistol match for all general officers, and, God, how these guys got out and practiced! They were shooting up more pistol ammunition; they didn't want to do anything except practice, thinking that practice makes perfect. Well, practice makes better, but it doesn't make a poor shot perfect. I didn't have time to do that. I used to be a pretty good shot . . . but anyhow we went out there and again we all fired and a Korean won it. I don't know whether they expected me, just because I was Commanding General, to win it or not. I had won plenty of matches, but I didn't win that one. Well, they thought this was great, you know, that they could get out and beat the old man pistol shooting. All these things were good and needed. They had that Oriental opinion of what face is and they didn't want to dirty their hands. They think that they can

command and control from a distance with a certain degree of aloofness, and we know better than that. Those were very satisfying things to get across to them. I'm sure other American generals have done this, too, because it is our way of doing things. We improved the battle positions, which hadn't been tinkered with for a long time up on the Kansas line. I accented the use of communications; I insisted that I be able to keep in touch with my commanders and they keep in touch with me, and I was rather merciless if they couldn't keep in touch. I built automatic relay stations up on the tops of high peaks so, whether they had line of sight or not, they could get through. They finally learned that they could get through.

I improved the use of artillery to a considerable extent, and I particularly accented battlefield illumination. That was a weakness in American forces always, and I think it is a weakness today. I say that for this reason: there is a tendency to depend upon the artillery illuminating round -- whether it is from an 82 mortar, a 105, a 155, or what have you -- as providing battlefield illumination. It does in a way, but it is often unsatisfactory because, while it may show you something for the half a minute or the minute that it lasts, when it is over you are worse off than you were before. Since the Chinese fight at night they hate battlefield illumination, not only because it shows them up but because again they lose their night eyes and can't continue effectively. I always accented to a great extent the same damn thing that I had done in combat, and that is take any kind of plane the Army has and put illuminating flares up there that have 2.5 to 3 minutes burning time. I've forgotten how many million candle power they had, but maybe 800 or 1,200 thousand and really get sustained light over the battlefield. That is what I'm talking about when I say battlefield illumination. I mean sustained at least until the period of danger has elapsed.

I have seen it where I have been able to keep light over the battlefield with just small planes at my own disposal as long as I had the flares for two or three hours at a time. That was another thing that I accented -- night action; I was always on that. I was also emphasizing the condition of messes, construction and, of course, field exercises; I enjoyed those and the men did too. I remember one field exercise we had -- I think the January before I left. I don't believe

the temperature ever got over 20 degrees, in other words, always below freezing. The tendency had been, and I did it myself in my earlier maneuvers, to have a withdrawal action, you know, from the prepared positions, leaving a minimum screen and moving the rest of them back. Well, these were good, but I finally said to myself, why in hell do we always have a withdrawal action? I'm going to withdraw first, and then we are going to attack and go back to our forward positions for psychological reasons. I remember the last day we had an attack at one of the principal strongholds just north of the Han Tan River. We had a big reviewing stand there and, of course, President Rhee and General Decker, who was then in command, came up on this final day of the attack. We had advanced north for four or five days and were practically back in our original battle positions when we put on this demonstration of a battalion attacking a high point. Old President Rhee was always testing me out as a Corps Commander and asked whether I would attack or not. Well, of course, he doesn't understand the American mentality if he thinks a Corps Commander is going to launch an attack without proper orders and preparation because of all the things that could happen between the time the order was given and H-hour. Perhaps nothing happened. Well, anyhow, he was sitting there; he had a hibachi and he was warming his hands. It was colder than hell, and we were watching this battalion attack up this slope with the artillery fire in front. Finally they got to the objective and there was the red flare. They had gotten their objective, and had done it well. Suddenly on the slope behind them from out of the ground where it had been rolled up, about four or six men, who had stayed behind dug this big sign out of a trench and put it into prepared holes. That sign that was so big, all in Korean, that it could be read from our reviewing stand which was probably at least 600 yards from it. Of course, I didn't know what it said in Korean so I said to President Rhee, "Mr. President, what does that sign say?" He says, "General, sign say, 'Let us go North'." And he gets up and he grabs Decker and myself by the hands and said, "Let us go now!" He was ready.

Q: You know, that is rather interesting because we hear now about General Thieu in Vietnam talking about going North. How did you politely, politically, and tactfully play that down?

A: Well, you just have to give the old man an offhand answer that you hope the situation some day will permit this; you just pass it off. He knows you can't do it, of course, but he is always pushing.

Q: I wonder if Thieu knows if he can or can't do it. Thieu has got now probably the strongest army going over there.

A: Well, this is alright, except he knows who controls his logistics. This is where we had him. This is where they were always limited as to the amount of ammunition they could directly have under their control and things of this sort, you know, fuel and ammo. They learned enough to know they couldn't move without their logistic tail being well supported.

We did a great deal for the civilian people in the area. As a matter of fact, I even established clinics where I sent nurses at certain periods of time to try and help, particularly where children were concerned. We built schools for them. We had a pretty good aid program and did a whole lot to help these people. Everything was valuable to them. I remember that we had a contract, for instance, that gave us the equivalent of \$600 a month, for collecting our waste. I don't mean just garbage. I mean things like beer cans which they flattened out and made into walls; not shingles, but walls. Cardboard cartons which our canned foods came in; they flattened those out and it may not sound like much but it is a hell of a lot better than a mud floor in your house. They could make use of everything. Trucks would disappear, and the next thing you know a bus would appear and the whole sides of that bus would be from oil drums flattened out; now this is quite a job. These fellows are ingenious; they could do all sorts of things and, of course, some of them did things that weren't too honest. I mean they had Oriental trickery; or to put it another way, they did things that I guess people feel they can do when they have nothing, and the other fellow has everything.

Did I tell you the story about the naming of Camp Red Cloud? Well, I think this is worth telling. My compound there, the corps headquarters, had always been called Jackson Six, which was our telephone exchange. That seemed to me a rather inadequate name. I told somebody -- my G-1, I guess, or PR officer, whoever it was -- to start digging and find

some people in this corps who got a Congressional Medal of Honor during combat and let's name our compound here, our headquarters, for the most worthy. They came up with several names, and they had a couple of lieutenants. One of them was this Lieutenant Shea that I mentioned, who had just reported to my division and was killed on Pork Chop Hill. Shea was sort of a favorite of mine, because he held the two-mile record at West Point, about 30 seconds faster than I had held it 30 years before. I had a great feeling for Shea and when I went back home had a review and presented the decoration to his mother. Shea was one of the names, and there were two or three other lieutenants. I finally looked this list over and spotted the name of Corporal Mitchell Red Cloud. I thought that was interesting; what did he do? I got out the citation, and Mitchell Red Cloud had done about everything a soldier could do; he charged a bunker and knocked off about 20 of the enemy and finally -- even after he was badly wounded, tossed a grenade in a bunker before he died. So what about Mitchell Red Cloud? Well, Mitchell Red Cloud's mother was the daughter of a chief of the Winnebago Indian Tribe. I said, "Now let's get hold of all the records we can, and we'll put in and get this camp named Camp Red Cloud." I was thinking of the relationship between a native American and a native Asian. We did this, and I had a brass plaque made. I put the brass plaque on a tremendous rock on the more or less flat sloping side in front of I Corps (Group) headquarters, where it is today. We put it in front, right at our flagpole. On Armed Forces Day, 1957, I decided that we had the authority to redesignate and announce it at the Armed Forces Day meeting.

It was a lovely May day; I had all the Diplomatic Corps, President Rhee and his wife, Ambassador Dowling and his wife, General Decker, I believe, or White -- all the Americans. We had about 150 people that were there for the ceremony and then for lunch at my club, which I had built or greatly extended across the street. They were sitting there. General Lemnitzer came over; he was always great because my wife had remained in Tokyo, so he brought her over. She was sitting in the front row of seats next to Mrs. Rhee. The President was standing there on one side of this curtain. I was going to say something about Camp Red Cloud, draw the curtain, and expose this plaque, and then the President was to make some remarks. This all happened; we pulled the cord and it worked, fortun-

ately, and the brass plaque was there, so I read what the brass plaque said. Then I said, "How wonderful it is that an American, a native American, an Indian whose ancestors lost their country to us, came over here to fight for the freedom of the native men of Asia." I went on and built this one up a little bit, and emphasized that he gave his life for the freedom of Asian people. I then turned it over to President Rhee. Well, he said excitedly what a great thing this was. Mrs. Rhee was getting itchier by the moment, because she knew that he frequently went off on tangents, and my wife was keeping her calm, saying, "Never mind, everything is going to be alright."

The President launched into this one. He said, "Yes, American Indians are exactly like Asian people. I think American Indians came from Asia." But then he said, "Why is it that all the time you have American movies over here, you show soldiers and cowboys killing American Indians? Asian people don't like to see white men killing American Indians." Then he said, "Never again will a motion picture be shown in Korea that has the American soldiers or cowboys killing American Indians." And they never have, but this doesn't mean that our compounds cannot. There was quite a "to-do," Mrs. Rhee was so upset. I said, "This is nothing. What he said is true, but this happened more than a hundred years ago." Of course, to them this could be happening today. The dates aren't shown frequently, and they think this is still going on out in the West. It is bad psychology.

Before I left there to come back to the United States at the end of that year, the end of 1957, I wrote back to G-2 and I said, "Listen, you have got to go out and get me two of the finest pictures, portraits, grand portraits of American Indian chiefs that you can get for me to present to President Rhee." Mrs. Trudeau and I were invited there for dinner at Chung Mu Dae, now the Blue House, with President and Mrs. Rhee. He presented me with another Korean decoration and then I said, "Your Excellency (or Mr. President), I have a presentation I would like to make to you." He said, "Certainly." So we went into the next room. The portraits were on the wall. I had this all planned with his people bringing him in and then we were going to flip the covers back. I said, "Mr. President, you remember the day we named the I Corps Headquarters Camp Red Cloud for Mitchell Red Cloud, the American Indian who came to fight for your freedom in Asia?"

He said, "Oh, yes, I remember". "Well," I said, "I want to show you, I want to present to you a pair of portraits of other famous American Indians who are high in our esteem in our country also." I've forgotten which ones they were, but I presented them to him; he thought it was tremendous. Goddamn it, they looked more like him than he did himself, if he had had a headdress on. It was terrific!

Well, that is about it. We accented athletics, we accented recreation. My troops of the United Nations Command shrank to almost nothing. I had a Thai company there, and it was a good little company, and they used to put on some very interesting entertainment. They had an orchestra with different kinds of wind instruments, bamboos; it was terrific. I also had a Turkish brigade, and about the time I left there this was going to be cut back. They rotated them on a yearly basis and it was unfortunate that they filled them with green men rather than with professionals. They came over and got good training, but then when they got back, they disbanded instead of utilizing this as an advanced training ground for their regular officers and men. They didn't do as good a job as the Koreans. They didn't have the standards of either personal appearance or of taking care of their equipment but I'm sure if there had been a battle, these guys would have been right in there doing it well. I had the British at first, the Sussex and Essex Battalion, but they were pulled out shortly and went to Gibraltar. I think down at headquarters, down at Far East United Nation Headquarters, they had a few representatives, sort of a consolidated color guard of three or four people from each of several countries, including the Ethiopians, but they didn't contribute anything to my strength. We used to have a lot of get-togethers, a lot of good athletics and recreation.

Of course, we had the usual visits from prominent people from all sources. I was there two Christmases, 1956 and 1957. The Cardinal came over; Cardinal Spellman came over on both occasions. Bob Hope was there on one; I think the other one he had been in Europe. Bob, as usual, always had a wonderful show, but he did give me a problem on this particular one. His last show had been in Okinawa and his people hadn't really estimated the severity of the weather conditions in Korea. When they went into their electronic hook-up just before the show, everything was being rushed, and things didn't work. He got

hours behind in his program, and the Cardinal was gracious enough to change his schedule of Masses and visits quite a bit to help Hope out. But I think Bob got a little mad at me. All of our Christmas dinners were delayed throughout the whole corps because of his tardiness, and finally it got so bad that if I was going to make the rounds to the dinners I had to get up and leave one of his presentations up at the 7th Division. I think he was quite annoyed that I had to do that. However, we played golf last summer and he didn't bring it up, so maybe he has forgotten that.

Q: You didn't mention this -- and I thought you would -- that you didn't like the name I (Eye) Corps; that you changed it.

A: Well, it isn't "I" Corps. It is a roman numeral because Corps are numbered with roman numerals. If the Roman four (IV) was there, you wouldn't think of calling it anything else besides four, and you can't improve on being first. I like to be first in anything I do, and I wanted this Corps to feel it was first. This is why I insisted on calling it First Corps, not "Eye" Corps. That's right. I told them I wanted them to be first.

Q: Your 6th ROK Corps Commander, Paik Sun-Yup, Pepper Paik, you called him . . . The feeling I got in talking to Jim was that the President would visit in your area mainly because you were there; in other words, he liked to come just to be with you; that sort of association was there.

A: That's right. Yes, I was very fond of him. The old man was a real friend.

Q: One of the things that you did talk about a lot to him was your whole philosophy on the Cavalry spirit and the Patton spirit and soldierly skill. I'm not going to ask you to talk about that because, in the six times that we've been together, it comes out all the time. I think it is there; it doesn't need to be discussed specifically. He told me of your areas of interest in the Middle East, Pakistan, and India. He also mentioned Sergeant Sullins, who was your orderly for years. You mentioned that he is still living.

A: Oh yes, he is still on active duty; he is in Panama. I'd hoped that he was going to retire and come with me and take care of some of my needs. I never got him

out of the service yet. I haven't really pushed him. Sullins is married to a Japanese girl, a very nice Japanese girl. She is a lovely little girl. They have three children, three boys, and Sullins frankly doesn't want to get mixed up in this racial mess that exists here in this country; furthermore, as I say, he is married to this Japanese girl. They've bought themselves a piece of property in Hawaii and he intends to retire in Hawaii. I probably will never have him with me. But he was with me for many years -- I've forgotten, 12 or more years. I went and raised him from a young private to at least a sergeant first class.

Q: Well, I did mention this because Jim did spend an hour or so with me.

A: I'm sorry I haven't seen that chap more, but time catches up with you so much. I think he is down at Belvoir.

Q: Yes, he's down at Belvoir. I thought that when I first started to do research on you that it would be necessary to get around and talk to all these people. It really wasn't, because I find that your files are complete enough where I know what you are writing to people, and this gives one insights. Plus the fact that you've had our conversations so well-organized; this made my job very easy.

General, what happened near the end of your tour? I find it intriguing that you've had such a diversified career and all of a sudden you are heading for Research and Development. I know you were interested early in your career in vast developments. Normally, however, I think it is a man who devoted his entire life to Research and Development efforts that gets into it. At least recently it has been that way. General Betts is an example; I don't think he has done anything but that. I know that there was the Gavin situation that occurred. I'd like you to address your last days here, where you start getting the idea that you might be coming back and anything else you want to talk about as far as your wind-up in Korea.

A: Well, of course, I had been reading about Gavin's problems and that they were upset because he said that nuclear attack could result in 70 million dead and all that. Of course, somebody over in the Pentagon said last week 100 million dead and it didn't shake

anybody. But it did in Gavin's days, and I suspect there were other problems involved there and I don't know about them. In any event, I received a communication, probably about Christmas time because I knew that nobody was going to hold my command for more than 16 months and taking over in October 1956, my 16 months was going to run out the end of January or in February 1958. So when Christmas came, I knew that I had orders coming up shortly.

Interestingly, thinking of the Cardinal again, he was a great little man and, of course, I'm Catholic, so I'm probably a little biased in his favor, but I want to tell you this one and then remind me to get back in the trend of things. He was there for Christmas Eve again, so we fixed up our gymnasium, which had practically no heat. We were just kidding ourselves but we had a couple of blowers there, and it was like a wartime gym, very temporary type. In any event, it was the only place that we had that was going to be big enough to hold the men that wanted to go to Midnight Mass and hear the Cardinal. I had my chaplain and his assistant fix the place up and I hadn't seen it that night before we went there. I'd had the Cardinal over before (1956) and we'd been talking at dinner. He got a little rest for two or three hours before Midnight Mass. When we went to the chapel there was a lot of snow on the ground, it was very cold and it was a matter of 300 yards, so I got him in a car and got him down there. I went in and, of course, he went into a room and put on his vestments. Well, when I got into the gymnasium and sat down on one of the front pews I saw what had happened to the altar and I personally got a great kick out of it, so I'll tell you what it was. The Cardinal came out to start Mass, he gets around in front as priests do when they are facing the altar then, you know, instead of the congregation. The altar was right under the basketball basket and as the Cardinal joined his hands and started to say the Mass he looked up, as Cardinals or priests frequently do, to heaven for guidance and what he saw was the statue of the Blessed Virgin Mary sitting in the basket. Well I was sitting not too far behind him. He started to giggle. He just giggled for a minute; I'm sure he did if you were looking him in the face, because he spoke of it afterward. It certainly took him by surprise, and he got a tremendous kick out of it. He said, "Well, at least She was looking down on me."

Q: General, we are going to bounce back to Korea for a minute. I found the special edition of the Bullseye, which is the farewell to General Trudeau.

I will say this; your farewell speech is the sort of battle cry that you carried forward with you. As you were talking with these people, you said, "There can be no thought of relaxation, no half-hearted efforts on the part of any individual, since the lives of his nation and his comrades as well as himself are at stake once the battle begins. As Marshal Foch once said, 'the side that fights the last 15 minutes wins the battle.'" This is your remark at your I Corps farewell ceremony on the 3d of February, 1958.

A: There is no date on this; this was prepared before that review, I think. I'll bet this is the week before. I'll tell you why. My departure was the first time we were able to show the Honest John and the 280mm gun battalions with their atomic weapons. I had been organizing that for months before. Have you got that somewhere?

Q: Is that the 280s? There is your Honest John sitting there.

A: You bet your life it is. Yes Sir, that is the day after. You see, that was a special edition the week before. That's right; that's the atomic cannon and Honest John. That is the first time they were ever shown in Korea; they had just gotten in. We had been preparing for that for several months. I knew they were coming, of course, and I was pushing to get them there before I left. As a matter of fact, I would like to tell you the story on the 280 cannon. We knew this was coming and, of course, we had a great problem getting our road system so we knew where it could go. There were many bridges, and some weren't capable of taking what totalled to a 70-ton load, I guess. So I took the biggest tank retriever I could get and put an engineer on it and a couple of other people, loaded it with sand up to the limit, and then we gave them a chart. I guess my engineer officer in charge of roads was the one doing it. I gave him a chart and told him to go from point A to point B or from point B to point X and back to Q and over to N and all that, you know, checking this road map for bridges. Well, this went on for three or four days with just the sergeant driving it with a jeep leading him, you see. Finally it broke down on some bridge and the officer came up

to him. Nothing had been said before; he had just been told where to go. The officer came up to him and the soldier said to him, "Lieutenant, can I ask you a question?" And the lieutenant said, "Sure soldier, go ahead." And he said, "Does any Goddamn bastard know where I'm supposed to deliver this load of sand?"

Well, anyhow, back to the end of the year. I got a message that I would be ordered back shortly after the first of the year to be the Chief of Research and Development. The Chief of Staff was my old friend, and greatly admired friend, General Lemnitzer. I guess I probably wrote a note to him and I said it would be a great honor but I was afraid, after what happened to me when I was G-2, that the red flag was up and that there were instructions that I was not to be brought back to the Washington area. Whereupon I got a letter from him saying not to worry about what anybody told me, that I was coming back to be Chief of R&D of the Army. It was very satisfying to know that I had that kind of gung-ho support from your Chief of Staff. And that is what did happen. I got orders and I left the corps at the very end of January. They wanted me back early for an overlap.

CHAPTER XVII I

Pentagon IV

A: When the time came to leave Korea about the 2d or 3d of February 1958, I went to Japan for a couple of days and made a presentation to the Japanese-American Chamber of Commerce. I also met with some Japanese scientists who had learned I was going back as the Army Chief of Research and Development.

On January 31st, of course, our first Explorer missile had been launched successfully into orbit and excitement was high. This was a great landmark after the Russians with their Sputnik 1 had beaten us by three or four months. This need never have occurred. The Army had the capability to do this job, and had had it for some time, but they were not permitted to do it; perhaps because nobody thought they could do it or there is always the other case where somebody doesn't want to see something done. I lived with that later.

I rushed back, spending only a couple nice days in Hawaii, where I could have thawed out for a week or two, and would have taken some leave if I could have, but Washington said, "No, you must get right back." I got right back and I reported in and then took some leave. I went down to Sea Island with my wife where we froze for a week or ten days instead of being in Hawaii where I could have been in the warmth and sunshine. There wasn't that kind of a rush. Gavin wasn't going out until the 31st of March, and there was no use for the two of us sitting there facing each other. This business of long overlap of senior people in responsible positions is for the birds. I took some leave and then I came aboard as a deputy. I used a good share of the month of March just getting around to various establishments, various companies.

I visited the three motor companies. I remember Detroit particularly; I spent over a week there. This always reminds me of a little story. They gave detailed briefings and some nice entertaining. It was very worthwhile getting briefed on their R&D concepts and their approach to business with the Army. One company gave me a luncheon and the Chairman of the Board was there and his top people. One of his people said to me, "General, we know you are just back from Korea and if you wouldn't misunderstand our motive, we'd love to have our distributor turn over a so-and-

building Nike Ajax, he finally overrode this opposition with a statement that should still be borne in mind today: "There is a time when research must cease and something put into production and then you learn by doing and proving that you are right to that point." This is a fair statement and it has worked well where it has been applied. After Nike Ajax had succeeded, the Army was allowed to go for Nike Hercules.

This was the next step, to knock down aircraft even with supersonic speeds up to heights of say 100,000 feet, although actually it probably can do more as it has been developed. Having seen this and knowing the threat now that was coming from missiles and satellites in orbit, it became quite apparent that something should be looked at here. While a number of systems were suggested then, and have been suggested since by the other services in particular, Nike Zeus was approved for research and development on April 1st, 1958, the day that I assumed the responsibility of Chief of Army R&D.

I've ridden herd on that one since we both started off together. I take no credit for having gotten it adopted as it was adopted during March while I was still in an acting or deputy stage. But I've followed it like a hawk since then, and I don't mean the kind of hawk that is trying to make war. I was following to see that it became a reality. To my knowledge even today, they keep changing the name. They changed it from Zeus to what they call it today. They call it Safeguard now, Nike X, and they've had a lot of names, but it is still the Nike system, advanced by having reached certain phase lines before and then someone having the guts to put them into production and go on to the next stage. We've got this capability of knocking down satellites if we will build it. If we don't build it that is something else; that is where we are today -- naked as a jaybird. In any event, I was convinced of the capability of a missile knocking down another missile, particularly when the satellite is not maneuverable, when it is following a constant path. To me that is like a vehicle coming down a straight road; if you can intercept it something happens and there is nothing they can do about it. Now when we get to maneuverable satellites (we may be there; we are, I think) the question is somewhat changed, yet the relative speeds are such that you can still bring the missile by radar to hit a maneuverable target in space.

In that connection I tried to set up a program for firing one missile against another at White Sands and this was frowned on, again by certain people who didn't think it could be done and by others who didn't want us to prove that it could be done. But we did fire such a missile. What we did was fire a Nike Hercules against one of the old WAC Corporals. I've forgotten the date, it was 1959 or 1960. I've got a fragment from it in a piece of plastic downstairs. What happened was, Hercules knocked the WAC Corporal out of the sky, and we repeated that on several occasions. Some people said, "Of course, you knew it was coming." Yes, we knew it was coming and we knew from about where it was coming although the angle at which they fired with respect to the intercepting weapon, the Nike, was changed several times from the firing point. But the point I'm making is this: since this was a short-range missile (the WAC Corporal), its time of flight was limited and that part of its time of flight, where it was observable from line of sight in order to pick it up and track it by radar, was only 17 seconds, whereas the minimum estimated time for acquiring an incoming satellite is up to 30 seconds. We were really accomplishing something with less time than would normally be available, assuming everybody's equally on alert at the time of launch. At that time, as interested as we were in space, it was quite evident that we weren't the only people there. The Air Force had its interest, as I said, in Thor and, of course, NASA was being brought to life.

I wrote a paper which was staffed and which I presented to Congress in this connection because I felt that the Army did have a real place in space, at least to the degree of having missiles of short or longer ranges. I also recognized that, above all, there was a military requirement in space which was anathema to the scientist and also to the Eisenhower administration. There seemed to be a feeling that if we didn't admit that there was a military potential for missiles and satellites in space the Russians wouldn't find it out, which is so naive that it isn't even worth considering. Nevertheless it did have a tremendous influence on American politics. My recommendation was as follows, and I was permitted to give it to the Congress: First, let the Army continue since it has the capability and we had a good portion of the men who had been brought over as scientists from Germany under the old "paper clip" program; they had really done the scientific development on much of what we had accomplished. Secondly, if they wouldn't

give it to the Army, have a Defense Space Agency that would take over all Defense space effort. Thirdly, if they wouldn't do that, then give it to the Air Force. When I said this before the Congressional Committee on Science and Astronautics, they couldn't believe it; they couldn't believe it. The senior Republican member on the committee, then as now, was Congressman Jim Fulton from Pittsburgh. That was before I had gone to Pittsburgh for Gulf Oil, so I was just getting acquainted with him. He is a very erudite and astute man and when I said, "Give it to the Air Force," he said, "Do you mean to tell me the Army would give something to the Air Force?" And I said, "Yes, in the interest of national defense. If you won't put it at Defense Department level, then give it to the Air Force. Furthermore, I don't want to see the Air Force being only the 'silent silo sitters of the 70s'," and that is where that famous term arose. I got some dark glances from certain people in the Pentagon on that one. Most of my Air Force friends thought it was a pretty good statement. I also got some wonderful cartoons showing airmen who were lifting the cover up on their silo, sticking their heads out and saying, "How about my flight pay?" and things of that sort.

In any event, you know what happened. It was given to NASA so the Army had to turn over most of what we had built down at Huntsville. Now 10 years later, almost 12 years later, there is at least some degree of public admission that there may be a military aspect to space, so we'll see what happens.

The importance of technical intelligence came upon me full blast at that time, and of course, as I told you, it had only been really three years, three to four years earlier when I was G-2, that I had strengthened technical intelligence and the Army's collection ability through their attache system. I continued to work closely with G-2 with a view of getting some men who understood what it was all about in attache jobs when they left R&D. Even from an overt position of an attache they could get a sensing, either directly or through third country information, of what was going on in whatever area they were stationed in the world. Another thing I did was to try to interest industry in building better conventional weapons. The success in space was getting the Army to think so much about space -- and this was a limiting factor in my mind -- that there was a tendency to disregard conventional weapons. I was opposed to that

thinking. I mentioned that in Sweden one of our magazines had come out years earlier and said that we'll win this with the big bomb -- you know, all-out nuclear power -- but they were concerned about their ground forces being degraded. It was beginning to dawn on people that maybe this wasn't going to be all-out nuclear war or nothing, that maybe there was going to be real deterrence and, therefore, the relative strength of conventional forces in the face of the Russian aggressive attitudes could be very, very important. Years before that, when I was at the War College and out at one of the early shots in the Pacific, Gavin was there also. At that time he was, I think, the head of WESEG; I was Deputy Commandant of the War College. We talked a great deal with members of the Atomic Energy Commission about the fact that this was not going to be all-out nuclear war; in other words, that no ground power was going to be needed. We were trying to interest them, you see, in development of tactical nuclear weapons through the AEC, for tactical support of ground forces; of course, after years this came about. It was very interesting because the minute that we'd get with one of the influential people in the AEC, people who were inclined in this direction, we immediately found that the chap who had joined us for a drink was a certain general in the Air Force. His job out there was to see that the Army didn't convince the AEC that there was a ground role for nuclear weapons. I have to say this frankly because it did exist. We knew the man well.

In any event, now it became my job to push for the development of ground weapons to improve our ability to use them in conventional artillery or through missile systems that could be developed for tactical employment. I mentioned that after I left Korea we did have the capability of the Honest John and 280mm cannon, but neither of them was considered the long-range solution to the problem.

We were then faced with coming up with Pershing. Pershing created some interesting problems in that the Army hadn't fully come to believe in the systems approach and project managers were not here then. The Ordnance Corps prided itself on executing a contract but frequently had two or more major sub-contractors over whom nobody really exercised day-to-day coordinating authority. This came to light more with the Sergeant missile. The Sergeant missile was developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, who had a

bunch of scientists who helped develop Redstone and Jupiter and how to get into space, a great bunch of men under Dr. Bill Pickering. Dr. Pickering tied in with Cal Tech. They had the design of the Sergeant system, but the Sperry people, or Sperry-Rand I guess it was, had taken over a factory in Salt Lake City and were going to build it. But the difference in concept between the scientist developing something and having it engineered to a point where it lent itself, with the greatest economy and efficiency, to mass production were two different tasks. The reason this lack of coordination appeared was because nobody was exercising enough coordination at the top. They were managing JPL from Ordnance at Huntsville, and they were managing a follow-on production contract with Sperry from the Office of the Chief of Ordnance. The interface was weak because there was nobody there day by day to get these two together and rap their heads, you know. We learned a lot about going more strongly towards "systems engineering" then, and soon that brought in the concepts of value analysis and value engineering which we applied. We learned a lot about that through General Electric, who had pushed for these concepts, and it was also applied vigorously by Martin-Marietta, who were building the Pershing, with the result that we simplified the construction and even changed the materials in it, probably with a savings of \$3 or \$4 million in the production of that particular missile.

Now to get back to industry. To industry this was going to be a war that was going to be fought by SAC and eventually missiles; in other words, the Army didn't amount to a hell of a lot. We bought some trucks; we bought a little of this and a little of that, but our budget was down. I felt that the education of industry, as far as I could do it, about the Army's problems was important. I took the Fortune list of 500 industries and picked out about 25 of those industries -- not necessarily the first 25, but 25 well up on the list of big industries -- and arranged through my Technical Liaison Office, which was for the purpose of making industrial contacts among other things, to go and make presentations to industry. I would take a team out and usually schedule four presentations other than my own. My remarks discussed three aspects of the Army's problem: fire power, mobility, and communications. Simple enough. If you've got those three licked and train an Army, you have got something moving. The fourth, of course, was basic research.

Basic research, when I arrived in the Army, was to some degree -- well, I shouldn't say that. It was non-existent at Army levels but it did exist in all of the Technical Services to some degree. Well, that "some degree" also included some degree of unnecessary duplication. It is so hard to define a new scientific problem that you can have the same problem under two different titles and different nomenclatures. Two men can be doing the same work, but doing it for two different parties, both of whom think they are getting a separate answer to two problems. To solve that, what I did was to take over the Ordnance Research Office set up at Duke University, take it away from Ordnance and establish it at Army level, then take money away from all services and make that the Army Research Office, in Durham, North Carolina. Well, the services howled bloody murder. I only took a couple million away from them the first year, but then we began taking more away. But they really couldn't gripe too much. Projects came in and, if it was work that was going on somewhere, it got a good screening by the Army Research Council -- I mean civilians as well as Army -- and then it was allocated back to the appropriate service, probably the one that had initiated it, with authorization of certain funds to go ahead with research. That is the way we moved a lot of our basic research and this, of course, was one of the presentations that we made to industry, trying to make it relevant to whatever that industry was; in other words it was different for General Dynamics than for General Motors, as an example. I took this team of five or six of us, and during the four years that I was Chief of R&D we went to some 20 or 25 industries. I had a very aggressive liaison officer. He always contacted the appropriate man at the corporate level and assured him that I would like to come out personally and bring an Army team and tell them what they could do for the Army, but would he come? In other words, would their top people be there, intimating that if they weren't we would send our second team, too. I think on every occasion that I went out the Chairman of the Board was there, the Chief Executive Officer who was usually the President, and an impressive cross-section of their senior corporate officers or directors. I might say even when I went to Sperry-Rand, no less a person than General MacArthur honored me by his presence at dinner, and he didn't turn out for many.

Our plan was about as follows: we would arrive and they would have us for dinner at night, and of course

this would be a little ice-breaking ceremony. In the morning we put on our four hours of presentation, my opening statement -- what basic research was doing and, as I said, fire power, communication, mobility. We would end up and go to lunch. After lunch they would come back and give us their presentation for four hours. Then, if the distance permitted, we went back that night. Or if it didn't, we scattered or did whatever we wanted or perhaps had dinner with some of them again and talked more about the day's work. This created tremendous interest. For instance, the Chairman of the Board of Alcoa, whom I got to know later, had all his people there, and when I got all through he said, "You know, I never thought of it because we don't produce the end product." I had just mentioned to him, "We're going to have your aluminum or your competitor's. One of them is going to have aluminum in 20,000 personnel carriers that weigh 10 or 15 tons each." Well hell, that is business and he began to perk up. From then, he changed their pattern of advertising and for a year or so they showed where their product was being used in support of the military effort, which was great. The chairman of another board, in this case General Motors, set up their meeting at the Allison plant near Indianapolis, I think. GMC had the operating and research heads from, I think, some 26 divisions present and this had happened practically never before. When he got through he said, "You know, this is the first time that I and some of my executives had ever heard a presentation across the board of what we can do ourselves in research."

The program sold itself pretty much and it did a great deal to strengthen the Army's position in industry; maybe it is one of the reasons that our friend Fulbright and some of these other birds are talking about the military-industrial complex. But we had better continue working together if we want to keep this country going.

The fight for aircraft was an interesting one. We had a couple of boards, one of which was the Howze Board. I believe very much in aircraft; I was very much for Army aircraft. What they have been doing in Vietnam is not a surprise to me. I think I mentioned before that I would like to see a study made on what they would have done without the helicopter and without armed helicopters. That would be quite a story. Even if we are losing a few a day, I mean, that is not the whole story. In any event, this was

difficult because the battle was still on with the Air Force as to missions, functions, and responsibilities. We were making pretty good progress when we brought in the Bell "Huey" aircraft which, of course, was the first turbine-powered aircraft. We went for the Chinook, which Vertol was making until Boeing brought it in. We went for the Caribou, the De Havilland plane, which was a fine plane, and then the Buffalo, its follow-on, which is even better. There was a lot of opposition to that, of course, because it was Canadian; yet here we are trying to keep in tight with the Canadians, to standardize on equipment, and we had to work with them. Another plane, of course, was the Grumman Mohawk. This was of great interest to us. It was built by Grumman in a plant under Navy cognizance and it's done its job beautifully. It was made for reconnaissance. It was made to carry side-looking radar for scanning behind the enemy's lines to try to get intelligence or, at least, information; all in all it is a fine craft. A couple funny things happened in connection with this one. This was opposed by the Air Force. I had been given certain instructions by General Lemnitzer one time: "Don't you arm this plane because I agreed with the Air Force that we wouldn't arm our planes." Well, it so happened that the plane factory was under Navy cognizance and so the Navy had thought perhaps that they or their Marines might have a use for the plane as well as the Army. So, lo and behold, when the plane was produced it had what they call "hard points" which is where you can hang bombs and other things under the wings; and, of course, I couldn't object to that. So that is the way the Grumman Mohawk came off.

We went ahead full speed. We had to beg, borrow, and steal our ammunition and our rockets. We found a hell of a lot of old machine guns the Navy was discarding, so we did all sorts of jerry-rig and bailing-wire stuff to put weapons onto helicopters for test purposes. I don't need to tell you how they've proven out in Vietnam. But that was a great struggle, particularly when McNamara came in because he wanted to cut us way back on everything, including parts. It got so bad that we were thrown into a situation where we could hardly keep 50 percent of our aircraft going because of the shortage of parts. I'm sure that since things really got moving in Vietnam that they must have been licked, but there were a number of efforts from all directions to cut us down.

Chemical weapons. I know that is one that you will want to bring up, or somebody will, in view of the fact that we are not supposed to have them anymore. I still would like to stand on the statement that if the North Koreans move against South Korea more delay could be obtained by saturating the DMZ with either lethal or non-lethal gases that make it practically impossible to cross, at least without great delay, than with any other conventional weapons system that exists. To me that would certainly be a justifiable use of it if they violated that armistice zone. Now it looks as though that may be thrown out for political reasons. What happened is this, and I don't see any reason why it can't be told now.

I was impressed about chemicals while I was a Corps Commander in Korea. I was impressed with the potential of chemical weapons and so I had special studies made. The board that I appointed came up with a recommendation to me showing what could be done in this respect. It was a good study; I approved it as Corps Commander and sent it on the Eighth Army. I followed it until I left there a few months later, and it was still lying around somebody's desk either there or possibly in Hawaii. In any event, I couldn't get my hands on it but I did find out that it wasn't in Washington. I was in a good position a few months later when I got back as Chief of Research and Development to call for the report, and it was found at Army Headquarters in Fort Shafter, Hawaii. We then called it forward and the report came and, as I remember, it had a favorable endorsement. There is a difference between favorable and enthusiastic, but I think it had a favorable endorsement. Well, when I got it back here, I started taking it up through DCSOPS and found that national policy as established by our national security policy council had a paragraph in there that, I don't know if you would say authorized or recognized -- but let's say recognized, chemical weapons might be used in ground conflict, but they had a clause in there, "In general war". So we had to take the necessary steps, at least did take the necessary steps, to get the policy modified to strike out the clause, "in general war." Otherwise we would have been very limited in trying to do anything in the way of developing the idea that we would use them on the offensive because we had that capability in World War II, but we never used them.

We never used them in World War II, we never used them in Korea other than tear gas and non-lethal irritants,

and I think anybody is really stretching the point when they call those chemical weapons. It seems that way to me anyhow. Well, in any event, I felt that we had to know what the enemy's capabilities were, and they were very great. We even had on hand the training regulations of the Russian Army and what they were doing to train their troops, including the use of injections against chemicals. They were highly trained to use weapons and to defend against them. We thought, how in the world can we learn how to defend against these weapons of various types, chemical and biological, unless we know something about them, which justified our research.

I might say in that connection that during those years, around 1960 and 1961, we put very substantial money, a considerable increase of funds, behind chemical weapons and biological, too. One of the things that we did, much to the disgust of some of the people in the Chemical Corps, was to put out a directive from OCRD that not more than ten percent of the increased funds in any year could be used in-house and that the other 90 percent had to go out by contract. I had two things in mind here; one was to interest more of the people in the chemical industry in getting into this aspect of assisting in their country's defense, and secondly, that if and when there were cutbacks or modifications, it would be a lot easier to terminate a contract or make a new contract than it is to get people off the government rolls. Whether my successor was able to hold them down or not I don't know, but during the two years after this policy went in, I did, to the best of my knowledge. That's that on chemical weapons. I think they have made a real contribution in what use they have had to date. While you may object that food has to be destroyed (and has been in some cases), nevertheless, in this kind of war -- and all war is getting to be more total war -- food is ammunition when it is in the hands of the enemy and all steps necessary have to be taken in the kind of conflict we face today.

Q: I have a few articles that I picked up. There are many, but one struck me, "A Painless Way to Win the War", which was on the psycho-chemical gas. You might refer to these.

A: We had many interesting things that occurred. Some of you will remember that when we started out, one of the things that we were showing was the cat and the mouse

film. This was a movie sequence where the cat, after being administered some of these non-lethal drugs, jumps all over the cage to get away from the mouse, scared to death. We ran tests with men also. You may remember, or you may never have seen, a picture on the use of any of these compounds against some troops in training at Fort Bragg. They literally fell apart at drill. Then another one: we sent one of our brigadier generals in the Chemical Corps to observe some tests which they gave to the people who were at the fire control center for an artillery battalion. The accuracy of their work after they had what appeared to be an innocuous cup of coffee was about 4 percent. So it showed that you just couldn't think logically with it. The interesting thing was that when this general went back to the Commanding General's office to report to him, they gave him a little coffee and by the time he had enjoyed his coffee and they had been talking a bit he forgot what he even came in to report on. These items are highly effective, and before we cut our own throats we had better take a look at some of them and permit them to remain in the inventory.

Q: I don't have it in front of me now, but am I wrong in saying that the psycho-chemicals that you were experimenting with then had as a base the LSD of today?

A: That was one of the compounds that was being looked at. LSD 25, yes, which we've known now for a long time, was one of them, no question about it. I hope that was not one of the factors that influenced this young and rabid rabble that we have been growing up here.

Q: Before we leave the chemical, I know it is a political decision today that has made us fall off. What about biological weapons? What did you do? You were involved in developing biological, at least getting some interest in biological weapons?

A: Right. As I say, food is a weapon. If you can deny the enemy their food you can bring him to yield, or at least you can go a long ways toward it. I don't know that any one weapon is total in its impact, and yet it could be. There are a lot of angles on this, and it is one of the threats that we may face because our country is open from the Pacific with a wind drift from west to east and from the earth itself moving from east to west; our cattle and our food areas could

be just overwhelmed with some of this stuff which could be leaked off aircraft or submarines surfacing at night or in many other ways.

Ground mobility, of course, was a major problem. This was true even with such things as conventional trucks, and there was great delay and many arguments in developing conventional trucks. It was true certainly with all the special vehicles such as this GOER vehicle, which we had put together and submitted straight off the shelf; in other words, all commercial parts, you know. They came up with a fine vehicle and it did all the things we expected it to around 1959 or 1960. Hell, I think they are still testing it even though excellent vehicles have been turned out, but everybody has gotten their damn finger in the pie. They want to add this and that and the kitchen stove, you see. They've raised it from 80¢ per pound, which was industry's first estimate for turning them out. I don't know what it costs today, but if it isn't \$2 a pound I would be surprised. They are using some in Vietnam, but I don't know if they have ever type-classified them. Of course, let me say the big motor industry, conventional truck manufacturers, were not for this baby because it could go places where we can't use any truck in the inventory today. Of course, the same problem applied to certain other vehicles. The armored personnel carriers, for instance, are fine personnel carriers and yet there were two or three components where I had to override the Ordnance in favor of the contractor, not only for the good of the vehicle but for greater economy in the manufacture of the part or parts concerned. So we live with the NIH factor; we still do and I don't know how you get rid of that.

In Canada we worked very closely with the Canadians, with Canadian industry. We turned out the Chinook, we turned out certain engines for Canadair which is tied in with Pratt and Whitney, and many other items. We finally came up with what we called the HARP program, which means High Altitude Research Project. One of their scientists showed how an electronic device encapsulated could be fired at very high velocity into concrete walls, several thousand G's as a matter of fact, and still come out and be operative. He said if this is true why can't we fire a conventional gun into space. The fact is you can fire a conventional gun into space, and we now have a few of them. One Naval 16-inch gun welded in prolongation to another Naval 16-inch gun is quite something to see. It fires

vertically into space and we are not only capable of reaching well into space but we are capable, with the appropriate electronic devices on the projectile, to orbit it into space. There are many gains that have come from this. It had its heyday but now it is not being supported as much as it was. A lot of the resistance again has been the NIH factor in certain places both in the Army and the Navy.

Q: The NIH factor being?

A: Not Invented Here. We used to have another one, NIBO, Not Invented By Ordnance; I told you about the expansion of basic research. In rockets and missiles it is pretty well known that in 1959 we came up with the idea of stressing value engineering -- value analysis -- and, of course, now it has become pretty standard. There are some people who don't understand it because they say, well you've got engineers on the project and it is their job to see that everything is most efficient. But their job really is to build the vehicle and to build it according to schedule and according to blueprints. The job of the value engineer is to get around and say how can I do that better, what is wrong with that, is there a cheaper material or a better way to machine it, can we get rid of this lug there, or do we need this many screws or that many rivets. There is real money in the bank in this effort. All of big industry has gone for this now.

In electronics and communications, there were many advances. We've seen what we can do with infrared; we've seen what we can do with passive devices as far as improving visibility at night. These are tremendous advances, I think. Then, of course, overmuch of this is operations research. These are the think tanks; I'm not surprised some of them are being cut back because I think many of them ran full speed ahead without really knowing where the hell they were going. Where the projects have been well defined and well directed -- and I don't mean keeping the blinders on too closely because you need latitude to roam a bit -- I think we've gotten a lot out of it, but it is time to ride herd on some of these operations research activities.

Materials. We've seen the greatest advance during this period. This gets into the heavy metals, the light metals, ceramics, cements, and plastics in particular. As a matter of fact, we have the

knowledge now where we can fabricate about any type of material we want, as long as we know what kind of performance we want to get out of it. I was a great believer in titanium. I fought for titanium for a long time. We have finally gotten it used, particularly in air foils and wings of airplanes at the present time. It has many other uses. Another material I'm still trying to get used is what we call depleted or spent uranium. This is uranium that no longer has any radioactivity. It is dull, inert, and a very dense and heavy product. I've been trying for more than ten years to get this used in armor-piercing shells because it should really be for free; there is so damn much of it and nobody knows what to do with it, you know. Of course, those who own it keep the price up high. Some day somebody will find a solution. I think I know the solution for a great deal of it, and that is for use in casks for moving spent nuclear elements from utility plants, which is going to be big business in the next ten years. This also could be substituted at a cheap price for tungsten, which is very expensive, in armor-piercing shells. In addition to having tremendous penetrating capability, even though it is sort of fragile, it has a tremendous pyrophoric effect. I guess that is the right word -- pyrophoric, fire, setting afire, yes. If it hits a turret it will not only spin around and knock shards off the inside but it will set the tank on fire. It has tremendous potential but we are still afraid of it. In small arms you know the efforts we made to go to flechettes, to go to little rocket-projected flechettes and the 40mm grenade and other improvements that are still available. I think we made a lot of headway. We were opposed in going toward the M-15 type rifle by some people in pretty senior positions who were still thinking of Camp Perry and the national rifle matches, hitting a 20-inch bullseye at 1,000 yards. That has gone by the board now. Actually when I got to Vietnam and was looking this over with the idea of establishing what I call the quick reaction laboratory, later to become the Limited War Laboratory about the time that I retired, I wanted to put something down there where the action was, even as early as 1961. This was frowned on. When I got into the question of weapons I found that one battalion -- and this reflected the leaders or the sergeants -- insisted the M-1 was the best rifle. There was another battalion that insisted that nothing but carbines were needed because it was enough for most of the short-range work, although they admitted it would not go through a 12-inch palmetto. But it

was short and easy to handle in the jungle. There was still another battalion under our friends in the CIA, and they insisted on shotguns. So you could find any answer you wanted. I sent 1,000 rifles of the M-10 or 14 -- I've forgotten which, but that same type of weapon that we are talking about today. I sent 1,000 of them down there and I also sent the ammunition for them by air. When I got there and had lunch with General McGarr, I asked about these rifles. He said fine, we got the rifles all right but we haven't got any ammunition. I thought, gee, that is funny, so I thought I would start working backwards. I took the time to go and talk to the G-4 and from the G-4, who didn't know anything about it (understandably), I went to his Ordnance officer and from his Ordnance officer I went to his ammunition officer and we finally went down to the sergeant who had charge of all the igloos. He didn't know anything about it except that he did say that he had some funny ammunition that came in there but he didn't have any weapons for it. Well, we finally got the two of them together. There is always somebody that doesn't get the word.

Q: You know, I didn't mention it when we were speaking of I Corps, but your interest in weapons for the Oriental was always high and I know you were attempting to design shorter stocks.

A: I was worried about the Oriental. I was worried about the Korean, whether or not the M-1 was the right rifle for his little short arms, particularly some of the younger ones and the men who were really using the rifles. I got in touch with General Sam Williams, a real soldier; I said, "What the hell about your problems because those Vietnamese are even smaller than the Koreans."

We did a lot to step up human engineering in our vehicles, too . . . the reaction of men under all conditions. You might say this had a touch of the social sciences, if you want to, and it did. Social sciences, life sciences -- we were across the board. I finally got the personnel section of the old Adjutant General's Office transferred to get into more personnel research. There was no reason that it shouldn't be integrated, in my opinion. We did a great deal in this field, a great deal because of problems of noise, although these youngsters don't seem to care about noise. Maybe in the future noise won't bother them. They won't be able to hear it or anything else. If they can stand this rock and roll

and some of this other stuff, why nothing that happens in a tank or on a battlefield is even going to upset them, if you can get them that far with a halter around their neck. We did a lot of work on that, trying to improve the comfort of our vehicles without getting into great luxuries and to get rid of protruberences that caused sore arms or scratched faces or black and blue bumps here and there. There is a lot more that could be done, there was a lot that was done, and there is a lot still to be done in that field.

We supported the Medical Department and I particularly supported the Dental Corps, who had never had any money for research to speak of. We finally gave them a research capability although much of it was done through commercial sources; you probably know yourself the tremendous advances we made in dentistry in these past years. We got the expansion through for the Walter Reed Institute for Army Research, where they do some very advanced work with respect not only to the brain but in every other part of man's anatomy that influences his motivation or his physical capabilities. We tried to push along that line.

We made several studies of industrial management trying to see if there are ways to improve our own. I know there are; there always will be ways to improve, because the situation is constantly changing whether it is in industry or otherwise.

I went to Gulf after I retired and had six years looking at industrial management and research from the civilian side, and both have their problems. They're not as dissimilar as they might sound. Support from the top is one of the things that is essential for adequate and competent research and development to go on. There has got to be some degree of enthusiasm or understanding or research falls by the way if you don't have that kind of support. And, of course, everywhere -- and this even exists among researchers themselves -- is resistance to change. Researchers may think they are looking for something, and they are, but if they find something new, they tend to resist any change in something they found new last year that might be changed this year. I don't mean to say they are all that way, but I will make the statement that in the research establishment there is resistance to change, and this I found particularly true in industry.

Of course, finally as my tour drew to a close I had some internal problems. I was still trying to speak when I could on the problems that involved the defense and security of our country, and my philosophy hadn't changed from earlier days. So during this time I became more and more anathema to Fulbright and some of the people in State. As a result some columnist wrote an article in the New York Times, and out of that came the "muzzling of the military hearings" in which Admiral Arleigh Burke and I seemed to be two of the prime victims.

We found that many of the speeches that we submitted for approval were being softened and they were taking any points of firmness out very frequently. I did try on two or three occasions, through the Army public information office, to find out who the individuals were who objected so that we could go and sit down with them and talk about their philosophy. None of that. You couldn't find out who they were and they really didn't want to talk to you. They wanted to turn it down, if they had authority, and that was that. We had our problems in this regard but I guess we all lived through it.

Q: I think the muzzling thing shouldn't be passed over too lightly. You did have support; I know that Senator Thurmond was your chief supporter. But the thing that I think is interesting is that it was actually the Pentagon that was muzzling the military, and Congress, in some cases, was coming to your assistance.

A: Yes, to some degree. I hadn't realized it, but most other officers had exceptions taken to a couple of their speeches. Burke has 7 and I find myself here with 27. But here is the kind of thing they'd pull on you: "I say nothing less will permit us to emerge victorious as the end of the century approaches," and this character, whoever he was, says, "Nothing less will permit us to achieve our goals as the end of the century approaches." Now there is not a thing about saying "emerge victorious" that says we have to wipe the Russians off the map to do it. But they will pull this stuff on you. This is one the censor wipes out: "Co-existence is not a choice. It is a fatal disease." He strikes that. Then this is interesting; it goes on to say, "Did Rudyard Kipling describe the cunning of our adversary when he said . . ." They changed that to read, "describe the cunning of an adversary." Actually, Kipling was talking about the

same threat that we were, the Russians: "This is the time to fear when he shows seeking quarter with paws like hands in prayer, that is the time of peril, the time of the truce of the Bear." I mean, this gets a little chicken, I think. This is interesting. I had forgotten about this particular presentation.

Q: I also found reprinted from the Citizen in March of 1962 a lot of humorous plays on censorship, Washington style. I think that you will recall it when I show it to you. I think that continues to show that you weren't one to sit back and not be heard. Perhaps we should talk about the fact that during the time you were in research and development, you gave 189 different speeches. If you figure that out over four years, that makes one per week, which is a pretty ambitious program.

You know, when you were G-2 in 1953-55 in Washington you departed suddenly and then you came back and all of a sudden you were a very tough spokesman for the military. As you describe the way you were building up the military complex and industry was becoming emotionally involved, it was a great relationship. I'm surprised that you were permitted to do this. Was there guidance from a controlling group with the military to get you to do that? Was this your own idea or what?

A: No, this was strictly my own idea. I was never urged by anybody. You mentioned that large number of speeches. There is a tremendous similarity among a great number of them. My pattern in making a speech was (and I finalized all my own speeches) I drafted some but I set the pattern for all of them and they were nobody else's but mine, although a lot of people did good work on them. My pattern was one-third that appealed to the local audiences, one-third that had to do with the general problems of Army research and development, and one-third that would deal with national security. If you look at my talks, while they may not spell this out in relative number of pages, that was the pattern of them all. So over any period of several months the pattern of the middle third would be as to where we were and what we were doing in R&D. The pattern of the front or the first third would be modified in every case to appeal to the audience and the locale or the atmosphere in which I was giving the talk. The last third you will find, by and large, was quite standard in many cases because it was always to a different audience and could be

repeated. Furthermore, I wanted to hammer home the same theme that nothing in the threat had changed; that the Russians were the same as they were before, that their intent was the same, that peaceful coexistence meant coaxful nonresistance if they could talk us into it and wipe us out. That peace, as far as they are concerned -- as defined by Marx -- is a condition that can only exist in a classless society, whereas peace to us is something else. To us it is a condition that exists when there is no threat of revolution from within or aggression from without. This is what peace really is. We haven't had any and we are not going to have any unless you accept the Russian's definition. Then if you do -- of a classless society -- you've just given in to it all. And, of course, Marx says that in order to get to that objective the end justifies the means; that is the other point.

I've done what I felt I needed to do and I would do it again. While I don't go around making many speeches these days, I still feel the same as I did then. I'm amazed at the apathy of our people, the condition that we've let our country get into, the atmosphere of anxiety and fear under which we live without faith in any religion or a belief in anything greater than ourselves, or any attempt to live up to the ideals that made our country great. I feel just as firmly about those as I ever did, but more worried.

Q: I'm sure you have a lot of followers and I think we need you to be heard again. General, I've got a lot more things to talk about. Let's talk about guerrilla warfare. I know that you are a prime mover of the program, and I think we need to talk about it.

A: Well, I recognized that something needed to be done in this field, as I told you; this is dated 1961. I had been to Vietnam the year before; I had been trying to set up a quick reactions laboratory, a limited warfare laboratory, because you could see all the time that we had been thinking of general war developing and we got caught with our pants down in Korea and again in Vietnam. It is because of this that we've appeared, even more than is true, to have an inequitable way of handling our manpower, which is the more sensitive area because it wasn't general mobilization. We are still paying the price for it, more and more. You could see guerrilla warfare coming.

When I had the 1st Cavalry Division on Hokkaido, the first requirement I had for that division (and they had only been away from the front for a matter of months) was to take the 8th Cavalry back to Hokkaido and the region between Taegu and Pusan where there was heavy guerrilla action in late 1952, believe it or not. This may not be recognized. Many of our dumps and other installations were in danger. This was at the same time or about the same time that things happened down at Koji-do; you remember the prisoners broke loose and they let them loose somewhere else and they had a hell of a mess. So this question of guerrilla warfare became a real question. Then when I got back to Korea as the Corps Commander, we had a couple of Koreans there who were real experts on guerrilla warfare. I remember getting copies of their doctrine and I think I sent them in to the Department of the Army, suggesting that they take a look. Perhaps even at the War College you might find one; I don't remember the Korean general who wrote them. I was impressed with this sort of thing breaking out. Then when I went to Vietnam -- as I say, I'd been there several times, 1954, 1956 and maybe again 1958 or 1960; anyhow at least three, probably five times -- it was then apparent that we were going to be fighting down there without any front lines, without any boundaries, and that you didn't know friend from foe. Of course, I told you I faced that to an extent even when I had the 7th Division. There were radio teams from the north looking down from the rear of my position and, in one case, even adjusting fire on us. So the threat of getting into a place like Southeast Asia, where there were two sides and where heavy Communist penetration was coming in, made it quite apparent that we were going to run into this. So I talked with certain people back in Washington in the early spring of 1961 and I said, "Give me some ideas on this." This paper in essence was given to me and then I did a little dressing it up. I thought finally we had gotten away from the idea that this had to be all-out war, that there would be no nuclear war. I'd been working for a couple of years to get them back to recognizing that conventional war would have its place. Then I thought I should move them into thinking about this and getting a limited war or quick reactions laboratory. I put a cover sheet on this after making a few other changes and published it through my office. As you see, the paper is relatively innocuous. I sent it out as shown here: the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Continental Army Command, Technical Services, their R&D chiefs, and the heads of

OCRD field activities. There was no reason to classify it; it is a simple document setting forth some facts. Well, the first thing I knew this hit the fan and it came out in the Armed Forces Journal. Then people began to ask some questions, and the first thing I knew I was asked to go down on a plane with Lemnitzer and Rostow, who was in the White House. We went down to see what they were doing at Bragg, and Rostow had a copy of this paper. He asked me about it and I told him, I said, "This is what we are heading into. We have to get with it". In any event, Taylor went down about this time and made another visit to Southeast Asia, and I guess when he came back maybe they were convinced. So they started getting with it. It took me another year, though, to get this limited war laboratory started. The minute this was sensed, a certain chap came down from ARPA. (I think he later went to jail for misappropriating or misusing some funds on a trip down there.) He insisted that this was bigger than Army business and was going to be taken over by DOD and he was going down to set it up. I guess he did, but back in the Pentagon it was recognized that maybe the Army had the primary responsibility although, surprisingly, the Air Force said this was right down their alley. How the hell you fight guerrilla warfare from the air wasn't clear to me, but they put a lot of heat on this and they were going to build this kind of team and that, and I guess they did; maybe they have all been needed, I don't know. In any event, we finally got a limited warfare laboratory at Aberdeen; I think we've done a lot of good in it.

Q: General, you have been involved in just about everything. You did things for people, you did things for equipment, you did things for tactics; you attempted to awaken the nation.

A: Maybe somebody can one of these days. Maybe at the wrong end of a bomb.

Q: Your reputation got so good that all of a sudden, with Dulles leaving the CIA, I noted that you were being considered, I think even at a high level, for the position as CIA Director. And then Cabell, the Assistant Director at the CIA, was leaving and you were very seriously considered for the number-two job because McCone got the number-one job. Would you like to comment on that?

A: Well, I was asked if I would take it. This would have been in the fall of 1961. I said I would take any job where I really felt I could serve my country but I didn't think the appointment could be made because I knew the power of the opposition and it went very deep. I didn't have any misapprehension about this but I said I'd keep myself in the clear for a few months. So two members of Congress -- important members of Congress -- talked to me about it and I said I expected to do other things, but if I was really called upon and felt I had the right support in the right places and adequate authority to do the job, and to bring in some people of my own choosing (because you can't operate entirely in somebody else's atmosphere), that I would consider. Well, that never came to pass. One day after Mr. McCone was appointed, he and I played golf at Burning Tree. We just happened to, as far as I know. Maybe somebody else arranged this cleverly -- could be; you never know. But, anyhow, we were in the same foursome so we talked for 18 holes; make it 19. I wasn't sure he knew all the background. He told me that I was going with him. I said to him, "Let me tell you what happened before here." So during the round I told him the whole story and I said, "The reason I'm telling you this is, in the first place you ought to know that this condition exists, although I think somebody else would be damn sure that you do." I said, "Furthermore, I want to say now that, despite the fact that you are going to be appointed director of the CIA, I don't think you can get me appointed." "Oh," he said, "I can take care of that when I come back." He said, "I'm going to London tomorrow to take a look at this thing." He went to London, and during his whole trip he was actually guided by the man who put me on the spot six years before. So I thought, good God! You know, things to laugh about! I knew then that they couldn't have assigned anybody as his guide who would have been as sure to condemn me every minute and from every damn angle he could think about. So that was that. We've never mentioned it from that date on, McCone and myself. He is a fine person; I could have worked with him and enjoyed it. I would have had to work a hell of a lot harder and for a lot less money, I might say, than what was in the wind. But if he had wanted me and the country had wanted me, I would have gone. As it was, I was holding off the Gulf Oil Corporation at that time; the Chairman had been waiting. He not only had been looking for a man for

six months to head up research for the Gulf Oil Corporation, but he then waited for me to make up my mind from December until June.

I hadn't committed myself, but I had a pretty fair number of opportunities. I decided first I was not going with a defense industry and be utilized that way; second, I probably would go with an independent industry; and third, I had decided years before that wherever I went I would not go to Pittsburgh. Well, that shows you how wrong a man can be. I did a lot of thinking about this and I talked to my friend K. T. Keller down in Florida around Christmastime that year and with some others. In any event, I ended up taking it. It was a very satisfying job. I took it for five years, which would take me to a retirement age of 65. I was well treated; I had lots of responsibility; I had lots of good friends and made a lot more. I was in a field that, as you know, had intrigued me for more than 15 years. This field of oil is a number one factor in the world strategy as well as economy in the power struggle that exists, and when the five years was up the chairman said, "I wish you would stay with us another year," so I did. It was a very satisfying experience and it gave me a beautiful chance to spend a whole decade looking at this field of research and development, engineering, production, procurement regulations. I spent half of it looking at it from the government side and half of it from the industry side. Fascinating, fascinating. But you can see why I didn't get in the CIA. I was not looking for it. I wouldn't have lifted a finger to get the job myself, but I could have done a real job there.

Q: There were a lot of people predicting that you would get the job at the time. You know, to go back to May 1961, everybody knew General Art Trudeau. It says here that Robert Allen and Paul Scott, reporting in the Northern Virginia Sun, stated that JFK planned a personal Chief of Staff and that he had indicated that you had a chance at that job. I thought that was very interesting.

A: That is very interesting. Well, I hardly knew Kennedy and I can tell you now that the coterie around him would have killed me off, too; you couldn't break through that coterie, and I'm neither a political liberal nor a Democrat. I told you before, or maybe I didn't, that he told a certain top industrialist in this country -- and I mean top -- to pick out and designate for him the new head of the Agency for International Development. Well, you've got those

reports I handed to you today, which you haven't read yet. You saw that folder on civic action in Latin America, which I knew a lot about, starting there and in OCB. This individual called me and asked me for lunch at the Mayflower one day; the year would have been the fall of 1961 before I retired. He said that he had been talking with several other men who were also top men in industry that knew me, and they had unanimously agreed that I was the man to handle that job. He wanted to know if I would accept it since he had an appointment with the President that afternoon. And he did have it! He had the appointment with the President and he called me back from New York about 24 or 48 hours later and said, "I'm sorry to tell you that despite all the promises that I would name the man and all the endorsements that you had, the President has telephoned me that his staff thinks it would be quite inadvisable to have a man with your military background in charge of the Agency for International Development." So that ended that. So the power of these staffs around the President is very, very great; they are hard to break through. I mean, if you could establish your outguard around your position with that strong a defense against, say, a Chinese penetration, you would always be a winner. But maybe that's the way it has to be; I don't know.

Q: General, in research were you looking at the laser?

A: Oh yes, you bet we were looking at the laser. We looked at tactical nuclear weapons, conventional ground weapons of all sorts, and the laser. Also its uses in passive light devices were very apparent. It takes eight or ten years to bring many of these things to fruition. With the McNamara system they put the projects up for bid after each step. In other words, a company could win the successful feasibility design and somebody else could then come in and bid on the R&D and build a successful prototype. And then somebody else could come in and win the production contract. Nobody makes any money on the early stages, on the R&D; they are looking for the production contract to do well at all, to really bring to fruition the things that they develop. McNamara destroyed that system and he permitted other companies to come in and underbid them. Then we would lose the time and delay by somebody getting in that didn't really know what the hell he was doing, and the first thing that new company had to do was to go and proselyte the men away from the unsuccessful bidder,

had to proselyte away the men that knew how to do the work. So you had delay, you had increased costs. I don't say you can just give one contractor his head and let him go. I know you can't. I know you can analyze estimates if you've got the people who know how to do it right, step by step with him. The new system that is being brought in is called "Should Cost" estimates. This means that they are going to analyze fixed-price contracts and certainly incentive-type contracts or cost-plus types and, step by step, the government is going to compare estimates with the contractor and check his costs and then come up with an estimate and say alright, this is what it should cost. Now in the Army Engineers, on that type of construction, we always made government estimates and we always expected the contractor to come out somewhere close to us. Certainly by now the procurement load is decreasing and more people have been trained in this game. We ought to have people in government who know how to price out a contract and make an estimate. It is high time we develop that technique. I know there is a lot of discussion in the Pentagon now. I hope that while we are not going to revert to what we had before, we will go to a more equitable system that will still enable this terrible lead time -- anywhere from 8 to 12 years -- to be cut down to 5 or 6. We've proven that we could do it; in some cases in the limited war laboratory they said, "We need this; you could use this in the jungle." Hell, in a few months we came up with it. Now I don't mean you can come up with a new satellite in six months, but it is quite obvious that we can do a better job than what we have done under the present procurement regulations or ASPRs.

Q: There does seem to be a pendulum now effecting concurrency; buying time versus fly-before-you-buy. In your view, where is the proper mix?

A: Well, the proper mix is this: first, a project manager who is really knowledgeable about what he is doing. I know that the Army is going to train more project managers in this area where they are still short, apparently by sending some colonels and lieutenant colonels to take a course at Harvard Business School. Well, this will be a big help in time. The Sloan School of Management might be just as good at MIT. They've done more work in analyzing government contracts, I think, than Harvard has. But let's say that either school is good. Then it comes down to the qualifications of the individual. Now I raised this

question at a recent meeting because, if you are looking at it from the procurement side, you're going to get the kind of man who can flyspeck a specification, both in preparing it, interpreting it, and in seeing that the customer lives up to the specifications. This may be perfectly good, although you can hire a lawyer who isn't the project manager to do it. What I maintain is that the man who is going to do this job is like the commander who is fighting a division; he should know how to fight a division. In other words, the man that is going to do this job should understand at least the technology of what he is going to be involved in. Nobody can understand the technology of all things mechanical, electrical, and chemical. I admit that, but this man should have an adequate technical knowledge and a breadth of knowledge and/or experience in this field so that he really knows what the hell he is doing. He cannot just be administering a piece of paper. That's my point, and that bothers me because I think the tendency is to get a project manager who is more acquainted or more directed toward the cost problems. It is difficult, if not impossible, to find any individual who can prepare or defend cost estimates against the battery of trained specialists available to any large corporation. What I'm saying about the project manager is that I think he should be sufficiently knowledgeable -- with respect to the systems and, in general, the technology involved -- to really understand what is going on. Otherwise, there may be points, particularly in the R&D cycle, where he could be at a loss as far as making a prompt and correct decision.

When you get to the other part, the procurement cycle, then frequently it is the interpretation of the contract that becomes more important than the technology involved. This is my point here. I think some sort of concurrency is necessary. There are none of these jumps today that are as great as the ones that had to be made during the stage of early missile development. This had to do with inertial guidance, motors, materials, communications, photography; you name it, and it was all there. All of this was, in effect, being done concurrently with the result that the system had come under considerable fire, particularly during the McNamara regime. The end product was frequently delayed with large cost overruns because of failure to produce critical components or sub-systems in a timely manner. They all came through eventually, but this did cause some

delay. I'm not sure but what the overruns and costs today, by dragged out procurement on the grounds that every component has to be completed or perfected before you can put it together, is just as costly. I do know that the system that we have today ensures a certain degree of obsolescence in some of the components, if not in the system itself; it's bound to. So we've got to be careful when we talk about concurrency as against fly-before-buy and if what we are doing isn't really reaching back to die before fly. That's exactly what I mean, and I'm concerned about this one.

Q: I'm going to ask some specific questions. Some of them may go into detail, and some not. What percentage of the Army's budget do you think should be preserved for R&D, and, within that, how much of your R&D budget should go to basic research?

A: I think that while last year things were getting low, the budget contemplated for 1972 is a reasonable one. While there may be some increase next year, depending upon whether it is decided certain new weapon systems should get under way or not, it is not too unsatisfactory. The question of basic research is very important; there's no doubt about it. On the other hand, the money that's needed for basic research is only a fraction of the moneys that are needed for advance research or, even leaving that as research, a fraction of the moneys needed for development, particularly prototype production, testing and evaluation and bringing it to the point of full procurement. By and large, you're dealing today with equipment that is on hand. Ten or 12 years ago you could buy a new piece of equipment and 6 months later something so much better would be available that you'd find yourself just buying equipment all of the time. This is not true today. I don't say things aren't changing, but not with that degree of rapidity. So what you're paying for is really manpower in basic research, by and large, as against the tremendous cost of prototype production when you get into applied engineering. I think we can handle that all right.

I want to mention something here that I had occasion to write a letter about to Business Week just a couple of weeks ago. An outfit like Bell Laboratories is one of the great research establishments in the world; no question about it. They have put together a combined organization in Denver that has people on basic research and applied engineering, in other words, up

to prototype production and marketing, all working as a team together. Now this is new. I wrote Business Week a letter just three weeks ago, but I don't think I have a copy of it here. Dr. Edward Teller was and is a good friend, and has been an acquaintance of mine since I took over the R&D job some 13 years ago. He spoke to me about this subject several times. The subject is applied engineering and I merely want to mention one action of his to show how important he considers it.

About 1964 I was the President of the American Ordnance Association and President of Gulf Research and Development. Edward had spoken about this (applied engineering) on several occasions when I had been at Livermore recently. I had invited him to be the speaker at our annual luncheon with the people who were going to be at the head table. These were the leaders of American industry -- many of them, maybe 40 of them -- and some military. Even though it was a cocktail hour, Dr. Teller said to me, "General, could I talk to these people a few minutes? I'd like to make them understand the importance of applied engineering." I said yes, so I rapped on a glass and got the attention of this crowd who were enjoying themselves and having a drink before luncheon. Teller spoke to them. Of course, everybody is impressed with Dr. Teller; he's a great person, he's a wonderful scientist, he's a great personality, and when he talks people listen and they should. The essence of Dr. Teller's talk to these people was, "I've asked General Trudeau to give me just a few minutes here because I want to accent to you the extreme importance to American industry of applied engineering. What we're doing today is inadequate. We've got to train more people in our universities and colleges in the field of applied engineering. Because while I, as a scientist, am worried about basic research, we're in a far better position today in basic research than we are in people who understand applied engineering and can put that basic research to work in something that really serves man."

He made his point. He was urging them to assist engineering education. This is why now, seven years later, even the Bell Laboratories, which have never done anything but basic research, have had to put a team together that brings in applied engineering -- to put some of their new ideas and concepts to work, and their production and marketing men, to see where the

so for you to drive until you get a car." Whereupon I replied that I knew I'd be coming back here and would be dealing with all of the companies in the automotive industry, and I didn't think I should show a preference so I bought a Mercedes Benz. Well, they got a big kick out of that and, of course, that is exactly what I had done and I've been driving one ever since. Our industry has never gotten around to building a medium-weight and size, high-quality automobile, and what a price we've paid.

In any event it was probably in March -- although my records are not here -- when Explorer II was fired into orbit. I went down to Canaveral with Secretary Brucker. We were in a great competition with the Air Force at that time. Our Explorers were Jupiter missiles that were based on the basic Redstone element with a liquid-fuel, rocket-dyne motor. The Air Force went in for the Thor missile, a solid fuel motor, as a competitor. We felt ours was better. Whether it was or not, there is no question but that the two were in direct competition. We had been successful; we had gone into space and we saw the potential of this missile. One of the places where we differed was where we believed in a principle called ablation. In other words, we made the surface of our nose cone out of a certain kind of plastic or ceramic that did melt away slowly and would absorb the tremendous heat, but at such a slow rate that it didn't damage the structure. The Air Force, on the other hand, with Thor tried to go by a principle called "heat-sink," where they tried to get a metal that would still function as a metal but absorb this fantastic heat caused by the speed of going into orbit, which is 18,000 miles an hour, or 5 miles a second. There was great competition in those times and actually on the day that I took over (April 1, 1958) I started getting acquainted with the Nike system. This was to be Nike Zeus.

Now we had Nike Ajax, which had come into being in 1952; there was great opposition to putting Ajax into production. This missile was for knocking down lower-level aircraft up to maybe 40,000 feet, which was considered high for an aircraft in those days. Finally it took a man, a practical man like Mr. K. T. Keller, who had been the head of Chevrolet and later of Chrysler -- a great person -- to get action. He was called in by President Truman during the Korean War to really ride herd on industry because he knew how to move things. Finally, with great opposition against

hell it can be sold. This is a new concept, but it's been coming and it's here.

Q: How do you feel about procurement of foreign military equipment for our forces -- major items, or even subsystems?

A: I don't object as long as it is U.S. production. No foreign-developed system should be purchased exclusively from a foreign country because of the difficulties in overseas transportation in time of war. Any item that is good enough, any system that is better than what we've developed in America, should be adopted if an American firm can be licensed, and obviously pay royalties on production, to build that product in the United States. The first buy in the interest of time might be procured from the foreign country, if it meets all American requirements, while we are tooling up and getting the special machinery needed for U.S. production. Now, by not doing this, we are at the point where British industry is falling apart, and the same in some of the other foreign industries. In the interest of NATO and the Free World of the West, we should have had a joint requirement established at the SHAPE level 'way back; I tried to get this done in the early 1960s. Establish a joint requirement for a system, whatever it is, and then the production should have been apportioned out, not exclusively to America, but to some of our allies. The only effort in this regard was with the Hawk missile system where a grouping, a syndicate, was put together where certain components were produced in one country and certain in another. It has been the only way to keep technology alive in these countries and now it's falling apart. If we don't do something about it . . . it may be too late. The British aircraft industry will be down to nothing. What is the British Empire unless they can produce and sell? They are not self-supporting; they can't even feed themselves. Who will they sell to unless their technology is advanced, and of course, they've been their own worst enemies, because their industry is so inefficient. Their management and their production per man per day per dollar is better, but still low. We need to keep our people at work, too, and of course this is the struggle that goes on between men and nations that got us right where we are today.

Take the HS 820-millimeter machine gun. The United States made an agreement with Hispano-Suiza. They

were going to license a company they were going to form in the United States for U.S. production. It could have been licensed to somebody like Smith and Wesson or Maremont or General Electric. In the overall government agreement (government-to-government, in other words) they went from their government to our government to a contractor. We are talking about the procurement setup that was arranged. The arrangement was that the first buy of so many hundred guns would be produced by Hispano-Suiza and shipped to this country. In the meantime, an agreement was to be made with some firm to be licensed. HS will be paid so much of a royalty on future production, and during the period of the first buy and the first shipment we'll tool up in the United States. The second buy and from thereon will be U.S. production. HS is furnishing that gun to the German forces. She makes it in Britian, and the British are using it. Wherever she had contracts with associates of ours, she would still be producing from there, but the standards and means of production would be ours over here as far as metals and tolerances are concerned.

One of the points that is unsettled, and quite unsettled, is this: Let's say we go to country A who is producing Weapon System B, or whatever that is, or Military System B; maybe it's communications and not weapons. All right, how do we arrange for U.S. production? Well, ideally, the United States would like to have at least three companies who would bid on it. But what are they bidding on unless they're informed as to what is to be produced? How can they be informed unless the arrangements somewhere are made so that Company A in France says, "All right, I'll be willing to license these three companies in the United States." Then the companies have got to say, "We'll accept the license, and we'll pay you so much for the license, and so much royalty per unit on U.S. production." Well, now how do you get to that point? In other words, there may be many cases where the government of France will say that anything that goes out of France has to be cleared on a government-to-government basis. And so this Company A in France says to their government representative, their DOD, "All right, yes, we'd like to license that to the United States if they'll give us \$20 million for a license and a five percent royalty." The government of France and the Department of Defense may say, "All right, we'll do that," and that's accepted in the

dealing. Then one of these three companies bids for it and gets it.

Another way, of course, is for the company in France to say, "The company we really want to work with in the United States is the Z Company," and they offer a license to the Z Company, and say, "If you can get a contract, we'll let you build it for such and such a fee and such a royalty per unit." Then our government has got to decide whether this is going to go through as a negotiated bid, or whether they're still going to decide on competition. If they decide on competition and the company in France wants Company Z in the United States to build it, all they've got to do is to raise their license and royalty price to Companies X and Y in the United States, and Company Z is going to get it anyway. Now, with a sure-cost type estimate where they can check out each of these items and sit down with Company Z, the government can, with the company in France, analyze this and that item. They can say, "Yes, this is right or this is too high. We're going to audit it; we're going to give you an audit on each item." But it certainly can be worked out.

The biggest opposition to this is going to come from companies M and N in the United States who are producing competing weapons systems. They'll say, "You can't go outside of the United States to get this." But then the successful U.S. company would say, "Yes, but we're going to produce it in the United States, and we'll be using as many men as you are." And then you get three senators in the fight.

Q: General, I probably shouldn't even ask the question, but do you think that you were running R&D or was it running you?

A: Fifty-fifty.

Q: You don't think it's going to change, either, do you?

A: Not really. There's too much power down below that's really distributed through the system. It goes all the way back to not only the service involved but to the officer directing the plan and contract management. It goes back to a project manager and the key civilians under them. It also involves the company representative who is selling the program; I know many of the top ones. OCRD is not where the work is done mostly, only the coordination. The work is

done down below; it's done with the project officer, the company representative and in other places; I have no misconception about that. I could organize policy, I could make a lot of improvements, and I could direct certain things to be done. I could limit the activities in some ways in some of the then technical services, but I have no illusions that the man at the top can really control it all, any more than the division commander can control all of the platoon actions in battle; I mean it's the same thing.

Q: We've talked about the manager, but how much latitude do you think the military manager should have in creating his own team? What I'm thinking of here is personnel he has known previously, and has confidence in, as opposed to just having them assigned; you know, qualified people assigned from personnel.

A: Now you ask a very good question. Again, my answer to that would be it depends almost entirely on how much he really knows about the business he's going to supervise. Is he just an administrator trying to keep his ducks in a row, or does he really know what the hell is going on? In other words, there are many different situations and I've been in them myself. For instance, I took a team overseas during the war and I needed an officer from each of the technical services. It was the job that I told you about in reconstituting the 2d Cavalry Division, which was a negro ex-Cavalry Infantry-type division, and forming some 130 units from these battalions as service troops. Do I want to take nine people with me from these battalions as service troops? Or do I want to take nine people with me that can always get the job done? Only to a certain extent; maybe a few. But I wanted one officer from every Chief of Technical Service whom he and I both had confidence in. I went to the Chiefs and said, "This is the job; we're going to take so many troops and we're going to make 18 different Quartermaster-type units. Give me a man who really knows your organization, your TO&E, your training problem." And they come through and give you one. I've seen it many times in G-2 where I wanted the right man. If I wanted a man who was an expert in a language, for instance, it makes far more sense to go to your personnel people and say, "Give me a man who really knows two or three languages, like Dick Walters." I am not unwilling to lean on people when it comes to selecting specialists, and I think they often do better than you do yourself. As a matter of fact, I'm not sure but what many officers would have

been better off, instead of trying to staff their staff with their old friends or buddies or drinking companions -- or their wife would say, "You remember, Tom's such a nice guy, you ought to find a spot for him." I'm not sure but what you would always do better to let a good personnel section, at whatever level it is, pick your man for you because if you don't like him, you can fire him and preferably before it's too late. I knew a senior commander during the war who really paid the price because he picked the wrong man for his number two, for his Chief of Staff. You need more than old friends and relatives around you when the going is tough.

Q: General, we mentioned ARPA, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, before. I don't have the dates that it started but it was around your time.

A: It was, yes. ARPA began in 1960-61. Dr. Herbert York had it first before they formalized the Deputy Director of Defense for Research and Engineering (DDR&E). They had a couple of people fighting for power at the Defense level as to who would decide this and who would decide that, and they finally appointed him. When they gave him that title, he was to be senior to all assistant secretaries and directly behind the Deputy Secretary. That is the law today, and York was the first one.

The Defense Department had quite a problem because the scientific community felt they weren't getting enough pay from the government, so the government was hiring them by contract through this Institute of Defense Analysis that was organized and headed by General Jim McCormack, who was a vice president on leave from MIT, a former Army Engineer and a protege of mine at one time. He retired from the Air Force as a major general and he recently retired as chairman of COMSAT. Anyhow, the scientific community wasn't satisfied with government salaries as they were then and I guess they are today. As a matter of fact, it's better than a hell of a lot of them are going to get on the outside. Unfortunately, I'm not saying that with any satisfaction. I hate like hell to see what's going on here but, in any event, the big problem for York was that he came in to run ARPA. He was hired by contract through the Institute of Defense Analysis at a salary about twice as great as he could have gotten from a senior GS civil service position. One of the reasons for his great hesitancy, and I think it's understandable in going from ARPA to this new

Secretary's job, was that his pay was damn near cut in two; not quite, but way back. Now, of course, they've gotten the DOD pay structure up in the \$30,000 to \$38,000 bracket. Of course, this is another problem with inflation in this country. A lot of this inflation has been caused by the fact that with the demand for people in the expansion in the late fifties and early sixties and cost plus type contracts, industry could go out and pay any damn thing they wanted to anybody. Then if they saw somebody over in the other fellow's company, they could hire him away, you see, for \$5,000 more a year. These prices got out of all range of anything else, which again reacted against keeping people on the campus. This also reacted on the kids, because the students got little attention on the campus, by and large, because the professors were either consulting or writing books. They really made money, so this is part of the kids' feelings on campuses that they don't belong; they couldn't identify with anybody. They had big halfhearted lectures given to them. The men of real competence that stood out would hardly teach them. If they taught a couple of hours a week, they were doing well. So then you got this struggle for higher salaries on the campus, you see, and then you got higher salaries in industry and then you got more inflation. You got the same thing applied to the technician and then organized labor. And so you're where you are today; you can't afford to educate your kids and the scientists cost so much companies can't afford to hire them unless they get a big contract. We walked right into this; you could see it coming.

Q: What do you see as the future role of ARPA?

A: Not as a very great establishment, I wouldn't say. If there are ideas coming up in basic research -- I'd say with status, the rated status of basic research in the three services today -- I think the service in question probably has more persons knowledgeable as to what use could be made of scientific breakthrough than the few people up in ARPA do. It seems to me they'd have to send an idea to some service to examine it in most cases. Maybe they should be able to brief the service, or perhaps there should be a coordinating agency, again to prevent unnecessary duplication in fields of real new basic research.

Q: We have a question in regard to Congress. Inconsistent funding by Congress has caused inefficiency in the management of some major programs.

Do you think this could be alleviated by two-year appropriations approved by Congress?

A: I don't know. The fact is that a program can't be funded until it has been authorized. I don't know what to say. It could be helpful. Of course, the longer the appropriation is for, probably the better, and yet if I get \$1 million this year for a project -- and it's a substantial project -- I would have spent \$300,000 of it this year, about \$580,000 next year, and about \$120,000 the third year. In other words, the expenditures on an appropriation made this year are about 30 percent the first year, about 58 percent the second, and about 12 percent the third year. That's interesting and that shows the impact. If you cut off the appropriation for a particular year, what are you cutting off, the 30 percent, or 58 percent, or 12 percent? If this is the second year it's in, you're cutting off 58 percent of what they hopefully would spend there.

Q: You've done a lot of testifying while you were in the service and even after you got out. How important do you think is the ability to testify in the selection of Deputy Chiefs of Staff?

A: I think it's important that they be able to do so, but with respect to their selection, I doubt if much consideration is given to that. Any officer who's going to talk before high-powered groups should be a salesman in his own right. It's a selling job, there's no question about it. You sell yourself, and you sell your product, and you sell your organization any time that you're going up to get something done. I think the military are uniquely prepared. We've been exposed all of the time since we were second lieutenants, telling the recruits and our troops what the hell to do, you know. All of the time we're training, we're teaching, we're having this kind of an impact on other people. No, I think, by and large, the senior officers of the military are very well qualified in this respect. But remember only a small fraction of the Officer Corps, even general officers, are ever chosen for duty in the Pentagon.

Q: Along the same line, can you provide any insights perhaps from the amount of exposure you've had with Congress? Are there any do's and don't's as far as testifying?

A: I don't think so, unless you know a congressman's strength or weakness, or his enthusiasm to do something or to concentrate on some area. If he starts bothering you about certain things, then if you can divert his attention to whatever hobbyhorse he's driving, you can sometimes get him off your back. I've seen that work a couple of times.

Q: I might have told you that I went before Congress last year on budget, and Danny Flood is in the House Appropriations. Congressman Flood's from my home town, and that was just beautiful. Once we established a rapport, just the fact that we were from the same home town made a big difference in the way he treated me and everybody else in the hearings.

A: That's funny that you'd pick on him, because he's one man that is amenable to this approach I'm talking to you about. The reason he is is because one thing that's anathema to him are the competing military hospitals in Panama and you can really get him red right up the back of the neck by any mention of them. He'll spend the next half hour on that. By that time somebody else has taken up the cudgel and you're off the hook. That's funny that you would mention Flood, because he rode this hobbyhorse for two or three years to my knowledge and that was always the trick everyone used. He was pretty caustic but I never was badly treated by any of those fellows and I always treated them very respectfully. I always answered them as straightforwardly and sincerely as I could. I think that they knew that. I never really tried to pull anything on them, except that I diverted their line of thought a few times.

I think Army officers ought to visit their congressmen with the idea of apprising them of the Army's functions, organizations, and problems, particularly in these days where we've got so many young fellows being elected and so many of them have odd ideas. I think our senior officers, by virtue of their age and experience, could have quite an impact on them. Unless the man is so anti-military that he wouldn't even welcome them, I think they might eventually come around to a better military view. We should not only build up our friends in Congress but build up their alter egos, their counsel and administrative assistants. The administrative assistants are really the ones who tell the congressmen when and what . . . I don't mean dictate; you understand what I mean. But if an administrative assistant makes a suggestion that

the senator would talk with you -- give you about 20 minutes -- and you've got an interesting subject to talk about the day after tomorrow, he's probably going to do it. The other point with respect to the counsel is that they are, in effect, the legal staff for all of these hearings. They're very sharp fellows and they like to impress their boss, usually the chairman of the committee. So give them a chance to do that and sometimes it'll get them off your back too; it'll make them a little bigger and a little better. They want to look good.

Q: General, we haven't talked too much about nuclear weapons, but they were an important thing during your last four years in the Army. What technological improvements do you see in the future for nuclear weapons?

A: They will be very important. Probably smaller size, as far as tactical nuclear weapons are concerned. There is no question but, what with the rocket assist, we can extend the range of our conventional guns and artillery by maybe 50 percent. We're having a hard time getting some people in government to see it; it's the NIH factor, "Not Invented Here." But we know how to do this and you put this together with terminal guidance and what we're going to have is rocket-assisted projectiles, gun type, with terminal guidance. Then put your forward observer at a point where he can put a laser beam on the target and pull that stuff right in. Whether we can live in the air under some of these conditions, everybody is wondering about . . . improved weapons of one type or another. There's some concern, as a matter of fact, whether helicopters can live within 10, 20, or even 30 miles of what we call the forward battle line, the FEBA. Now there's your question. As we were talking the other day about guerrilla warfare, it looks more and more to me as though we are going to the concept of naval warfare, I mean on a smaller scale, with islands of defense prepared for all-around defense; there just is no FEBA. So a longer-range missile, longer-range projectiles, are going to be important. I've always wanted to go farther with small nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, you know, if these helicopters would come over an area where they're being fired on and drop one of these nuclear bombs about the size of a bucket, I think they'd slow down a hell of a lot of people who are shooting up at them. They have no way of doing this yet. All they can do is forward fire -- shoot out of the bow or sides -- but I'm not sure but

what we ought to be able to drop something out and down or propel it to the front or rear over an area where we are being fired on. What do we call the small nuclear bomb, the bucket job, you know? Davy Crockett. It's a sub-kiloton job and I've often thought about it just being dropped like a bucket of hot water out of a helicopter.

Q: That's a very interesting thought, very interesting. The Army was active at one time in nuclear power generation, reactors. We're out of business now.

A: Are we? I didn't know that. We built the prefabricated plant that we put in Greenland, of course, and then we've built a couple of barges with nuclear power plants on them. Then we built the 2-megowatt, 2000-kilowatt plant at Fort Belvoir.

Q: What was our idea of getting into the business to begin with?

A: Well, the Army's supposed to furnish power during war, and we thought that a nuclear power plant made a lot of sense. As a matter of fact, we were very much concerned in R&D about the ability to put down a nuclear power plant overseas; you can envision the situation in the Atlantic where we can't haul the oil across because of submarine threats and so forth. Where do you get your power, and, of course, that brought up the question of where the hell do we get our fuel for ourselves? We could see the need for the development, and that's why we contracted with a couple of firms to develop batteries that could be charged and recharged, liquid metal batteries, for instance. We were going to recharge them at a nuclear power plant and then have various other places where we could also charge them. You might have to take out your whole battery every 200 miles along the highway. It's not the easiest thing to recommend, but we didn't know what we might get into. This has gone quite a long way toward helping to develop electric drive.

Q: Are there any lessons that we in the Army could learn from the Atomic Energy Commission procedures or organization? What was the early relationship between AEC and DOD?

A: I don't know exactly. I was once offered that job as a military liaison officer with AEC but I didn't take it. I read the charter about 1947. I read the

charter for the job, and it seemed to me rather hopeless, because it was to urge, to encourage, and a few other things of that sort; you know, no teeth in the damn thing. We went over there without any authority. I think the AEC has done pretty well, together with Sandia and the other projects we've had in WESEG. I wouldn't say that the military position, with respect to nuclear weapons, has been held back too much by AEC. I think they've been pretty cooperative. Now, they occasionally have had a man on the commission, one of the four or five, who is quite anti-military. I think they have one at the moment and I think we lost one of our best friends when Ted Thompson was drowned out there at Salt Lake or Boulder Dam, or wherever it was just a couple of months ago. He was a great person.

Q: Sir, I've got a whole batch of questions that I could ask you, but I think we have covered a range here on R&D. Let me go back to Cuba and the missiles in Cuba, and perhaps the prologue to the crises. How were you involved? I know there were paper reports that said you had warning of this.

A: Well, we had, for one reason or another. I was knowledgeable from, I guess, the early summer or fall of 1961, that there was what I would have called ample evidence. Some people didn't consider it so, or didn't want the problem surfaced; but we did urge that attention be paid to the problem and called attention to the fact that our intelligence was showing that this was happening down there. It was certainly a badly mishandled situation.

Q: Actually it goes back to 1960. On August 2, 1960, a whole series of papers said, "General Arthur G. Trudeau said that there was no question that Russia had mobile missiles that could be fired on such cities as Charleston, New Orleans, and Houston"

A: I tried to get the public to understand that this didn't have to be something with great big towers. They got the idea that for anything of this sort you've got to have a great big tower because they've seen ours at Canaveral. They don't realize that they have mobile missiles on tractor or wheeled vehicles that can be taken underground, and all you've got to do is to survey in your control point, then bring them out, program your firing, and fire the goddam missile. You can do that in an hour or so and I used to mention that fact, because I knew what their range

was; their range was up to 1,100 miles or kilometers, I've forgotten which. I used to say that those missiles could reach . . . I put it this way, "New Orleans, Nashville, and Norfolk, and maybe Washington." I had just taken a compass and followed it around an 1,100-mile curve and hit about there for the euphemism I just said. But our public had the wrong idea. They got the picture that you had to have a great big tower that everybody can see. If you've got a theodolite, a north-seeking theodolite, you go out and survey in your zero point. You come out and anchor on that with your computer, and that's it.

Q: General, I'm going to switch gear. I want to talk about the Roosevelt lecture program, which occurred in 1959. Your series of lectures was entitled "Time, Tactics, and Technology." Would you like to describe the series, how you got selected, and essentially what came of it.

A: Well, I don't know. It was either Kermit Roosevelt or Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt who decided that better relationships between British and American military associates would be developed through this exchange of lectures. She set aside 500 pounds a year for this purpose, which then gave us \$1,400 for whoever was going over. It was a two- or three-week job; I've forgotten what the schedule was. And it was rather favored that you take your wife with you, because there were many social engagements that went along with it. It was a truly delightful experience. I don't know why I was selected in particular -- I've forgotten who preceded me -- but many of our leaders have gone over to give these talks, and, of course, the same thing by the British. The Roosevelt fortunes in later years have not turned out to be quite as good, I guess, but in any event, the 500 pounds, or \$1,400, is being made available now. I think that was to cover everything except basic transportation. This may give the list of people here. I thoroughly enjoyed it. I related these lectures one to the other. I tried to vary them in a way that would be of interest to the level of the audience because we were going from Camberly, the Staff College, up to the Royal Military College of Science; the schools were all at different levels. And, of course I should add the Imperial Defense College and Sandhurst, where there were only cadets. Our approach was all British. It was a great experience; I enjoyed it.

Q: I have a feeling that you were selected for this job because you had become, in a year and a half, a very outstanding speaker for the government, for the military. Another subject is the Freedom Foundation at Valley Forge, and I know that on 1 May 1961 you were there. What's your connection with the Freedom Foundation?

A: Well, I'd been interested in it for some time. Don Belding was one of the founders, certainly one of the great supporters. He passed away last year; he was a friend and acquaintance of mine. Perhaps it was through him that I met Dr. Kenneth Wells. By the time I was approaching retirement that was one of the opportunities that was suggested to me, that I go up there and live, understudy and take over from Admiral Stump, who was living there at the time and was in charge. I've always had a very pleasant relationship with Admiral Stumpf because, as I told you, he was the commander in the Pacific at the time I was General Lemnitzer's deputy in the Far East, when the two were consolidated. The admiral is a dry and crusty fellow, but he's a perfectly wonderful man and I've had a great respect and admiration for him. At that time I said that I would consider it, but that's all I said.

General Harold Johnson, former Chief of Staff, is now going to run the Freedom Foundation. I went up with my wife when they were going to dedicate a building given by Sears and Roebuck. I remember Dr. Wells apologized to me that he didn't have anything better than a little guest house. It was Washington's old powder house. He said, "It isn't much, but we've fixed it up a little bit, and that's where you and Mrs. Trudeau can stay unless you go to a motel around here." We said, "No, that'll be great, staying in Washington's old powder house," and we were quite amused by it. Those were the days when ladies felt they should wear hats, and Mrs. Trudeau didn't realize that there was going to be a ceremony the next morning. A bunch of people were coming up from Washington and we were going on to Philadelphia to see some friends after the ceremony was over in the morning. So she said, "Gee, I forgot my hat." So I said, "Well, I can take care of that. I'll call Sullins." He was back at my quarters. We were then living at Fort Myer. I said, "General Vittrup and some others are coming up by helicopter in the morning; I'll have Sullins take your hatbox over to him." So I called Sullins and I put my wife on the phone, and she said, "Sullins, please get out the box

with such and such a hat, take it over to General Vittrup and ask him to bring it up to me in the morning." Sullins said, "All right." So my wife, in her lighthearted way said, "and Sullins, you'll never guess where we're sleeping tonight." Sullins said, "No, Ma'am." My wife said, "We're sleeping in Washington's old powder house." I don't know what the hell that meant to Sullins, but he thought that over for a minute or so and said, "Well, pleasant dreams, Mrs. Trudeau." Maybe he thought she was going to be blown up.

Q: . You mentioned General Vittrup earlier. We mentioned General Caraway. Wasn't Vittrup one of the people who was in Europe when you went over to talk about redeployment?

A: Yes, Vittrup was on General Devers's staff then and Caraway was also. Earlier they were preparing for the invasion of Italy and Caraway was there too. Vittrup was at the War College and also G-1 while I was Chief of Research and Development. We are close friends and played golf whenever we could.

Q: General, I think we've covered your time as Chief of Research and Development in great detail. We've talked a few times about offers being made and looking forward to another career -- perhaps not looking forward to it, but obviously it was coming near the end of your career, which did occur on June 30, 1962. I think that needs to be discussed and talked about.

A: Well, as I say, things were rather fluid for the six months or so preceding that time. You queried me about the CIA possibility, either as the Director or Deputy, and I responded to you on that. Then I got this invitation to visit Pittsburgh before Christmas 1961 from the chairman of the Gulf Oil Corporation. He said that he was going to have a Board of Directors meeting, and they would like to have a dinner for me. Would I come? Of course, I knew that I would be sized up for the job, as the initial approaches had been made. I set aside the date. Actually, I remember it happening to be just one week before Christmas, so it must have been about December 18. I flew out to Pittsburgh and was put in the top of the U.S. Steel Building where they had some special accommodations; that is, General Richard Mellon did. The directors were all present at dinner except General Mellon, who was away but was returning late

that night. I had a delightful dinner with these fine men. They asked me to make some remarks and I was in pretty good shape to do so because of my longtime interest in the oil business and, let's say, some slight knowledge of the Middle East, it's importance worldwide and where oil fits into world strategy as well as it's economy. Apparently that meeting went quite satisfactorily, and again I was reminded that General Mellon would be in about midnight. I was returned to my quarters, which were in one of the nice and very private clubs in Pittsburgh, not an open club. In the morning I had breakfast there in the suite with General Mellon. I had known him, not well, but I had known him before, and I knew that he thought reasonably well of me. General Somervell, my wartime commander, had offered me a position in a Mellon industry there years before. I think I mentioned also that Somervell was very helpful at the time we put the War College at Carlisle when we were planning the move in 1950. He again offered me a senior position in Pittsburgh industry. So General Mellon was not unaware of me. His right-hand man (who was the general counsel for T. Mellon and Sons, the governing body of the Mellon interest), Joe Hughes, was a civilian aide to the Army from Pittsburgh. I knew Joe Hughes as one of my close friends, and he has been ever since then, both he and his wife.

I knew that from the Mellon standpoint I probably had a reasonably good standing, but the Mellons are very quiet people and they don't like any publicity. I realized that he might have thought that I'd been talking too much. So I think one of the angles that he was really looking for was any admission or any statements I would make on my own part, not about the research job but about my, shall we say, willingness to not just use the job as a public forum. I assured him that I wouldn't. He didn't ask the question; he's too astute for that. But I was also astute enough to know that that was what was on his mind. I settled his mind on that.

Mind you, this is a week before Christmas. About January, Mr. Whiteford, the Chairman of the Board, called me up and said, "What about this?" and I said, "Well, they've got me over a barrel here," not knowing quite whether I am supposed to stay in government for this CIA job, which was still hanging fire. I said, "I really need more time on this." He said, "Well, come on out again before too long. I want to talk to you." I went out and he discussed matters very

frankly with me. He told me about the salary problems and other benefits and asked me if there was any part of it that was not adequate and, if so, to tell him frankly. I didn't push that; it was very good, let's say. Then, on top of it, he just made a slight additional offer as far as my retirement benefits were concerned. He said, "Now, goddamnit, you don't have any reason for not coming." "Well", I said, "I still got this little thing hanging over my head, but I will notify you; you certainly have a right to an answer on this, one way or another, and you've now been waiting four months for me, so I will call you back." So I got in touch with him and, to make a long story short, it was settled probably in May of 1962 that I'd go with them.

He said, "Now, come on out and we'll announce this, and then I want to finalize your letter of agreement, your contract." I set the date for the 12th of June. On that day they announced that I was retiring from the Army at the end of the month and would come to be President of Gulf Research. At 6:00 that evening, the Pittsburgh Chapter of the American Ordnance Association (of course, I tied this thing together) had a dinner at which I was the principal speaker. It made a rather perfect setup in that respect. We finalized the contract that day, and he said to me, "When will you be joining us?" I said, "Well, I'm going to Korea to retire." (I'll tell you a little piece at the end of this story.) I said, "I haven't had much vacation in really 10 to 15 years. I've never had a month off since we fought World War II. I thought I'd take a month or two and then join the organization." I think I said September, after Labor Day. He said, "Oh gosh, we need you now, but I can understand your position. However, your contract begins July 1st, so you come whenever you feel like you've had enough leave." I said, "Well, you really put me on the spot on that one. I do need a month. Let me have July, and I'll be here by the 1st of August." We shook hands on that, and off I went and gave the talk; the next morning I was on my way to Korea.

Now, this was interesting, because I told you about my service in Korea and the fact that I'd gone back there a number of times for various purposes. I had the bit put on me in Washington, and I'd been there four and a half years. I had known that there was no other job for me in the Army, and I accepted that. There was no problem; I was enjoying what I was doing and I stayed

with it. But I still retired a month before I had to for my own personal satisfaction; I mean, retiring on a voluntary basis instead of being forced to retire for age, which isn't much but it's that little difference that sometimes counts. Anyhow, I went to the Chief of Staff, or I guess the Vice Chief of Staff, and I said, "The one thing I want to do before I retire is to return to Korea. I'd like to have my retirement ceremony over there," because this parade ground business at Fort Myer leaves me cold. He gave me the okay. This was Barksdale Hamlett, a good friend of mine, now President of Norwich University, and so he gave me his okay. He'd generally been junior to me, but in those days the people were going by me on the promotion list like I was standing still; and I was. But, in any event, I made this plan. Then he came back and said, "You can't take an aide with you, because the Secretary doesn't feel that this is really essential." This was McNamara. I said, "All right, what the hell." Then they came back and said, "And you have to go tourist." Well, I thought, you can rub it in just so far. I said, "Oh hell, that's all right. I can afford to pay the difference if the government can't after 38 years, I can afford to pay the difference." Well, I guess that shamed them into letting me fly first-class. It's a long trip. Anyhow, I went over and had my retirement ceremony at my old headquarters. It was a great experience and I'm glad I did. I felt great satisfaction retiring with the corps and the division reviews from units I had commanded. It was far better than any ceremony Fort Myer could have offered me. I was gone about ten days, and my final retirement was on 30 June 1962. A couple days later my wife and I took off to Cape Cod for three weeks. We then returned to Pittsburgh and that's the story to the end of my career. The final party was given to me by my group and the OCRD. Of course, there were numerous other things that went on, various luncheons and things of this sort; we were very well treated. We went down to Belvoir which had, of course, been my first station, when OCRD gave me our last party and they had movies made up with the story of my life.

Q: General, it's a distinguished career, and I wonder if you'd like to close this session with perhaps some reflections. You've been reflecting the whole time, but is there anything specific? I think you must have a few reflections and perhaps some advice.

A: Well, I don't know that I do, because I've been thinking about things that happened sequentially, or chronologically, during my career as we just ad-libbed along here. But I can say that my military career was one of great satisfaction. I hold no bitterness toward anybody. As a matter of fact, I'm not the type of person that was ever bothered by that. Just quite easily I accept resistance in some places; I overcome it when I can. When I can't, I accept whatever happens, so I have no bitterness. I had a great career in many ways, perhaps better than I should have expected. As a matter of fact, it was definitely more than I expected because, I told you, when we came out of West Point we thought we'd be captains in 17 years, and a few might retire as colonels at the age of 64. Obviously we all did better than that. I had a very satisfying career. I felt that I had, and it's shown itself in many ways; it does every day -- the respect I receive not only from my contemporaries but from my seniors for the most part, also from my subordinates. This has been very gratifying and very rewarding. They knew that I at least stood up for what I believed in, and I think this is important. I've seen a lot of commanders who were hailed as heroes over an easy victory. I've seen some fired when there was a failure to achieve that victory, and who might have performed better than the hero to whom success came easy because of the factors involved. I was interested, of course, after going to industry, to see the differences between the military and industrial side of it but, in many respects, it's the similarities that are more striking than the differences. After all, you are talking about people. The motivation of the military is one of its main assets, the devotion to country rather than the search for money. This is what upsets me about the volunteer Army. I don't think you can "buy it;" in other words, I'm sure you can't buy quality. You're not going to buy quality and with the kind of an Army being proposed, I don't know what you'd have when the chips were down; they might not be there when the whistle blew. Of course, you don't really have to blow reveille anymore, so you might find them over having beer with their lunch by that time.

I think the caliber of the senior officers in the Army is outstanding. I've compared them with people in industry, as I've compared them with people in other branches of the government, including the Executive and the Congressional, and, by and large, I have not found them wanting. I think that the group that are

selected for higher education and higher staff and command responsibilities in the Army are certainly not surpassed; they might be equal in other services, but they're not surpassed. I think we're as broad as if not broader gauged than any of the services in this respect, and I think time is showing that to be true, both in the military and in a considerable number of our people who go into successful positions in civilian life.

I think Washington is an odd place, because most people have some particular motivation other than just doing their job. This may be unfortunate, but I guess we're all victims of circumstances, just human beings. I've often referred to the four sweet P's of Washington, which are pay, power, prestige, and politics, and almost everybody plays to one of those. I don't know that the politician does any more so than the man in the military. Each one has a different approach to their goals in life, either their announced or unannounced goals, and this is also true of the scientist.

I've been concerned about the areas of interest of some of the scientific community who, because they have reached the highest level, supposedly, as education has indicated (Let's say a Ph.D.) nevertheless have set themselves up as arbitrary experts on almost any aspect of life today. In other words, they not only are physicists and chemists, but some of them attempt to solve the world's social problems. There's an intellectual arrogance on the part of some of this group that is very bothersome, and not only to me. It's showing itself throughout industry and through their attempt to have a greater impact on government.

Since 1957 we've seen the race for space go on, and I must say that one of the papers I'm breaking loose shortly is "Project Horizon." I might have mentioned it earlier, but in the earliest days when I was Chief of Research and Development it was apparent to me, as I've stated before, that there were military implications in space, and that the exploration, and perhaps even -- I won't say occupation, but let's say residence -- temporary residence on the moon would be important. Between the Ordnance and the Engineers, I directed them to come up with a plan for landing and living on the moon, and this carried it at least as far as the Russians have gone today with their lunar vehicle. In other words, we designed a comprehensive

program. When it was submitted to me and sent to higher levels, the project hit the fan. The greatest secrecy was clamped on it, which seemed to indicate military implications in space, and it looked as though we were taking something away from NASA that they didn't have yet. I now have had the two volumes of that project and my letters of instructions unclassified, and I think one of these days this is another story that should be told. At least we did get to and on the moon two years ago.

CHAPTER XVIII

Gulf and Rockwell

Q: General, since we have now looked at your career from around 1918 to the time you retired in 1962, I thought we should continue and look at your second career with Gulf Research and then talk about your third career in which you are now engaged as Assistant to the Chairman of the Board of North American Rockwell, Mr. Al Rockwell. At the time of your retirement what were your feelings, what were the opportunities, and what actually led you to take up your new career with the Gulf Oil Corporation?

A: Needless to say, I had known that retirement would arrive at age 60; incidentally, for my own satisfaction, I retired voluntarily a month before I reached age 60. As I told you before, for certain reasons, I had known from its beginning that this (OCRD) would be my last assignment. While I might have made a couple of people unhappy, including Secretary McNamara, I don't think anyone wanted to take it on to ask me to retire early; we were moving in OCRD. At least none of my Army friends on the staff would have, because our associations were always very satisfactory, including mine with the then-Chief of Staff, General George Decker, a lifelong friend of mine. In any event, as a man approaches that time in life where he is going to make a major change, many things come to mind as to where to go, and opportunities begin to present themselves; if they don't, retiring people should seek opportunities themselves.

In my particular case I was fortunate in having a strong technical background and was being retired from a job for which there was very considerable demand for my experience or services on the outside, particularly in defense and/or space-oriented industries. This was an easy decision on my part. I made up my mind that under no circumstances would I go with a heavily oriented defense or aerospace agency where my brains and contacts would be picked on for a few years to capitalize on my experience and contacts. This wasn't what I chose to do. I had a fair number of opportunities. As a matter of fact I'd had them off and on for a period of more than 15 years, as I told you about IBM's offer in 1946. In any event, I looked them all over carefully. I was to some degree interested in the presidency of a college; that

fascinated me in many respects. But the one definite offer I had as the President of Norwich University did not attract me because of the isolation of the university and the question of what I would do with myself outside of normal student hours. My interests, in other words, had gotten too broad. My interests then and today are in the international and the security field as far as my country is concerned. I've never had an overwhelming . . . Let me put it the other way. This type of interest has always superseded my interest in things domestic, although I in no way disparage the importance of civil rights, better employment, better living conditions for our people, better working conditions, and all those factors that go into making a better America. The industrial area interested me. I had a pretty fair number of opportunities to select from. Let me just say as a base figure more than 25. I thought this over carefully and when I was approached and asked about taking over the Presidency of Gulf Research I was intrigued for two reasons, maybe more than two reasons. First, Gulf Oil is a great corporation; I knew that they had a substantial research establishment and that intrigued me. Secondly, they were not a defense-oriented industry, although they do their part when called upon. Thirdly, because of my intense interest, as indicated back as early as 1950, in the importance of oil as a key element in world strategy, then and now. I talked this over with a number of very senior people, people who retired from top positions in industry, and almost to a man they said yes, this is for you. That helped me to make up my mind. On the other hand, as I told you, I had to hold off because there was indication that I might be wanted in another agency of government, namely the CIA. While I felt in my own heart that that was not about to be, for reasons that came up earlier in my career and blocked me in certain respects, nevertheless I felt that if there was real demand and it was service to the country, I would do it. But that didn't come about. So, when it didn't, I finally made a decision and I went with Gulf. This was a decision that I never regretted.

There were difficulties in some respects because, to be very frank about it, as President of Gulf Research, I reported primarily through an executive vice president who was, and still is, known as the corporation's hatchet man. When you try to advance real research and development through a person of this brilliant but difficult type of mentality, it is not

easy to do. The establishment I found had grown gradually over the years; they were pretty set in their way. Most of the people in it were rather senior in experience and, let's say, not too aware of the latest technology as it was developing so rapidly in the late 1950s and early 1960s. They were really more devoted to product improvement than to really getting in on research and development. Furthermore, engineering had, to a great degree, been discarded by the corporation. Certainly it had been discarded as far as being a major element or group anywhere. More attention was being given to turnkey jobs where the contractor provided all the engineering and Gulf paid the bill. They finally realized that perhaps they were paying too much of the bill and not getting the quality and reliability their new plants should have, with the result that during my time I was able to re-establish an engineering department.

I was also able to bring a number of ideas in new fields of technology that hadn't simmered down to that level yet. This involved work with the laser, which was becoming terribly important; work in magnetohydrodynamics and plasmas; and just a number of things of that sort. Also I brought a greater appreciation of what the advent of the computer could do in improving efficiency and in the general application of the term of what we refer to as systems engineering and value analysis. It gave me great satisfaction in many of these fields. For instance, the application of the computer to the control and scheduling of the fleet of tankers that Gulf used; some owned, some leased -- long-term leases -- and some on what we call spot charter for a period of time or voyage or voyages as it may be. We were able to take this. Of course, we were dealing with ports all over the world, with ships of different size, with ships of different speed, with ships carrying anything from crude oil to various kinds of distillate or gasoline or lubricants or packaged goods all over the world. By cranking this information in and programming these variables of maritime transport, it appeared that we were able to get a gain in efficiency of at least seven percent. That is a good profit in any business, and if you can put it on top of other profits it is even better.

Then there were interesting problems in programming such things as the flow of different types of fuel to the markets from the sources. Let's say the source in this particular case is the Texas-Louisiana oil

field. After processing, this has to be distributed to all various areas of the country, and the requirements change with respect to climate and season. For instance, Gulf has a modification in its formulas, 13 modifications depending on the particular area and the climate involved. Furthermore, you can imagine the problem in scheduling the build-up of, say, gasoline in New England for the summer trade as against heating oils for the winter trade. All these matters are subject to programming and the time of flow. For instance, take the Colonial Pipeline which we use and in which Gulf is principal owner; that pipeline, running from the Gulf Coast to New York, holds some 15 million barrels of oil which even today is about one and a half days' supply for the entire United States. You have to schedule very carefully what product you want to put into that pipeline in order to have it delivered at a certain point at a certain time. Without getting into too much detail, these are some of the areas where the computer and systems engineering have really paid their way.

With respect to a refinery, there was no reason why there had to be work by-guess-and-by-God at the conference table in Pittsburgh when, through either recording real-time or periodic information, you could have right before you exactly the data that you needed to tell you what the picture was. Knowing the demand, let's say for fuel in the Northeast, you could work right on back from that demand to your refineries and through each of the steps at the refinery to decide what you needed to do with your crude oil way back at the input stage. It also told you the rate of flow you needed from your storage fields, wherever they were, into the refinery for the initial processing of your crude. There were naturally a great many things here that were quite fascinating to me.

Another point about Gulf was the importance to me . . . I don't take the credit for their decision at all; I had nothing to do with their final decision. I was not a Director although I had an ear to the Chairman, the President and, as I say, the people in power. One of the earliest ideas that I lent my small shoulder to was in getting them to think of themselves more as an energy corporation and not just an oil corporation. This resolved itself in several ways. First, they bought in Spencer Chemical Company in Kansas City and I acquired their research establishment at this time. This was one move to get us into agriculture chemicals, plastics, and petrochemicals,

which has now become real big business. I understand that Gulf is not going to stay in the agriculture chemical field, but it certainly will in petrochemicals and in plastics. This is real big business. In the field of biodegradable detergents, for instance, we did very advanced work in that connection and are one of the principal suppliers in this country to various soap companies that put out detergents under their name, not ours.

Another angle, of course, was in the field of nuclear power. The attention of Gulf on nuclear power was brought into focus by me after I had had an initial dinner meeting with Dr. Fredrick DeHoffman, who is one of Dr. Edward Teller's proteges. Dr. Teller was a friend of mine. I met with DeHoffman in California one night for dinner. He was the President of General Atomics, which was part of the General Dynamics Corporation. We decided then that General Dynamics probably, first, was not interested in pushing in this field and secondly, General Dynamics was faced with some very serious problems that put limits on their capital structure or capital funds for further investment. As a result, this was brought to the attention of our board at Gulf. They bought General Atomics, which was then renamed Gulf General Atomics, and now it has been expanded into Gulf Energy and Environmental Systems, which gets into this whole field of atomic power. They are dealing with the high-temperature, gas-cooled type of reactor rather than the boiling water or the pressurized water systems that we know today. Incidentally, it's in contrast to the fast breeder reactor that we are now developing in the North American Rockwell Corporation.

Another field that interested me greatly was in our marketing efforts; it seemed to me in many cases that people who were doing our selling were not sufficiently equipped with technical knowledge to satisfy the consumer. This applied not so much to service stations where it is rather obvious that the type of fuels used are suitable to most U. S. cars, although we constantly had to study that problem every month. This applied to where we used cutting oils and lubricating oils involving heavy machinery, machine tools, and equipment of this sort. I was able to start a course for marketing technical training for many of our people, particularly young engineers who we brought in. Instead of a salesman going out and having to come back and say they need an engineer, the engineer would be there. Consequently, he was a much

better salesman from the fact that he did know what he was talking about technically. These were some of the actions that were very satisfying.

We got an increased acceptance of the importance of research and development at the corporation level. You can't price these actions out because of the inflationary effects, but due to the acquisition and expansion of our work in the chemical field, in establishing the engineering department, and later in the field of atomics (although that was really operated as a separate R&D establishment), my own Gulf Research and Development Company did increase during the six years that I was with it by as much as 100 percent as far as funding and expenditures were concerned. While some of this was inflation, much of it was in additional and new types of effort.

At the same time, the corporation was very generous to me in its support. I made numerous trips throughout the United States (our domestic establishments) and overseas; we were then building refineries and lubricating plants in the Far East in such places as Korea and later Okinawa and Taiwan. I was able to build a small research laboratory in Holland to take care of the special needs in Europe which are caused by perhaps even greater extremes of climatic conditions than we have here, plus these very small, high-speed motors and cars that are always running at their limit. Whereas our motors are normally operating at maybe 25 or 30 percent capacity, over there, in Volkswagens and other cars, they race their little motors up to 5,000 or 5,500 RPMs. This gave us some unique problems with respect to lubricants. This was also true in our expanding field in marine fuels and lubricants where we made a lot of headway.

In addition, the corporation was very generous, very receptive to my taking on certain outside activities in the overall interest of the company and of technology. I was the President of the American Ordnance Association for a couple of years. I was a member and Director of the Industrial Research Institute all of that time. I served on the American Petroleum Institute committees; I continued to be a member of the Army Scientific Advisory Panel reporting to the Secretary on military problems, and was a trustee or regent for three universities. Between these activities I managed to keep fairly busy.

When my five years were up in 1965, which is the normal and pretty well established retirement age in Gulf (as a matter of fact, they are dropping it to 62 now), they asked me to stay on an additional year, which I did. By that time my first wife had passed on and I had remarried a widow from Washington. While living in Pittsburgh, we kept this house we are sitting in now. I built the home in Pittsburgh myself. I designed it along certain Japanese lines that appealed to me and my first wife; our children were gone and married, so we designed a small home which became inadequate when I acquired three teenagers by my second marriage. When vacation came, the family all raced back to this house you're in here now in Chevy Chase, Maryland, in order to have room for our three teenagers. After I left Gulf, I decided that we would retire here and this is where we have lived ever since.

Q: When you went to Gulf did you feel that there was an enhancement of rapport as a result of your coming out of the military? Was there a breaking-in period? Did you feel any resistance to you?

A: Well, there is bound to be some degree -- if you don't say resistance, at least resentment -- when a person entirely from the outside is brought in to head a company of 2,000 people. Gulf Research consisted of nearly 2,000 people then. It went above that figure later. We had 700 professional men, of whom I recall 160 were Ph.D.s, and something over half the total had masters degrees. There is bound to be some resistance. They weren't used to this kind of change. Nevertheless, I found that I was highly respected because of my position as Army Chief of R&D. I'll tell you what I did. In one week I made 20, 45-minute talks with 100 people at a time in the theatre so I could give them my philosophy of life and what the job meant so that they could see the kind of guy that they had to put up with. I must say that I ended up with a lot of friends. I got wonderful support. A couple of people might have been initially jealous, but one of them turned out to be probably the best friend I have in the whole company.

Q: Since this was really the first civilian or total civilian contact or task that you were performing in many, many years, did you feel this to be a harder, more disciplined organization versus the military, or vice versa?

- A: I don't know quite how to answer that. It was not different materially from our own Army laboratories. From my standpoint, having been an Engineer officer, I was used to civilian contractors and civilian contacts in civilian work since I had been a young officer. This wasn't like feeling peculiar because I didn't have a uniform on; that didn't bother me at all. Furthermore, I adjust to things readily so that my enthusiasm, my objectives on the day that I took over, were for that company -- just like that. I never moaned or groaned or felt sorry for myself that I wasn't still in the Army or anything of the sort. I had a new job, an interesting one, and I did the best I could with it.
- Q: If you ran into an obstacle, an incompetent, did you find that you could correct that situation more easily in the civilian organization than perhaps you had been able to in the military?
- A: No, I could correct it more easily in the military, particularly after I got to the point where I had authority, because I just removed the individual. I had him reassigned if I had that degree of trouble with him. It wasn't quite that easy in civilian life. These people were staid; they were fixed. They'd probably been in the same house for 30 years. They weren't used -- like we are in the military -- to packing up and moving this year and next year and every second or third year. So there was more difficulty in that regard.
- Q: You have told us that you have come back to Chevy Chase to retire. I know that you didn't retire and I know in the four months that we have been working together I don't think you probably ever will retire because you are involved in so many things. How did you get involved with North American Rockwell?
- A: Well, of course, the Rockwells, both father and son, are very prominent people in Pittsburgh, and nationally, for that matter. The father, Colonel Rockwell, is older than I but Al Junior, who is W. F. Rockwell, Jr., and Chairman of North American Rockwell, is a younger man than I am. I'm about halfway between the ages of the father and the son. They were both my good friends. Of course, the colonel is still a strong Army supporter, a wonderful patriotic American and a great supporter of the military.

The year I retired was the year after the merger of North American Aviation with the Rockwell Standard Corporation, which largely dealt with automotive components and other devices. As a matter of fact, if you turn any big truck over on its side in this country, about everything that you are looking at, such as the power train and all the rest -- axles, transmissions and brakes -- are made by the Rockwell Standard Corporation as it was then known. This is a very big business. The two of them joined and Al Rockwell, who was then Chairman, talked to me and said that he had problems in trying to merge these two very diverse industries, one hard-nose business (automotive), the other largely defense-aerospace (aircraft-oriented), both quite different in their approach to the problems of business. He offered me an opportunity to go to the West Coast and take over a corporate position.

Well, I didn't want to take over a corporate position because I didn't want full-time employment. I wanted some freedom to do things that perhaps I had never been able to do before. I really wanted something that involved part-time employment but something challenging. He had something challenging, so an agreement was made. A letter agreement was made between Mr. Rockwell and myself whereby I gave a certain amount of time to North American Rockwell each year, so many days a year, in return for which I was generously compensated. What he wanted me to do was two things: first, to assist in exploiting (and I guess that is the word to use) the new technology that was being and had been developed in the aerospace industry into the hard-nosed side of our business. This was a big corporate problem; it is a major problem in American industry today. I agreed that this was an interesting one to take on and not an easy one. The second thing he wanted me to do, because of my extensive acquaintances in the United States and in many other countries of the world, was to assist in new acquisitions, joint ventures, and other business opportunities in order to expand and diversify the North American Rockwell Corporation.

This was a fascinating one. With respect to that one I can only say that at that time -- and remember, this was within one year after the two corporations had merged -- there was really only one person designated with a primary responsibility for new acquisitions and joint ventures, although many others were assisting. At the present time there are probably 15 people with

a primary function for doing this sort of thing. Consequently, my efforts have not been used greatly in that field although when any opportunities come to my attention I forward it to those people who are interested in this section which deals with new corporate developments. I would make the observation here, though, that while this is one of the things that industry as a whole proclaims -- the great desire to diversify, when you get down to what we call the profit centers -- in other words the subordinate elements, the smaller companies, the subsidiary companies or divisions -- that this isn't necessarily so. The president of this company has got profit and loss statements to live with, and if he is going to diversify or take on something involving a new risk, then it is at the risk of decreased profits. Presidents are hired and fired based on their profit picture, you know. So, by and large, you find great resistance to diversification -- great care, let's say, in taking risks of this sort.

The same thing is true in the field of technology. The scientist and the engineer, you may think, are always willing to change. They are not always willing to change. They get certain ideas in their heads and you have to prove that something is better before you can effect change.

Change isn't this easy to come by. Believe me, it isn't, even in the technical field. When you realize this, you realize that you are dealing to a large extent with tangible things, with something that is available or that you can make available. If you've got this resistance to change in the hard disciplines, in the physical sciences, then how much more resistance you've got to expect from people where it comes from effecting social changes about which no true measurement is possible and no real reaction is possible as to the expected response of people as a whole. This is one of the problems we're having, and this is why we're in a position where in the physical sciences we've advanced our knowledge and its application so much further than we have in the social sciences that man is now in a position to destroy himself. These are simple facts.

You find people who are on relief today who have lived in the same village for 30 years. You can tell them that in the next state or in the next city 100 miles away there is a job they could get. For the most part they want to stay right put. The man may have some

degree of willingness to investigate, but the wife says, "Oh, we can't leave this community where our kids were brought up. They're all here; they are all living around us." Social change is really something hard to effect. This is why Congress, in its unwisdom, has had so much trouble thinking that they can adopt these civil rights programs and change things overnight. You can't change them; no country in the world has ever been able to change them, particularly when you are talking about a racial problem. They can't even settle a religious problem in Ireland. The same is true in other parts of the world. You've got these cleavages between the two Vietnams, the two Koreas, the two Germanys. How in the world the reformers think that we can just absorb the great difference in the social structure here between white and black overnight is something that I can't fathom. I think we just left ourselves open to real trouble. It is a greater problem than we've ever had with the Chinese, the Japanese, or with the Hebrews, if you want to look at it. No other group ever caused such severe problems trying to adjust to an American way of life; and the Blacks have been here the longest.

Q: I think that is probably due to the fact that these people have actually lived in their own separate culture apart from ours.

A: I think that is true to a very great degree. Yes, no question about it. But here we are; these are still the great problems of our age.

Q: General, when I first started talking with you today, although we didn't put it on tape, I said that there was a question that I'd like to discuss and I think that we've led right to it. There are many people who feel that the world is going downhill, that things are not improving, that everything is getting worse, that individually we can talk about better areas of social activity, living standards and so forth. But in general across the board we don't seem to be going up as a nation, as a world. You said that change is resisted, and we use the term evolution rather than the term revolution because that is a peaceful way of bringing about change. I was wondering, in your wisdom do you see any possibility of a breakthrough, from a revolutionary point of view, that perhaps something will occur that will get us moving upward again, not just this country, but the world?

A: I don't think that will occur from a revolutionary point of view if you are talking about resort to violence. Things can be almost revolutionary, short of violence, and something of this sort could occur. For instance, while I have been generally opposed to the recognition of Red China (and I'm not ready to say yet that I'm for it), nevertheless, if there were three poles in this world around which people gather, instead of two, the likelihood of any two of them or any one of them daring to initiate or be aggressive about war would be greatly reduced. This might lead to more in the way of evolution in the future.

There is no question but that man's problems are becoming more broadly recognized and more complex. They can't be quickly solved, though; there is no easy solution to the problems including the famine in Asia and Africa and the health problems in all the Third World. I don't know how we can change that. As a matter of fact, being a Christian I always think of the Lord having established this life as a struggle; he said it was a struggle and he left a Cross to prove it. Those people who think that they can exchange the Cross for the couch of the psychiatrist have got another guess coming. Things aren't going to be that easy. Life is a struggle and it is going to continue to be that way for man; it was intended that way. But I don't think the situation of some living in complete comfort and others living in dire poverty and starvation and malnutrition can go on. Where is the man wise enough to know how to alleviate it most rapidly? Certainly war won't do it.

Q: General, do you see a rapprochement -- a coming together of the two great clashing ideologies of communism and democracy, perhaps because of the requirement of an ecological revolution or from some greater threat to both of us?

A: Well, I suppose there will be some modification; I think it is a matter of degree. I'm not one of those "one-worlders" who believe that since the other extreme to capitalism is communism and the other extreme to communism is capitalism that socialism in between is the answer. I don't believe that, although I do believe that the natural resources, the God-given resources of the land, probably are going to be more carefully controlled by governments than exploited by particular individuals or interests in that area. Our

type of democracy is showing many cracks at the seams; it may be inadequate in the third millennium of our world.

I think one of the great things that has happened, almost God-given perhaps, is the cleavage that has arisen between Russia and China. I didn't believe it could happen. I didn't accept it for four or five years; I thought that this was a game that they were playing to trap us. But I now think that cleavage really does exist, and it may be one of the most helpful signs on the horizon. That's why I must say that I'm behind the President's efforts to feel out this situation with China and see if there is a better accommodation that can be arrived at, because we all need each other.

Q: General, there are many questions that I would like to ask you. Inasmuch as you have spent so much thought on the Middle East, I would be interested in getting your view at the present time on the situation; where do you think they're going?

A: By "they're," I guess you mean either Egypt or Israel. I don't know; I think to a degree we have created an impasse. I think something that has happened has been helpful in this regard and, since I am entirely unaware of either the State Department or petroleum industry plans or actions, I can just state it as a personal observation. I think the agreement just made between the major oil companies and the countries of the Middle East to increase their take but at the same time to insure the flow of oil to Western Europe and Japan for the next five years has had a somewhat quieting effect on the situation. It is true that the Arab countries could break their word like Russia does, but I don't believe they will. At the same time this must be a very inhibiting fact as far as the Russians are concerned if they are thinking about seizing it, because it puts them right on the spot as far as world opinion is concerned. As far as the Arabs are concerned, they're not communistically inclined; they neither like nor trust Russia and they know that if Russia takes over the oil in the Middle East they won't get paid for it; it will be just taken from them. That's what is going to happen. Now, at the same time, I share the concern you do that there appears to be a continued military build up in Egypt. This is one of the important way-points that the Russians are using to advance their interests not only in Egypt and the Middle East but particularly in

moving to the West, to Algeria and Gibraltar. They can outflank us and then do the same thing to France in reverse that we did when we secured Algeria almost 30 years ago.

The immediate item that bothers many of us, of course, is the Suez Canal, which will be a big gain for the Russians if they reopen that canal. It will give them immediate access to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean that they don't have and can't exercise if they have to go all the way around Africa each time they want to get there. Of course with their expanded holdings in Somaliland and Yemen down toward Aden, the Seychelles, Mauritius -- you name it -- the advent of Russia into the Indian Ocean is a very, very disturbing thing. I don't know that I have anything more that I should say on it at this time. I don't really look for open warfare on the Suez front. I don't think it is going to occur; I think there are too many inhibiting factors at the present time. I don't say that it will never occur; I don't mean that.

My major concern is the growing inferiority we have with respect to nuclear power, both offensive and defensive, as far as the Russians are concerned. I share the concern. I've said it for ten years, and others are saying it now, that the Russians can get to a point of dominance with their SS-9s, their SS-11s, and such defensive power as they have that they can really give us an ultimatum, "Do this or else," and I don't really know what the response would be. I'm glad I'm not the President to have to make it. But I think that if he appreciates this point -- and I hope he does -- then it seems to me that the only answer is to continue to strengthen our military position, our military posture. I doubt if this can be done within eight percent of the GNP; it never has been before.

Q: General, do you think if we are able to terminate the Vietnam War on the terms we would like to see it terminate, that the will of the people, the mood of the people, the understanding of the people will be receptive to more intelligently understanding the true problems that we face in the world.

A: I think so; I hope so. Southeast Asia is an area that our people do not understand. They do not understand the importance of it at all. They never have and they still don't, and we've done a poor job of explaining it to them. We've never told them what it meant to have 110 million Indonesians back on our side,

Singapore available for use, the passages into the Indian Ocean open for the movement of commerce and trade and oil for Japan, and Australia and New Zealand safe for the moment. They don't seem to get it and if they don't it is because we've done a poor job of salesmanship. Just the same as we've done a poor job as far as our military operations are concerned. By that I go back to the same token that once having decided that we were going to engage in land combat, we should have gone all the way to seal off the port of Haiphong and Hanoi and give them the works fast. You can't temporize on this sort of thing.

Q: Limited objectives but not limited power.

A: No. Except not nuclear power either. The difference in the attitude of the country between immediately pulling out of Southeast Asia but being willing to rearm to protect the Middle East and Western Europe is like night and day. An Iron Curtain, yes. A Bamboo Curtain? They can see through that one. They don't go for it.

We talk too much about this graduated response. Another term, of course, is the discrete use of force. In other words, if you don't hit me any harder than that, I won't hit you any harder than that; this is really escalation and you are asking for it. But I think we have absolutely discredited this idea of graduated response or discrete use of force. I think if you decide to use force, then use it fast, all of it. If you don't call our action a graduated response, then it was something less than that; this is fighting with one hand behind your back. We've seen generals -- good generals -- put on the shelf for mentioning the fact that the enemy was really falling back into Laos and using it for a sanctuary; we've seen the denial on Cambodia; we've seen all the limitations and restrictions that have been put on us as far as military operations are concerned at a terrible price.

Q: I spoke with General Larson about just that particular situation just a few weeks ago. Do you know he has moved to Chief of Staff and Deputy USARPAC Commander just in the last week?

A: All right. Then Westmoreland got him off the hook as far as the administration is concerned. I'm delighted to hear that, even if they don't promote him any further (and they may not, the way those things happen). Nevertheless, they've put him where he can

be of maximum use instead of riding herd on a domestic Army here in the U. S. A.

These sessions have been very satisfying to me. I've gotten a lot of fun out of thinking back about things that had slipped my mind, that I had probably thought of only occasionally over the past decades but not in any sequence like we've attacked them here. I think that the final step whenever we quit -- it is 11:20 now -- you ought to go over with me to the 19th hole at the Chevy Chase Club and grab a drink or a beer and a sandwich before you take off.

Q: Right.

You have certainly made a tremendous contribution to the collection, first with your papers and now with this excellent series of recordings and transcripts.

A: Well, it is not voluminous, I don't imagine, compared to some people's volumes and trunk-loads of records.

Q: Well, I would consider it one of our outstanding collections.

1.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SOMERVELL:

Subject: Landing Craft for Proposed Operations.

In accordance with instructions, the following comments on various JCS papers are submitted:

A. Adequacy of estimated requirements for landing craft for proposed operations:

1. Invasion of European Continent from United Kingdom in 1943-44 (Ref. JCS 291/1).

- a. Table VII considers maximum capacity of all available craft and arrives at figure of 226,000 men and 6,900 tanks. It is assumed that 6,900 tanks are mentioned for tonnage considerations only, as an armored force of that size would require a strength of more than 226,000 men in itself.
- b. A force of 225,000 men would include 20,000 vehicles (including artillery, bull dozers, etc.) requiring an added 100,000 tons of space. If some of these are substituted for tanks, the tank tonnage allowed (200,000 tons) would not be excessive as cubage rather than weight governs where vehicles are concerned, and the figures used for landing craft are not ship tons.
- c. A force this size for this operation would have to carry with it at least 5 days supply, an additional 75,000 tons.
- d. The utility of the 36' boat (LCVP) in a cross-channel operation is limited. If it is used, both this craft and the LCM must be loaded more lightly with personnel. In a report prepared just one year ago, representatives of all services (including British) seriously questioned the general use of 36' craft in this operation due to the impaired condition of troops upon landing. If they are to be used in the numbers shown, their combined troop capacity should be reduced from 131,652 to 100,000.



e. The text seems to indicate that an arbitrary reduction of 10% in numbers has been made, based on losses due to training, etc. No training has ever been conducted with 90% of craft kept in service. I believe another 10% reduction the absolute minimum to consider.

f. To summarize:

(1) Table VII provides:

200 LST	@	600	-	120,000 tons
300 LCI	@	75	-	22,500 tons
577 LCT	@	150	-	86,500 tons
750 LCM	@	30	-	22,500 tons
1157 LCVP	@	4‡	-	<u>4,600 tons</u>

Total weight carrying capacity -	256,100 tons
Less 10% (sub-par.e)	<u>25,610 tons</u>
Net	230,000 tons

(2) Required for balanced force of 225,000 men with 5 days supply:

225,000 men	25,000 tons
5 days supply (all classes)	75,000 tons
6900 tanks (or 20,000 vehicles, arty. pieces, etc.)	<u>200,000 tons</u>
Gross requirement	300,000 tons
Add 10%	<u>30,000 tons</u>
Net	330,000 tons

(3) Comparison of (1) and (2) above indicates deficiency of 100,000 tons.

(4) Landing craft in Table VII will carry:

18 Assault Battalions	18,000 tons approx.
6 Infantry Divisions	120,000 tons approx.
2 Armored Divisions	50,000 tons approx.
40,000 Corps and Army troops	<u>40,000 tons approx.</u>
175,000 men w/equip. & supplies	228,000 tons approx.

(5) Everything else that floats will be necessary to augment the landing force.

2. Mediterranean Operations.

- a. The landing craft scheduled for the mounting of HUSKY should be sufficient for any other Mediterranean operation except for a combined Crete-Dodecanese operation. If HUSKY is over, say by September 15th, there will not be time, however, to mount another Mediterranean operation of any importance and still withdraw trained troops and equipment, including landing craft, to U.K. in time for ROUNDUP. A diversion on a small scale is possible, however. The withdrawal of 3 - 6 battle trained divisions from the Mediterranean for ROUNDUP is most important in my opinion.
- b. The Crete-Dodecanese operation will require augmentation of the landing craft available. This can only be done at the expense of Pacific areas and of ANAKIM and ROUNDUP.

3. Proposed ANAKIM Campaign. (Ref. JCS 297 and 303).

- a. Without regard to availability, it appears that the requirements stated in Appendix "A", JCS 297 are inadequate to meet the revised ANAKIM set forth in JCS 303. Even if full requirements listed under Appendix "A" II, JCS 297 are met, there will still only be sufficient to move slightly more than one division. The plan calls for four divisions plus six assault brigades. No information is available on use of AP's and AK's. Our Navy is providing 200 LCM's and 250 LCVP's immediately. Additional data is needed on the operational plan before recommendations can be made, however.
- b. Craft scheduled for ANAKIM can be used for no other operation before late 1944.

4. Pacific Areas.

Landing craft withheld from this area will vitally affect proposed plans. Despite failure to list LCM's and LCVP's in Table III (see note B, page 47, JCS 291), present plans contemplate increasing the number of these craft for shore-to-shore operations. The number of sea-going landing craft are likewise being increased unless diversion for BOLERO is ordered. We must retain the capability for some offensive action in the Pacific.

B. Production and distribution of landing craft.

1. Tab A presents a condensed picture of all landing craft production during the war and of distribution to theaters and to the British through 1943. This is considered as the deadline for production of craft to be used in ROUNDUP. I believe the figures given can be met substantially. Losses in major types should not be great, including HUSKY.
2. The following number of each major type craft are scheduled for assignment to theaters as indicated upon completion this year. They are included in totals shown in Tab A and are in excess to those already shipped.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Atlantic*</u>	<u>Pacific</u>	<u>Total</u>
LSD	4	6	10
LST	32	126	158
LCI	45	82	127
LCT	33	52	85
Tonnage	38525	98550	137075
%	30%	70%	100%

* Includes delivery to British.

3. The above data indicates that present Navy plans do not propose to distribute this equipment where the major operations are indicated. JCS 291/1 does recognize the need for such a shift, however. These figures were secured from the Navy Department and should be more correct than those in Table III, JCS 291/1.
 4. Where small craft are involved in numbers the possibility of assembly in the theater of operations may be indicated. Production in Australia is at the 200 per month figure now. Tests on shipping sectionalized LCM's have been made successfully. A saving in space of 50% for LCM's and 80% for LCVP's is indicated besides release of deck space for other purposes.
- C. The impressions gained by an initial study of the various JCS papers, leads to the following opinions:

1. The successful completion of HUSKY and the development of heavy air attacks on Italy is quite likely to force an internal upheaval. If so, some units may be needed to exploit it.
2. Any other Mediterranean effort against islands can only involve a diversion of limited value in the final conflict with Germany. Russia will not be deceived. Such an operation could not be mounted before November, would not help Russia much as the winter will be on, and would probably extend well into the spring of 1944 interfering with, if not preventing, ROUNDUP.
3. The British may desire this to maintain a sort of "floating reserve" in the Mediterranean to offset their fears of a thrust into the Near East.
4. The seizure of the Brest Peninsula would appear to be of far more importance than Sir Alan Brooke would indicate (page 8, CCS 83d meeting). Any beachhead "locks up" troops until they launch an offensive and break through, and this area would provide a fine base on the continent. The destruction of the submarine bases would play an important part in conserving shipping and supplies besides facilitating support for the offensive. Battle trained divisions from the Mediterranean might be mounted for an attack in that sea and actually be launched against, say St. Nazaire, with the elements for the channel crossing striking at about D + 3 days, or certain factors might reverse this timing. These same units might be staged in the U.K. except for disclosing our decision not to launch attack in the Mediterranean.
5. It would seem that ANAKIM could be mounted and that the situation in China demands action.
6. The possible absence of Russia from the war by 1944 deserves more consideration.
7. The development of combined air-amphibious plans and technique should be expedited. Air Corps tactical units from Africa and air-borne troops will be essential.
8. The thorough training of all elements is vital. Our present state of training does not justify the attempt of ROUNDUP unless a large proportion of battle trained troops can be obtained. Additional training in the assault of fortified positions and passage of obstacles should be initiated.

9. The training of Army and Navy crews and Army shore units must be expanded and accelerated. It may be necessary to review the projected use of Engineer Amphibian Brigades if ROUNDUP is firm.
10. Unless extended efforts are made by the British, our weight should be thrown to the Pacific. There is too much equipment becoming available to disperse it all over the world and fail to seek a decision on any front. The principle of mass still applies. We can't outwait the enemy; we must outfight him.

Arthur G. Trudeau

ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU,
Colonel, General Staff Corps

2.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

AG 370.2 (19 Mar 45)E

A.P.O. 500,
19 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Engineer Special Brigades.

TO : The Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington 25, D. C.

1. In the succession of amphibious operations up the coast of New Guinea to Morotai, thence to the Philippines, the performance of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Engineer Special Brigades has been outstanding. The soundness of the decision in 1942 to form organizations of this type has been borne out in all action in which they have participated. These units have contributed much to the rapid and successful prosecution of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area. I recommend that careful consideration be given to the perpetuation and expansion of such units in the future Army set-up.

2. I pass on to you an item extracted from a report to me from Headquarters, Administrative Command, Seventh Amphibious Force, file A16-3, Serial No. 0078, dated 15 February 1945, subject: "Report of the Lingayen Operation - San Fabian Attack Forces".

"It is believed that the Engineer Special Brigade as organized in the Southwest Pacific Area is the most efficient Shore Party organization now functioning in amphibious warfare and that the permanent organizations of these regiments have contributed in a large measure to the success of amphibious operation in this theater."

Douglas MacArthur

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
General of the Army, United States Army,
Commander-in-Chief.

3. Speech to Incoming Officers

7th Division, Korea

March-July 1953

Officers and newly arrived officers to the 7th Infantry Division: I am not going to take much of your time with the history of the Division because I am sure that will be discussed with you and presented to you by other parties. However, there are a few things that I think are important to touch on as you literally have arrived here to begin your Army career, at least in combat. I think it is quite likely that some of you have previously won your commissions through OCS or may have been in combat; I don't know. Are there officers here who have served in combat before? Fine. That's good. Well, you know what I am talking about. You can evaluate combat as far as passing information on to the other officers who may wonder about it. The first thing I want to stress to you is that when you've learned the various techniques of being an officer and doing an officer's job in the Army by going through various courses of instruction, that is only the foundation. The primary effort has to develop within you--your leadership capabilities must continually develop, and that will be true as long as you serve in the Army. The development of leadership is the essence of our job at all times.

Let's look into the question of leadership for just a moment. I could give you a talk on leadership. I'd like to if we had time, but I don't have that kind of time and neither do you. There are things to be done and work to do. But I want to point out to you that the two principal facets which make up the quality of your leadership are: first, your character; and second, your knowledge. Now I am not going to spend much time talking of your knowledge. You've taken various courses in schools and prior to that you were selected to go to those schools because it was evident that you had the basic brainpower and other good characteristics which would enable you to absorb the knowledge put before you. You have the knowledge if you have paid attention to the instruction given you; and you have the brainpower to acquire additional knowledge, so that is not the problem.

The principle in leadership problems here, as anywhere else, is in the development of the individual's character. Now we don't like to have anyone say that

there's anything wrong with our character. And I'm not making such a statement, although each of us being human has our weaknesses. But, I am saying that there is need for constant effort to improve our characters, and that's just as true at my age and for myself as it is for you as young men who are just starting out on your careers. Some of you may be in the Army all of your life. Many of you probably intend to go back to civilian life. At least I congratulate you on your determination to accept the responsibility and also the honor and the privilege of an officer's commission. Too many of our young men, who do have brains, are not willing because they don't understand the need to make some personal sacrifice for the good of their country. Now, this question of character--it's a matter of will-power primarily. It's a matter of doing the right thing at the right time.

The example that you set for your men will determine whether or not they follow you when the going is tough in the offensive. It will determine whether or not they stay with you when the going is tough and when you've got to hold what you've got. That is will-power; it's determination, it's guts, it's a lot of things. It isn't only a question of physical courage. All of us, to a certain extent, are creatures of fear, but by building day by day the determination within ourselves that when the time comes, when the going is hard, when it's tough, we are not going to be found wanting. We develop within ourselves those qualities of physical and mental courage which enable us to come through when the going is tough; and if there is one job that is more important than the other for the officer, that's it. You will have under you 20, 30, 40 or more young men. Green soldiers; youngsters. Your leadership will determine whether or not they will do the job, and in the tough and dirty job of combat it takes that kind of leadership. It takes that kind of leadership if the platoon sergeant under you and the squad leaders under him are going to react and do the right thing when the going is tough. They've got to have confidence in the "old man" even if you are only 21 or 22 years old, as some of you probably are. You're still the "old man" as far as your platoon is concerned, and the sooner you get in and prove it to them and win the confidence of your platoon sergeant and win the confidence of your squad leaders then you've got a team. Until then, they're wondering. They're wondering about you. So make up your mind that constantly, day by day, you are going to strengthen your ability to do your job and that you are going to strengthen your determination to do it no matter how tough the going is. It will pay you great dividends both in the Army and later if you

return to civilian life, whatever you intend your career to be.

The cost of doing your duty may be great at times. We all know that this is not ping pong we're playing here; but nevertheless, the individual must make up his mind that the service to his men, the service to his unit, the service to his country, is bigger than he is himself. He must go ahead and do the job with that feeling and that understanding. If you do that, you will not only be successful as an officer but you will gain great confidence in your ability to overcome any kind of obstacles and that confidence will pay you dividends wherever you go. It will be a matter of personal satisfaction that not even ribbons or decorations can equal, for they are only the tangible, the outward evidence, that you have accomplished something in battle. The inward feeling, that you have been man enough to do the job and that men under you respect you, they are the ones who know. The man under you knows more about you many times than the man over you does. Don't forget that. You can't fool the men that serve under you. They know. You can't fool them, and that confidence, that satisfaction that you have been their leader, that they recognize you as such will give you a satisfaction which nothing else in this world will equal, at least that's my feeling as a soldier of over 30 years service.

Now, without going into many of the details, I want to caution you about one thing in particular. There has been a tendency, unfortunately, by troops on the line to feel, "Well, we will only be here a week, so we'll sit on our butts and just leave the position as we find it"; and the result is that while there are trenches and various types of fortified works on our positions, they are not the strong positions they should be after a year and a half of occupation. They are pitifully weak in some respects, and when you go up there you will see that a great deal of diligent effort is going forth to improve those positions. Trenches have to be deepened. Shallow trenches are no good. Trenches have to be deepened where they will protect a man walking along from either being observed on the skyline or from incoming rounds. At least give them reasonable protection. Certain sections of your trench have to be decked over to give you protection when there is incoming enemy fire or when we put VT on our own positions as the enemy starts to close with it.

Your protective wire: You've got to have numerous bands of it. It's got to be far away from your front lines so that the enemy can't come up against your wire and start

lobbing grenades into your trenches. Your sleeping bunkers have to be away from the areas in which you fight. Something that you will have to watch all the time is the tendency of men in the first shock of battle, when fear hits them, to stay down in the bunker, taking their security in that place even when the enemy closes with your position. Most of the casualties that we take, not only of our own, but many, many of the enemy, we find are in bunkers. Men have sought refuge in bunkers when there has been close-in fighting; and the result is that the enemy tosses a grenade in the door, and that's the end of the people in that bunker. So when the fighting is close, there is only one place to fight and that's out in the trenches. It may be the tough way, but there is nobody's artillery fire on you at that time; it comes to hand-to-hand closure with the enemy. It is true that not many of the enemy are killed at the end of a bayonet, but it is in hand-to-hand fighting and it is the grenades and a lot of other things which are in close. Those of you that have been in combat know what I have been talking about. So be sure that you train your men to take cover when the artillery is coming in and to get out into the firing positions when the enemy are closing with you.

Another thing which is a great weakness, a tremendous weakness--in fact, I don't know anything that is giving me more concern--is the constant failure of your wire communications. I have great faith in radio; radio can be used very extensively. However, wire is most necessary in a fixed position, particularly; and the answer to it, gentlemen, is to get that wire buried. When you get up there you will be amazed at the maze of useless wire that is all over some of the positions and in the trenches in many cases. What we want to do is get the wire cleaned up and get it buried, and it should be placed along the bottom of your trenches. Perhaps, instead of actually burying it there, you sandbag it along the edge, but you protect it; you protect it so that practically nothing can get to it. This makes it easy to repair or to lay a new line, and the big thing is that you will have communication when you need it. We've hardly had an attack since I've been here where our wire hasn't gone out immediately. While I know the difficulty of keeping wire in, under heavy enemy fire, I will not admit that it is impossible; and I think that to date a very poor job has been done in this and in many other respects.

So, I give you those two points: Strengthen your positions while you are in them even if you should later move somewhere else into another area, another sector, a month from now. The other fellow is going to be doing

the same thing, and it isn't enough to let men sit back and say, "Well, we had to be up all night last night." Sure, they have to get sleep, I know that, but there are still certain periods of the day when you can get some constructive work done and improve your position because you either go forward or you go backwards in connection with your position; and we're going forward, so I want to get that point across right now. Strengthen your positions. Use what you've learned about organization of the ground. Perhaps you didn't get much instruction. There isn't much being given in the service schools right now, not as much as there should be in my opinion. Then, we will try to help you by additional measures which are being taken here to give you information in that regard. The second thing is get hold of your men. Control them. Earn their respect. Earn their affection if you can, but you don't do it by being too easy with them. Make them hew to the line. Make them do the things that you want them to do and make them do it exactly. If you can't get your work accomplished during the normal peace-time hours and if you can't get your orders carried out exactly the way you want them, what makes you think you can make them carry them out amidst the confusion of battle? The point is, they won't. They aren't.

So, treat your men with firmness. Treat your men with understanding. Treat your men with respect. Talk to them. Talk to them about things which are official and military, and talk to them about things that are personal. Learn the big things and the little things which interest the man. Have something in common with him, and you will create in him, with him, and particularly in your non-commissioned officers, respect and trust. They're the ones you should work through to establish a bond which will give you a team when the going is tough. They will come through, and you will know success as a leader.

I am very proud to have you in the 7th Infantry Division, and I hope that you find your service is stimulating. Much of it will depend on your own attitude. So go forth with guts, courage, and curiosity as to what makes this world go round, what you can do to run your platoon better, and what you can do to make yourself a better officer; and you will gain from that a satisfaction which will transcend anything else you have ever known. Thank you very much, and good luck to you.

This is a story about a dog and it developed like this.

The wife of the senior representative of a major U.S. newspaper was a key volunteer in assisting Mrs. Mark Clark in the direction of the USO in Tokyo during the Korean War. She also was the leading American proponent for a Japanese SPCA (Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals). She may have had a good sense of humor but this story about her husband doesn't so indicate.

One day he attended a Japanese luncheon and after a "few" drinks and lunch returned home. (A "few" in Japan meant any single digit number but the effect varied whether it involved saki, beer, or Scotch, or any two of them - or all three). In any event my friend went home, slipped in to his bedroom from the garage and outside to the sun porch for a nap in the nude. While he was a well-balanced man, in this case he lost his balance fell off his cot and also off his porch.

Shaken, but uninjured he found himself locked out. Undaunted, he ran around the house and entered the front door. To his amazement, his wife was entertaining four tables at bridge. In record time, he flew through the dining room, knocking over a servant and disappeared in his bedroom.

There is no moral to this story but he later admitted under pressure that several of the ladies present exhibited a much more friendly approach later. Now, back to his wife, who reportedly kept him in the dog house for some time.

During 1953, I commanded the 7th (Bayonet) Infantry Division in combat in Korea. One of my soldiers, a private, when on R & R to Japan happened to meet the lady in question in the U.S.O. He was bitter that he couldn't have a dog in the forward areas and castigated me for it. We were in close contact and frequent combat with the Chinese as the battles of Pork Chop Hill, the T-Bone, the Alligator Jaws and others may remind you.

Nevertheless, the complaint, via the lady to Mrs. Clark to General Clark and thence to Gen. Max Taylor at Eighth Army, in Korea, thence to Gen. Bruce Clarke at I Corps and finally to me arrived for explanation. I replied as per the following doggerel and printed it in my division weekly paper. The demand was such that 20,000 extra copies were printed later to satisfy requests. Here it is. There was no further official correspondence that I recall.

Tokyo
June 12, 1953

Brigadier General Paul D Harkins
Chief of Staff
Headquarters Eighth US Army
APO 301

Dear General Harkins:

Thank you very much for your prompt reply to my letter enclosing an excerpt from a letter from the Headquarters of the 707 Ordnance Battalion of the 7th Infantry Division.

Am afraid though that it does not help the immediate situation cited in the letter. You do say that there is no directive prohibiting the owning of pets by enlisted men. In view of the fact wasn't this commander who had all the pets summarily taken away from the Battalion a little too drastic? Could not something be done to soften his attitude.

I realize this situation is a problem in Korea and I see all the sides of the question that you present but I was hoping that something could be done to facilitate the boys keeping their pets. Inoculations will immunize them and with a little care demanded of the men all potential menaces to the boys could be eliminated. These "pets" are a great morale booster as you know.

Animals can be taken home by anyone so desiring. The Navy Transports all Army personnel and will take pets provided they have been immunized and passed on by an Army Veterinarian.

Please give this your deep consideration. I am asking this as an animal lover and for the sake of the men who own pets in the Eighth Army.

Thank you again for your kind consideration of this problem. We are hoping not to have much more war so the situation can change and Korea no longer will be a combat zone.

Most sincerely,

/s/

/t/ - Mrs. _____, Vice President
Japan Society for the Prevention of C. to Animals
P.I.O. - G.H. C. F.E.C.

APO 500

C O P Y

22 June 1953

Major General Arthur G. Trudeau
Commanding General
7th US Infantry Division
APO 7

Dear Art,

I have now taken up correspondence with Mrs. about her dog, and the dog is the one in your 707th Ordnance Battalion. Can you give me any suggestions on how to answer her this time? What kind of orders did the Battalion Commander put out? Perhaps if we would look into the facts like so many other things, we will find that her friend may have read the problem incorrectly.

General Taylor chuckled to think that I had now taken over the correspondence, and being a dog lover himself doesn't want to ban all pets from the Army, yet he wants to be sure that the rules and regulations are sufficient to protect individuals who are around the dogs, and that the rules and regulations are carried out.

I have not answered Mrs. as yet. I will wait until I hear from you before I do. Sorry to bother you.

Best,

1 Incl
Ltr fr Mrs.
Parrott

PAUL D HARKINS
Brigadier General, General Staff
Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO 7

27 June 1953

Brigadier General Paul D. Harkins
Chief of Staff
Headquarters, EUSAK
APO 301

Dear Paul:

Prelude

There exists a single (but loud) complaint against some degree of control of the dog population in my sector. The exigencies of this "police action" in Korea have forced certain subordinate units to control the number and caliber of dogs inhabiting their areas. There is no order against dogs as such; in fact, there are hundreds in my sector.

Most soldiers have all they can do - and more - to care for themselves and their equipment. Few, if any, have time to devote to pets (and still do their work). As a result, most dogs are stray, and as such, impose a burden on units and become a nuisance in spite of our normal fondness for them.

In the summer season, dangers to health are very real. Registration and inoculations of this vagrant population is impossible under war conditions. Hence, while I am sympathetic toward dogs, I must permit my subordinate commanders, who know their local conditions intimately, to control indigenous dogs as well as indigenous personnel in their areas. The single complaint voiced out of a force of 25,000 men serving in the "Bayonet" Division area certainly permits no conclusion of unfairness to be drawn as regards existing policies.

OWED TO A DOG

I hasten to answer your latest letter
About the lad who lost his setter
Or was it a Korean malemute
With a collie's tail and a bulldog's snoot?
To tell you the truth, we have no orders
Against the possession of canine boarders;
Albeit the battlefield restricts
The way that dogs and soldiers mix.

The howls of woe from canine lovers
Have left my staff "twixt" smiles and tears.
This fight we're in is not just play
With all due respect to the SPCA;
So let's get on and win this war.
Then we'll cater to dogs, but not before;
When Chinese troops have left their trenches
We'll turn to legal sons of bitches.

We've brown ones now and black ones, too.
In fact they come in every hue;
They've got terrier's heads and airdale's rears
With corkscrew tails and amazing ears.
They follow the band and stand retreat,
In fact they are always under our feet.
But, like some soldiers I'm sure you've known
They seem to prefer the 2-point zone.

There's Kimchi and Sukoshi and No. 10,
And Hav-a-no, Tocsan and Pohung-dong.
They sit in the shade and sleep in the sun
For a dog's real work is always done.
And when your chow you start to eat
They stare until you toss your meat
To chase them away with their Kimchi smell
Which all of us here now know so well.

They've got fleas and mites
And other dog's bites;
They bay at the moon and bark at the sun
And yelp and snarl at everyone.
The way they wet like any pet
Is beyond all rhyme or reason;
The darn little pests pick the oddest nests
- and they're usually in season.

To whelp litters on a barrack's floor
Makes lots of other soldiers sore;
And our problems of field sanitation
Are worse when bones and defecation
Are left beneath your bunk or tree
Where in pensive moments you felt free
To contemplate on home or pals,
- Or dream of luscious pin-up gals.

To chase away a harmless pup
Whose tail curls down - but seldom up -
Is not exactly what kindly men prefer,
Except to keep some rabid cur,
Roaming an unsanitary area
Further upset by war's hysteria,
From spreading hemorrhagic fever
Would seem to justify stern measure.

To give them all an inoculation
Would require my vet to go on vacation
From checking the vegetables and meats
To chasing dogs out of company streets.
He'd never be able to retain his composure,
(I could round up thousands in the PW enclosure);
My Chinese prisoners have been rather serene
But most of these hounds are downright mean.

We're now dog-conscious "Bayonets"
And lest each GI doubts or frets
It's only fair that each should know
Most hotdogs come from Chicago;
That dog-tags bought by Uncle Sam
Are really made for use by man;
And only an SOB would invent
A contraption like a U.S. "Pup" tent.

I, too, love dogs and I own a cocker.
He's our pride and joy and his name is Topper;
We've some fine dogs here in the battle zone
And we give them food and a frequent bone;
But our complex tasks (less one forgets)
Require accent on battles and not on pets.
I can only say I'll do my best
And hope sleeping dogs will do the rest.

Sincerely,


Arthur G. Trudeau

5.

EDUCATION IN UNDEVELOPED AREAS

During three one-month inspection trips which have taken me to nearly all the countries of the Free World except South Africa and those in South America, I have noted that serious deficiencies exist with respect to education in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

This situation in a world of radio permits the user of the air waves to inflame popular feeling and thus influence its reaction in a manner out of all proportion to the soundness of his proposition in minds incapable of evaluating the fundamental truth or falsity of the thesis. The extended use of television in time will add to the danger. Motion pictures have contributed their share. Thus to utilize these great scientific and technical achievements for good instead of evil, there is a crying need to advance the mental level of man. In Libya, with a population of over 4,000,000, only 57 persons have had the advantage of a cultural education.

It is clear that scholarships to the U.S. for a relatively few selected individuals is inadequate, expensive and can be dangerous, if ideals and objectives are implanted which only become focal points for frustration as the years go on and youthful aspirations fail to be realized.

In none of the areas where the economy is largely an agricultural one does one find an integrated educational system. It is a long-range but worthy objective for us to explore. It can have a vital bearing on the world situation by the turn of the century if developed. If disregarded, it can only aggravate the untenable situation existing today.

I recall the Sheik of an Arabian tribe whose great desire was to send his son to the American University at Beirut. No money had been seen in his tribe for 10 months -- self-support or barter were the only means of livelihood. As he said, "I have many sheep and goats but I can't drive them a thousand miles to Beirut to pay for my son's education."

Last month in Southeast Asia I saw 500 young Chinese from Indonesia on a ship in Singapore harbor headed for Hong Kong and college in Red China. They were but a small part of an estimated 5,000 Chinese-Indonesians who are making that trek this year. Throughout the area, this is a pattern. Our loss of their brains is Red China's gain -- and they will be used against us later.

Without exploring further the related political, economic and psychological factors it appears to me that we must proceed along the following lines:

1. Expand the elementary school opportunities by training teachers, improving facilities, and developing a climate favorable to a solution of the problem.
2. Establish vocational and intermediate school facilities with teachers properly trained and oriented.
3. Encourage and support institutions of junior and undergraduate college level in selected countries.
4. Establish and support colleges and universities in selected areas for the training of outstanding individuals from neighboring countries. As a thrust I would suggest:
 - a. University of the Far East -- Philippines.
 - b. University of China -- Formosa
 - c. University of South Asia -- Pakistan
 - d. University of the Middle East -- Lebanon (American University of Beirut)
 - e. University of East Africa -- Ethiopia
 - f. University of West Africa -- Liberia
 - g. University of the Americas -- Colombia
5. Outstanding graduates of the above universities would be given graduate work in the U. S. as at present. Normal exchange of students would be continued.
6. English should be the basic language in area universities, but the faculty and guidance, while properly oriented should, for the most part, be indigenous to the area concerned.

For the cost of one month of battle in Korea, impetus could be given to the whole program. We ought to do more. We dare not do less, in my opinion.

March 1955

General

Although great advances have been made sociologically and, in many cases, from an economic standpoint in the countries of Latin America, the rapidly growing population, which is presently expanding at a greater rate than the ability of the area to even feed itself, constitutes a grave problem for the United States. Demographic studies indicate that by the turn of the century the population of Latin America will be in excess of five hundred million people or more than twice that of the United States. From a selfish, if an altruistic viewpoint, therefore, it behooves us to seek a solution to these problems before they are aggravated to a point beyond out control.

The health programs initiated during the last war have borne fruit to a point where infant mortality rates have been substantially reduced. Improved nutrition, although still inadequate, has likewise lowered the death rate and increased life expectancy. Birth rates continue at an all-time high. Unfortunately, the ability of most countries to make themselves even reasonably self-sufficient in food and food products, despite their potential to do so, is held back by graft and ineptness in high places and by the lethargy and indifference of the people.

The failure to initiate sound programs for the development of agriculture and grazing lands, including access thereto, for the exchange and distribution of produce and other items needed by the people is appalling. The people, on the other hand, despite their poverty and isolation, have been awakened by the motion picture, the radio and by demagoguery to seek and demand what they consider their fair share of the world's goods despite their inability to contribute much in the way of progress or effort.

While education has made reasonable advances, it is still limited and inadequate. Moreover, improvement in the general standard of education must be accompanied by comparable improvements in the general standard of living or else dissatisfaction and unrest will increase instead of being reduced.

The political structure of many of these countries leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, the concept that American democracy should be substituted for those forms of government now in effect must be approached with care. In countries where more than fifty percent of the people are illiterate and wide ethnic differences exist, as in Peru, it is not reasonable to demand our type of democracy or to expect that it could be effective even if adopted. I feel that the American press at times does us a great disservice by constantly criticizing the chiefs of South American states as being either Dictators or Communists. These are views that South American extremists have of each other but they should not be the views of the average American. In many countries our Ambassadors, as well as many other responsible officials, stated to me that the local form of government in the particular country appears acceptable to the majority of the people and that, while maximum progress may not have been made, they could envision other forms of governments which would have been far worse and few that would have done any better.

Since our main target in Latin America is, and should remain, the destruction of Soviet-dominated Communism or at least its reduction to impotency, I believe we should support the existing forms of government, barring positively the creation of extreme leftist or Communist states, which are presently a threat in several areas.

It seems to me our present military objectives should be to enable each country to have such minimum armed force as is necessary to provide internal security with a complete orientation toward the United States and with a standardization of arms, equipment, tactics, technique and doctrine to a point where additional effective military force can be generated in emergency.

The efforts of the Foreign Operations Administration and the United States Information Service are productive of great good and should be continued under constantly improving policies and procedures. The efforts of other governmental agencies are likewise assisting the area and generating ideas which we can hope will result in constructive programs of development and improvement. The training of elementary and secondary school teachers and the installation of additional vocational training facilities are of considerable importance. The program for the exchange between these countries and the United States is generating much good will and will have an even more important effect in the coming years. The training of Latin American military personnel in U.S. military schools is of the greatest importance and should be expanded. The concept of a University of the Americas, to be staffed by a faculty of outstanding educators from all countries and utilized on a large scale by carefully

selected students from all countries of the Western Hemisphere, deserves to be implemented in my opinion.

Arrangement for the investment of more U.S. capital under proper safeguards and with certain inducements such as tax reduction is badly needed. The competition from foreign markets, principally in Western Europe, is reaching a point where some easing of the trade terms imposed by an American business must be considered.

The need for roads of all classes and essential means of transportation and communication is of primary importance. It can well be said that South America has tried to leap from the donkey and the dugout to the airplane without much success. The construction of highways and access roads to potential agricultural areas requires maximum support. Some of this work could be done, however, by equipping army units within the particular country as engineer units to pioneer the development of new areas. In addition to the actual work accomplished, which would do much to raise the prestige of the army in the eyes of the people, these battalions would constitute an effective internal security force. It is difficult for me to justify MDAP anti-aircraft battalions in lieu of units that could provide constructive improvement for a country as well as a better type of essential internal security force. Under several country reports, this point is discussed in detail.

The situation whereby American business has controlled the Latin American market, to a great extent on its own terms, is disappearing due to the aggressive trade policies being instituted by Western European countries. It may be that they can better our offers as to price although American business has seldom been undersold. What is alarming is that through easy trade terms they are frequently taking the business away from American firms who have offered the product at a lower unit price. We can surely meet such competition with out resources. Perhaps we are subsidizing other governments to an extent that they can underbid us in one of our own primary markets. This is being felt not only in the commercial field but also in the purchase of military items. Venezuela, with her capability to pay for what she buys, is a good example of where we are losing in this latter field. I am sure that the New Orleans conference and studies by individuals far more capable in this field than myself will bring this problem into focus and indicate a solution.

Economics

Despite the facts that U.S. imports from Latin America dollar-wise have increased four and one-half times

since World War II and that our foreign trade with Latin America percentage-wise has increased from less than one-quarter to more than one-third during this period, the economic conditions in most of this vast area are still critical. With a larger population and more than twice our area, Latin America has only 6% as many miles of road, 5% of our power production, 3% as many automobiles and produces only 11% of our GNP. Too many of these nations are dependent on a one-crop or one-product economy which leaves them in a desperate position when adverse conditions in the world markets occur. One needs only to consider the importance of coffee in Brazil, sugar in Cuba, tin in Bolivia and copper in Chile to appreciate this condition. In certain countries fortunate enough to produce a diversity of items for export, any lowering in the demand or market price of a particular item can be absorbed with less financial difficulty. In those countries that are dependent on dollar exchange earned by export to pay for import of essential food items, the conditions caused by lack of markets become critical. This situation exists today in Chile where such great dependence rest on the export of copper. The economic repercussions of the drop in the coffee market are felt in many Latin American countries. The same condition ensues with respect to surplus tung oil in Paraguay and wool in Uruguay.

It is hoped that the interest being shown in Brazil as to the contract agreements arrived at in Venezuela with respect to United States investment and assistance in the development of petroleum resources will bear fruit. However, it is doubtful if much progress can be made prior to the election or change of government in Brazil. It is also to be hoped that favorable oil agreements can be reached with Mexico in the coming years.

The agricultural development of many countries in South America is a matter that deserves high priority. It is difficult to conceive that so many countries with primarily agricultural populations continue to be unable to increase their low degree of self-sufficiency in food and food products. Agricultural methods are archaic. Large landowners are relatively indifferent to modern methods of increasing production as long as they themselves gain a comfortable living. There is no distribution system worthy of the name. National programs for improved methods of farming and opening up and resettlement of new areas are largely non-existent although they are being stimulated by present U.S. and U.N. efforts.



HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

20 March 1961

7. MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTORS, OFFICE AND DIVISION CHIEFS
OFFICE CHIEF OF RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: Guerilla Warfare.

1. The expanded interest in Special Warfare activities, particularly guerrilla warfare and counter-guerrilla warfare, is causing this matter to be given a great deal of thought. It is important, in the Office of the Chief of Research and Development, that no effort be left unturned to provide the very latest and most effective equipment for such personnel. This applies particularly to the fields of fire power, communications, and items needed to live within the environments expected.

2. In stimulating thought toward that end I am having a review made in conjunction with the General Staff and Technical Services of what more can be done in this field. To assist in the thinking involved I am attaching comments from an individual who has given much thought to the field of guerrilla warfare. While this has no official standing as doctrine it is thought-provoking and is, therefore, furnished for your study and consideration.

1 Incl.
Some Comments on
Guerrilla Warfare

Arthur G. Trudeau
ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU
Lieutenant General, GS
Chief of Research and Development

Copies furnished:
CG, US Continental Army Command
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Comptroller of the Army
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief, Coordination Group, OCS
Heads of Technical Services
Technical Services' R&D Chiefs
Heads of OCRD Field Activities

SOME COMMENTS ON GUERRILLA WARFARE

I'm flattered that you asked my views on guerrilla warfare and training requirements. I have given a lot of thought to this, particularly as it relates to Communist tactics in the cold war and what we should be doing in this field. Of course my views are personal and probably would not stand the test of the cumbersome staffing and coordination process.

I do believe that accenting guerrilla training in regularly established combat units is not enough. Our regular units should receive training in antiguerrilla operations because this requirement may be laid on them at any time. The United States has not been faced with fighting against Communist-supported guerrillas to any great extent as yet. But the French, British, and other NATO powers have had some experience fighting guerrillas in underdeveloped areas. There are five general areas where we need to take further action.

1. Antiguerrilla training in its broadest aspects for our conventional forces;
2. Antiguerrilla training for friendly foreign armies in underdeveloped areas;
3. Developing a guerrilla warfare capability in friendly foreign armies, particularly where they border on countries with hostile governments with similar ethnic minorities;
4. Developing a guerrilla warfare capability under U.S. sponsorship from refugees from Communist-dominated countries, including not only those from the Communist bloc, but also from such areas as Cuba;
5. A regional school system in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Middle East Africa and also in the United States on Communist strategy and tactics, Free World political goals, guerrilla and antiguerrilla operations, propaganda, and subversion for both foreign and U.S. cadres.

Our special forces came about initially to provide training, equipment, and leadership to guerrilla forces in general war. This type of guerrilla warfare was to be primarily for supporting ground operations in general war. Much of our doctrine was patterned after the Soviet use of partisan forces against the Germans in World War II. Even as late as 1956 this was the extent of our doctrine in guerrilla warfare. There was little impetus to change this concept or at least to broaden it. Colonel Ed Lansdale (ASD/OSO) was interested in seeing special forces used to

advise foreign armies in underdeveloped areas how to fight Communist-supported guerrillas. Unfortunately, our doctrine is politically sterile and does not provide the answer to all the multiple facets of Communist cold war tactics in underdeveloped areas. The U.S. still maintains a wall of separation between politics and the military. This is fine for our domestic problems, but it does not work against Communist-supported guerrillas where political and military action are one.

The best example of a foreign army defeating Communist-supported guerrillas in their homeland was the Philippine experience in the early 50s. Colonel Lansdale (F) had witnessed this action. At first the Philippine Army was unable to isolate and defeat the Communist-supported HUKS. I believe the principal reason was that the army forces concentrated solely on trying to find and defeat the guerrillas themselves, ignoring the political climate in the Philippine villages. When the Philippine Army modified its doctrine and undertook civic actions programs designed to win over the villagers, the attitude of the people changed. The people then supported the government forces, accepted them as their protectors, and withdrew their support (even though sometimes this support was coerced) from the HUKS. With these changes the HUKS were defeated because the fish no longer had water in which to swim. The same tactics were applied late in Indo-China, but too late to save North Vietnam from Communist control under the Geneva Agreements.

Some officers in the French Army picked up these tactics in Indo-China and made further studies of overall Communist tactics. It had been quite puzzling for professional officers to witness the defeat of a well-equipped, well-trained, superior professional army by a few poorly-equipped, politically motivated guerrillas. I imagine Batista felt the same way observing a motley crew of Castro followers defeat 40,000 troops equipped with reasonably modern arms.

The French officers attempted to find a solution in a new doctrine for their conventional forces. Their magazine, "Revue Militaire D'Information," in 1957 had several articles reflecting some new thoughts in this field. They called this doctrine revolutionary warfare and psychological pacification. Application was begun in Algeria but was ceased after the French government considered certain French military elements to be using this doctrine against the French civil authorities in Algeria.

I wanted to cover these points to indicate that foreign armies have moved further in antiguerrilla warfare than we have. We have not had the combat experience in this field. Our experience with the Indians left much to be desired.

activities, and guerrilla warfare. The schools exist in the CIC School, Information School, Special Warfare School, Civil Affairs School, and the '59 National Strategy Seminar. Each could contribute something in the field of their primary interest in how to counter Communist tactics (including guerrilla warfare) in underdeveloped areas. From such a course we could train cadres for military units, develop doctrine, and finally train foreign military leaders from Latin America, Middle East Africa, and Asia.

To turn the guerrilla warfare coin over, we must find a way to overthrow a Communist regime in power short of general war and even short of limited war. I still see no reason why we should accept a tyrant government in Laos, the Belgian Congo, or any Latin American country. If they can afford a million dollars a year on propaganda alone in Latin America, and support a Communist government in our backyard, we can support free governments in Eastern Europe or any other area dominated by Communists. Again, this can be an indigenous operation supported by the tremendous psychological prestige of the backing of the United States in Eastern Europe. We can provide military assistance to an anti-Communist revolution. But here, too, we need a doctrine in the Army.

Presently we broadcast to the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as you know. When a revolt occurs such as in Hungary, we are unprepared to cope with it. We could train and equip some of the hundreds of thousands of the nationals who have escaped from Communist domination. I include here not only the Soviet bloc, but Communist Cuba also. Place these forces under U.S. leadership, organized on the basis of special forces. These detachments could have a capability of becoming a MAAG to a denied area where a resistance potential exists. Where U.S. policy supports such assistance, our whole foreign information activities can be stepped up. The assistance detachments under the Army's sponsorship can provide the basis for not only military assistance, but economical assistance to the resistance forces. There would undoubtedly be a political opposition to the Communist regime which our government might support. A government in exile or in belligerent status would provide the political base for the military or guerrilla warfare operation. I believe Communist armies are susceptible to subversion, however, we're not capitalizing on this vulnerability. The soldiers come from the people, and the people of Eastern Europe would fight along with the soldiers to overthrow the Communist regime if they knew we would assist them. The people of Eastern Europe respect the United States as much, or more, than any other peoples because we are their only hope for the future. The Hungarian Army joined the Freedom Fighters, not the Communist regime. We need no better lesson for all the doubters. The Soviets apparently do not fear that they will

activities, and guerrilla warfare. The schools exist in the CIC School, Information School, Special Warfare School, Civil Affairs School, and the '59 National Strategy Seminar. Each could contribute something in the field of their primary interest in how to counter Communist tactics (including guerrilla warfare) in underdeveloped areas. From such a course we could train cadres for military units, develop doctrine, and finally train foreign military leaders from Latin America, Middle East Africa, and Asia.

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start general war when they assist Communist rebels in Laos. Why should we fear general war in providing assistance to Freedom Fighters in Eastern Europe? The people are on our side here. We could do this overtly. But in any event the Army could provide the tactics, doctrine and units to accomplish such an operation should policy ever provide for assistance to the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe.

I would visualize the doctrine as not much different from present doctrine for special forces. Infiltrate into resistance areas; develop a military base through recruiting, training and equipment and eventually expand the operation to military action if necessary to overthrow the regime. The differences between this doctrine and present doctrine would be these. The operation would not be in support of conventional U.S. military operations. Our military force would be the psychological club held cocked, prepared to prevent outside intervention. The guerrilla war would be political and anti-Communist, for national self-determination. The resistance area would be a base for total U.S. assistance (military, economic, political, psychological). Then let us compromise for a neutralist government in the Communist bloc as the Soviets so well like to do in western colonial areas.

Again, the Army could develop such a doctrine and such units as we have for the nuclear weapons. Where and when we use either is a matter of national policy decision. But the Army should have both weapons in the arsenal.

The Army could also participate in exploiting the vulnerability of the Communist armies as a threat to Communist political controls. Broadcasts for a short time each week could be prepared at Fort Bragg for dissemination over the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberation. The Army has the potential. We need more professional talent at Fort Bragg. I believe the largest paradox in the Communist system is their Army. They can't survive without one. But when one exists it is a power force and potential threat to the regime. Two examples stand out. Stalin brutally purged the majority of his senior commanders in 1936. The sore still lingers, I'm sure. The Soviet forces in Hungary fraternized with the Freedom Fighters in 1956. Outside forces, ignorant of the issues, had to be called in.

I certainly do believe we can do a great deal more in this field. I'm not sure the Army staff is ready to go as far as I think we should. The two names I would mention in the Pentagon who are most knowledgeable in this field are Colonel Ed Lansdale, OSO, and Slavko N. Bjelajac, Special Warfare.

8. Remarks at Final Retirement Review

Headquarters I Corps (Group)

Uijongbu, Korea

June 1962

Thank you, General Harris, distinguished members of the Korean Government and the Diplomatic Corps, Right Reverend and Very Reverend Monsignori, General Meloy, members of the Armed Forces, ladies and gentlemen, my Korean friends and fellow Americans.

It is almost exactly twelve years since communist forces to the north assaulted this country and after battle, tribulation, and tremendous sacrifice, they were repulsed by the American, Korean, and United Nations troops. Why we didn't march on to victory is not for a soldier to say. But after these many years the struggle still continues against world Communism.

Today some say that containment is a substitute for victory, but there are no cases in recorded history which prove this to be true. I know of no athletic sport that can be won as long as the other side has the ball. This is a time for all men who love freedom to stand side to side together. From Korea to Kuwait and from Berlin to Bangkok, too much blood has been shed by all of us to permit small issues to strain the bonds of freedom and unity. We must concentrate on the large objectives to be won and rise above human frailties if we are going to preserve the gains so dearly purchased ten years ago.

In addition to one million Korean people and thousands of Allied troops who shed their blood here, more than 140,000 Americans also shed their blood that Korean independence might be restored. This was four times as many casualties as we suffered in our own Revolution, but the cost of freedom is higher today.

In the several years and many times that I have been in Korea, it always seemed to me that the purple flowers that bloom on the north side of these beautiful hills in April and May were a bluer blue and a redder red because of our blood that had trickled down the hillsides.

You are different men than the fathers and brothers before you, but you are in the same units whose colors

you so proudly bear. We no longer hear the nighttime alerts that call for flash fires on "Pork Chop" or "Arsenal" or "Spoonbill" in our dreams. But if the call comes again, I am sure the spirit of old will rise again within you to meet the challenge in full measure. The law of life is one of struggle, and the cross man bears is a heavy one and probably was intended that way. It will never be made of foam rubber and our problems will not be solved on psychiatrists' couches or with tranquilizers.

It is a great pleasure for me to come back as a commander who has had the honor to command all of these units in time of peace and humble to command some of them in the full force of battle. No other tribute that could be paid me compares to this, and I thank you for the honor that you give me. That is why I came.

As I lay aside my uniform and the accoutrements of battle, I do so with pride in having shared command and comradeship with the finest cross-section of American men and gallant allies--men steeled in the crucible of war. Don't underestimate the importance of your role, even when deterred by the daily and sometimes monotonous routine of duty. No enemy has ever struck where we have stood fast by our colors. Dynamic leadership, determination, and devotion to duty are the hallmarks of freedom, victory, and progress.

Today we stand here, Americans and Koreans, Thais and Turks, shoulder to shoulder. Let us never break the bonds that give us common cause in this fateful area of Asia, or to the south, or around the periphery of the free world. There is a victory for men and nations who dare and who stand with determination and courage behind bold, dynamic policies.

Faith and not fear; courage and not complacency; patriotism and not patronage; and sacrifice and not selfishness, are the guidelines to victory. We must be inspired to live but willing to die if necessary. As Horatio said at the bridge: "How can men die better than facing fearful odds; for the ashes of their fathers and the temples of their gods?" Without such courage to meet the future, we will deserve the slavery that will be ours.

We live in an era of great change that demands courage and boldness equal to that of the past but with a somewhat different approach. While the armies of Genghis-Khan swept through these valleys 700 years ago with weapons that had been in use 1500 years before and for 500 years

thereafter--principally the horse with the lance and saber--now our weapons of 70 years ago are outmoded. Even some of our newer weapons that came on station seven years ago will soon be superseded by better ones.

But steel and fire are still inadequate for victory. Behind it all is good leadership and courage steeled in the hearts of men. These are the priceless ingredients. These are the determining factors in battle, assuming other factors are in reasonable balance.

Be proud of your country and be proud of your unit. This will be easy if you begin in the most important way--by being proud of yourself. Someday, when the sound of battle has passed and the roar of artillery has been stilled, when the crackle of small arms has faded, when the blood and courage of the battlefield is but a memory--and the brotherhood of man is more than just a dream--perhaps you say, as I do, "Thank God for having known such noble men." We need more like you. Goodbye.

9.

EXTRACT OF CLOSING REMARKS
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE 1950-1951 SCHOOL YEAR

BRIG. GEN. ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU
DEPUTY COMMANDANT, ARMY WAR COLLEGE

And now, let me give you ten elements of strategy to consider in the light of the world panorama today.

1. With all due regard to the ideological aspects of, and moral values involved in the present world crisis, neither our government, nor our way of life, nor even our western civilization can be maintained without continued access to (1) the resources of the world and (2) the markets of the world.

2. The greatest threat today is Soviet-dominated Communism and its heart is in the Kremlin.

3. Since we cannot-

(1) Sustain so great a diversion of our resources and our wealth for security purposes indefinitely without seriously impairing our system and our strength; or
(2) Permit development of the tremendous manpower and resources behind the Iron Curtain indefinitely without a serious loss of resources and markets and further deterioration of the non-Communist world- a showdown before the turn of the century must be had. Every means and resource available to us must be used, including ready military strength if necessary.

4. In the present world, Russia is the acknowledged heart of the Communist octopus and all satellites, including China, are the tentacles. While slashing at the tentacles, the main thrust must be aimed at the heart.

5. Among our closest allies are the peoples of Western Europe. The most important industrial complex and power center in the world outside the USA is also in Western Europe. The life blood of European industry and trade, however is Middle East oil. For the long haul, whoever controls Middle East oil, controls Europe (Disregard temporary neutralization of Middle East oil or temporary supply to Europe from the Western Hemisphere). We must retain, or if temporarily lost regain, control of it. To this end the friendship of the Arab and Moslem worlds is most essential.

6. In view of the above, the security and defense of the Levant are vital and the situation pivots on the

Balkans, Southwest Asia and Egypt. The course of history for the next hundred years will be primarily affected by what we do or fail to do in this critical area.

7. The roll back of the Soviet can best be effected by securing Western Europe and the Mediterranean, rolling up the Balkans, continuing pressures at other points until victory is achieved and final detachment of the Ukraine and Caucasus as well as the nations of Eastern Europe.

8. The USSR must not be permitted to disintegrate, creating a vacuum, or the Yellow Peril will bring World War IV to the West.

9. China, denied direct access to any industrial complex, including Manchuria, can then be brought back to our sphere of influence.

10. World leadership by the U.S., established in a most enlightened way by resorting to the United Nations, NATO and Point 4 programs and not outmoded colonial methods, is essential to world stability and is the only alternative to world chaos.

10.

Arms Control: Noble Goal or Free World Suicide?

From a Speech Delivered at the Arms Control Symposium

Los Angeles, March 9, 1965

Since 1947 there has been a gradual movement toward arms control and disarmament. As early as 1945, the War Crimes Tribunals and "bring the boys home" hysteria signaled this movement. Or we could go back another 20 years to Litvinov's proposal to the League of Nations in 1927.

In recent years arms control has become a great national movement--or, more precisely, an international movement. The momentum of this movement has accelerated in the last two years. The impetus has come from both sides of the Iron Curtain, but for different reasons. Many respected advocates of arms control and disarmament in the United States believe that this is a road to real peace, while the Soviets use this as an effective instrument to further their goal of world domination.

A Contrast in Purposes

Indeed the United States and Soviet views of the purpose of disarmament are a study in contrast; the former being on the whole idealistic to an extreme, the latter being wholly self-serving.

The Soviet view on the purpose of disarmament is clearly shown by a very candid passage in Soviet Booklet No. 115 on disarmament written by B. Masyukedich which states: "In no way, therefore, can disarmament hinder the development of the national liberation struggle. Quite the contrary, it is precisely disarmament which will create these stable conditions of peace in which nothing will hinder its speediest triumph."

Quite obviously the Soviet definitions of the terms "stable" and "peace," as illustrated by this passage, are in stark contrast with the picture of conditions under general disarmament painted by most United States advocates.

Foundations and Government agencies, such as the Department of Defense, Department of State and The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, have opened their coffers to finance studies, publications, meetings and

seminars, costing millions of dollars. Press, propaganda and popular literary efforts have extended this movement by such novels and movies as "On the Beach," "Seven Days in May" and "Fail Safe." The public is being frightened to death by such language as "escalation," proliferation, megadeath, second strike and mutual deterrence.

The fundamental and worthy aims of Arms Control have widespread appeal. The desire to reduce the huge expenditures for armed forces and armaments is universal and understandable. Military men are no less concerned in doing this than are civilians, but must resist disarming if this is to be done at serious risk to our national security. Differences arise not in the ends, but in the means and the risks in terms of national security and the struggle to preserve the fundamental values of our civilization.

Effect on Our National Policy

Today Arms Control efforts are adversely affecting our national policy and military posture, from strategy to weapons. This influence is one of the most pervasive of all the forces at work today in restricting a more positive national policy worthy of the United States.

Many well-intentioned people believe that the risk of war can be reduced by making our forces "non-provocative." They conceive of such an establishment made up of forces which can survive a first strike and react slowly and deliberately. Hardened missile sites and overly restrictive control of tactical atomic weapons stem from this doctrine. They want to deny nuclears to other countries while curtailing our own capabilities, fearing that proliferation will increase the chances of war. Thus no Medium Range Ballistic Missiles have been built for NATO. Western Europe has been denied our assistance in developing a nuclear capability while it faces Soviet missiles, and Red China and even Indonesia forge ahead. Bombers are declared to be vulnerable weapons, only good for first strikes, and thus extremely provocative and destabilizing, so all production is ended. While a stable world environment is a worthwhile national objective, the basic and continuing ideological cleavage between the free and slave worlds makes this more ethereal than real unless human nature itself can be altered.

The very fact that recent United States disarmament proposals do not seem to require political solutions of major existing disputes as a prerequisite of disarmament demonstrates a very real danger that, in the United

States, disarmament, which is at best an idealistic approach to peace, may be becoming an end in itself. There is great peril in assuming that conditions of general and complete disarmament are synonymous with peace as we understand that term.

Secondly, the conditions of general and complete disarmament would make a pre-emptive attack more tempting. In the conflict between powers with major but demobilized war potential, any surprise move could be decisive. Therefore, the temptation of an enemy to strike first will be much stronger if the planned reduction of our stock pile from 30 to two thousand megatons is effected by the 1970s.

What Kind of Peace?

Lastly, disarmament favors those states which are better equipped to employ nonmilitary or submilitary and covert means of coercion. This gives a distinct advantage to the closed society over the open democratic society as years of cold war experience have proven.

Nor is the only danger in disarmament. We should also seriously consider whether such peace as might be established through disarmament would also protect and provide liberty and justice for other free peoples. The only peace that disarmament could provide today is peace that, even if free of overt military conflict, would force us to coexist with both continued injustice and covert revolution and struggle on every continent.

These premises may be anathema to many sincere devotees of disarmament--particularly unilateral disarmament--but the burden is theirs to dispel the serious concern most Americans have on this very delicate and difficult subject.

Let us begin with only three postulations. (We could add several more.)

1. Substantial disarmament can only take place with any acceptable degree of security in a world where Cold War or vicious covert political conflict as conducted by the Communist world has vastly diminished from what exists today. Short of this, a real "meeting of the minds" is impossible.

2. Treaties alone are inadequate guarantees as to future actions with the proven ingenuity of the human mind to

circumvent the written word or develop in secrecy weapons systems not yet conceived.

3. Bilateral agreement to "achieve parity" between the world's two most powerful nations, even if possible, would prevent timely and adequate defense by one against aggression fostered by the other in various parts of the world and completely disregards all third country problems, which are many indeed.

While many disturbing tremors and rumors have floated about for years over appeasement, accommodation, coexistence, interdependence, convergence, detente--and now controlled conflict and modernization with respect to our relations with the Communist or slave world, certain discussions and papers issued since 1960 increase the concern of many of us as to the base for disarmament negotiations and the true objectives being sought.

Influence of the Pugwash Conferences

The advocates of the World of Disarmament at the Sixth Pugwash Conference held in Moscow, Russia, three weeks after our 1960 presidential election stressed three objectives:

1. A highly centralized world government.
2. A socialist economic system.
3. A totally regimented society with a built-in, self-policing process using police and informers.

Are you skeptical? As a good citizen, you should be, particularly since this position was acceptable to a group of recognized American scientists, including some who came to occupy key policy-making positions in our national government.

Some of you may be inclined to scoff when I say that these Pugwash Conferences advocate a totally regimented society. But the late Dr. Leo Szilard--who with Cyrus Eaton and Bertrand Russell was one of the founders of the Pugwash movement--seriously proposed a worldwide Gestapo system at the eighth conference held in Vermont even more recently. Dr. Szilard emphasized the need for empowering a World Peace Court to "impose the death penalty" on anyone who even justifies war in defense of his ideals. Furthermore, he proposed that, "The Court could deputize any and all . . . citizens to execute the sentence." I'm sure you can readily see that this would only lead to disorder and chaos.

True, Dr. Szilard said that the system of worldwide control that would follow general and complete disarmament should be "aimed at securing peace with justice." But more significantly he added that "peace with justice might NOT be obtainable . . . and that we may have to choose between peace and justice. The system favors peace over justice, in cases where these two goals cannot be reconciled."

Lest you be inclined to shrug off the Pugwash Conferences are mere theorizing, I would like to point out that this movement has, to date, enjoyed unbelievable success. It may have paved the way for the Test Ban Treaty and for the United Nations resolution banning the orbiting of nuclear weapons--both seemingly desirable, but both loaded with possible fateful consequences for the future of our nation and of freedom in the world. What else have these Pugwash Conferences planted the seed for or accomplished? Have they signaled the weakening of American foreign policy supported by sufficient power to make it realistic--and credible?

Have they fostered other steps towards unilateral disarmament?

Did they initiate muzzling of the military and the continued downgrading of professional military opinion?

Did they press for reduction in the development and even procurement of new weapons systems and the cutback or elimination of some already under development?

Did they forecast the coming reduction of U.S. ground divisions to a number less than those available at the beginning of World War II? And air units to come? Or the psychological impact from the reduction of reserve forces that is likely to decrease the interest of our youth in preparing themselves to serve their country in emergency?

Did they result in the rejection of the manned bomber, Sky Bolt, Red Eye, Davy Crockett, the MRBM and other weapons systems advocated for new or continued military use?

Was such a philosophy extended in State Department Paper #7277 in September 1961? This paper proposed, you will remember, placing all armed forces and all weapons under one international organization--the United Nations. Our country could only possess weapons needed, literally, for internal police. This is the concept envisioned when

they talk about world order under world law. But who would enforce it?

Our Present Position on Peace

The proposal for general and complete disarmament, as presented by President Kennedy to the General Assembly of the UN and by our government to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, stands as the official U.S. position today as far as I know.

And how about the Phoenix papers prepared by the Institute of Defense Analysis at government expense to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1963? These studies call for parity of U.S. and Soviet military power. They advocate U.S.-Soviet unification in "near nuclear monopoly" to enforce peace. What impact does the Red Chinese nuclear--or perhaps thermonuclear--test blast have on this? If our Western European allies lack nuclear weapons when China possesses them, how can the Free World be protected and war deterred if we forfeit our present weapons superiority and accept a 1:1 ratio with the Soviet? This husband-and-wife row between Moscow and Peking is not one for us to get in the middle of. Their joint objectives to destroy us remain unchanged even though they differ as to strategy and the eventual control of the Indian sub-continent.

What "Study Fair" Recommends

If these examples aren't enough, let's get clarification on another government-funded study on disarmament entitled, "Study Fair, Volume 1." This study seeks to restrict the collection, evaluation and dissemination of accurate intelligence. It claims that there is "significant danger in information which is 'too informative.'" It states that "the loss of a third area does not always require positive action by the opponent." For instance, if Russia overran Western Europe, we need not necessarily contest it. Do you interpret our NATO commitments that way? Or even our interest in advancing a Free World?

It also advocates that we should "prevent shifts in allegiance of third areas whose prospective loss would cause the opponent to attack." For instance, we should renounce any hope for freedom from Soviet oppression for the Eastern European satellites because Russia might attack us. In short, should we abandon these people to slavery and Communism for all time?

Study Fair's recommendation of how our intelligence agencies must distort, delay or deny available information of the enemy, are astounding to me both as a former Chief of Army Intelligence and as a Combat Commander. Here are some of the actions suggested to assure the Soviets that we intend no overt hostile action under any circumstances. They say:

1. "It might be desirable to reassure the Soviets that no Polaris submarines are within firing range of the USSR; and yet we could not afford to pinpoint the location of all of them. One proposed solution is for the Soviets to be able to demand that a few submarines, of their choosing, surface and make their positions known.

2. "Automatic measures for delaying the transmission of information. Provide no data, for instance, on the current location of mobile missiles, as would a satellite equipped with television.

3. "Cessation of transmission during crises. If it did turn out that observation satellites equipped with television could provide substantial information on the location of mobile missiles, it might be desirable to be able to turn the cameras off by mutual consent, reactivating them only after the crises had passed."

How the Communists Must Be Laughing!

Soviet intelligence must be doubled up with laughter at such a concept. It is completely contrary to all human experience. To judge how far the United States may safely go in "depending upon the Soviets' word," one need only hark back two years to the Cuban missile crisis. You will recall that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko blandly lied to President Kennedy in assuring him that the USSR had no intention of installing missiles on Cuba when they were already there. If the policy recommendations set forth in Study Fair had been in effect in October 1962, the United States could have ignored verification or at least suppressed information of the missile installations. Since our Government still discounts frequently reported evidence of renewed missile activity on Cuba, this may be an indication that some of the recommendations of this study are already in effect.

Don't be deceived that these studies are merely think pieces. I've seen too many come to fruition to be fooled by this argument. They are trial balloons to establish trends and suggest policies in accord with their supposed logic.

We dare not, based on a record over these last two generations and evidenced every day throughout the world, rely merely on the Soviet word. There is a government within a government in Moscow. This is a basic point about the Communist structure that can only be ignored at dire peril. Promises or treaties made by the Soviet government are not binding on the Soviet Communist Party or the true control mechanism, the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Central Committee of the Communist Party can and does order actions through its extensive worldwide covert and overt agencies either unknown, contrary--or both--to the normal diplomatic or intelligence channels of the Soviet Government. What Kosygin says may well be the exact opposite of what Brezhnev intends to do.

The explosion of science and technology has opened doors never dreamed of a few years ago. In the nuclear field all of us, both friend and foe, are still infants. For one thing, we have no way of determining how much we don't know. More important to our security, we don't know how much our potential enemies do know, or how long it will be before--or even if--they know more than we know today.

A Nuclear Nudist Colony

I cannot accept the warped conclusion promulgated by some that since no modern defense can be completely adequate, we must accept the best disarmament terms we can negotiate. Had this criterion of absolute perfection been applied to our major weapons systems or space ventures over the past decade, we would have nothing today--not even early warning. In fact, practically nothing new has come into being in the last five years. With no defense against missiles or satellites worthy of the name, we stand forth today as the world's greatest nuclear nudist colony. Remember Russia, and perhaps even poor little Cuba, is looking down our throat today, with Red China in the background.

Recently, the Soviets displayed some new antimissile missiles. Even more recently, they demonstrated their ability to launch and land on land a manned and perhaps maneuverable satellite. If they are concentrating their current resources on the production of a weapons system by building supermegaton weapons deliverable from near-earth orbiting, maneuverable satellites, we are really facing the greatest threat that has evolved to date.

While the CIA is reported to have told Congress that the Soviets are pouring an enormous amount of resources into upgrading military weapons and hoping for a "qualitative breakthrough," defense plans still withhold a proposed \$25 billion expenditure over five years for missile and satellite defense that, by their own estimates, could save over 70 million American lives. Though I've gladly taken my battlefield risks for free, I hate to have any of us written off for about \$350 per person in these days of government largess.

Our apparent failure to press on toward even better weapons systems endangers our survival in the years ahead. I hope that within the bounds of such security as we possess, more progress is being made than is admitted publicly.

We must continue to develop and procure new weapons systems and equipment of the most advanced types conceivable. There appears to be a dangerous trend not only to reduce the research and development effort but to restrict the procurement of new equipment to even less than the annual amounts authorized and appropriated by the Congress. We may shortly be embarrassed by the appearance of enemy weapons systems superior to ours.

Strength Alone Guarantees Peace

To date, there is no alternative to the maintenance of superior military power to preserve our own freedom and repulse the thrust of Communism. Even assuming a positive foreign policy to accomplish these objectives and retain vitally needed access to the peoples, raw materials and markets of the world, it would be ineffective and worthless unless supported by enough power across the whole spectrum of possible conflict to at least make it credible and respected.

Again I must caution against those who equate the possession of power with the use of force. Possession of the former deters, and usually prevents, use of the latter when accompanied by the evident determination to use it, if necessary.

Of all the premises arms controllers should accept, I know of none more valid than this one:

The peace of the world, as far as overt conflict is concerned, has been maintained for nearly two decades primarily by the preponderant power of American arms and American industry.

Let us be sure of the soundness of any substitute before we destroy or degrade this power. We can "save," not two but up to 50 billion dollars a year on the National Budget by reducing our defense effort but if we do, we may be paying many times over in tribute and taxes to the Communist Treasury some day. If that sad day ever arrives, the Great Society will become the Ingrate Society overnight. We can neither cause the great international challenges of our time to evaporate or sweep them under the rug of domestic tranquility and complacency. Neither can we negotiate away any more of the free world without accepting a secondary power status and rejecting the basic principles that made us great.

Thus I am hopeful that, after establishing a more sound and safe base from which to proceed than is presently indicated, we may discover valid and acceptable guidelines for seeking arms control that may lead someday to the true peace for which most men and most nations yearn: cradled in the frame of a wiser civilization, lighted by the freedom and dignity of all men and roofed over by the kindly and protective hand of the Creator.



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9 February 1978

Editor
The Washington Star Newspaper
E Cap & 22nd St. S. E.,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Editor

With Lincoln's birthday again upon us, it seems appropriate to tell this story about the best known and best-loved American in Asia and the Far East.

In 1952, when I commanded the 1st Cavalry Division on Hokkaido, the northern island of Japan, I made frequent trips by rail to visit the cities and many small, isolated villages on the island.

I would get into a town with some of my staff and be met by the mayor and the local police in an effort to establish good relations with the people on Hokkaido. There were usually very large crowds of children at the station when they heard that an American General was coming through. People who had been to some of the northern villages before told me how all the kids met trains. The first time I went I took two or three boxes of candy of one kind or another, chocolate bars, gum and whatnot, but by the time I stopped at two or three stations, I found I was getting pretty depleted, so I even had to break them up into pieces.


The next time I went I brought more but it still didn't suffice so I had to think of something else to do. Each trip I would then buy 10 dollars worth of pennies, so I started out with a bag with 1,000 pennies. I still ran out on some of these trips. This shows you how many kids would come to see the train. In talking with the Japanese I found what a great love and respect they had for Abraham Lincoln so I thought, "what can I do about this?" The commissary and Post Exchange complained about a shortage of pennies to make change with so I came up with the idea of a little card, plasticized so that it wouldn't fall apart too rapidly. I decided to put Lincoln's head on the front and the reverse side of the penny on the back and print something on it in Japanese. Of course, I realized that a lot of the smaller children could not yet read Japanese.

What I decided to do with the card was to make it large enough so that on one side I could print Lincoln's Gettysburg address and on the other side print a little anecdote about Lincoln that would have a special appeal to the Japanese people. Here it is.

Very few Americans, if any, are as well known to the Japanese people, including children, as our great American President of the nineteenth century, Abraham Lincoln. This simple man of the people with his deep devotion to his country and his dedication to democratic ideals recognizing the dignity of man, equality of opportunity, and freedom of speech and religion for all men, endeared himself to all the peoples of the free world. Doctor Henry Hansen, then President of Gettysburg College, where the decisive battle of the American Civil War was fought, and where Lincoln gave his great address to the people, told me when I was at the Army War College at nearby Carlisle that in 1938, at the request of our State Department, he hosted a prominent Japanese Statesman for lunch and a visit to the Gettysburg Battlefield. Asked what he most wanted to see, his guest said, "Only the place where Abraham Lincoln stood and gave his magnificent address." Taken to the spot the Japanese Statesman bowed his head in reverence and silence. Then turning to Dr. Hansen he said with great emotion, "if only the people of the world would understand Lincoln's message." His image is on our smallest coin, the penny, the one cent, but that is where he would want it, for all the people, even the poorest, to see and remember the ideals to which he consecrated his life.

Now with the penny in bronze on this card, which was about 4 by 6 inches, Lincoln's Gettysburg address on one side and this little anecdote about the Japanese Statesman which I felt would appeal to the people on the other, I had these cards printed and plasticized knowing that if the children didn't read them, and particularly if they couldn't read them, they'd take them back so their parents would read them. This was even more meaningful and what I had in mind. I had them printed by the thousands and it was not unusual to give away a thousand or 15 hundred while I was on a week's trip through northern Hokkaido.

All through Western Pacific from Australia north to Japan, the image and the memory of Abraham Lincoln still shine as a beacon to the disadvantaged and the down trodden of what American stands for.


Arthur G. Trudeau
Lt. Gen. U.S.A. (Rtd.)

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

Very few Americans, if any, are as well known to the Japanese people, including children, as our great American President of the 19th century, Abraham Lincoln.

This simple man of the people with his deep devotion to his country and his dedication to the democratic ideals recognizing the dignity of man, equality of opportunity and freedom of speech and religion for all men, has endeared himself to all the peoples of the free world.

Dr. Hanson, President of Gettysburg College, where the decisive battle of the American Civil War was fought and where Lincoln gave his great address to the people, told me that in 1937 a prominent Japanese Statesman visited the Gettysburg battlefield. Asked what he wanted most to see, he said, "Only the place where Abraham Lincoln stood when he gave his magnificent address." Taken to the spot, the Japanese Statesman bowed his head in reverence and silence. Then, turning to Dr. Hanson, he said with great emotion, "If only the peoples of the world would understand Lincoln's message."

His image is on our smallest coin- a penny, one cent - but that is where he would want it for all the people - even the poorest - to see and remember the ideals to which he consecrated his life.

ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU
Major General, United States Army
Commanding

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